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Foreword
The main purpose of the British Documents on the End of Empire Project (BDEEP)
is to publish documents from British official archives on the ending of colonial and
associated rule and on the context in which this took place. In 1945, aside from the
countries of present-day India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Burma, Britain had over
fifty formal dependencies; by the end of 1965 the total had been almost halved and by
1985 only a handful remained. The ending of Britain’s position in these formal
dependencies was paralleled by changes in relations with states in an informal
empire. The end of empire in the period at least since 1945 involved a change also in
the empire as something that was more than the sum of its parts and as such formed
an integral part of Britain’s domestic affairs and international relations. In
publishing official British documents on the end of empire this project is, to a
degree, the successor to the two earlier series of published documents concerning
the end of British rule in India and Burma which were edited by Professors Mansergh
and Tinker respectively. The successful completion of The transfer of power and The
struggle for independence,1 both of which were based on British records, emphasised
the need for similar published collections of documents important to the history of
the final stages of Britain’s association with other dependencies in Africa, the Middle
East, the Caribbean, South-East Asia and the Pacific. These documents are crucial
research tools for scholars both from sovereign independent states which emerged
from colonial rule as well as those from Britain itself. BDEEP is also set in the much
wider context of the efforts made by successive British governments to locate
Britain’s position in an international order. Here the empire, both in its formal and
informal senses, is viewed as an instrument of the domestic, foreign and defence
policy of successive British governments. The project is therefore concerned with the
ending of colonial rule in individual territories as seen from the British side at one
level, and the broader political, economic and strategic considerations involved in
that at another.
Despite the similarities, however, BDEEP differs in significant ways from its
predecessors in terms both of presentation and content. The project is of greater
magnitude than that undertaken by Professor Mansergh for India. Four major
differences can be identified. First, the ending of colonial rule within a dependent
empire took place over a much longer period of time, extending into the final years of
the twentieth century while having its roots in the Second World War and before.
Secondly, the empire consisted of a large number of territories, varying in area,
population, wealth and in many other ways, each with its own individual problems
but often with their futures linked to those of neighbouring territories and the
1 Nicholas Mansergh et al, eds, Constitutional relations between Britain and India: the transfer of power
1942-47 12 vols (London, 1970-1983); Hugh Tinker, ed, Constitutional relations between Britain and
Burma: the struggle for independence 1944-1948 2 vols (London, 1983-1984).
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growing complexity surrounding the colonial empire. Thirdly, while for India the
documentary record for certain matters of high policy could be encapsulated within a
relatively straightforward ‘country’ study, in the case of the colonial empire the
documentary record is more diffuse because of the plethora of territories and their
scattered location. Finally, the documents relating to the ending of colonial rule are
not conveniently located within one leading department of state but rather are to be
found in several of them. As the purpose of the project is to publish documents
relating to the end of empire from the extensive range and quantity of official British
records, private collections and other categories of non-official material are not
regarded as principal documentary sources. In BDEEP, selections from non-official
material will be used only in exceptional cases to fill gaps where they exist in the
available official record. 
In recognition of these differences and also of the fact that the end of empire
involves consideration of a range of issues which operated at a much wider level than
that normally associated with the ending of colonial rule in a single country, BDEEP
is structured in two main series along with a third support series. Series A represents
the general volumes in which, for successive British governments, documents
relating to the empire as a whole are published. Series B represents the country or
territory volumes and provides territorial studies of how, from a British government
perspective, former colonies and dependencies achieved their independence and
countries which were part of an informal empire regained their autonomy. In
addition to the two main documentary series, a third series—series C—has been
published in the form of handbooks to the records of the former colonial empire
which are deposited at the National Archives (formerly the Public Record Office).
Series C consists of two volumes which form an integral part of BDEEP and also
serve as guides to the records at the National Archives. Together they enable scholars
and others wishing to follow the record of the ending of colonial rule and empire to
pursue their inquiries beyond the published record provided by the general studies in
series A and the country studies in series B. Volume one of the handbooks, a revised
and updated version of The records of the Colonial and Dominions Offices by R B
Pugh which was first published in 1964, is entitled Records of the Colonial Office,
Dominions Office, Commonwealth Relations Office and Commonwealth Office
(1995). It covers over two hundred years of activity down to 1968 when the
Commonwealth Office merged with the Foreign Office to form the Foreign and
Commonwealth Office. Volume two, entitled Records of the Cabinet, Foreign Office,
Treasury and other records (1998), focuses more specifically on twentieth-century
departmental records and also includes references to the records of inter-
departmental committees, commissions of inquiry and international organisations.
The two volumes were prepared under the direction and supervision of Dr Anne
Thurston, at the time honorary research fellow at the Institute of Commonwealth
Studies in the University of London, and more recently executive director of the
International Records Management Trust. 
In the two main series the research is organised in stages. Stage one, covering the
years 1925-1957, is now complete and consists of three general volumes and five
country volumes, collectively published in twenty-one individual parts. In series A
there are volumes on Imperial policy and colonial practice 1925-1945 in two parts
(1996), The Labour government and the end of empire 1945-1951 in four parts
(1992), and The Conservative government and the end of empire 1951-1957 in three
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parts (1994). In series B there are volumes on Ghana in two parts (1992), Sri Lanka
in two parts (1997), Malaya in three parts (1995), Egypt and the defence of the
Middle East in three parts (1998) and the Sudan in two parts (1998). Starting in
1999, the project began publishing volumes in a second stage which covers the
period 1957-1964. Here there are five volumes, a general volume on the Conservative
government and the end of empire 1957-1964 in two parts (2000), and country
volumes on the West Indies in one part (1999), Nigeria in two parts (2001), Malaysia
in one part (2004) and Kenya. Research for a third and final stage, covering the years
1964-1971, began in 2000. It consists of a general volume—East of Suez and the
Commonwealth 1964-1971—in three parts (2004) and country volumes on Central
Africa in two parts (2005), Southern Africa, the Pacific (Fiji, 2006), and the
Mediterranean (Cyprus and Malta). 
The criteria which have been used in selecting documents for inclusion in
individual volumes are explained in the introductions written by the specialist
editors. These introductions are more substantial and contextual than those in
previous series. Each volume also lists the sources searched at the National Archives.
However, it may be helpful to outline the more general guiding principles which
have been employed. BDEEP editors pursue several lines of inquiry. There is first the
end of empire in a broad high policy sense in which the empire is viewed in terms of
Britain’s position as a world power and of the inter-relationship between what
derives from this position and developments within the colonial dependencies. Here
Britain’s relations with the dependencies of the empire are set in the wider defence,
economic and foreign policy contexts of Britain’s relations with the United States,
with Europe, and with the Commonwealth and United Nations. Secondly, there is
investigation into colonial policy in its strict sense. Here the emphasis is on those
areas which were specifically—but not exclusively—the concern of the leading
department. In the period before the administrative amalgamations of the 1960s,2
the leading department of the British government for most of the dependencies was
the Colonial Office; for a minority it was either the Dominions Office and its
successor, the Commonwealth Relations Office, or the Foreign Office. Colonial policy
included questions of economic and social development, questions of governmental
institutions and constitutional structures, and administrative questions concerning
the future of the civil and public services and of the defence forces in a period of
transition from European to indigenous control. Finally there is inquiry into the
development of political and social forces within colonies, the response to these and
the transfer of governmental authority and of legal sovereignty from Britain to its
colonial dependencies as these processes were understood and interpreted by the
British government. Here it should be emphasised that the purpose of BDEEP is not
to document the history of colony politics or nationalist movements in any particular
territory. Given the purpose of the project and the nature of much of the source
material, the place of colony politics in BDEEP is conditioned by the extent to which
an awareness of local political situations played an overt part in influencing major
policy decisions made in Britain. 
Although in varying degrees and from different perspectives, elements of these
2 The Colonial Office merged with the Commonwealth Relations Office in 1966 to form the
Commonwealth Office. The Commonwealth Office merged with the Foreign Office in 1968 to form the
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.
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various lines of inquiry appear in both the general and the country series. The aim in
both is to concentrate on the British record by selecting documents which illustrate
those policy issues which were deemed important by ministers and officials at the
time. General volumes do not normally treat in any detail of matters which will be
fully documented in the country volumes but some especially significant documents
do appear in both series. The process of selection involves an inevitable degree of
sifting and subtraction. Issues which in retrospect appear to be of lesser significance
or to be ephemeral have been omitted. The main example concerns the extensive
quantity of material devoted to appointments and terms of service—salaries,
gradings, allowances, pension rights and compensation—within the colonial and
related services. It is equally important to stress certain negative aspects of the
official documentary record. Officials in London were sometimes not in a position to
address potentially significant issues because the information was not available.
Much in this respect depended on the extent of the documentation sent to London by
the different colonial administrations. Once the stage of internal self-government
had been reached, or where there was a dyarchy, the flow of detailed local
information to London began to diminish. 
Selection policy has been influenced by one further factor, namely access to the
records at the National Archives. Unlike the India and Burma series and the current
Foreign and Commonwealth Office series of Documents on British Policy Overseas
(DBPO), BDEEP is not an official project. In practice this means that while editors
have privileged access (in the form of research facilities and requisitioning
procedures) to the records at the National Archives, they do not have unrestricted
access. For files which at the time a volume is in preparation are either subject to
extended closures beyond the statutory thirty years or retained in the originating
department under section 3(4) of the Public Records Act of 1958, editors are subject
to the same restrictions as all other researchers. Apart from cases where files or
series of files are withheld, official weeding processes now tend to remove sentences
or paragraphs from public view, rather than the whole document; such omissions are
indicated in footnotes. To date access has not impeded the research undertaken by
the project to any significant degree, and the project has been successful in securing
the release of a number of hitherto withheld documents from the Historical Section
of the Cabinet Office and the Records and Historical Department of the Foreign and
Commonwealth Office. 
A thematic arrangement of the documents has been adopted for the general
volumes in series A. The country volumes in series B follow a chronological
arrangement; in this respect they adopt the same approach as was used in the India
and Burma series. For each volume in both series A and B a summary list of the
documents included is provided. The headings to BDEEP documents, which have
been editorially standardised, present the essential information. Together with the
sequence number, the file reference (in the form of the call-up number at the
Archives and any internal pagination or numeration) and the date of the document
appear on the first line.3 The second and subsequent lines record the subject of the
document, the type of document (letter, memorandum, telegram etc), the originator
3 The call-up number at the Archives precedes the comma in the references cited. In the case of documents
from FO 371, the major Foreign Office political class, the internal numeration refers to the jacket number
of the file.
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(person or persons, committee, department) and the recipient (if any). A subject
entry in a heading in single quotation marks denotes the title of a document as it
appears in the original. An entry in square brackets denotes a subject indicator
composed by the editor. This latter device has been employed in cases where no title
is given in the original or where the original title is too unwieldy to reproduce in its
entirety. Security classifications and, in the case of telegrams, times of despatch and
receipt, have generally been omitted. In the headings to documents and the contents
lists, ministers are identified by the name of the office-holder, not the title of the
office (ie, Mr Lennox-Boyd, not secretary of state for the colonies).4 In the same
contexts, officials are identified by their initials and surname. In general volumes and
where appropriate, ambassadors, governors, high commissioners and other embassy
or high commission staff are cited in the form Sir D Jakeway (Fiji). Footnotes to
documents appearing below the rule are editorial; those above the rule, or where no
rule is printed, are part of the original document. Each volume provides an initial
summary list of which principal offices were held by whom, and a separate series of
biographical notes (at the end) for major figures who appear in the documents. Other
figures are identified in editorial footnotes on the occasion of first appearance.
Link-notes, written by the volume editor and indented in square brackets between
the heading and the beginning of a document, are often used to explain the context
of a document. Technical detail or extraneous material has been extracted from a
number of documents. In such cases omission dots have been inserted in the text and
the document is identified in the heading as an extract. Occasional omission dots
have also been used to excise purely mechanical chain-of-command executive
instructions and some redundant internal referencing has been removed, though
much of it remains in place, for the benefit of researchers. No substantive material
relating to policy-making has been excised from the documents. In general the aim
has been to reproduce documents in their entirety but where available space is a
major constraint on editors, a consideration which applies particularly in the case of
general volumes, where the documentation is voluminous, this is not always
possible, and some purely factual information may be omitted. It must also be
emphasised in this context that the BDEEP volumes do not remove the necessity for
researchers to study the original records themselves. The footnote reference ‘not
printed’ is used only in cases where a specified enclosure or an annex to a document
has not been included. Unless a specific cross-reference or note of explanation is
provided, however, it can be assumed that other documents referred to in the text of
the documents included have not been reproduced. Obvious typing errors in the
original are in the main silently corrected, but abbreviations and contractions stand.
Each volume has a list of abbreviations together with a consolidated index, and
country volumes include a chronology of principal events.
One radical innovation, compared with previous Foreign Office or India and Burma
series, is that BDEEP reproduces many more minutes by ministers and officials.
Crown copyright material is used by permission of the National Archives under
licence from the Controller of Her Majesty’s Stationery Office. All references and
dates are given in the form recommended in guidelines from the National Archives.
* * * *
4 This is an editorial convention, following DBPO practice. Very few memoranda issued in their name were
actually written by ministers themselves, but normally drafted by officials.
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Formally launched in 1987, BDEEP has been based since its inception at the
Institute of Commonwealth Studies. The work of the project is supervised by a
Project Committee chaired by Professor Andrew Porter, Rhodes professor of imperial
history in the University of London. Professor Porter succeeded Professor Anthony
Low, formerly Smuts professor of the history of the Commonwealth in the University
of Cambridge, who retired in November 1994. Professor Michael Crowder became the
first general editor while holding a visiting professorship in the University of London
and a part-time position at Amherst College, Massachusetts. Following his untimely
death in 1988, Professor Crowder was replaced as general editor by Professor David
Murray, pro vice-chancellor and professor of government at the Open University,
who played a critical role in establishing a secure financial base for the project and in
negotiating contracts with the volume editors and the publisher. His invaluable
advice and expertise in dealing with the early manuscripts are acknowledged with
particular gratitude. Mrs Anita Burdett was appointed as project secretary and
research assistant. She was succeeded in September 1989 by Dr Stephen Ashton who
previously worked with Professors Mansergh and Tinker during the final stages of
the India and Burma series. Dr Ashton replaced Professor Murray as project director
and general editor in 1993. 
The project benefited from an initial pump-priming grant from the British
Academy. Thanks are due to the secretary and Board of the Academy for this grant
and for the decision of the British Academy to adopt BDEEP as one of its major
projects. The Academy made further awards in 1996 and 2005. The Managers of the
Smuts Memorial Fund in the University of Cambridge are also to be acknowledged.
They made possible the workshop from which the project developed and they have
since provided a further grant for work on two of the stage two volumes. The
principal funding for the project in stages one and two has been provided by the
Leverhulme Trust, and the early volumes are a tribute to the support provided by the
Trustees. For the third and final stage 2000–2005, BDEEP has been the beneficiary of
a major research award from the Arts and Humanities Research Board. In making
the award the AHRB made generous reference to the value of BDEEP, and the project
is grateful for this support. 
Members of the Project Committee, who meet annually at the Institute of
Commonwealth Studies, have provided valuable advice and much needed encour-
agement. Professor Low, the first chairman of the Committee, made a singular con-
tribution, initiating the first exploratory meeting at Cambridge in 1985 and
presiding over subsequent developments in his customary constructive but unob-
trusive manner. Professor Porter continues in a similar vein and his leadership and
experience are much appreciated by the general editor. The director and the staff of
the Institute of Commonwealth Studies have provided administrative support. The
editors of volumes in both stages one have benefited considerably from the
researches undertaken by Dr Anne Thurston and her assistants which resulted in
the publication of the two handbooks. Although BDEEP is not an official project,
the general editor wishes to acknowledge the support and co-operation received
from the Historical Section of the Cabinet Office and the Historical and Records
Department of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. He wishes also to record his
appreciation of the spirit of friendly co-operation received from the editors of
DBPO. Dr Ronald Hyam, editor in stage one of the general volume on the post-war
Labour government and co-editor of the stage two volume on the Conservative
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government, played an important role in the compilation of the house-style adopted
by BDEEP and his contribution is acknowledged with gratitude. Thanks also are
due to The Stationery Office for assuming publishing responsibility and for their
expert advice on matters of design and production. Last, but by no means least, the
contribution of the chief executive and keeper of the records and the staff, both
curatorial and administrative, at the National Archives must be emphasised.
Without the facilities and privileges afforded to BDEEP editors at the National
Archives, the project would not be viable.
S R Ashton
November 2005
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PFP (Committee on) Future Policy in the Pacific
PhD Doctor of Philosophy
PM prime minister
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Principal Holders of Offices 1955–1970
UNITED KINGDOM
1. Ministers
(a) Conservative governments to October 19641
Prime minister (Sir) W L S Churchill2 (26 Oct 1951–
5 Apr 1955)
Sir Anthony Eden (6 Apr 1955–
9 Jan 1957)
Mr M H Macmillan (10 Jan 1957–
13 Oct 1963)
Sir Alec Douglas-Home3 (18 Oct 1963–
16 Oct 1964
S of S colonies Mr A T Lennox-Boyd (28 July 1954)
Mr I Macleod (14 Oct 1959)
Mr R Maudling (9 Oct 1961)
Mr D E Sandys4 (13 July 1962)
Parliamentary under-secretary of Mr J Amery (28 Nov 1958)
state for colonies5 Mr H Fraser (28 Oct 1960)
Mr N Fisher (16 July 1962–24 Oct 1963)
(b) Labour governments Oct 1964-June 19706
Prime minister Mr J H Wilson (16 Oct 1964–
19 June 1970)
S of S colonies Mr A Greenwood (16 Oct 1964)
under Commonwealth Lord Longford (23 Dec 1965)
affairs from1 Aug 19667 Mr F Lee (6 Apr 1966)
1 Elected 1951, re-elected 1955. Ministers in the Conservative government elected in June 1970 are
identified in footnotes to the documents.
2 Knighted 24 Apr 1953.
3 Formerly Earl of Home.
4 Office held jointly with S of S Commonwealth relations.
5 Junior minister, not in Cabinet. This is not a full list; only those of relevance to Fiji are listed here. Office
held jointly between CO and CRO from 21 Oct 1963.
6 Re-elected  Mar 1966.
7 Office of S of S colonies discontinued Jan 1967.
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S of S Commonwealth affairs8 Mr A G Bottomley (16 Oct 1964)
(previously Commonwealth Mr H W Bowden (11 Aug 1966)
relations) from 1 Aug 1966 Mr G R Thomson (29 Aug 1967)
S of S foreign and Commonwealth Mr M M Stewart (16 Mar 1968) 
affairs (previously foreign
affairs) from 17 Oct 1968
Parliamentary under-secretary of Mrs Eirene White (Oct 1964–Apr 1966)
state for colonies9
Minister of state, Commonwealth Lord Shepherd (July 1967–June 1970)
Office/Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office10
2. Civil servants
(a) Colonial Office
(i) Permanent under-secretary Sir Thomas Lloyd (1947–1956)
of state Sir John Macpherson (1956–1959)
Sir Hilton Poynton (1959–1966)
(ii) Deputy under-secretary Sir Charles Jeffries (1947–1956)
of state Sir Hilton Poynton (1948–1959)   joint
Sir John Martin (1956–1965) 
Sir William Gorell Barnes (1959–1963)
(ii) Assistant under-secretary Sir John Martin (Pacific, 1955–1956)
of state11 P Rogers (Pacific, 1957–1959)
A R Thomas (Pacific & Indian Ocean, 
1960–1963)
Trafford Smith (Pacific & Indian Ocean, 
1964–1966)
(iii) Assistant secretary12 H P Hall (1955–1962)
J E Marnham (1962–1964)
A J Fairclough (1964–1966)
8 Office discontinued 17 Oct 1968.
9 Junior minister, not in Cabinet. This is not a full list.
10 Junior minister, not in Cabinet. Not a full list.
11 Whose supervisory responsibilities included the Pacific or the Pacific & Indian Ocean Depts.
12 Head of Pacific/Pacific & Indian Ocean Depts.
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(b) Commonwealth Office from 1 Aug 1966
(i) Permanent under-secretary Sir Saville Garner13 (1966–1968)
of state & head of Diplomatic Sir Morrice James (1968)
Service, 1965–1968
(ii) Deputy under-secretary (Sir) Arthur Galsworthy14 (1966–1968)
of state & head of Dependent 
Territories Division
(iii) Assistant under-secretary Trafford Smith (1966–1968)
of state, responsible for 
Pacific & Indian Ocean Dept
(iv) Head of Pacific & Indian A J Fairclough (1967–1968)
Ocean Dept
(c) Foreign and Commonwealth Office from 17 Oct 1968
(iv) Permanent under-secretary Sir Paul Gore Booth (1965–1969)
of state and head of Sir Denis Greenhill (1969–1973)
Diplomatic Service from 1968
(v) Deputy under-secretary Sir Arthur Galsworthy (1968–1969)
of state Sir Leslie Monson (1969–1970)
(vi) Assistant under-secretary J C Morgan (1968–1970)
of state, responsible for 
Pacific & Indian Ocean Dept
(iv) Head of Pacific & Indian T C Jerrom (1968–1969)
Ocean Dept Miss E J Emery (1969–1970)
FIJI
1. Governor Sir Ronald Garvey (Oct 1952–Oct 1958)
Sir Kenneth Maddocks (Oct 1958–
Jan 1964)
Sir Derek Jakeway (Jan 1964–Dec 1968)
Sir Robert Foster (Dec 1968–Oct 1970)
2. Colonial secretary A F R Stoddart (1949–1957)
P D Macdonald (1957–1966)
13 Permanent secretary at the CRO, 1962-1966.
14 Knighted 1967.
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3. Chief secretary G P Lloyd (1966–1970)
4. Financial secretary H W Davidson (1952–1958)
E R Bevington (1958–1961)
H P Ritchie (1962–1967)
5. Secretary for Fijian affairs G K Roth (1954–1957)
(and local government C R H Nott ((1957–1959)
from 1964) A C Reid (1959–1965)
Ratu P K Ganilau (1965–1967)
6. Members (appointed) from Ratu K K T Mara (natural resources) 
July 1964 J N Falvey (communications and works)
A D Patel (social services)
7. Members after 1966 election Ratu K K T Mara (leader of government
(all Alliance Party) business, natural resources)
Ratu Edward Cakobau (trade, industry, 
tourism)
Vijay Raghubar Singh (social services)
C A Stinson (communications and works)
8. Ministers Sept 1967–1968 Ratu K K T Mara (chief minister)
H P Ritchie (finance)
Ratu P K Ganilau (minister for Fijian 
affairs and local government)
Ratu Edward Cakobau (commerce, 
industry and tourism)
Vijay Raghubar Singh (social services)
C A Stinson (communications and works)
J N Falvey (minister without portfolio)
D W Brown (natural resources)
9 . Ministers 1968–1970 Ratu (Sir) Kamisese Mara15 (chief 
minister)
H P Ritchie (finance)
Ratu Edward Cakobau (commerce, 
industry and labour)
CA Stinson (communications, works and 
tourism)
J N Falvey (minister without portfolio)
Ratu P K Ganilau (minister for Fijian 
affairs and local government)
Vijay Raghubar Singh (social services) 
D W Brown (natural resources)
15 Knighted 1969.
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Assistant Ministers
K S Reddy, (social services, No 1)
J Mavoa (natural resources)
Ratu D Toganivalu (communications, 
works and tourism)
E Vuakatagane (social services, No 2)
P D Naqasima (commerce, industry and 
labour)
10. Leader of the Opposition A D Patel (1966-1969)
S M Koya (1969-1970)
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Chronological Table of Principal Events
1958
Oct Sir Kenneth Maddocks appointed governor of Fiji
1959
Apr Report by O H K Spate on the Economic Problems and Prospects of the
Fijian People published
Sept Ratu George Cakobau installed as Vunivalu (paramount chief) and
traditional leader of Fijian people, the first such ceremony since 1835
when his great grandfather, Ratu Seru Cakobau, was installed. Seru
Cakobau ceded Fiji to the United Kingdom
Dec Strike in Suva involving Wholesale and Retail General Workers’ Union
and Shell Oil and Vacuum Oil companies, leading to riot and looting and
causing much concern to the authorities
1960
Jan–Feb Alan Lennox-Boyd (later Viscount Boyd) visits Fiji
Feb Report of the Burns Commission into the Natural Resources and
Population Trends of Fiji published
April Fijian Stevedores’ Union, the first of many exclusively racial (Fijian) trade
unions, formed in the aftermath of the 1959 strike to discourage the
formation of multi-racial trade unions
May–Oct Strike in the sugar industry
Aug Council of Chiefs’ offer to government to help break the strike in the
sugar industry, causing racial tension
Sept Council of Chiefs’ opposition to Burns Commission’s recommendation to
abolish the separate system of often moribund Fijian Administration
Sept Establishment of Public Services Commission to advise governor on staff
matters including appointments and promotions.
Oct Parliamentary under-secretary of state for colonies, Julian Amery, visits
Fiji on a familiarisation tour
Dec Sir Malcolm Trustram Eve appointed chairman of the inquiry into the
strike in the sugar industry, assisted by C J M Bennett and J S Wheatley
1961
Mar Hearings before the Eve Commission into the sugar industry strike
Feb Fiji government announces proposals for constitutional reform
Apr Legislative Council debate on Fiji government’s proposals for
constitutional reform
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Aug Land Development Authority established to carry out projects for the
development, improvement and settlement of land, including giving
loans to local farmers to assist in increasing production.
Sept Publication of Sir Malcolm Trustram Eve’s Report of the Fiji Sugar
Inquiry Commission
Nov New Letters Patent published increasing the size of the number of
unofficial members in the Legislative Council (from 15–18), introduction
of universal adult suffrage, enfranchising women
Dec Legislative Council debate on the government’s proposal for
constitutional change, expressing Fijian disapproval
1962
Jan South Pacific Sugar Mills established as a wholly owned subsidiary of the
Colonial Sugar Refining Company, in response to a recommendation of
the Eve Commission
Jan Sugar Advisory Council comprising representatives of growers and
millers established, following a recommendation of the Eve Commision
Mar Fijian Association changes its name to Fijian People’s United Party ‘in
keeping with the present trends’
Mar Fijian newspaper Nai Lalakai published for the first time.
Aug Fiji Public Employees and Workers Union formed, open to all races
except Indians.
Oct Budget address by governor on constitutional advance for Fiji
1963
Jan Parliamentary under-secretary of state for colonies, Nigel Fisher, visits
Fiji
Jan Presentation to Fisher of the ‘Wakaya Letter’ outlining Fijian
preconditions for constitutional change
Apr Formation of the Fijian Democratic Party by Fijian dissident Apisai
Mohammed Tora.
Apr General elections
June Formation of the Federation Party (its constitution was formally adopted
in June 1964)
Aug Opening of the first South Pacific Games in Suva
Dec Opening of COMPAC, the new Pacific cable, giving continuous telephone
service between Fiji, New Zealand, Australia, Canada, the United
Kingdom and Europe.
1964
Jan Sir Derek Jakeway appointed governor of Fiji
July Introduction of the membership system: Ratu Mara (natural resources),
A D Patel (social services), J N Falvey (communications and works)
Nov Renewed UN General Assembly debate on Fiji, with a resolution calling
on UK to ‘take immediate steps to hand over power unconditionally to
the people of Fiji’
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Nov Close down of the Royal New Zealand Air Force base at Laucala Bay in
Suva. The premises later became the founding campus of the University
of the South Pacific.
1965
Jan Formation of the National Congress of Fiji, principally an Indian political
party opposed to A D Patel’s Federation Party
Jan Meeting of the Fijian Association expressing Fijian views about
constitutional change; adoption of a new constitution; formation of
branches throughout Fiji
Mar Trafford Smith from CO visits Fiji
Apr Eirene White, parliamentary under-secretary of State for the colonies,
arrives in Fiji to ascertain views of the people in relation to forthcoming
constitutional conference in London
Apr Sudden termination of pre-London constitutional talks in Suva among
principal Fijian, Indian and European leaders when confidential issues
are leaked to the media
June Council of Chiefs expresses the view that the goal of the London
conference should not be independence but strengthening links with the
Crown.
July–Aug Fiji constitutional conference at Marlborough House
July Debate on Fiji at UN Committee of 24; resolution in favour of a fact-
finding mission
Dec UN General Assembly debate on Fiji, approving a resolution asking UK
government ‘as a matter of urgency to repeal all discriminatory laws in
Fiji and to establish an unqualified system of democratic representation
on the basis of one man, one vote’
Dec Formation of All-Fiji Muslim Political Front to protect Muslim rights and
to demand separate representation in the Legislative Council
1966
Mar Formal launch of the Alliance Party, comprising the Fijian Association,
Suva Rotuman Association, All-Fiji Muslim Political front, Chinese
Association, National Congress of Fiji, General Electors Association, Fiji
Minority Party, Rotuman Convention, and Tongan Association
July Liquor Bill is passed in the Legislative Council removing race and gender 
restrictions on the consumption of alcohol in Fiji, one among many bills 
dismantling racial discrimination in the colony
Aug Secretary of state for the colonies, Fred Lee, visits Fiji on a
familiarisation tour
Aug Fiji National Provident Fund established
Sept General elections; victory for the Alliance Party, election of Ratu Mara as
Leader of Government Business, A D Patel leader of the Opposition
Dec UN General Assembly votes 76 to 6, with 17 abstentions to send a fact-
finding mission to Fiji and calls on UK to ‘grant independence to Fiji
without delay’
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1967
Feb Secretary of state for Commonwealth affairs, Herbert Bowden, visits Fiji
Apr Officials from US, UK, Australia and New Zealand meet in Washington
and recommend political solutions for Pacific territories stopping short
of independence
June Ratu Mara visits London for talks at Commonwealth Office in connection
with EEC issues and holds talks on political developments in Fiji
Aug UK government rejects United Nations General Assembly’s proposal for a 
Visiting Mission
Sept Introduction of full ministerial system, with Ratu Mara as Chief Minister
Sept Federation Party walks out of the Legislative Council in protest against
the conduct of the Alliance government and the constitution
1968
Jan Independence of Nauru
Feb The University of the South Pacific opens at Laucala Bay, Suva.
May Commonwealth Office meeting with Ratu Mara on the future of
expatriate civil servants and general development needs of Fiji
May Commonwealth Office meeting with P N Kaul, India House
Aug Apisai Tora’s National Democratic Party seeks merger with the
Federation Party, leading the following year to the creation of the
National Federation Party
Aug Commonwealth Office meeting with governor-designate Sir Robert Foster
Sept By-elections return the Federation Party to the Legislative Council with
increased majority causing racial tension
Sept Fijian rallies throughout Viti Levu against the Federation Party, with
calls to deport its leaders and not to renew leases to Indian tenant
Nov Address of Loyalty to Her Majesty the Queen by the Council of Chiefs on
matters concerning the Fijian people
Dec Private talks between Ratu Mara and A D Patel on prospects for future
constitutional developments
Dec Sir Robert Foster appointed governor of Fiji
1969
Jan Ratu Mara knighted, the second Fijian after Ratu Sir Lala Sukuna
May Ratu Mara visits FCO for talks on constitutional matters and on the
implications for Fiji’s sugar industry of the possibility of the United
Kingdom joining the European Economic Community
July Announcement that Lord Denning, master of rolls, will chair arbitration
commission to decide the terms and conditions of the contract between
the sugar cane farmers and the South Pacific Sugar Mills Limited;
hearings begin in August
Aug K C Ramrakha, general secretary of Federation Party, visits FCO for talks
Aug First of the confidential meetings between the Alliance and the National
Federation Party in preparation for the next constitutional conference
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Sept Appointment of the Fiji Education Commission to enquire into the
system of education in Fiji and to make recommendations about future
policy
Oct Leader of the National Federation Party and of the Indian community A D
Patel dies
Oct S M Koya elected new leader of the Opposition
Oct–Nov Visit from FCO of Sir Leslie Monson and Miss E Emery to Fiji for talks
with leaders of the National Federation and Alliance parties and
representatives of the Fiji civil service
Oct UK again rejects the proposal by the United Nations General Assembly to
send Visiting Mission
Nov Alliance and the National Federation Party agree on dominion status for
Fiji
1970
Jan Announcement of visit to Fiji by Lord Shepherd, minister of state, FCO
Feb Meeting in Suva between Lord Shepherd and Ratu Mara and
representatives of the Council of Chiefs
Mar FCO meeting with representatives of the Colonial Sugar Refining
Company
Apr–May Fiji independence conference at Marlborough House
May Ratu Mara and S M Koya visit New York
Aug FCO meeting with Ratu Mara and SM Koya regarding UK negotiations to
join the EEC
Oct Fiji independence
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The Foreign Office and the Foreign Office documents
In his Christmas message to the people of Fiji, Governor Sir Kenneth Maddocks
described 1961 as a year of ‘peaceful progress’.1 The memory of industrial disturbance
and a brief period of rioting and looting in Suva in 1959 was rapidly fading.2 The
nascent trade union movement, multi-ethnic in character, which had precipitated the
strike, was beginning to fracture along racial lines. The leading Fijian chiefs, stunned
at the unexpectedly unruly behaviour of their people, warned them against associat-
ing with people of other races, emphasising the importance of loyalty to the Crown
and respect for law and order.3 The strike in the sugar industry, too, was over. Though
not violent in character, the strike had caused much damage to the colony’s economy
dependent on sugar, bitterly split the Indian community, and polarised the political
atmosphere.4 A commission of enquiry headed by Sir Malcolm Trustram Eve (later
Lord Silsoe) was appointed to investigate the causes of the dispute and to recommend
a new contract between the growers, predominantly Indians, and the monopoly miller,
the Australian Colonial Sugar Refining Company (CSR). The recommendations of the
1959 Burns Commission, as it came to be known after its chairman, the former gov-
ernor of the Gold Coast (Ghana), Sir Alan Burns, into the natural resources and pop-
ulation of Fiji, were being scrutinised by the government.5 The construction of roads,
bridges, wharves, schools, hospital buildings, and water supply schemes was moving
apace. Maddocks had good reason to hope for ‘peaceful progress’.
Rather more difficult was the issue of political reform but the governor’s message
announced that constitutional change would be introduced. The existing
constitution, in place since 1937, had been overtaken by immense social, economic
and demographic change in the post-war years.6 The international climate too had
changed during this time. Former colonies in Asia and Africa had gained, or were in
the process of gaining, independence.7 Harold Macmillan’s ‘wind of change’ was
gaining momentum everywhere. After Hong Kong, Fiji was Britain’s most important
colonial dependency in the East Asia–Pacific region. Whitehall was keen to avoid
being overtaken by events. It hoped to lead Fiji to internal self-government perhaps
over a decade of cautious, gradual change. The constitutional settlement aimed at
had to be broadly acceptable to all the people of the colony as well as to the
international community, but especially to the indigenous Fijians for reasons that
will become clear shortly. The governor informed the Legislative Council that its size
would be increased from 15 to 18 unofficial members, consisting of 6 Europeans, 6
Fijians and 6 Indians. Four members of each community would be elected from
separate communal rolls and two nominated by the governor. In the case of Fijians,
the two members would be chosen by the Great Council of Chiefs. The number of
official members would be 19. Women would be enfranchised for the first time and
property qualification for voters would be abolished. The government hoped for a
slow but steady start to assuage the fears and anxieties of all the segments of Fiji’s
society.
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But therein lay the problem that would preoccupy both Suva and London for the
rest of the decade, until Fiji finally gained independence in 1970. Fiji was a colony
not of ‘one people’ but of three separate ethnic groups, each with its own distinctive
understanding of its interests and aspirations in the broad scheme of things, its own
distinctive historical experience and economic circumstance.8 For one group, the
Indians,9 the pace of change was not rapid enough. They rejected the premises which
underpinned the racially-ordered political structure that Suva proposed and London
reluctantly acquiesced in, and wanted it replaced with one that was racially neutral.
In other words, they wanted a common roll system of voting, not communal.
Further, they saw any constitutional advance towards greater internal self-
governance as leading inevitably desirably to full independence in the not too distant
future. If Western Samoa could become independent in 1962 and the Cook Islands
attain full internal self-government in free association with New Zealand in 1965,
why not Fiji, they argued, somewhat misleadingly as Fiji, by virtue of its history and
demography, was unique in the Pacific.
This view was rejected by both the Europeans and Fijians. They insisted on the full
and complete retention of the racial system of voting and guaranteed equal political
representation for the three main groups, irrespective of population size. This
guaranteed representation, it was feared, would be jeopardised in an open, non-racial
system of voting, which, in their view, would lead to uncertainty and unrestrained
competition for power. Since Indians were the majority community, an open, racially
neutral system would lead to ‘Indian domination’. That outcome would be
unpalatable at any cost, a sure recipe for disaster, perhaps even racial violence.
Furthermore, Fijians and Europeans did not want links with the British Crown
severed. They saw no reason to. Unlike the Indians, they wanted them strengthened
instead.
London’s dilemma was thus starkly defined. The prospect of independence could
not be ignored however much significant numbers of Fijians and Europeans opposed
it. Nor could the United Kingdom government ignore the increasingly insistent and
sometimes politically embarrassing demands for decolonisation from the United
Nations Committee of 24.10 Western Samoa’s independence from New Zealand in
1962 was followed by that of tiny Nauru, from Australia, in 1968.11 By the mid-1960s,
the question was not whether Fiji would become independent. That was a foregone
conclusion. Indeed, as one commentator has observed, the paradox of decolonisation
in Fiji was ‘underlined by British attempts, throughout the 1960s, to encourage the
growth of representative political organisations likely to responsibly contest office
and hasten decolonisation’.12
The real and the most fraught question was on what—or whose—terms. The
Colonial Office acknowledged both the substance and the logic of the non-racial
argument, and accepted the imperative to create, as far as possible, political
institutions which were based on ideology, not race. But its hands were tied. Officials
had a prudent appreciation of the strength and character of the Fijian opposition to
any change that might unwittingly give the impression of derogating from their
privileged position in the colony. Fijians constituted the overwhelming majority of
the colony’s armed forces, a key fact that could not be ignored, or ignored at the
government’s peril. Moreover, there were many influential officials both in London
and in Suva who felt a keen sense of moral responsibility to hand the colony back to
the people, the indigenous Fijians, who had ceded it to Queen Victoria in the first
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place and who had throughout, in war and in peace, remained steadfastly loyal and
respectful to the Crown.
This volume of documents attempts to present as full an account as possible of the
political dilemmas facing both Suva and London in deciding the future course of
Fiji’s constitutional evolution, and chronicles the ideas, issues, assumptions,
understandings and internal debates that determined policy. Several points need to
be emphasised. The documents portray the concerns and priorities of the United
Kingdom government, informed closely as they were by regular reports from Fiji.
There was broad agreement among top policy makers but by no means complete
consensus on all major issues in dispute. On the contrary, these records show how
widely divergent sometimes the views were and how, over time, they were developed
through several exchanges into a coherent policy. Nor was there unanimity of
opinion between London and the Governor’s Office over what the most appropriate
course of action might be. London listened and consulted closely with the governor,
paid close attention to his assessment of the situation on the ground, and sought his
opinion and even initiative on important matters. There were no matters of
constitutional significance on which the governor was not consulted, although his
views were refined or modified—sometimes rejected even—in the light of the wider
experience in London.
A typical way in which policy was developed might follow this pattern. The
governor would inform London of a particular issue or problem he had under
consideration. This might be communicated through a despatch, letter or a
telegram. It was sent after the governor had full consultation with his senior advisors
whose opinions guided but did not necessarily confine the governor to a particular
course of action or line of thought. On political or constitutional matters, the
recipient in Whitehall was invariably the head of the Pacific and Indian Ocean
Department at, successively, the CO (to 1966 when the head was an assistant
secretary), which then merged with the Commonwealth Relations Office to form the
Commonwealth Office (1966–1968), which in turn merged with the Foreign Office to
form the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (from October 1968). At the Colonial
Office, the communication would be the subject of internal debate or discussion
through a series of internal departmental minutes and meetings. Other CO
departments, or other government departments outside the CO, were brought in
when needed. Within the CO the discussion proceeded up a chain of command, to a
supervising assistant under-secretary responsible for several departments, including
the Pacific and Indian Ocean, and then, on matters of the highest importance, to the
permanent under-secretary, the senior CO official.
Ministerial involvement with Fiji’s affairs was usually conducted at a level beneath
that of secretary of state. While some secretaries of state visited Fiji as part of wider
Pacific tours (Fred Lee from the CO in 1966 and Herbert Bowden from the
Commonwealth Office in 1967), in London it was more usual for junior ministers—
specifically the parliamentary under-secretary of state at the CO, and the minister of
state at the Commonwealth Office and then FCO—to take responsibility for Fiji.
Junior ministers were also visitors to Fiji. Julian Amery’s 1960 visit as parliamentary
under-secretary at the CO had significant long-term political consequences. Other
junior ministers playing important but lesser roles were Nigel Fisher and Eirene
White in 1963 and 1965 respectively, both as parliamentary under-secretaries at the
CO, and Lord Shepherd, minister of state at the FCO. Shepherd was especially
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important at the time of Fiji’s independence, visiting the colony shortly beforehand
and presiding over the independence conference in London. Only rarely did
secretaries of state become involved with Fiji, a reflection it must be said of where
Fiji ranked in UK priorities. Although Fiji was by some distance the most important
of the UK’s Pacific possessions, possessing what London viewed as an acute and
potentially dangerous racial problem, it was still, by contrast with other territories
(Aden and British Guiana for example) relatively peaceful. To the extent that
secretaries of state involved themselves, it was usually in the context of where Fiji
stood in relation to UK policy towards the remaining dependent territories as a
group. Communications were often sent back to Suva in the name of the secretary of
state but junior ministers and senior officials were the real policy makers. Other
Cabinet ministers were hardly ever brought in, although, as was always the case prior
to independence, Fiji had to be placed on the agenda of the Cabinet’s influential
Defence and Oversea Policy Committee. And policy towards Fiji did not change with
a change of government in the UK. The Fiji policies of the Conservative
governments, to October 1964, and then from June 1970 to independence in October
of the same year, and the Labour governments between 1964 and 1970 (a second
election in 1966 gave Labour an increased majority) were indistinguishable.
Once a policy was communicated to the governor, and if the subject involved
significant constitutional change, an outline text was published, in London as a
white paper. These and their Suva counterparts are widely available and they are not
reproduced here. Almost all the documents included in the selection are
unpublished. The emphasis in them is political and constitutional, concerning issues
relating to the constitutional evolution of Fiji. Legal, economic and other documents
relating to the development of Fiji are included only in so far as they illuminate the
larger debate about constitutional developments. Further dimensions represented
are the international and regional contexts.13 Fiji played an increasingly significant
part in UN debates about colonialism in the 1960s, and the Government of India in
New Delhi was more than just an interested spectator in Fiji’s affairs.14 Whitehall
believed it important where possible to co-ordinate policy towards Fiji’s political
future with the policies of other colonial powers in the Pacific, notably the United
States, Australia and New Zealand, towards their own dependencies. France was
regarded as an outsider in this respect. The emphasis on political and constitutional
issues reflects the preponderance of material on such matters in the official UK
records. Overwhelmingly the documents are drawn from two main classes at The
National Archives: CO 1036, the records of the Colonial Office and Commonwealth
Office from the Pacific and Indian Ocean Department, 1952–1967, and FCO 32, the
successor Pacific and Indian Ocean Department of the Commonwealth Office and
FCO from 1967 to 1974.
This volume focuses on the period 1960–1970. The last date selects itself: Fiji
became independent that year. With independence, Britain’s formal responsibility for
the colony ceased although there were continuing consultations about defence and
related matters. The volume opens in 1960 because that was when the first serious
discussion started about the future course of Fiji’s constitutional development, and
when the first policies toward greater internal self-government were enunciated. The
decade was dominated in Fiji by intense, often deeply bitter, debate about
decolonisation, especially about the way in which Fijian interests, accepted by
everyone as special and requiring specific, water-tight protection, could be
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safeguarded in any future constitutional arrangement within a framework that was,
to all outward appearances, democratic and acceptable to the international
community. The faint outline of what eventually transpired began to become visible
by 1965, and clarified as the decade progressed.
Constitutional matters had been very much on the mind of Sir Ronald Garvey,
Maddocks’s predecessor as governor, throughout the 1950s. Garvey was an
independent-minded old Pacific hand, having served from the late 1920s in a number
of locations, including the Solomon Islands where he was district officer
(1927–1932), and then Nyasaland, St Vincent in the Caribbean and British Honduras
(as governor, 1948–1952) before becoming governor of Fiji in 1952.15 From very
early on in his tenure as governor, he was concerned that Fiji’s constitutional
arrangements had become an obstacle to the colony’s political progress and an
impediment to harmonious race relations. From the mid-1950s, Garvey proposed a
number of constitutional reforms, none of which bore fruit during his time in Fiji
because in London they were deemed premature, too far ahead of public opinion, or
insufficiently cognizant of the constraints of the colony’s complex and contested
history; some of them, however, would be re-visited a decade later. Garvey was also
concerned with the internal social and economic problems facing the Fijian people
and with the problems hindering Fiji’s economic advancement. He took measures to
address these issues, which came to the fore by the late-1950s. The volume begins
with an introductory chapter from this period, including documents which provide a
sense of the key issues and the discussion upon them taking place. And while the
1960s are the principal focus of the volume, events taking place during that time,
and the issues dividing the people and confounding senior officials in both London
and Suva, had deep roots in Fiji’s colonial history. It is to these that we now turn.
I. Paramountcy, Parity, Privilege
An archipelago of some three hundred islands lying on the border between the
cultural regions of Melanesia and Polynesia, Fiji was settled some three thousand
years ago by a seafaring people travelling eastwards from the Southeast Asian
region.16 The group was made up of a number of rival, semi-autonomous tribal
chiefdoms embroiled in incessant struggle for political supremacy. The problem of
power struggle was compounded with the arrival of European traders,
beachcombers, missionaries and fortune-seekers from the beginning of the 19th
century. They took sides among the rival aspirants, acquired land through dubious
means, built up plantations, engaged in trading (in sandalwood, beche de mer,
coconut oil, shipping), created port towns and urban centres and variously sought to
insert themselves into the political scene, creating mayhem in the process.17 Unable
to tame these new, destabilising forces of change and fearing for their own political
fortunes, the leading chiefs of Fiji, headed by Ratu Seru Cakobau, the self-styled Tui
Viti, the supreme chief of the archipelago, ceded Fiji to the United Kingdom on 10
October 1874.18 Britain accepted the offer after spurning earlier ones, now keen to
exercise control over the activities of its nationals on the unsettled island frontier
and to heed calls by missionaries and other humanitarians to curb abuses in the
Pacific island labour traffic reported to be soaked in blood.
The transfer of sovereignty was cemented through a Deed of Cession. Much has been
made of the Deed and it certainly featured prominently in the constitutional debates
of the 1960s. The Fijian leaders invested it with a particular meaning. The Deed, they
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argued, assured them not only that their rights and privileges would be safeguarded
by the Crown, but that they would remain paramount in the management of the
colony’s affairs. ‘Paramountcy of Fijian interests’ was a phrase invoked over and over
again throughout the 1960s to stake special claims and to influence the direction of
constitutional change.19 Some Fijian leaders even asserted that in its intent and impli-
cation, the Deed of Cession was similar to the Treaty of Waitangi under which the
Maori ceded sovereignty of New Zealand to the United Kingdom. The comparison is
misleading. Unlike New Zealand, which was a settler colony (while Fiji was a Crown
colony), the cession of sovereignty was recognised and enforced at law, a fact which
had ‘never been questioned or even raised as an issue’.20
The words of the Deed in English—there was no Fijian version,21 unlike the Treaty
of Waitangi—are clear. The chiefs who ceded Fiji to the United Kingdom agreed that
the ‘possession of and full sovereignty and dominion over the whole of the group of
islands in the South Pacific Ocean known as the Fijis’ was to be ‘annexed to and be a
possession of and dependency of the British Crown’, that the Crown would ‘prescribe
and determine’ the laws and legislation governing the colony, that the ‘absolute
proprietorship of all lands not shown to be now alienated so as to have become bona
fide property of Europeans or other foreigners or not now in the actual use or
occupation of some Chief or tribe or not actually required for the probable future
support and maintenance of some chief or tribe shall be and is hereby declared to be
vested in Her Said Majesty Her heirs and successors’. That is, it would become Crown
land. Finally, the Deed acknowledged that upon cession, ‘the rights and interests of
the said Tui Viti and other high chiefs ceding parties hereto shall be recognised so far
as is and shall be consistent with British Sovereignty and Colonial form of
government’.22 That was the extent of the undertaking given in the Deed, and this
understanding of it was endorsed by such Indian leaders as A D Patel and Vishnu Deo
in the 1940s.
The phrase ‘paramountcy of Fiji interests’ entered Fiji’s political vocabulary in the
early 20th century, often invoked by European settlers as guardians of the ‘Fijian
race’ to protect the European-dominated colonial order against demands by Indians
for constitutional change. Political and economic self-interest rather than a genuine
desire to protect Fijian interests informed the European reading of the document, for
the same people who championed the cause of the Fijians hankered for more Fijian
labour and land. The Fijians themselves saw the Deed as a ‘protective’ document
which would safeguard their ‘rights and interests’, particularly the ownership of land
and chiefly titles. In that sense, their interests would be paramount. But as
independence approached, and fears were raised about how or if Fijian interests
would receive special recognition in the new constitutional order, a protective
interpretation was transformed into an ‘assertive’ one. That is, Fijian interests could
be protected—be paramount—only if Fijians were in control of Fiji’s political
leadership, notwithstanding the legal and institutional protection. The Deed, in
other words, became a bulwark against change not authorised by or acceptable to the
Fijian leaders.
Once Fiji was acquired, the first substantive governor, Sir Arthur Hamilton
Gordon (1875–1880), decided early that the Fijian society, already showing signs of
stress from contact with the outside world—the indigenous population declined
from around 114,000 at the time of cession to 87,000 at the turn of the 20th century,
largely because of introduced diseases to which the people had no immunity—should
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be allowed to live within their own subsistence environment, under the leadership of
their traditional chiefs in a system of indirect rule.23 To that end, he created a
separate system of native administration complete with its own rules and regulations
and courts governing indigenous life, a system of native taxation through which
people paid tax in kind rather than cash (which thus prevented the disruption of the
subsistence lifestyle of the people), and engineered an enquiry into land alienation
which eventually ensured that 83 per cent of all land would remain inalienably in
Fijian ownership.24 Fijian fears of dispossession of the kind that took place earlier in
other colonies—notably New Zealand—were by this process put to rest. The
imposition of a uniform pattern of landownership over an archipelago of great
cultural and social diversity created its own problems25 but in the end, the Fijian
people retained possession of most of their land. When, in the late 1990s, former
Crown lands were transferred to Fijian ownership, close to 90 per cent of all land was
in Fijian hands.26
Gordon gave further substance to the idea of indirect rule by formalising a Council
of Chiefs, an umbrella organisation of the indigenous community, entirely chiefs
until the 1940s, to advise him on all major policy matters relating to their people.27
Although the strength and intensity of the consultative process fluctuated as times
changed and other imperatives intruded, or when governors of a more reforming
zeal were at the helm, the voice of the Council was heard when it mattered. The
Council of Chiefs was the only body in Fiji which enjoyed the privilege of addressing
the Crown directly, and this it did regularly, raising the concerns of the Fijian people
or directing attention to matters that needed addressing. In the independence
constitution, the Great Council of Chiefs, through its nominees in the Senate, was
given the power of veto over any legislation which specifically affected Fijian
interests.
Great Britain acquired Fiji reluctantly for strategic purposes as a means of dealing
with threatened local instability. The islands were remote and their economic
potential unpromising. Unwilling to incur a heavy expenditure in starting the new
colonial project, Britain expected the new colony to become economically self-
sustaining in the quickest possible time. This was easier said than done, for the basic
prerequisites for rapid economic development were lacking. Local Europeans,
themselves impecunious following the collapse of the cotton boom after the end of
the American civil war, could not be expected to provide capital sufficient for the
large scale plantation enterprise Gordon had in mind, having observed its success in
Mauritius and Trinidad where he had been governor before coming to Fiji. Gordon
settled on sugar cane as the crop most appropriate for Fiji, and turned to the
Australian Colonial Sugar Refining Company.28 The CSR arrived in Fiji in 1882 and
remained there till 1973, after independence, dominating the colony’s largely mono-
crop economy and exercising a great influence on the way things were run there. The
company’s determination to maintain an iron grip on the industry caused friction
with the growers and colonial governors and led to three major strikes in the sugar
industry in 1921, 1943 and in 1960, although, not least for its own interests, the
company was nevertheless a benevolent landlord. The conflict between the Indian
cane growers and the CSR would exercise a deep influence on political developments
in Fiji in the post-World War II years.
The Indian cane growers were descendants of indentured labourers. Gordon
decided to introduce Indian indentured labour to Fiji because of its success in
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Trinidad and Mauritius, where the first migrants had gone in 1834. The prohibition
on the commercial employment of Fijian labour on European plantations and the
uncertainty of labour supply from the neighbouring Pacific islands deepened the
colony’s dependence on India. Between 1879 and 1916, over 60,000 indentured
labourers were introduced into Fiji, 45,000 from north India and the remainder from
the south.29 Small groups of free migrants from Gujarat and the Punjab, later
economically and politically significant, continued to join them after the formal
abolition of indenture in 1920. The indentured migrants arrived on a five-year
contract which promised a return passage at their own expense after five years of
service or free passage after ten. For a variety of social and economic reasons,
including inducement provided by the government to stay on, the majority of the
migrants settled in Fiji and contributed immensely to the economic development of
the colony. From the very beginning, it was expected that those who remained in Fiji
as British subjects would enjoy rights equal to those enjoyed by other British
subjects resident in the colony. This intention was broadly encapsulated in Lord’s
Salisbury’s despatch of 1875,30 even though the despatch became a dead letter when
Indian provincial governments refused the request to assist indentured recruitment
and emigration. And the sentiment was repeated on many occasions later on.31 It was
on the promise of equality that Indians demanded full participation in the colony’s
political life. This demand for equality, too, would be at the core of the political
debate as Fiji inched towards independence. Just as Fijians demanded the
recognition of the principle of ‘paramountcy,’ Indian leaders struggled to gain
acceptance of the principle of ‘parity’.
The third leg of the Fijian stool were the Europeans—which in Fiji included
Australians, New Zealanders, and British.32 They had been coming to Fiji since the
middle of the 19th century, numbering around 2,000 at the time of Cession. Although
small in number, the Europeans dominated the retail and wholesale trade in the colony,
owned or leased plantations and occupied senior positions in Fiji’s public life. In keeping
with the ethos of the times, they regarded themselves, by virtue of their race, as superior
to other segments of the society and therefore entitled to a privileged position in the
colony’s affairs. In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, European settlers, unhappy
with the government’s ‘native’ or land policies and unable to get their way, led a
movement to federate Fiji with New Zealand. But when that effort failed, they used
other methods and approaches to advance recognition for their interests. Chief among
them was the acceptance of their ‘privileged’ position in the colony’s affairs.
Paramountcy, parity, privilege, then, were the three competing, not to say
incompatible—but mutually reinforcing33—principles which informed the
understanding the three communities had of their place in Fiji’s society. These were
invoked, with varying degrees of success, whenever London and Suva proposed
further constitutional change. The demand for changing the fundamental structure
of the colonial order could be—and was—deflected as long as Suva and London had
their hands on the levers of power and portrayed themselves as impartial arbiters of
the colony’s best interests. The ‘Crown’ could be trusted to be fair to all its subjects.
But as independence loomed and the departure of the colonial government became a
certainty, the feeling of comfort began to give way to a deep and disquieting concern
about the values and assumptions which should underpin the new order, about how
the vital interests of the three communities could best be protected. This would be
the central issue facing the Colonial Office in the 1960s.
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A colony deeply divided by ethnicity and competing claims to political
representation was one reality which confronted both London and Suva. There was
another: the racially compartmentalised nature of the electoral system that Fiji had
adopted from the outset. From Cession in 1874 to 1904, the Legislative Council
comprised members nominated by the governor, much to the dismay and opposition
of the European settler community which wanted direct (and greater)
representation. Their continuing agitation resulted in the opening up of the
legislature to limited elected representation.34 By Letter Patent of March 1904, the
hitherto wholly nominated legislature was replaced with one comprising 10 official
members, 6 elected Europeans and 2 Fijians nominated by the Council of Chiefs. In
1916, the Letters Patent were further revised. European representation increased by
one (from 6 to 7), and nominated members increased from 10 to 12, one of whom,
for the first time, was an Indian (Badri Maharaj). Fijian representation remained
unchanged. In 1929, partly as a result of representation by the Government of India,
the Letters Patent were once again revised, reducing European seats in the
Legislative Council from 7 to 6, giving Indians 3 seats to be elected from a communal
roll, and 3 to Fijians, to be selected by the governor from a list of names submitted by
the Council of Chiefs. Thus the new Legislative Council consisted of 13 official
members, 12 unofficial members, 9 elected and 3 nominated.
Soon after election, the Indian members walked out of the Legislative Council
when their motion for a non-racial common roll system of voting was rejected.35 This
was the first public occasion when the government’s policy of separate racial
representation was challenged, but not the last. The issue of a common roll would
become one of the most deeply divisive issues in Fiji politics in the 1960s.
Throughout the early 1930s, the method of election—common roll versus
communal roll, the disparity in the representation of the three communities, and the
merits of nomination over elected representation—dominated the political debate in
the colony.36 Indians demanded parity with the Europeans, while Fijians favoured
nomination over election, and rejected the Indians’ demands as unreasonable and
unjustified and a threat to their own position in the colony. London consistently
refused to sanction a common roll, citing as its reason the need to uphold pledges
given to the Fijian people in the Deed of Cession. Both Europeans and Fijians
opposed a common roll which they saw as the thin end of the wedge for Indian
domination. And both opposed expansion of election, at least in part because they
saw this as threatening their interests. The Europeans feared competition from the
Part-Europeans (as they were called) because the latter were greater in number, and
Fijian chiefs opposed election because they saw it as a threat to their traditional way
of life, and because their key concern was the economic betterment of the Fijians,
not national constitutional advancement.
But change could not be averted. In 1937, for the first time, the three main ethnic
groups were given equal representation in the Legislative Council, with five
members each. Three each of the Europeans and Indians were to be elected (with a
property qualification for candidates and voters) from communal rolls and two
nominated by the Governor. For the Fijians, the governor nominated five members
from a list of ten submitted by the Council of Chiefs. The remainder of the Legislative
Council was made up of ‘official members’, that is, heads of government
departments. The distribution of representation in the Legislative Council ensured
that the government always had the numbers to carry the day even in the most
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unlikely event of all the non-official members combining against it.37 This structure
remained in place until 1963.
Intact but not unchallenged. Throughout the 1940s and 1950s, unofficial
members made several attempts, all ultimately unsuccessful, to persuade Suva (and
through it London) to change policy and open up representation in the legislature to
reflect and accommodate the demographic, social and economic changes sweeping
Fiji as well as to honour London’s commitment to gradual self-government for the
colonies. Specifically, the advocates of constitutional change wanted the system of
nomination abolished and replaced by election. The agitation for constitutional
reform in the 1940s was led not by the Indian leaders but by Europeans. The main
period of Indian political agitation had ceased by the mid-1930s. Unable to persuade
their Fijian and European counterparts to embrace the principle of non-racialism,
they quietly supported, but did not initiate, constitutional debate. For their part,
Fijian leaders staunchly resisted any substantive change to the constitution, or any
perceived dilution of their cherished links to the British Crown cemented in the
Deed of Cession.
The first wartime debate took place in 1943, when Alport Barker, elected member
of the Legislative Council and mayor of Suva, moved to have the nomination system
abolished in favour of election, and to increase the number of unofficial members
from five to six for each of the three main communities. His aim was to give the
unofficial members dominance in the Council. The debate went nowhere. Fiji was
engaged in the Pacific War, and the sugar industry was embroiled in a catastrophic
strike.38 Barker withdrew the motion when the governor promised to appoint a select
committee to investigate the issue.39 Two years later, Harold Gibson, another elected
member, broached the subject of increased elected representation, again to no avail.
In 1948, Amie Ragg raised the subject again, but Fijians remained opposed. With the
Indian population established by the census of 1946 as the largest community in the
colony (46 per cent to 45 per cent for the Fijians),40 both London and Suva expressed
concern about the protection of the interests of the indigenous community. And this,
together with a growing concern over how to deal with the ‘Indian problem’, weighed
heavily on the minds of officials. Opinion in Suva was divided. Some urged greater
sympathy for the position of Indians who had made an enormous contribution to the
economy and who were therefore entitled to their fair share of rights in the colony.
They urged greater Fijian integration into the mainstream colonial economy.
In London, too, opinion was similarly divided. Some officials urged caution and
sympathy for the Fijian position. J B Sidebotham, assistant secretary and head of the
then Pacific Department at the CO, was adamant in 1947 that any attempt by
Europeans and Indians to force the pace of change should be ‘firmly resisted,’
otherwise ‘we are not fulfilling our duties as guardians’ of the Fijian people.41
Removing the official majority would place the Fijians at the mercy of Europeans and
Indians ‘who would undoubtedly use the resulting situation for their own ends’. And
any change which disturbed the traditional nature of the social structure—elections,
for example—would be ‘the greatest disservice that we could do to the Fijians’,
because they would become the ‘plaything of political parties of other races’. But
there were also those who argued that the status quo could not continue indefinitely.
Among them was Sir Charles Jeffries, joint deputy under-secretary of state at the CO,
who responded that the system of electoral representation had to bear some
resemblance to the size of the two communities:
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We cannot hope to hold indefinitely or perhaps for very long, the position that
an official autocracy is necessary because the Fijian community is backward.
We have to face the fact that the Fijians are only half the population of the
Colony. The other half consists mainly of Indians, with a not negligible
minority of whites. We, as trustees, have a special obligation to protect the
interests of the Fijian race, but it is obvious that the ultimate goal must be a
constitution based on a Fijian citizenship which shall include persons of all
races who have made their home in the Colony.42
By the mid-1950s, Fiji had changed dramatically from the pre-war years. In 1955, of
the total colonial population of 345,164, Indians numbered 48.2 per cent, Fijians
42.6 per cent, Europeans 2.7 per cent, Part-Europeans 2.3 per cent, Chinese 1.2 per
cent and other Pacific Islanders 3.0 per cent. The increase in the Indian population—
by 46,000 between 1945 and 1955 (it had taken Fijians twenty-two years to reach that
figure)—was due mainly to four factors: a higher fertility rate, a lower infant
mortality rate compared to the Fijians, early marriage of Indian women and a higher
proportion of female children.43 These figures rang many alarm bells. Population
projections were disturbing. By 1967, it was predicted that the Indian population
would increase to a quarter million while the Fijians would reach that figure by 1980.
The disparity in the actual size as well as in the projection of Fijian and Indian
populations not only caused officials concern but also poisoned race relations in the
colony, leading to calls in the 1950s for steady deportation of Indians to remoter
parts of the empire, such as the New Guinea highlands.
There were other developments as well which were beginning to change the public
face of the colony. As a result of the war, both sea and air communication had
improved greatly, connecting Fiji to the world as never before. Within Fiji, the
internal transport system improved. A flourishing media, in English as well as Fijian
and Hindi, brought the world closer to home. Radio came to many homes in the late
1940s and early 1950s. There was a rapid increase in primary and secondary
education. In 1946, there were 438 schools with 36,000 pupils.44 Ten years later,
there were 479 schools with 60,000 pupils. The number of Fijian schools, that is,
schools which admitted only Fijian students, increased from 306 in 1946 to 310 in
1955, while the number of Indian schools in the same period increased from 106 to
149. But numbers by themselves do not reveal the full story. Even though Fijian
schools outnumbered Indian schools by almost three-to-one, most Fijian schools did
not go beyond grade 5 (only 32 of the 300 schools did), while among Indian schools,
84 of the 141 primary schools took their students up to the final year, grade 8. This
disparity was evident in other fields as well. In 1958, for instance, there was no
professionally qualified Fijian lawyer and only one dentist and one medical doctor. In
contrast, there were 38 Indian lawyers, 12 medical doctors and 8 dentists practising
in Fiji. The gap in the educational and professional achievements of the two
communities, a result of cultural, historical and economic circumstances, would
become a matter of urgent public policy concern for both London and Suva in the
1960s.
Three distinct problems faced the new governor, Sir Ronald Garvey, when he
assumed office on 6 October 1952: the internal social and economic problems facing
the Fijian people which impeded their progress, the economic development of the
colony in the context of a rising population and limited and ineffectively utilised
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natural resources, and constitutional reform. Garvey tackled them with the courage
and confidence of a man with an intimate acquaintance with islands (he was a close
friend of the pre-eminent Fijian leader Ratu Sir Lala Sukuna). He appointed a
commission of enquiry, headed by Professor O H K Spate of the Australian National
University, to investigate and report on the ‘economic activity of Fijian producers,
with special attention to the effects of their social organisation on that activity’, and
to ‘consider how far the Fijians’ social organisation may be a limiting factor in their
economic activity, and to suggest in what ways changes in that organisation might
be desirable’.45 Spate’s report confirmed the widely held view that Fijians were indeed
lagging behind other communities. This was not necessarily because of the success
of other groups but because Fijian social institutions and practices, which had
evolved in another era and were suited to the needs and requirements of simpler
times, had become moribund, smothering the creative life of the community. At the
heart of Spate’s report was the recommendation to loosen the rigid, stultifying
structures of the traditional society, to discourage social practices which made
unwarranted demands on individual or communal resources and to encourage the
gradual growth of individual enterprise and activity among the people (such as
galala or independent farming) within the overarching ambience of village
communities and not as an extraneous, unwelcome extension to it.46
To tackle the problem of population growth and economic development, Garvey
appointed a commission chaired by Sir Alan Burns and comprising A T Peacock,
professor of economics at Edinburgh University, and T Y Watson, former secretary
for agriculture and natural resources in Uganda, to ‘examine the surveys of the
Colony’s natural resources and population trends and, having regard to the need to
ensure the maintenance of a good standard of living for all sections of the
community, to recommend how the development of the Colony and its resources
should proceed’.47 The Burns Commission’s recommendations were understandably
more far reaching than Spate’s. Those of a non-controversial nature dealing, for
instance, with the improvement of the local infrastructure and the conditions of
agricultural production, extension of the cooperative movement and technical
education and the encouragement of independent farming, were accepted by the
government and legislation was passed to implement them. But the more
controversial ones, especially those dealing with the structure of Fijian society,
raised alarm in many Fijian minds.48 Among the most radical of Burns’s proposals
was the recommendation to bring the traditional society into the mainstream. Burns
recommended the reform and opening up of a separate system of Fijian
Administration and its replacement by a broad-based multiracial local government.
The separate system of administration, it will be recalled, was established by Sir
Arthur Gordon in 1876 as a part of his policy of ‘indirect rule’, complete with its own
secretariat, court system and native regulations designed to ‘secure the continuance
of the Fijian communal system and the customs and observances traditionally
associated with it’.49 The recommendation to dismantle the system of administration
was opposed by Fijians because they saw their identity and aspirations tied with it
and because it came at a time when the political atmosphere in the colony was deeply
unsettled. But once the emotions had subsided, Fijians came around to the view that
change was desirable, and the system would be substantially liberalised in the late
1960s (document 14). Among the changes was the abolition of the penal sanctions
that had enforced acceptance of subsistence village life for most Fijians and the
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introduction of elected provincial councils. Fijians were then completely free to
remove themselves to towns or other places (as they had already been doing for some
time).
The third problem Garvey tackled was constitutional reform. He informed London
in February 1956 that he was convinced of the need for change. ‘The position now is
that there is a slowly growing interest in constitutional matters, both on the part of
the Fijians and the Indians.’ Fiji was calm and peaceful, Garvey said, but for how
long? ‘If we can consider changes in the constitution, now, deliberately and calmly
should we not be wise to seize this golden opportunity? There is at present this
healthy, if hesitant trend; so should we not seize the growing interest and turn it to
our advantage’ (2). Later, writing to Sir John Macpherson, permanent secretary at
the CO in October 1956, Garvey proposed a number of changes (5). Among these
were the removal of the official majority from the Legislative Council, the
disappearance of nominated members, an increase in the number of Fijian, Indian
and European members to 5 (from the existing 3), with the Fijian members being
elected by the Council of Chiefs itself (rather than the governor selecting names
from a list provided by the Council), and universal adult franchise for Indians and
Europeans subject to literary qualification. His most radical proposal, the first time it
was ever made, was for the creation of a ‘multiracial bench’ of 4 members (one each
for the three main racial groups and one for ‘other’) elected by a weighted common
roll.50 His ultimate goal was a common Fijian citizenship, he said, while
acknowledging that racial parity among the three main communities, along with
separate communal representation, would have to be retained ‘for an indefinite’
period.
Another of Garvey’s controversial proposals was for the abolition of the official
majority in the Legislative Council. The main reason, or at least the officially stated
reason, for the official majority was to protect special interests, such as the interests
of the Fijians. But in practice, Garvey said, he had never found it necessary to use the
official majority for that purpose. ‘I do not think there is any danger in the
Government being defeated if the official majority were removed, always provided the
Governor were invested with reserved powers, and I consider that a healthier
atmosphere would be created if it went.’ Garvey also wanted to abandon the system of
nomination. Its abolition would be a popular move, he told London. ‘Whatever may
be said about nominated members they are always regarded as Government yes-men,
even though frequently they are among Government’s more trenchant critics, and
this taint vitiates them in the public eye. The choice of them becomes more and
more difficult, and their value is just as difficult to assess, and little—if anything—
would be lost if the system were discontinued.’51 He was echoing the sentiments of
his predecessor, Sir Brian Freeston, who informed the CO in 1949 that he ‘attached
little value or importance to maintaining the principle of nominated members, and
should shed no tears if the nominated seats . . . were thrown open to election’.52
Garvey also wanted the number of elected European and Indian members increased
from 3 to 5, and all 5 Fijian members elected by the Great Council of Chiefs.
On the more controversial of his proposals, Garvey was not supported by his
closest senior advisors, who argued that Europeans and Fijians would be opposed,
regarding them as a ‘thin end of the wedge’ leading eventually to a common roll,
paving the way for reforms too radical for the colony to bear, and giving the Indian
leaders a sense of victory. Garvey remained undaunted, saying that his proposals for
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encouraging multi-racialism were necessary and long over due if the aim was—as he
assumed it to be—the encouragement of a multi-racial Fijian citizenship. Preserving
the status quo was no solution to Fiji’s problems at all.
Nor was Garvey averse to talking bluntly with the Fijian leaders who resisted
change. He did this from a position of strength and from strong personal
relationships with many leading Fijians, including especially Ratu Sir Lala Sukuna.
In 1954, he asked the Council of Chiefs to consider directly electing three of their five
representatives to the Legislative Council and even floated the idea of an adult Fijian
franchise. He told the chiefs that the ‘chiefly system on which so much depends
should march with the times and should not ignore—for too long—the modern
trend of democracy’. To those who invoked the Deed of Cession in support of
gradualism and permanent paramountcy of Fijian interests, he responded with
characteristic though unprecedented bluntness. He told the Colony in his Cession
Day speech in 1957 with a frankness rare in Fiji’s history:
Surely the intention of this Deed, acknowledged and accepted by chiefs who
were parties to it, was that Fiji should be developed so as to take a significant
place in the affairs of the world but that, in the process, the rights and
interests of the Fijian people should be respected. To read into the Deed more
than that, to suggest for instance, that the rights and interests of the Fijians
should predominate over everything else, does no service either to the Fijian
people or their country. The view, for the Fijians, would mean complete
protection and no self-respecting individual race wants that because,
ultimately, it means that those subject to it will end up as museum pieces.
The Indians are equally eligible to have their interests respected. By their
work and enterprise, the Indians in Fiji have made a great contribution to the
development and prosperity of their country, and to the welfare of its people.
They are an essential part of the community and it is unrealistic to suppose
that they are not or to imagine the position of Fijians in the world today
would benefit by their absence.53
Garvey’s proposals were widely discussed in the CO, which recommended caution to
‘keep a firm grip of the initiative’, to act ‘just in advance of pressure, but only just’
(3). The racial factor had to be kept in mind; to go too fast would ‘play into the hands
of the Indians’. ‘If there is no pressure to change, we should be the last to stimulate
it.’ Garvey’s motives were questioned. Perhaps he wanted to end his term in office by
announcing ‘some significant advance’. London remained unmoved by further
protestations from Garvey. Writing to the governor in January 1957, Philip Rogers,
assistant under-secretary of state, shut the door. It was not ‘desirable to stimulate
constitutional change purely for its own sake’, bearing in mind the ‘possibilities of
racial conflict’ in Fiji (6). The official majority should be retained, along with
nominated members who had an important role to play and who could represent
minority communities which sought separate representation such as Muslims. The
spirit of Garvey’s multi-racial bench was accepted though not his proposal about how
to achieve it. ‘We do not care for the system of weighting votes which you propose,
largely because they would highlight the disparity in size of the electorates and lead
to probably irresistible pressure for a, possibly gradual, whittling down of the relative
weighting.’
Instead, London preferred the existing, not weighted, arrangement through an
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additional elected member for each group on the basis of a common roll, with an
equivalent increase in official numbers to retain the official majority. In further
discussion with Garvey in Suva in June 1957, Rogers remained unconvinced about
the merits of the governor’s proposals. It was dangerous to provide for an unofficial
majority without executive responsibility. The separate racial system of
representation could be softened through holding some elections on common roll
seats along with with reserved seats. Increasing inter-racial education was crucial to
breaking down barriers. Rogers doubted whether much could be achieved without
addressing the fears and concerns of the Fijians.54
By the time Garvey left Fiji on 28 October 1958, the need for constitutional reform
and change in other areas of colony’s life had been widely accepted. The main
questions to be resolved were its pace and direction.
II. Amery and the Aftermath
Sir Kenneth Maddocks replaced Garvey and remained governor until 1964. Maddocks
was different from Garvey in both temperament and experience. Born in 1909, he
joined the colonial service in 1929 after graduating from Wadham College, Oxford,
and served in Nigeria before coming to Fiji. Unhappily for him, his tenure in Fiji was
punctuated by long periods of illness. While he did not have Garvey’s sure touch, his
familiarity with the Pacific, or his wide-ranging friendships across Fiji, Maddocks’s
Nigerian career provided relevant experience in one important respect. In Northern
Nigeria he had been intimately involved in the process of transforming powerful
native authorities into subordinate instruments of local government.55 But unlike
Garvey, Maddocks was not one to show vigorous initiative; temperamentally he was
more reactive than pro-active. His tenure coincided with perhaps the most turbulent
years in Fiji’s post-war history. A year after taking office, he was confronted with
deeply damaging industrial unrest in the oil industry in Suva in 1959 and in the
sugar industry the following year. The overall effect of the unrest upon the governor
was to reinforce the importance of caution and gradual change, and an acute
appreciation of political realities in the colony.
Maddocks’s major concerns throughout his years in office were twofold: to address
the imbalance between the two main races in the public sector, and to forge an
appropriate path for the orderly constitutional development of the colony. Fijians
were not only under-represented in the professions, as we have already seen; they
were also greatly outnumbered in the higher echelons of the civil service. This
under-representation had a number of causes. Among them was the reluctance of
traditional leaders, including Ratu Sukuna, to encourage academic education for
their people whose appropriate place, they felt, was in the villages.56 Indeed, a
revamped Fijian Administration in 1944 had strengthened the authority of
traditional structures of Fijian society, especially the power of chiefs. But while
Fijians were advised to stay close to their traditional cultural roots, Indians were
actively pursuing higher education for their children. The gap presented the officials
with a delicate and difficult situation, to juggle civil service appointments between
preserving the principle of merit on the one hand, and increasing a Fijian presence in
it on the other.
To improve Fijian prospects in the civil service, separate scholarships under the
Colonial Development and Welfare scheme were inaugurated to enable selected
individuals to receive special training in the United Kingdom (23, 24, 32). The
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scheme did not attract much adverse comment from the Indian community who
were excluded from it. Over the course of the 1960s, the special training schemes did
increase, if not dramatically, the number of Fijians in the civil service. There were
other unexpected benefits as well. The elite of the emerging Fijian leadership on
scholarship in the United Kingdom came in contact and socialised with officials in
places that mattered. Through informal and personal contacts, officials in London
gained deeper insights into Fijian thinking on critical issues while a period in the
United Kingdom increased Fijians’ already considerable respect and affection for
British institutions and values.
On the constitutional front, Maddocks sought advice from the CO about electoral
systems and constitutional arrangements in other places which might have some
relevance for Fiji. In particular, he enquired about the so-called ‘Tanganyika model’
and about the functioning of Legislative Councils with unofficial majorities (7). The
Tanganyika model provided a mix of communal as well as common roll seats, the
latter reserved for each of the three principal racial groups of Africans, Asians and
Europeans. Regarding the Tanganyika model, the CO replied, the ‘crux of the matter
is whether representation is to be a racial or a party basis. If the intention is that the
Fijians, Indians and Europeans should have the opportunity to return candidates
acceptable to the majority of their respective races, thereby perpetuating communal
divisions, then the Tanganyika system does not appear to be the solution’ (8). It
would work to produce inter-racial cooperation if politics were conducted on party
lines.
Yet it was the Tanganyika model which was adopted in Fiji, where political
participation had always been racially compartmentalised and where established
political parties, while having roots in looser communally orientated political
associations, were recent creations. The Federation Party was set up in 1963 and the
Alliance Party in 1966, in the latter case just a year before the introduction of a new
electoral system with provision for cross-roll voting. As for an unofficial majority, the
CO advised against it. The practice had been used in a number of places, including
Aden, Gibraltar, Tanganyika, Uganda, and elsewhere, but the experience ‘tended to
produce frustration and to strengthen premature unofficial demands for greater
executive representation and authority’ (8). The official majority in Fiji’s Legislative
Council was not removed until after a constitutional conference in 1965.
Fiji’s unique set-up required careful deliberation. Given the colony’s history and
the ethnic sensitivities involved, the CO conceded that representation would have to
continue on racial lines, but it did not favour an extension on a racial basis. And as
far as constitutional change was concerned, ‘we want to keep one pace, but not two
paces, in front of real political feeling and we certainly want to avoid widespread
feelings of frustration’ (8). The governor was advised to consult his senior officials
and present fresh proposals for constitutional advance.
This the governor had been doing in any case (13), with his most senior advisors
P D Macdonald, the colonial secretary, and Q V L Weston, the assistant colonial
secretary, both with long experience of Fiji, the latter since 1940. Their views differed
considerably. Weston argued that the only way Fijians could be persuaded to accept
constitutional reform was if the paramountcy of their interests was explicitly
acknowledged, perhaps through extra seats in the legislature. He cited the Deed of
Cession in justification. Fijians were the indigenous community, they owned over 80
per cent of the land and had always been loyal to the Crown. The reference to loyalty
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was intended to remind London of the Fijians’ distinguished record of service in
World War II, which contrasted markedly with the record of the Indians who stayed
out of it partly in protest against the racially discriminatory rates of pay of European
soldiers.57 Once the principle of paramountcy was accepted, Weston argued, the way
would open for the introduction of a limited number of common roll seats on the
Tanganyika model. The Indian community could be placated by reducing the
number of European seats in the Legislative Council. He proposed doubling the
number of Fijian members to the number of Indian members (from 5 to 10), with the
additional 5 being nominated by the Council of Chiefs.
Macdonald, with whose views Maddocks agreed, opted for the retention of racial
voting and the principle of parity. A common roll, in any shape or form, was
anathema to both Fijians and Europeans, he argued, and it would be ‘impossible’ to
get their acquiescence to its introduction. For their part, Indians could not be
expected to accept Fijian paramountcy without protest, nor would Europeans be
likely to accept a reduction in their numbers. European representation in its present
form was necessary ‘both in order to protect the Fijian, and in order to ensure that
the confidence of European businessmen and investors in Fiji, now already shaken,
does not result in a flight of capital and cessation of investment’. The way forward,
Macdonald advised, was to reduce official numbers in the Legislative Council
(something which had been opposed both by Suva and London in the past) and
introduce a ‘member’ system where unofficial members were given a supervisory
role over collections of government departments.
These views were being canvassed in Suva when parliamentary under-secretary of
state at the CO, Julian Amery, arrived in Fiji in October 1960. Amery was a well-
connected Conservative (his father, Leopold, had been secretary of state for India in
the 1940s), supremely self-confident and with a penchant for sharp, unequivocal
judgements. During his two years (1958–1960) at the CO he developed a particular
interest in island colonies, whether in the Caribbean, Mediterranean or Pacific. While
his views did not always command support among officials, they always demanded
attention. Amery arrived in Fiji at a particularly unfortunate time, when the colony
was in the middle of a prolonged strike in the sugar industry. Some Indian leaders,
including A D Patel, told their followers that Amery had been sent by London to help
end the strike. That, of course, was not the case, although they used Amery’s visit as
a convenient, face-saving excuse to end their strike. Feelings were inflamed against
the Indians, with troops being sent to the sugar belts to ‘protect’ farmers who wanted
to harvest. Fijians were still reeling from the recommendations of the Spate and
Burns Commissions, feeling isolated, apprehensive and abandoned. Understandably,
their attitude to change had hardened.
The timing of Amery’s visit was critical because his recommendations were to have
a far-reaching effect on official thinking about policy towards Fiji. The problem of the
racial divide was already known in London, and the CO had access to a wide range of
informed opinion about the colony. But Amery put the issue vividly, so that his name
and words echo in most major policy deliberations throughout the 1960s. He was
blunt in his assessment. ‘The Fijians and Indians are more distinct as communities
than Jews and Arabs in Palestine, Greeks and Turks in Cyprus or even Europeans and
Bantu in South and Central Africa’(13).58 Fijians feared Indian domination, and had
hardened their attitude to change. Their confidence in British intentions had been
shaken. They regarded the recommendations of the Burns Commission for internal
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reform within Fijian society ‘as an attempt to give the Indian community control of
the land by breaking up traditional Fijian society’. It had to be remembered that it
was the Fijians who had been the loyal community, the reference here being to the
non-active participation of the Indian community in the war effort. The Fijians
provided seventy-five per cent of the armed forces. ‘The islands could hardly be
governed without them, let alone against them.’
For the foreseeable future, Amery suggested, it was ‘impracticable to think in
terms of a single Fijian nation of a common roll’. Instead of gradually abolishing the
separate system of Fijian Administration, as the Burns Commission had
recommended, Amery urged its retention because the Fijians were ‘determined to
resist any move in this direction’. Indeed, he recommended an Indian counterpart to
it. The principle of parity in the civil service (in each grade of each department)
should be the aim of the government. And finally, Amery recommended a move
towards a ‘quasi-ministerial system’ while retaining the official majority in the
Legislative Council. It was more important to give Fijians experience of how
government administration functioned than to extend their representation. His
overall policy direction was clear. The Fijians would no longer accept the goal of a
single multi-racial community; the more the UK emphasised multi-racialism, the
more suspicious the Fijians would become ‘that we plan to sell them out to the
Indians.’ The only way, in Amery’s view, to ‘exorcise the fear of communal
domination’ was to make it clear ‘as of now’ that the UK stood for equal rights for
both communities, and would ‘not pull out until both ask us to do so’.
Amery’s views were widely discussed in the CO. While it was generally agreed that
his prognosis was probably correct, there was debate about his prescriptions. Sir
Hilton Poynton, the permanent secretary, accepted that the challenge of making Fiji
into a cohesive non-racial state was difficult but argued, ‘to decide now that we
should abandon the attempt [towards non-racialism] and base all our future policy
on a constitutional and racial partition (even though not a geographical one) seems
to me to be a counsel of despair’ (16). Once racial separation was entrenched in the
constitution, it would be nearly impossible to change it. The matter was important
enough to invite a more thoroughly considered proposal from the governor. Poynton
did not want policy formulated ‘on the basis of views expressed on particular
recommendations here and there’.
Elsewhere in the CO there was general consensus on the broad thrust of Amery’s
report. The strength of the Fijian opposition had to be recognised and respected. The
Fijian Administration would not be abolished in favour of a more multi-racial system
of local government. After all, the Fiji government, with CO authorisation, had done
much in the 1940s to reinvigorate the separate system of Fijian Administration,
elevating ‘chiefs to greater status and authority than they had ever held before’,59
partly as reward for the enthusiastic Fijian war effort and partly because of the
enormous influence of the pre-eminent Fijian chief, Oxford-educated and a
decorated soldier Ratu Sir Lala Sukuna, who was also the secretary for native
affairs.60 Fijians had their reasons for refusing to accept change, but London was also
caught in a bind: it could not reverse the wheels it had set in motion and reject the
legitimacy and foundations of an order it had so assiduously nurtured. Ironically,
therefore, until well into the 1960s, the Fijian elite were clinging defensively to
colonial rule as the rulers started to prepare to end it.61
Some of Amery’s other recommendations were rejected. The idea of a separate
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Indian administration, unacceptable in principle because of London’s long-term
commitment to multi-racialism, and impracticable in any case because of the
structure and settlement pattern of the Indian community, was rejected. Fijians
needed help and protection, officials in London agreed, but they had also to be taught
to face up to modern economic realities. And officials favoured the gradual racial
integration of public institutions. Amery’s off-hand remark that women should not
be franchised if men did not favour it was shrugged off as an itinerant thought of an
idiosyncratic mind. In November 1960, Poynton wrote to Maddocks that Amery’s
recommendation to retain the communal system was accepted for the foreseeable
future, but the long-term goal was a non-racial state. This was to be achieved
through a ‘withering away’ rather than ‘an overt extinction of the communal roots of
society’. And he emphasised to the governor that ‘we should avoid any statement
which commits us forever to communal representation’ (19). The overall impact in
London of Amery’s visit was summarised by Hugh Fraser, Amery’s successor as
parliamentary under-secretary of state. He described the CO’s stand as a holding
position or middle course between ‘the Burns non-racial line and the Amery
communal approach’. Fiji was a potential trouble spot in the Pacific. Sooner or later,
the following year according to Fraser, clearer policy guidelines would be needed
(18).
While waiting for a fuller policy statement on Fiji’s political future, Maddocks
sought the CO’s approval of the Fiji government’s draft proposal for a new
constitution. The reform was to proceed in two stages. In the first stage, selected
unofficial members of the Legislative Council would be invited to accept supervisory
roles—but with no executive authority—over a number of government departments,
working within the conventional framework of collective responsibility exercised in
the Executive Council—the membership system. The second stage would be a
transition to a full ministerial system in which members would exercise executive
responsibility. London approved the governor’s proposal, the title ‘member’ being
used in the first stage and ‘minister’ in the second (25, 28).
The government’s constitutional proposals were debated in the Legislative Council
between 21 and 24 April 1961 (36). It was the liveliest debate for years and the
reaction of the Fijian leaders determined the outcome. With one lone exception
(Semesa Sikivou), all of them rejected the motion which, the government was at
pains to explain, was not seeking approval or decision but was intended to gauge the
views of the people. Ratu Mara, who by a combination of his intellect, education and
chiefly birth had emerged as the dominant Fijian leader by the early 1960s,62 set the
mood. Confident that he was speaking for the majority of the Fijian people, he
opposed the motion. He felt it would lead to independence, even though it might be
in the Commonwealth. The proposals were ‘ill-conceived and ill-timed’, Mara said,
accusing the government of ignoring the Deed of Cession, which, he suggested, had
never contemplated the severance of the link between Fiji and the United Kingdom.
In private, however, he tended to be less dogmatic (42). Fijians, he said, would accept
constitutional reform towards greater self-government if Fiji were guaranteed a
continuing link with the United Kingdom similar to that enjoyed by the Channel
Islands and the Isle of Man. This was the first mention in Fiji of a proposal often
mooted publicly subsequently that Fiji might somehow be ‘integrated’ with the UK.
Ratu Penaia Ganilau, supporting Mara, chided the government for not consulting
the public before announcing the constitutional proposals and raised fears about the
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introduction of a common roll. Ravuama Vunivalu, perhaps the ablest debater on the
Fijian side, summed up what he called the message from the Fijian people. ‘We
cannot reconcile the implications of these proposals with the assurances that have
been given from time to time that our interests in this, our native land, shall always
remain paramount.’ His people regarded the Deed of Cession as a contract which
could not be annulled by unilateral revocation. In any future constitutional
arrangements, he continued, Fijians must have majority representation in both the
Executive as well as the Legislative Councils. Fijian preconditions for accepting
constitutional reform were made explicit for the first time: recognition of the
principle of paramountcy of Fijian interests and a continuing link with the United
Kingdom.
The Fijians’ opposition to the proposals for constitutional reform had its effect on
the government. In July 1961, the governor sought clearance from the CO for a
passage he intended to include in his Cession Day address in October to reassure the
Fijian people that the pace of change towards internal self-government would heed
the advice of their leaders. Maddocks wanted London to agree it would not transfer
power until a substantial measure of agreement had been reached among the
different races, and legitimate Fijian interests safeguarded (38).
The first concern was superfluous. Fijians could not be forced into self-
government against their wish, H P Hall, assistant secretary and head of the Pacific
and Indian Ocean Department, minuted. At the same time, the United Kingdom
could ‘not accept a Fijian veto on any changes whatsoever e.g. the introduction of the
membership system’. Poynton was blunter. To give one community in a colony a
power of veto over constitutional changes would be ‘tantamount to an abdication by
the Secretary of State of his responsibilities to Parliament for the orderly
constitutional development of the territory’.
The CO view prevailed. London had ‘no intention of forcing the pace of
constitutional advance in Fiji’, it advised the governor, by declaring that the ‘extent
and timing of such advance will continue to take into account the need to safeguard
legitimate Fijian interests and HMG will only decide on any major changes after full
consultation with the representatives of the various communities in Fiji’ (38). The
concept of a Fijian veto was discounted. But at the same time Maddocks also flagged
the subject of increased Fijian numbers in the Legislative Council to recognise the
principle of Fijian paramountcy. He suggested 6 Fijian members, 4 elected and two
nominated by the Council of Chiefs, and 5 Indian and European members each, 4
elected and one nominated.
London required a fuller explanation for a proposal that entailed a fundamental re-
direction of policy, upsetting the principle of parity that had been the hallmark of
Fiji’s constitutional arrangements since 1937. In a long despatch of 21 July 1961,
Macdonald, as acting governor, provided the justification (39). An extra seat for
Fijians, Macdonald argued, would among other things be recognition by HMG of the
rights of the Fijians in their own country, and also of their loyalty in two world wars
and in the emergency in Malaya, in which conflicts Indians in Fiji contributed
‘virtually nothing’.
The CO rejected the proposal. Assistant under-secretary of state A R Thomas noted
that it ‘would be needlessly provocative to Indians to have anything short of parity of
representation between them’ (40). Maddocks agreed that giving Fijians one more
seat was not the best way of protecting Fijian interests; it was the governor’s duty to
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protect the vital interests of the people, especially the Fijian people (43). London also
rejected the proposal that the unofficial members of the Executive Council should be
elected by the Legislative Council as a whole, preferring them to be appointed at the
governor’s discretion. The principle of electing unofficial members might in due
course complicate the appointment of a chief minister when a full ministerial system
came. It would be best to let the governor appoint the person best able to command
majority support in the legislature.
Fijian concerns and interests and how best to accommodate them did not fade
away. The following year, 1962, Maddocks resumed his correspondence on the
subject, reminding London in a lengthy despatch of the difficulty he encountered in
getting the Fijians to accept the idea of inter-racial local government (48). This had
been one of the recommendations of the Burns Commission. He once again outlined
Fijian fears—Indian domination, the loss of Fijian identity in a multi-racial
administrative arrangement, comparative disadvantage in education, the economy,
the professions, the public sector—and reported that the gulf between the two
groups was increasing. He added that the ‘dissolution’ of the colonial empire was
causing Fijians to question how long the UK would be able, or prepared, to protect
their interests. Maddocks quoted the words of Ratu Penaia Ganilau and Ratu George
Cakobau during the 1961 Legislative Council debate that at independence Fiji should
be handed back to the Fijians. This sentiment, he said, was broadly shared by many
Fijians. The reference to Amery’s findings in the despatch gave an insight into the
governor’s broad frame of mind and that of his senior officers many of whom
supported the principle of Fijian paramountcy (46, 47). This concession, they felt,
was necessary to get the Fijians to accept change. The way forward, Maddocks
suggested, was ‘Fijian racial majority on the Legislative and Executive Councils, with
the Indians next in numbers, and the Europeans combined with the other racial
groups, coming last’.
The reply from the CO was blunt, and informed by growing anti-colonial pressure
at the United Nations, and studies undertaken by the CO itself of Fiji’s place in the
wider context of UK policy towards its remaining colonial dependencies.63 The
Fijians could not expect the UK to be in control of Fiji in perpetuity. Nor could
London accept the recognition of Fijian paramountcy as practicable. It would be
difficult to persuade the Indian community to accept the principle when it
constituted the majority population. Moreover, it would be ‘the negation of
democracy’. Indians had become a permanent part of Fiji and ‘any solution which
does not recognise these facts is doomed to fail’, Duncan Sandys, the new secretary of
state, told Maddocks in a despatch (52). Sandys suggested another approach, a kind
of ‘shock tactic’, telling the Fijians they could not expect the United Kingdom to hold
their privileged position indefinitely. Multi-racialism was not only a desirable goal
but an attainable one as well. Independence, he suggested, might be only ten years
away, perhaps less. He sought further ‘positive recommendations’ from Maddocks
about the future direction of constitutional policy.
Sandys’ despatch was a document of uncommon candour, intentionally, provoca-
tively so, designed to provoke Suva to fresh, creative thinking about alternative solu-
tions to Fiji’s complicated problems. It was sent when the CO was also contemplating
what to say about Fiji in preparation for regional talks at official level in Washington
on the future of colonial territories in the Pacific with representatives from the US,
Australian and New Zealand governments. A draft on Fiji was described by officials as
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‘controversial’, because it tried to outline ‘the makings of a policy for resolving the
Colony’s internal problems which we frankly have not yet got’ (49). Three solutions
were under consideration—abandoning attempts to foster integration, acknowledg-
ing Fijian paramountcy, or further attempts to bring the communities together—
but the UK had yet to decide which to pursue. Only one point seemed certain. The
economic value of Fiji to Britain was described as ‘nil’.
To the extent that Sandys’s despatch was designed to provoke a response, Maddocks
rose to the challenge. The governor stood his ground and responded equally forthrightly
(53). The policy of nudging Fiji towards multi-racialism would contradict past
assurances given to Fijians about their special place in the country, he said, and would
provoke ‘anger and amazement’ among them—and Europeans. Echoing Amery,
Maddocks continued that if Fijians lost confidence in the UK, they might embark upon
the path of passive resistance which would hinder moves towards self-government and
might even lead to violence. London, he said, did not fully appreciate the strength of
the Fijian opposition. Nor did it appreciate that not all Indians wanted multi-racial
self-government. Of course, the UK could not be expected to hold on to Fiji indefinitely,
but it was too soon to announce that policy publicly. Nor was it wise of London to be
preoccupied with long-term goals. The best way forward was to prepare the ground for
internal self-government, and acknowledge the special position of the Fijians, perhaps
through a friendship treaty similar to the one enjoyed by Tonga.
Maddocks acknowledged the deleterious effects of a racially segregated electoral
system, but was also mindful of total Fijian and European opposition to non-racial
politics. This problem could partly be solved through the adoption of the Tanganyika
model. The Fijian people were not unreasonable, Maddocks assured the CO; they
would accept change if they felt their vital interests were protected. Among the
proposals the governor had in mind was that the chief minister, when the ministerial
system came, should be a Fijian, that Fijian land rights should be given water-tight
security, and that a racial balance in the civil service should be preserved.
Within Fiji, where elections were due early in 1963 and with the announcement of
parliamentary under-secretary of state Nigel Fisher’s visit around that time, the
leaders began to manoeuvre for advantage. Among them was Ratu Mara. While
voicing liberal opinions in private, he adopted a hardline approach in public. For
example, he privately acknowledged that the system of Fijian Administration was in
need of an overhaul. He favoured the introduction of multi-racial local government,
and the membership system. But he opposed them in public for fear of alienating his
Fijian constituency. In a meeting with other high chiefs in September 1962, Mara
alleged that while in London, he had sighted an agreement between Ratu Sukuna
and the British government on the future of the Fijian people, implying that London
was reneging on the agreement. Me satini vakavinaka mada na nomu masi, the Fiji
Special Branch reported him as saying, ‘Be prepared to go to war or be prepared to
accept whatever is given to you’ (54). No one in the CO knew anything about the
supposed secret agreement (55). When consulted Sir Ronald Garvey, the former
governor, said ‘with absolute certainty, so far as I am concerned, that no such
document exists’ (56).
At the same time, the CO pondered Maddocks’s suggestion about the Tanganyika
model for an electoral system, relevant and appropriate on surface appearance, but
problematic upon closer scrutiny.64 The governor wanted a pre-determined outcome:
Fijians on top, with a Fijian chief minister. An appropriate, not necessarily a
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democratic, system would have to be devised to achieve that outcome. There were
other problems as well. The Tanganyika model worked well because political parties
existed there. There were only embryonic political parties in Fiji when the governor
advanced the proposal. Moreover, racially the population was unevenly distributed
throughout the colony which, as one CO official commented, would make it ‘silly’ to
have a constituency dominated by Indians, with few Fijians and hardly any
Europeans, and yet have a seat each for the three races.65 In the end, Maddocks’s view
about constitutional advance prevailed, with London proposing to reassure the
governor that in future, a ‘more gradual programme’ of change would be adopted.66
Simultaneously questions were asked if anything was to be learned by comparing the
position of the Indians in Fiji with that of the Chinese in Malaya (57, 58).
Fisher visited Fiji in January 1963 as part of his wider Pacific tour, the purpose
being ‘to listen, to confirm a view, and to advise the Secretary of State on his return’
(59). He was advised to avoid causing ‘alarm and despondency’ by suggesting that the
UK was about to force constitutional change upon the people of Fiji, but at the same
time to avoid saying anything which might be interpreted as a pledge that no change
would be introduced until all sections of the community wanted it. In Fiji, he
listened carefully to a wide range of opinion through petitions and submissions. H G
Nicholls, chief inspector of the Colonial Sugar Refining Company in Fiji, urged
London not to ‘turn Fiji loose’ as an ill-prepared self-governing territory (61). The
Suva Chamber of Commerce expressed the fear that if British administration ceased,
‘our rights as free citizens of a democratic state may be seriously affected’ (63).
London wanted above all to gauge the breadth and depth of Fijian opinion about
the pace and direction of constitutional change, for as the correspondence from
Amery onwards shows, it was what the Fijians thought that counted. What it heard
was sobering. The Fijian Cane Growers Industrial Congress, based in western Viti
Levu, the heartland of Indian settlement, bluntly said: ‘We Fijians will not give up
our rights.’ They wanted to be reassured that the bond between the Fijian people and
the Crown was intact (62). Apisai Tora, a politician and radical trade unionist, made a
written submission in which he railed against the government as well as Fijian
chiefs, demanding more representative government.
Tora could be—and was—dismissed, but not so the Fijian Affairs Board a body
composed of the Fijian members of the Legislative Council with broad responsibility
for Fijian welfare and the observance of Fijian customary rights. In its submission to
Fisher, popularly known as the ‘Wakaya Letter’ after the Fijian island on which it was
formulated, the Board captured the various strands of Fijian political thinking and
articulated them with force and coherence for the first time (64). The letter was
signed by all Board members, including three ‘paramount’ chiefs with the highest
ranks in Fiji: Ratu Mara (from Lau), Ratu Penaia Ganilau (Cakaudrove) and Ratu
George Cakobau (Bau). Its other signatories were A C Reid and R M Major, both
senior civil servants, and J N Falvey, European member of the Legislative Council,
and the Board’s legal advisor. The letter wanted the ‘spirit and substance’ of the Deed
of Cession strengthened, links between Fiji and the United Kingdom preserved, along
the lines enjoyed by the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man, Fijian land rights
secured, Fiji to be declared a Christian state, and the policy of racial parity in the civil
service enforced. Only then would Fijians entertain the possibility of further
constitutional change. The Wakaya Letter was a powerful negotiating document with
wide-ranging implications.
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Fisher reassured the Fijians that the UK would respect the terms of the Deed of
Cession although he pointed out that the Deed was ‘primarily concerned with the
transfer of sovereignty over Fiji to Her Majesty’s Government’.67 He undertook to
examine the proposal for Fiji to have a similar relationship to the United Kingdom
enjoyed by the Channel Islands. He reassured the Indian community that they were
equal, not second-class, citizens of Fiji. And he emphasised the need to develop a
more multi-racial approach to problems facing Fiji (71). Sandys wrote to the
governor in August 1963 to say he had ‘studied carefully’ the contents of the Wakaya
Letter. He hoped for further progress towards internal self-government but ‘in
consultation with representatives of the people of Fiji’, and not one section of it as
demanded by the Fijians. As for a relationship along the lines of the Channel Islands,
the circumstances of the two countries were dissimilar, and so the constitutional
arrangements would be different although where appropriate some relevant features
might be adapted for Fiji. Opinion within Whitehall was rather more candid on this
point. In a note for an Official Committee on Future Policy in the Pacific in April
1963, the CO weighed the arguments for and against the UK confirming that a link of
some sort would be maintained between Fiji and Britain (66, 67). On balance the
arguments were in favour, despite the difficulties this might cause with the anti-
colonial movement at the UN and the precedent which might be seized upon by
other UK territories anxious for similar treatment. Confirmation of a continuing link
(its precise form need not be determined immediately) was required to persuade the
Fijians to enter a constitutional dialogue, and while other colonial powers would
have to be consulted a continuing link would doubtless please the Americans for
whom strategic considerations were uppermost in deciding whether Pacific
territories might progress to independence (65). The Foreign Office in Whitehall was
never backward in reminding the CO of the importance of the strategic dimension
(92, 93).
Against this background Sandys proposed in August 1963 a constitutional
conference in London to ‘try together to agree upon concrete proposals’ for
constitutional change (68). But before that happened, Maddocks left Fiji. In April
1964, the CO gave the new governor, Sir Derek Jakeway, who had assumed office in
January, its response to the ‘Wakaya Letter’ and broadly outlined the line he might
take in his discussions with the leaders in Fiji. London would try to work out a
constitution that was as advanced ‘as the Fijians will swallow’. The links with the
United Kingdom that the Fijians sought would be preserved in the ministerial system
in any case (precisely how was not made clear). The governor would be vested with a
range of powers over advisory bodies—such as the Public Service and Police
Commissions—to ensure that the interests of all the communities were protected,
obviating the need for a precisely formulated pledge the Fijians wanted. It might be
counter-productive for Fijians to push too hard for an ‘ultimate solution’ lest it
unduly antagonise the Indians and invite the attention of the United Nations.68 The
demand for Fiji to become a Christian state should be abandoned in favour of the
principle of non-discrimination. London was acutely aware of the deep sensitivities
on the ground in Fiji, and advised Jakeway not to commit himself to any particular
cause of action before further consultation.
Jakeway was a complete contrast to Maddocks. He was energetic and involved,
unlike his predecessor who was distant and detached. But more than personality,
Jakeway’s background was important. He had been chief secretary in British Guiana
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in 1956 when Cheddi Jagan’s Peoples Progressive Party had accused the government
of gerrymandering the division of constituencies to favour its opponent, Forbes
Burnham. Surviving the controversy, Jakeway left to serve as chief secretary in the
former British Protectorate of Sarawak which became part of the Malaysian
Federation in 1963. In Sarawak he came to know first-hand the service of Fijian
soldiers fighting Chinese communist insurgency in the 1950s. He developed a
sympathetic understanding of the problems of the Malaysian peoples, and saw the
Fijian dilemma through the lenses of his Sarawak experience, describing Fijians as a
huskier version of non-Muslim Sarawk Malays. In Fiji, Jakeway was active behind the
scenes advising Mara to form a multi-racial political organisation along the lines of
the ‘Alliance’ party in Malaya. Jakeway fell foul of the Indian leaders who petitioned
London to recall him. London did not, and Jakeway remained to guide Fiji through
its most intense and contested period of constitutional development.
Fiji’s first election for an expanded legislature under a new constitution replacing
that of 1937 had been held in April 1963. 69 It was an important election for a number
of reasons, being fought for the first time on the basis of universal adult franchise,
with no property qualification for voters or candidates. And it was the first time the
ballot box had reached the Fijian people, enabling them to elect their representatives
directly. Until then, Fijians were sent to the Legislative Council by the Council of
Chiefs. In the Fijian constituencies, all the three sitting members of the Council—
Ratu Mara, Ratu Penaia and Semesa Sikivou—were re-elected. Among the Indians,
the contest was more fierce and more unpredictable. Emotions in the community
were raw over the sugar strike of 1960, with the result that the election came
effectively to be seen as a referendum on the strike and on certain people’s role in it.
Among them was A D Patel, the leader of the strike, who had been a member of the
Legislative and Executive Councils from 1944–1950 but had retired to his flourishing
private law practice after several electoral defeats in the early 1950s.70
Patel won the election easily in the Indian communal seats, along with another
member of the recently formed ‘Citizens Federation’, S M Koya. It was an interesting
and unusual combination of a Hindu and a Muslim representing the Indian
community, especially in view of the argument that Muslims could not be elected
from a predominantly Hindu electorate of the colony. Patel’s re-entry into the
political arena galvanised the political scene. His uncompromising stand on the
common roll was to become one of the most deeply contested issues as Fiji moved
towards independence. With Patel in the Council as the leader of the Indian
community, Fiji had at its helm in the mid-1960s three (Falvey representing the
Europeans) exceptionally talented and tough-minded men, attached (in the case of
Mara and Patel) to strongly held principles, unwilling to compromise, each seeking
advantage for their respective communities.
With the election over, Jakeway proceeded to prepare the colony for the
introduction of the membership system. That came on 1 July 1964 (76, 77).71 The
government appointed three members, one Fijian, one Indian and one European.
Ratu Mara became member for natural resources, A D Patel member for social
services, and J N Falvey member for communication and works (part-time).The
choice of the three was to be expected: they were the acknowledged leaders of their
respective communities. Mara’s portfolio included agriculture, cooperatives,
fisheries, forestry, geology, lands, livestock, marketing and mining, all areas of
particular concern to the indigenous community. Patel was responsible for
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broadcasting, cultural activities, education, health, prison and social welfare. And
Falvey’s portfolio included meteorology, postal services, civil aviation tourism,
transport, hotels, areas in which the Europeans had major investment and interest.
The members of Executive Council had a collective responsibility for the
implementation of policy but real authority still rested with the governor and his
European officials. The office of secretary for Fijian Affairs remained an Executive
Council appointment, but its portfolio was widened to incorporate Local
Government as well as Fijian Affairs, a significant change.
The membership system was cumbersome. It was intended to give members
administrative experience within a framework of collective responsibility. But
members, elected representatives of their respective ethnic communities, had their
own interests to safeguard while participating in government with whose policies
they might not agree. Wires were certain to be crossed, and they were, especially
between Patel, as the leader of the Indian community, and Jakeway as the head of
government (and indeed between Patel and his own supporters).72 As preparations
for the constitutional conference (initially proposed by Sandys in 1963) in London in
1965 began, the political temperature in Fiji increased. Patel’s Federation Party
raised issues—about the common roll and independence, for instance—which
aroused a strong reaction. Inevitably, they came under attack from the conservative
Australian-owned newspapers, and even from the government’s own Public Relations
Department which, ironically, was in Patel’s original portfolio but was withdrawn
upon threats of mass European resignations from the department. The Fiji
Broadcasting Commission, a statutory body, called members of the party ‘badmash,’
hooligans (82).
When Patel attacked the Commission publicly, Jakeway rebuked him and
demanded his resignation if he could not observe the rules of collective responsibility
entailed in the membership system (76). The governor wrote to Patel asking him to
‘explicitly and immediately’ dissociate from the attacks, failing which would ‘bring
into question your continued membership of Executive Council’ (78). Patel
reminded the governor of the terms and conditions upon which he had accepted the
appointment. He could not be expected to consider himself ‘responsible to defend the
wrongful acts of civil servants or defend them against public criticism’ when he
himself, as member for social services, had no power to hold officers in his portfolio
to account. He had joined the government to ‘serve my people—not to forsake them;
and I am not prepared to sell my soul for a mess of potage’. He offered to resign if
that was what the secretary of state and the governor wanted (82).
Patel’s offer put the governor in a difficult position. It would be a severe setback for
the experiment of multi-racial cooperation the government was undertaking. At the
CO assistant under-secretary of state, Trafford Smith, sympathised with Jakeway but
alerted him to the ‘serious and far reaching’ consequences of not having Patel (and
his fellow party member James Madhavan) in the Executive Council. Might they not
adopt a more extreme position which could potentially affect race relations, internal
security and affect the smooth running of government? (77). Jakeway reluctantly
heeded the advice ( 84),73 while London hoped that the ‘whole incident has not so
seriously undermined the confidence of the other communities in the Indians as to
make progress between now and the conference impossible’.74
The altercation between Patel and Jakeway could not have come at a worse time,
on the eve of the constitutional conference in London. Relations between the two
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men, never close, became frosty. The Federation Party, though not Patel himself,
publicly criticised the governor.75 Jakeway’s refusal to allow the Indian community
to accord a formal Indian welcoming ceremony for secretary of state Fred Lee when
he visited Fiji in August 1966 dismayed many, especially when Fijians were allowed
to welcome him traditionally at the chiefly island of Bau. The governor’s statement
during the course of a visit to Australia that ‘it is inconceivable that Britain would
ever permit the Fijian people to be placed politically under the heel of an immigrant
community’, and that ‘the Indians do not want self-government, because this would
immediately cause racial strife’,76 provoked a storm of protest which did not abate
quickly. The Federation Party protested against the characterisation of the Indians as
an ‘immigrant’ community (with all the political implications it entailed at a time
when the constitutional future was being decided). Jakeway’s statement, the party
said, had seriously prejudiced the forthcoming conference by pre-judging important
issues. It petitioned the CO to recall Jakeway. For his part, the governor responded
that he had been misrepresented. London backed Jakeway, but worried if his
reputation for impartiality had been damaged. For the Indian leaders it had.
III. The 1965 Conference and its Aftermath
The stand-off between Jakeway and Patel took place during the familiarisation visit to
Fiji by parliamentary under-secretary of state, Eirene White, in what was now a
Labour government in Britain (90, 93). Her task was to report back on issues that
might be raised at the forthcoming constitutional conference. She heard a wide
range of opinion: from Muslims about separate representation, from Fijians about
their special interests, including political leadership of the country, from Apisai Tora
about deporting Indians from Fiji as Ceylon and Burma had done, from the Council
of Chiefs reiterating the terms of the ‘Wakaya Letter,’ from the journalist Alipate
Sikivou who expressed the Fijian nationalist line that the Indians could always go
back to India, the Chinese to China, and the Rotumans and other islanders to their
respective islands but the Fijians, the indigenous people, had Fiji as their only home.
Sikivou was not alone in holding such views. Many others were of the view, as Ratu
Penaia Ganilau and Ratu George Cakobau had said in 1961, that at independence, Fiji
should be returned to the Fijians. As Uraia Koroi put it at a meeting of the Fijian
Association in January 1965 chaired by Ratu Mara, ‘Fijians were determined to
achieve this claim of right [returning Fiji to Fijians] at the cost of their lives.
Bloodshed would mean nothing if their demands were not acceptable to other races
in the Colony’ (74).
A month before White’s tour, in March, Trafford Smith had visited Fiji to talk
specifically to the leaders of the three communities about their attitude and possible
policy stance at the London conference (75). Ratu Mara reiterated Fijian opposition
to a common roll, expressed optimism on the resolution of the land-lease situation
while conveying Fijian fears of being dispossessed of their ownership rights, and
thought the Fijian demand for paramountcy could be accommodated perhaps by
giving Fijians an extra seat. Patel attacked the inequities of the colonial
administration, the official patronage of anti-Federation Indians, the ‘islands of
autocracy’ in the public sector immune from parliamentary scrutiny. For him, the
main controversial issues at the conference would be the method of election and the
composition of the executive. Echoing his earlier confidential comments (70), Falvey
explained the basis of Fijian-European political co-operation against the Indians,
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emphasised the depth of the Fijian attachment to the principle of paramountcy and
offered to give up a European seat to accommodate it, and flew a trial balloon of three
common roll seats contested by a member of each of the three main groups.
Throughout the early1960s the issue of land ownership, and Fijian fears of
dispossession lay close to the heart of the problem in Fiji, fears accentuated by a
rapid increase in the Indian population and increasing demand for a more secure
land tenure system.77 If they were not in political control, Fijians feared Indians
would enact legislation to take their land away. But for Indian politicians, land
ownership itself was not an issue; everyone respected the ownership rights of the
Fijians. At issue were the terms and conditions under which Fijian land could be
leased to mostly non-Fijian tenants. Fortunately, the lease issue was addressed in the
report of the Agricultural Landlord and Tenant Committee which was accepted by
the CO, with slight modification (73). New leases would be granted for a minimum of
ten years and would be heritable.
This Trafford Smith pointed out to Jakeway, was an improvement upon the
English practice. Under the new legislation, tenants would be paid compensation for
improvements they had made if the lease was not renewed, and there would be a
Lands Tribunal to review rents and, perhaps more importantly, to decide on the
‘relative’ hardship if the lease was renewed or not renewed. As this tended to favour
the tenants, the provision came over time to be resented by many Fijians. But in
1965 the passage of the legislation caused much relief to officials in London and in
Suva. In Fiji, Indian leaders, Patel in particular, were blamed by some for ‘selling out’
the interests of the tenants, without appreciating the constraints of the times, the
tenacity of the Fijian opposition, or the subtlety of legislation which actually secured
for tenants rights and privileges which no earlier legislation had done. Land issues
were not expected to play a significant part at the forthcoming London constitutional
conference, but the CO wondered if the proposed legislation might be used as a
bargaining counter, ‘in that Indian readiness to compromise over the retention of
mainly communal rolls could well be dependent on that of the Fijians to implement
the landlord/tenant proposals’.78
Early in 1965, Jakeway initiated among members of the Legislative Council a
dialogue about issues likely to be raised at the London conference. He aimed to
achieve a measure of consensus which would augur well for the coming talks. The
discussion produced consensus on many issues: complete and immediate
independence would not be the aim of the conference, and links with the British
Crown would be maintained. But, predictably, the talks faltered on the perennially
thorny issue of the method of election to the Legislative Council. Patel pressed his
case for a common roll, while the Fijians and Europeans opposed it. When distorted
versions of the confidential talks began to appear in the colony’s major local daily,79
accusing Patel and his fellow members of the Legislative Council of unstatesmanlike
behaviour, Patel withdrew from the talks—not only because the leaks had ‘created an
atmosphere of mistrust and misunderstanding among the people of Fiji’, but also
because ‘nearly all the remaining subjects for discussion are controversial and on
which it is very unlikely any agreement would be reached in Fiji’.80 The government’s
own intelligence unit reported that the Fiji Times often published distorted and
damaging versions of Patel’s speeches. But the breakdown had several unfortunate
consequences. It deepened the rift between Patel and Jakeway. It poisoned political
relations between the principal protagonists, and forged ever closer relations
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between Fijian and European leaders. Patel’s stand against any compromise probably
hardened too. As Jakeway informed London, the possibility of ‘reaching unanimous
agreement in London receded over the horizon’ at the moment the Suva talks
ceased.81
The conference opened at Marlborough House on 26 July 1965 (87). The United
Kingdom government set the agenda but then played a disengaged role in the
deliberations. Anthony Greenwood, the secretary of state, assured the Fiji delegation,
‘you will encounter no disposition on the part of the British Government to press
particular solutions upon you’. Ratu Mara, in his opening remarks, paid warm tribute
to Britain, emphasising loyalty, trust, and gratitude, saying that independence was
not his goal, and that he saw no reason to sever links with the Crown ‘forged by our
forefathers in 1874’. Falvey, speaking for the Europeans but also ‘with’ the Fijian
delegation, echoed Mara’s sentiments: continuing links with the Crown, satisfaction
with the status quo, gratitude for all that Britain had done for Fiji. Patel predictably
took a completely different line to Mara and Falvey. He hoped the conference would
produce a new constitution which would lead Fiji to ‘complete independence in the
not too distant future’. He wanted the conference to mark the ‘beginning of the end
of a form of government which stands universally condemned in the modern world’.
And he too had ‘faith and trust’ in the British government to work out a just and fair
solution for Fiji.
Patel’s anti-colonial sentiments would have been unexceptionable in most
circumstances. Many in the UK itself felt the days of colonial rule were numbered.
And the words were a regular part of the vocabulary of many a nationalist leader in
the Third World. But Fiji was different. There British colonial government was not
reviled, but warmly embraced by the indigenous population. It had preserved their
way of life and secured their fundamental interests, such as ownership of the land. In
that context Patel’s condemnation of colonialism struck a jarring note. The UK
delegation was already favourably disposed to the Fijian position, with the Fijian
leaders making a considerable play of the Fijian contribution to World War II and the
poor contribution of the Indian community to that conflict.82 Patel’s denunciation
damaged his own cause. For their part, CO officials put the ‘failure’ of the conference
to provide a broadly acceptable consensus outcome squarely on the shoulders of
Patel and his colleagues (91).
The conference nevertheless produced several major steps towards greater internal
self-government (90). A new constitution replaced that of 1963, providing for the
first time, a majority-elected Legislative Council and the end of the nomination of
unofficial members. Ministers were to be appointment, headed by a leader of
government business who then became chief minister. The only nominated
members in the legislature were the colonial secretary, financial secretary, and
attorney general; the ex-officio secretary for Fijian affairs and local government was
to be replaced by a minister. Chinese, Rotumans and other Pacific islanders were
enfranchised for the first time, the Chinese placed on the European roll and the
latter two on the Fijian. The constitution also had for the first time a bill of rights
though it did not provide protection against discrimination in civil service
appointments, not surprising in view of the concern over racial imbalance there. A
subject which remained in the background at the conference was the future of the
Fijian Administration, and the related issue of the development of local government.
The CO recognised before the conference opened that any attempt by non-Fijians to
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interfere in such matters would ‘instantly cause the Fijians to stop in their tracks and
refuse to make any constitutional progress at all for the present’. Progress was being
made, but it was slow and it was in everyone’s interest to keep the Fijians ‘sweet by
letting them go on at their own pace’ (86).
It was the composition of the Legislative Council and the method of election that
proved to be the most contentious issues at the conference. In the event, the Council
was expanded to 36, 14 Fijians, 12 Indians and 10 Europeans. With the two additional
members, nominated by the Council of Chiefs but who would be full members of the
Legislative Council, the principle of Fijian paramountcy, which had so long divided
opinion both in London and in Suva, was recognised. European numbers had been
reduced by two, but they were still disproportionately over-represented. London was
disposed to reduce their numbers even further to appease Indian feelings, but Fijians
would not countenance further reduction: after all, Europeans were their ally against
the Indians.
The conference produced an outcome that pleased—and relieved—officials: a
Fijian majority (assured because of traditional European support) and thus a Fijian
chief minister. Second, the Tanganyika model, which Maddocks had so strenuously
advocated, was also introduced. Of the 12 elected Fijian and Indian members, 9
would be elected on separate racial rolls, now called a communal roll, with 7 General
Electors.83 The remaining members, three General Electors, Fijians and Indians,
were to be elected on a cross-voting roll where the ethnicity of the candidates would
be stipulated, but they would be voted for by everyone eligible to vote, irrespective of
ethnicity. There was another feature of the constitution which further isolated the
Indians from the rest of the community. For the first time the Chinese were
enfranchised, and they were placed on the General roll while Rotumans and other
Pacific islanders were placed on the Fijian roll. This amalgamation in effect turned
the Fijian and European rolls into a non-racial common roll, while the Indians
remained communally separated.
The Federation Party protested against the final report of the conference (88). The
two extra Fijian seats (through the Council of Chiefs) had upset the principle of par-
ity between the two communities. The Tanganyika model was unacceptable to them
and inappropriate for Fiji because of its electoral provisions. The fear of Indian domi-
nation was more psychological than real, because the geographical distribution of the
population was uneven. But by then, the Federation Party was talking to itself. When
the party realised that the Fijians and Europeans would not move on a common roll,
and that the UK would not intervene, Andrew Deoki (non-Federation member of the
Indian delegation), proposed a compromise towards the end of the conference which
he had presented earlier in Fiji. His proposal was to introduce three additional com-
mon roll seats to the existing system of communal representation. But by then the
Fijians had the upper hand and London had the result it desired, and so the proposal
was not considered because it had come ‘too late’.
The Federation Party threatened, but did not carry out, a boycott of the final
session of the conference, ‘out of respect for the Secretary of State’, they said. They
accepted the outcome on protest, and put it in writing the next day. Greenwood
played little part in the proceedings, having been preoccupied with issues concerning
Aden. He admitted at the end that the constitution was not perfect but thought
sufficient progress had been made towards multi-racialism in the cross-voting
proposals and urged everyone to ‘strive to make it work (103). An elated Ratu Mara
06-Fiji-Introduction-cpp  10/5/06  6:54 AM  Page lxii
INTRODUCTION lxiii
cabled Fiji: ‘Ni yalovinaka ni kakua ni taqaya, na veika kece koni taqayataka e seqa
ni yaco, sa nomuni na lagilagi (‘Don’t be concerned. All that you were concerned
about did not materialise. The victory is yours.’84 Large victory celebrations awaited
the Fijian delegation in Fiji.
Trafford Smith offered his own assessment of the conference (91). He revealed that
White had held private talks with Mara and Falvey to see if giving Indians an extra
seat would ‘be worth the candle’, but the proposal was rejected. There was no
political advantage for any of the three parties in making this concession anyway.
Trafford Smith thought Patel ‘got off on the wrong foot’ during the formal opening
session with his attack on colonialism. And he considered the Federation group
singularly inept and unprepared for the conference. Had ‘Patel and his henchmen’85
tabled the compromise proposal for a limited common roll at the beginning of the
conference, the British government would have had to take serious note of it and
impress upon the Fijians and the Europeans the need to consider it. Rarely,
according to Smith, had a case been so mishandled by three lawyers, a reference to
Patel and Koya and their legal adviser.
Trafford Smith’s view can be explained by several considerations. The UK
delegation seem to have been more concerned to appease the Fijians than to arrive at
a solution broadly acceptable to all parties. White held private talks with Mara and
Falvey, but made no such attempts with the Indian delegation, to impress upon them
to meet the others half way. In this she was apparently disregarding the advice of
officials who thought it ‘necessary to have separate discussions with the delegates
from each community to find out to what extent they are prepared to compromise on
the issue of common roll’ (85). The CO itself recommended avoidance of the issue of
a common roll at an early stage as it might lead ‘to the striking of attitudes and
deadlock’. To argue later that the Indian delegation should have declared their hand
earlier seems contradictory.
The Federation Party wanted to convince the conference of the merits of their
common roll proposal for building a new, non-racial Fiji, and expected the UK
government to show some sympathy for their position. Only when that approach
failed was it thought prudent, at the last minute, to present their minimum demand.
But London seemed more attuned to the demands of the Fijians, and some members
of the European delegation felt socially close enough to the officials in London to
make, as Trafford Smith reported, racist, anti-Indian comments in their presence.
Privately, some CO officials, such as A J Fairclough, assistant secretary and head of
the Pacific and Indian Ocean Department, agreed that the outcome of the 1965
constitutional conference was ‘unduly pro-Fijian’ (103) An independent expert,
Professor Stanley de Smith, regretted that the Federation Party’s ‘relatively moderate
compromise proposal [for limited introduction of a common roll] received such
short shrift’ (119).
Were the Fijians going to be as intransigent on a common roll as officials in
London thought? A CO brief prior to the conference summed up Jakeway’s talks with
three pre-eminent Fijian leaders, Ratu Mara, Ratu Penaia Ganilau and Ratu Edward
Cakobau. The governor reported that ‘some gentle selling of the attractions of a
limited common roll element in the next constitutional stage has been done with all
three and does not appear to have fallen on entirely unreceptive ground’. It was true
the Council of Chiefs had come out in favour of a communal roll but there was no
specific discussion on the electoral system. Jakeway suggested that ‘the position is
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that they are prepared to listen to proposals from the British side and to give them a
fair hearing’ (98). The governor also informed London that Patel would pursue a
common roll; ‘if he sees no alternative, he will probably accept a limited number of
common roll seats in a Legislative Council which is otherwise elected on communal
roll’.
But the United Kingdom delegation went into the conference with its mind
already made up to recommend the adoption of three cross-voting seats on the basis
of parity. The CO recommended that Fijians and Indians have parity (12 seats each),
but the Fijians got two more during the conference. Once back in Fiji and stunned by
the vehemence of the Indian reaction, Jakeway broached with Mara and Falvey the
possibility of Fijians reverting to the status quo, but by then it was too late, and
would ‘lead to too many internal difficulties for the Fijians themselves’ (96).
In September 1966 Fiji held a general election under the new constitution. It was
an important contest fought for the first time between two political parties, the
Federation and the Alliance. The latter was officially launched on 12 March 1966,
although component parts—the Fijian Association and the Indian National
Congress, for example—had existed before then. The Fijian Association was the
foundation of the Alliance. Most Europeans and a number of Indians also joined the
party. The Alliance saw itself as a multi-racial political party, unlike the Federation,
which while ideologically non-racial, had its base in the Indian community and was
unable to attract many Fijian or European members. Something like the Alliance
was bound to enter Fiji’s political arena, but it was helped by encouragement from
Jakeway who organised contacts (97, 98). As he told a sitting of the Legislative
Council in 1966: ‘The way is wide open for leaders of imagination, who have the
interests of all the people of Fiji truly at heart, to build political alliances with the
object of contesting elections on a common cross-racial platform and, if they win a
majority of seats, forming a broad-based administration which will be effectively self-
governing. I shall be only too happy to cooperate with such an administration and
give it maximum freedom of action.’86 Patel clearly was not one of Jakeway’s ‘leaders
of imagination’.
The elections produced a massive, though expected, victory for the Alliance: 22
seats to the Federation’s 9 (all Indian communal seats, none of the cross-voting
ones). As the leader of the Alliance, Mara was appointed leader of government
business, while retaining his natural resources portfolio for a few months before
handing it over to a General Elector member of the Alliance, Doug Brown. Vijay R
Singh, Patel’s most bitter opponent though with a sharp mind and an eloquent
tongue, was appointed member for social services and Charles Stinson, a Suva
businessmen, member for communications and works. Three other elected members
(Ratu Penaia Ganilau, Ratu Edward Cakobau and K S Reddy) were co-opted to the
Executive Council. This arrangement lasted until 1 September 1967, when a
ministerial style of government was established with Mara as chief minister.
The Federation Party protested against their exclusion from the Executive
Council, pointing to paragraph 39 of the conference report (90) which said that the
‘Governor would continue to appoint the unofficial members of the Executive
Council in his discretion but would provide for appropriate representation of the
various communities in the unofficial element of the Executive Council’. As the
Federation Party represented the Indian community, it claimed it was entitled to be
invited on to the Executive Council. Trafford Smith agreed, saying the ‘Secretary of
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State no doubt had in mind that the [Executive] Council would be formed on an all-
party basis as hitherto’. But a resounding Alliance victory was not foreseen at the
time of the conference. Now with the adoption of a ‘government’ versus ‘opposition’
system, Fiji had ‘crossed a major Rubicon’ (104). Mara did not want the Federation
Party in government because their policies, he said, were diametrically opposed to
his party’s and because in all probability the Federation would insist on the exclusion
of Indian members of the Alliance Party from the Executive Council as a
precondition for participating. This Mara would be loathe to accept (111), as it would
in effect undermine the Indian members of his party and hand Patel a victory of
sorts. In any case, Patel had accepted the role of the leader of the opposition, and the
matter was allowed to rest. Urban local government elections were held in six
townships under a common roll in December 1966. In all but one township the
electorate was overwhelmingly Indian and the Federation Party mounted a
determined campaign after its showing in the general election. Its efforts were
rewarded. The Alliance Party, by contrast, did not campaign in its own name. To
Trafford Smith ‘familiar Fijian conservatism’ at the time of the local elections was a
‘depressing feature’. A ‘more forward looking’ Alliance Party organisation was needed
(106).
The Alliance government faced the normal teething problems of all new
administrations: limited resources, unskilled personnel, demands for development
from all sides, the negotiation of grants and experts from London, the politics of
patronage, but for the most part it acquitted itself well (103, 110, 111). Jakeway was
concerned about the emigration of skilled people from Fiji to Canada and the United
States in particular and sought CO advice on how to curtail it (94, 99, 100). The
government could do very little was the short reply, because any undue restriction
on the movement of people would breach human rights conventions. Perhaps a bond
system requiring scholarship holders and other beneficiaries of subsidised training to
work in the country for a specified length of time might be the solution. The CO saw
a silver lining in the departure of Indians from Fiji: an improvement in the racial
balance between the two communities (95). When Lee visited Fiji in August 1966 he
alluded to other pressing problems. Among them was the need for racial integration,
especially in education. In the past, this had been strenuously opposed by Fijian
provincial schools, fearing that integration would submerge their unique identity
into something amorphous and threaten their cultural foundation. ‘There may be
room for argument about timing and methods, but not for doubt of the principle
itself’, Lee concluded. And he advised the people to accept change, ‘assimilate it into
the structure of society without allowing tradition either to impede it or to be swept
away by it’. 87
The uncertain future facing expatriate civil service officers, employed not on
permanent or pensionable terms since a new policy came into effect in 1962, but on
contracts in the territories where they were serving, was also a matter of grave
concern not only to the officers concerned 88 but also for the orderly transition to
independence (101).89 The interests and welfare of the expatriate officers had to be
balanced against the imperatives of localisation. Under the existing constitution, the
governor, not his elected ministers, was responsible for staff matters, but with a full
ministerial form of government soon to be established, the equation had changed. In
particular, Mara was adamantly opposed to the continuation of the old arrangement,
which involved differential rates of pay for local and expatriate officers. He himself
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had been a victim of the old system in the early 1960s, and was determined that it
should go. He wanted the Overseas Services Aid Scheme and Her Majesty’s Oversea
Civil Service dismantled, with appropriate compensation, and all future expatriate
officers employed on contract or on secondment. For obvious reasons, Mara wanted
accelerated localisation (112).
Mara’s opposition caught London in a dilemma. It understood the depth of his
personal feeling on the issue and its political ramifications in Fiji. For that reason, it
could not confront him publicly. Antagonising him at a critical moment in the
transition to independence held grave dangers. But neither could London disregard
the welfare of senior, long-serving civil service officers who were caught in a
dilemma not of their making. Matters became more complicated with Mara’s refusal
to go to London to discuss the issue with UK ministers. He was adamant that it be
discussed in Fiji, with many like-minded colleagues, where he could resist pressure
he might have to succumb to in London. There was little London could do except ‘to
do everything possible to persuade Ratu Mara to see the difficulties of the course he
has suggested and to accept that it is preferable that OSAS should continue, despite
the problems it poses for him’(112).
Another major area of concern was the implication for Fiji of the UK’s second
application, lodged in May 1967, for entry into the European Economic Community,
in particular for the future of the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement. Sugar was, and
long had been, the backbone of the country’s economy. There was, moreover, a
political dimension to the problem as well. A major success on the sugar front would
augur well for Mara politically with the support he commanded in the Indian
community. It would also undermine Patel’s standing among his strongest
supporters in the cane belt. To safeguard Fiji from any potential fallout from
Britain’s entry in the EEC, Mara revived his ‘integration’ proposals. Britain was not
encouraging, not only because of the local difficulties but also because of the
precedent which might be set. Mara dropped the idea, but privately what was now the
Commonwealth Office in London conceded that some form of ‘associated state
status’ (103) was ‘probably the right goal for Fiji’ (109). And associated status was in
any case preferable to independence, a point which was not to be divulged to Mara
when he came to the UK in September 1967 as part of a world tour.
The recommendation to avoid independence if possible was made after a further
round of official talks about the Pacific at Washington in April 1967 involving the
same four powers. The UK delegation was led by Trafford Smith at talks which proved
to be detailed and, in the case of the US, unusually candid. While admitting that
Washington had yet to formulate clear policies for the Pacific, US officials made clear
they preferred association arrangements to independence. This was a view shared by
the Australian delegation and Australia emerged at the talks as the most beleaguered
of the four powers. Nauru and Papua New Guinea were onerous responsibilities, and
the stand taken on both by the UN Committee of 24 was resented in Canberra. All
four powers, New Zealand to a lesser extent, were concerned to limit UN involvement
in the region. A major preoccupation of the Australians was the danger of
penetration by ‘hostile influences’; ‘Indonesia and Asian communists seemed
uppermost in their minds’, according to the UK report on the talks. The Australians
also claimed to have a ‘national interest’ in Fiji’s stability. They regarded Fiji as ‘the
key to the island region’, and they voiced strong opposition to ‘any forward
movement there’. Throughout the talks UK delegation steered a middle course,
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emphasising that stability in the Pacific was a concern of all four powers; individually
their aim should be to avoid ‘competitive constitutional escalation’ and to consider
the interests of other powers in making decisions about their own territories (108).
Two observations might be made about the wider significance of the Washington
talks in April 1967. First, despite the claim to have a national interest at stake,
Australia appeared less keen to involve itself in assisting financially with Fiji’s
development plans. The suspicion always lurked in Canberra that the UK was seeking
to ‘offload’ its Pacific responsibilities (117, 120). Secondly and rather unexpectedly,
Nauru, the subject of extended discussion at Washington, became an independent
republic in January 1968. With an area of only 8 square miles and a population of just
over 5,561 (an ‘English village’ according to officials in London), Nauru was perhaps
the best example of where, according to the criteria established in Washington,
independence was to be avoided. The UK went along with the decision to grant
independence, believing that if Australia and the US, who had more at stake in the
Pacific, were prepared to acquiesce, it made little sense for the UK to object. By
implication, if Nauru could become independent, so too could Fiji.90
Earlier, in February 1967, Herbert Bowden, secretary of state for Commonwealth
affairs, visited Fiji as part of a familiarisation tour of the South Pacific. He gave assur-
ances that the new departmental arrangements in Whitehall—Jakeway described the
merger of the CO and CRO as a ‘betrayal’ of dependent territories (113)—did not mean
any change in the British government’s policy on Fiji.91 Britain would not rush Fiji to
independence, but would act only if Fiji asked for and was ready for it. It was advisable,
he said, for Fiji to progress gradually.92 On the future of the contested constitution,
Bowden said that since it had been in existence only a short while, ‘it should be given
a chance to work and see if it is a viable one that meets the needs of Fiji’. On the sur-
face this appeared an innocuous statement, but the words angered the Federation
Party which had accepted the constitution under protest in the first instance, had been
disadvantaged by it and was publicly committed to its revocation. Patel recalled a con-
versation with Greenwood—which the Commonwealth Office denied ever took place
(121)—that the 1965 constitution would have a short life of two years after which
another constitution would be drawn up.93 The prospect of the contested constitution
having a longer life caused him alarm. As Patel put it, if the constitution was not
changed immediately, the Indian community would be consigned to ‘the wilderness
of frustrated and possibly endless opposition’.94
Patel’s criticism of the apparently unilateral manner in which the Alliance
government conducted itself, hastily using the guillotine to cut off debate on
important issues—a charge steadfastly denied by both Mara and the governor—
soured political relations even further. On 1 September 1967, exactly a year after the
elections, Patel moved a motion in the Legislative Council rejecting the constitution
and asking for a fresh conference to devise a constitution based on democratic
principles without any bias or distinction on the grounds of colour, race, religion or
place of origin.95 As Vijay R Singh for the Alliance was replying to the motion,
condemning it in ringing terms, Federation representatives walked out.
The boycott caught everyone by surprise and complicated plans London had for a
gradual transfer of power at a pace acceptable to the Fijians. The Federation Party’s
by-election platform occasioned by its walkout was a reiteration of its demand during
the 1966 elections of complete and immediate independence for Fiji on the basis of a
common roll. The Federation Party was out to prove that the overwhelming majority
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of the Indians rejected the constitution. But the occasion also provided the Alliance,
and Mara in particular, with the opportunity to test their strength in the Indian
community and to prove that they too had a substantial base of support. Mara told
the Commonwealth Office he was optimistic of making inroads into the Indian
electorate,96 expecting to win one or two Indian communal seats (118). The Indians
were beginning to realise that ‘he was genuinely determined to safeguard their
interests’, he said. He was receiving support from Indian workers and Gujarati
businessmen opposed to Patel, but not from the Indian middle classes who saw better
prospects for advancement under the Federation Party. Patel himself was ‘clearly
losing ground’.
Mara’s optimistic assessment of his political support among Indians was
misplaced, for the by-elections, held in September 1968, returned all the nine
Federation members with increased majorities (from 65 per cent of the Indian
communal votes in 1966 to 76 per cent in 1968), Patel returning with the largest
majority of them all.97 The Federation’s win came as a result of the party
representing itself as the only authentic voice of the Indian community, its superior
list of candidates compared to those of the Alliance, a professional campaign, and a
promise to secure a new sugar cane contract favouring the grower (125). The tension
and animosity and the solid Indian support for the Federation Party and the dismal
performance of the Alliance among Indians, Mara’s strenuous efforts to woo them
over notwithstanding, took Fiji to the brink of racial riots amidst loud calls to deport
Indian leaders, and to cancel land leases to Indian tenants. The fragile experiment in
multi-racialism was tested (123). Patel had proved his point that he was the
dominant leader of the Indian community who could not be ignored or sidelined in
any future constitutional negotiation. But this proof had come at a great cost to race
relations, hardening attitudes on the Fijian side which saw the increased support for
the Federation Party as an Indian attempt to control political power. The Fijian
determination to stand their ground and not concede to demands which might
threaten their interests was also out in the open. They shifted to a stance aiming for
an early independence, with them in control. The by-elections were the sobering
wake-up call to begin negotiations on a more realistic basis.
Throughout the 1960s, London hoped it might be able to resolve Fiji’s
constitutional and political problems outside the glare of international scrutiny, and
it devoted a great deal of its diplomatic energy to that end, both at the United Nations
as well as with fellow members of the Commonwealth (not to mention the
expectation of the UK parliament itself). But not entirely successfully, for Fiji
frequently came to the attention of the UN Committee of 24 throughout the decade
(102, 115). The Committee had shown intermittent interest in Fiji earlier, but after
the 1965 conference it did so with the active encouragement and even lobbying of
the Federation Party (121) which alleged misconduct on the part of the Fiji
government and breaches of undertakings by the UK. In 1968 Fiji was on the
Committee’s agenda, in company with the Portuguese colonies, French Somaliland,
British Honduras and the Falkland Islands.98 There were many issues which had the
potential to cause severe embarrassment to the governments in both London and
Suva, including the racial system of voting, European over-representation in the
legislature, and the delay in fixing a date for independence.
Fijian leaders had always dismissed the Committee as a nuisance which should not
be allowed to visit Fiji. Britain too wanted to keep the Committee out but total non-
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cooperation was not an option. ‘We should aim to be as forthcoming as we can’, the
Commonwealth Office advised when enquiries came from the Committee, ‘some of
the questions posed do raise difficulties, particularly as regards any premature
disclosure of the substance and timing of changes to the constitution’ (115). As broad
policy, the Commonwealth Office suggested that on matters of further constitutional
development, London would listen to the advice of the Alliance government;
proposals for the extension of cross-voting were under consideration and gross over-
representation of Europeans in the legislature would be corrected at the next
constitutional conference. The aim was to deflect attention from Fiji with soothing
words of reassurance about timely constitutional advancement. The UK delegation at
the United Nations found a surprisingly friendly ally in India which accepted the UK
argument that pressure to introduce a common franchise would be counter-
productive,99 and which encouraged moderation in debates and resolutions
concerning Fiji. Mara’s own chance meeting with Indira Gandhi, India’s prime
minister, in Malaysia and favourable reports of Mara’s multi-racial posture by the
Indian high commissioner in Fiji, all contributed to India becoming more amenable
over Fiji.100 For the time being at least, it suited the UK to have support from New
Delhi.
IV. Towards Independence
The 1968 by-elections changed the political dynamics in Fiji,101 with London
acknowledging that ‘the circumstances in Fiji are against us’.102 For their part, the
Fijian leaders realised that they could not expect to drag their feet over constitutional
reform and continue to expect sympathetic understanding and support either from
London or from younger Fijians who favoured a quicker move to full internal self-
government, even independence (123).103 In the past, London had feared Fijian
insurrection if changes it introduced did not meet their approval; now officials were
anxious that Patel’s successors, ‘people of a different calibre’, might resort to strong
arm tactics, even ‘have recourse to violence’ (118). The Special Branch reported that
Apsai Tora, the western Fijian leader, had been offered a large sum of money by
Siddiq Koya ‘if he would pledge his support for certain courses of action’, including
‘physical persuasion’.104 After the 1965 conference, Koya had threatened to break
away from the Federation Party against Patel’s ‘passive attitude’ and non-violent
approach to the outcome of the conference, and was talking about forming a ‘Subhas
Party’—after the Indian leader Subhas Chandra Bose who had been committed
during the war to overthrowing the British in India by force—and engaging in
massive civil disobedience, such as burning cane.105 Relations between Patel and
Koya, never particularly warm, were tested.
In December 1968, Jakeway left Fiji, telling London on the eve of his departure to
eliminate the communal roll and replace it with cross-voting. He was supported by
his chief secretary who reached similar conclusions against a constitution which, in
his view, had ‘an admittedly undemocratic and unsatisfactory electoral system’ (123).
Jakeway was succeeded by Sir Robert Foster. Six months before he took office,
London had been considering the effects of the by-elections and exploring ways of
reforming (or rejecting) a constitution it knew was flawed in favour of something
more democratic and more broadly acceptable. It was with this goal in mind that
Professor Stanley de Smith was sent to Fiji in July 1968. He spent a week in Fiji
talking to government officials and political leaders. His extensive report was tough
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and insightful (119, 123). The 1966 constitution had two major defects, he said: it
entrenched communalism and over-represented the Europeans (1.4 per cent of the
population holding 25 per cent of all elected seats). Separate racial representation
could work perhaps as a transitional measure, but ‘most of the countries in which it
has been adopted at one time or another (eg India, Ceylon, Cyprus, Kenya) have had a
depressing record of inter-communal violence’. For any constitution to be workable
it had to be practicable as well as realistic and attuned both to local interests and
hopes and aspirations as well as to the principles of equity and justice.
With that in mind, de Smith proposed what he called a ‘radical approach’ and a ‘real-
istic approach’. The former proposed an enlarged legislature with two Fijians elected
by the Council of Chiefs, but the rest elected in a mixture of some single-member and
mostly two-member constituencies on a common roll, without racial reservation of
seats. Communalism would be gone as an organising political principle, and parties
would be forced to nominate people of different ethnicities. But de Smith realised that
this proposal would be unacceptable, because it introduced an element of unpre-
dictability in the outcome of elections and removed guaranteed representation on a
racial basis. His realistic approach, following the Kenyan example, comprised an
enlarged legislature of 45 seats elected on a common roll and 6 reserved seats, 2 for
the representatives of the Council of Chiefs and 4 for ‘General’ candidates.
This realistic approach, which ‘aroused a great deal of interest’, seemed certain to
attract criticism. The Federation Party would object, and so might the Fijians, while
the question of which minority groups should receive ‘special protection’ could
potentially open a divisive debate. The third, and for de Smith the least attractive
approach, involved an extension of cross-voting seats with racial reservation. One
point stands out in de Smith’s proposals: the need to move away from communalism
to a non-racial electoral system. In this respect, he was closer to Patel than to Mara
and the Europeans. For his part, Jakeway had favoured eliminating communal voting
altogether and extending cross-voting or any other system which, as his chief
secretary, Peter Lloyd, put it, could be ‘cloaked with respectability’ and was
‘defensible internationally’ (123).
Soon after the by-elections, an Indian government minister (Sukhlal Hathi), and
three senior officials from the Indian Ministry of External Affairs (Rikhi Jaipal, T N
Kaul, and Manjit Singh)— visited Fiji. Hathi and Singh ‘offered disinterested
assistance’ in healing the political and racial divide accentuated by the walkout and
the by-elections. During the course of their visit, they met a wide cross section of
leaders, including Mara (123), who told London that he ‘had recently had
considerable cooperation from New Delhi’ (132). Writing to Mara after his Fiji visit
Hathi, India’s minister for labour, employment and rehabilitation, said: ‘I have
returned to India with a feeling of optimism in regard to the future of Fiji. I have no
doubt that with your wise and tolerant approach, the current difficulties in Fiji are
bound to be resolved satisfactorily.’106 Kaul and Jaipal advised the Federation Party to
co-operate and abandon their boycott of the Legislative Council (118, 123). Kaul also
offered advice on a possible compromise formula for a new electoral system: 15 Fijian
and Indian seats each, 5 General seats and 5 ‘other’ seats (127). Precisely what ‘other’
meant—whether the seats might be filled through election or by the governor
through nomination (128), and whether the elections for them would take place
from single or multiple member constituencies—became matters of considerable
debate.
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Kaul refused to provide further clarification, saying he had confined himself to
principles, including the extension of cross-voting, a reduction in the number of
European seats and parity of representation between Fijians and Indians (133). Patel
interpreted the Kaul formula to mean that 35 of the seats would be cross-voting, and
the remaining 5 would be elected on a common roll basis from single-member
constituencies, with no racial reservation. The 5 common roll seats would provide
the opportunity for political parties to compete for votes on non-racial grounds.
Patel was in the process of discussing his understanding of the Kaul formula with
Mara when he died, in October 1969. India’s contribution in counselling moderation
at the United Nations was appreciated, along with its emissaries’ role in thawing
relations between Mara and Patel.
That the Fijian Indians wanted an early constitutional conference was not
surprising. What did surprise both Suva and London was that Fijians themselves
were now demanding the same thing, though for very different reasons (124). Their
demand was based on a pragmatic assessment of the political realities on the ground.
Fiji could not forever remain immune from international scrutiny or protected from
proportional representation or majority rule, both of which were unacceptable to the
Fijians. Full internal self-government would remove Fiji from UN scrutiny whose
pressure could not be resisted for too long. The Indian population was increasing,
and further delay would make it more difficult for Fijians to insist that the political
control of Fiji be handed over to them. Fijians were dominant in the legislature, and
their numerical superiority provided an opportune moment to seize control while
they were ahead and make further amendments to entrench Fijian control later. The
public stand of Fijian leaders was: no independence, at least not yet, no common roll,
and deep gratitude to the UK (122), but privately attitudes were changing or at least
more flexible.
By mid-1969, it was becoming clear both in London and in Suva that a conference
to decide a new constitution for a fully self-governing, if not completely independent,
Fiji should be held sooner rather than later, especially in view of agreement on this
by both the major parties. Officials continued the search for solutions to the issues
which still divided the two parties. A full common roll and single-member
constituencies were considered unrealistic because they were unacceptable to the
Fijians. As G T P Marshall, second secretary at what was now the Foreign and
Commonwealth Office wrote, the ‘Fijians cannot afford to take the risk that voting
may develop along non-racial lines since there is too much at stake for them to be
wrong. These arguments of the Fijians can never be adequately countered because
there always comes a point when logic is swept aside and emotion is given free
reign’.107 With the 1969 communal riots in Malaysia fresh in his mind (133), Mara
seemed wedded to the ‘Bahamas’ model which provided for a large measure of
internal self-government, with certain powers—external affairs, internal security,
the police force and the public service—retained by the Crown, but with the
provision for devolution of these responsibilities to the elected government (129,
131). The idea of an upper house to address Fijian concerns was also mooted, but the
government was uncertain whether this would be acceptable to Patel’s side and
whether it would really solve the problem of the two additional Fijian members in
the Legislative Council. London noted, moreover, that upper houses were ‘rather out
of fashion’ and generally ineffective. Surveying the overall position, the FCO
commented, ‘we are necessarily still working to a large extent in the dark’ (130).
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Mara visited the UK in May 1969. He was knighted in Edinburgh and held a series
of meetings with FCO officials in London (134). His discussions covered the politics
and problems of defining electoral boundaries, the structure of the Public Service
Commission and similar matters. The FCO warned Mara that his proposal to
perpetuate communal voting would cause problems not only at the United Nations
but also with members of the UK parliament who were ‘sincere advocates of the one
man, one vote democratic concept [and who] would regard a pattern of communal
voting as a retrograde step’. Officials urged him to consider reducing the number of
communal seats and increasing the cross-voting ones. Mara gave no undertaking but
promised to discuss the proposal with Patel. Mara’s London talks also touched once
more on the implications for Fiji of UK entry into the EEC (135). Dissatisfied with
the assurances he was given, Mara mused about the worth of Fiji’s loyalty to the UK
and wondered whether Fiji would be better off moving to full independence rather
than remain in a relationship doomed to fail under the pressure of economic self-
interest on Britain’s part. London promised to give its position in writing (137). It
also agreed to send a senior official to Fiji to assess for himself the degree of
agreement the two parties had reached on outstanding issues, the electoral system
among them, before a new constitutional conference could be held.
In August 1969 representatives of the Alliance and Federation parties began a
series of informal, confidential talks about a new constitution for Fiji 108 to identify
areas of agreement and disagreement. In an atmosphere marked by cordiality, the
leaders talked frankly and freely about their concerns and fears. Patel, who died just
over a month after attending the first meeting, pressed his case for a common roll
and immediate independence. He was succeeded by Siddiq Koya, also a lawyer by
training. He was less doctrinally or ideologically committed to a common roll, and
more conciliatory and pragmatic. Mara’s relations with Koya were cordial, as they
never had been with Patel.109 Having grown up at the dawn of Gandhi’s anti-colonial
movement, and deeply influenced by its philosophy, Patel was committed to the idea
of a non-racial society to the point of stubbornness. Koya, on the other hand,
accepted the reality on the ground and sought to work within its parameters and
constraints whereas his predecessor sought to change them.
Between August 1969 and March 1970, the confidential meetings identified many
areas of agreement: on the protection of Fijian interests in an upper house, on
moving straight to dominion status without going through an interim period of
internal self-government, and on citizenship. The idea of an upper house and a move
straight into independence within the Commonwealth may have originated with the
Federation Party. The outstanding issue remained the method of election. By
October Mara was telling the governor that the existing 1966 constitution ‘was now
outlived and we should proceed as soon as possible to full independence’. But while
talking amicably to Indian leaders, Mara was not averse to playing the nationalist
card with an eye to extracting as many concessions from Britain as possible. It was
the UK which had brought Indians to Fiji, he said on one occasion, and their fate was
London’s responsibility, not that of the Fijian people. The United Kingdom ‘had
better see that arrangements reached left Fijians in control or there would be real
trouble in the country’ (141).
Sir Leslie Monson, deputy under-secretary of state at the FCO whose departmental
responsibilities included the Pacific and Indian Ocean, visited Fiji on what was
officially presented as a familiarisation tour in October 1969. Before leaving, he told
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Lord Shepherd, the minister of state, that for moral and ‘realistic’ reasons, the UK
should strive for a constitutional arrangement that left the Fijians in control. His
justifications were almost identical to those of Julian Amery in 1960. The realistic
argument was that the dominance of Fijians in the police and armed forces and their
ability, if they were so minded, to create an ‘intolerable security situation’, could not
be discounted in any political discussion. And the moral argument was the
connection with the Deed of Cession. Disadvantaging the Indians in such an
arrangement was potentially risky, but it was the lesser risk of the two (142). A draft
about Fiji policy was also prepared for the Cabinet’s Defence and Oversea Policy
Committee. Here the options open to the UK were examined in detail. Independence
on the basis of Fijian paramountcy was recommended. ‘[W]e will not in the end be
able to justify, either in conscience, or in political terms, in our own country, a
solution that does not ensure that independence will leave Fijians in control.’ Indians
would have to be content with strong constitutional protection of their basic human
rights. But the pace towards independence was not to be forced. Time should be
allowed for a possible reconciliation of Fijian and Indian differences (143). The draft
did not go to the Committee, it being decided that Monson should visit Fiji first and
then report back. But the recommendation in favour of independence on the basis of
Fijian paramountcy had one significant consequence. Officials believed that the
Indian government would in all probability resent this decision. They would see it as
consigning Fiji’s Indians to the status of second-class citizens. They might also think
they had been misled, deliberately, by the UK. The FCO was confident the UK could
manage any Indian protests but also decided now was the time to disengage from any
further consultation with India about Fiji’s affairs. From New Delhi, the UK high
commissioner concurred. The Indian connection had outlived its usefulness to the
UK.110
In Fiji, Monson held a series of meetings with representatives of both the Alliance
and Federation parties (144), and heard a range of essentially entrenched views, with
some exceptions. Perhaps the great change was the increased willingness of the
Federation Party to compromise. The personal chemistry between Ratu Mara and
Koya was an important factor in the new equation. Afraid that London might force
some variation of a common roll on Fiji, Mara hinted that the country might ‘go to
independence on the present constitution’. The Federation Party had not abandoned
its common roll platform, but the urgency was gone. In a secret discussion paper
(147), the party proposed adopting Fijian customs and traditions as national
traditions as a mark of respect for things indigenous, an upper house (made up of 13
hereditary seats occupied by the direct descendants of those who had ceded Fiji to
Britain, and 15 others of whom 5 had to be indigenous Fijians), and an elected
indigenous Fijian head of state.
Monson’s report on his trip covered several themes. The Fijian economy was self-
sustaining, with consequential reduction in the political temperature; there was
greater rapport between the two main political parties and their leaders, and it was
appropriate for the UK to step aside while political leaders sought mutually
acceptable solutions to their problems. But Mara’s personality was beginning to
cause concern. He had a ‘habit of evading discussions which run contrary to his pre-
conceived and ill-tutored ideas’ (147, 148, 149) and he seemed personally insecure.
Fijian leaders growing impatient with his authoritarian style of leadership might in
time contemplate ‘ditching’ him ‘for a less complex and more self-confident Fijian’.
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And he seemed to be turning against the UK because the FCO would not contemplate
a defence agreement with Fiji to maintain internal security (151).
To FCO officials Mara’s behaviour was becoming erratic, in contrast to his earlier
amiability (56, 71, 110). They commented on his moodiness, and his deeply held
grievances against real and imaginary wrongs. But his more recent confidence and
assertion of independence were the result of his steadily growing stature, and a sense
of personal indispensability to ongoing dialogue about Fiji’s future. His warming
relations with Indian leaders lessened (though did not completely remove) the need
for outside mediation. With Federation concessions coming unexpectedly and all his
main fears allayed, particularly in regard to a common roll, Mara needed the UK less
now than in the past. His growing confidence in his own authority—he was opposed
to his fellow Alliance ministers meeting Monson—and his warm relations with the
opposition were reflected in his call (it was not heeded) for the penultimate
constitutional conference to be held in Fiji itself, not London.
Over the early months of 1970 the inter-party talks produced a large measure of
consensus among the leaders. On the most contentious issue which had long divided
the two parties, the electoral system, the Federation agreed it would present its case
in London, but would not wreck the conference over it by suggesting that between
independence and the next elections, an independent commission might be
appointed to examine the subject and make recommendations for the future. This
was postponing the problem, Koya admitted, but he would be the ‘last one to destroy
his bi-partisan attitude towards the inception of common roll’.111 Other Federation
concessions were in the offing, initiated by them, Mara told Sir Robert Foster, rather
than demanded by the Alliance (150). Fiji should proceed to dominion status (153)
soon after the constitutional conference in London, with the office of chief minister
and the Council of Ministers replaced by the office of prime minister and Cabinet.
The question of electoral boundaries and method of election would be settled after
independence.
Fiji would go into independence without holding an election. ‘It is fully
appreciated by the Opposition that this proposal gives a position of advantage to the
Government of the day’, Mara informed Sir Robert Foster. ‘They accept this and have
said they will fully support a Prime Minister during the period when final details are
being worked out, particularly with regard to elections’ (150). This was the outcome
that the Fijian leaders and the UK had long wanted: Fijian leaders, in control, taking
Fiji into independence. When a surprised governor probed him about the
concessions he had made, Koya explained that he proposed the idea of an election
after independence because he did not want the prevailing cordial atmosphere
disrupted, that he wanted a completely successful conference (unlike 1965), that he
‘thoroughly trusted’ Mara, and that he preferred to go into independence with him
rather than someone else an election might throw up. As for a common roll, Koya
said he understood the Alliance leader’s position and would be happy if ‘Mara would
say that although it is not possible to have it now, it is not ruled out for all time and
in 5, 10, or 15 years it will probably be possible’.
London was satisfied with the outcome of the intra-party talks (152) and accepted
Mara’s proposal. Issues which had provoked much discussion in the past few years—
some form of associated statehood, a Bahamas-style constitution, a defence
arrangement with the UK, external defence or internal security of an independent
Fiji—could now be resolved. And to address concerns voiced in the Defence and
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Oversea Policy Committee about constitutional arrangements which might lead to
racial troubles at some future date, steps were taken to ascertain whether the
agreement between the two parties was guaranteed. Mara’s and Koya’s invitation for
a UK minister to visit Fiji was accepted, and Lord Shepherd went out in late January
1970 to obtain ‘clear, firm and public statements of their agreement’ about
independence (153). Shepherd left with instructions about Britain’s refusal to engage
in any defence or internal security arrangement with Fiji, and an expectation that the
UK and Fiji governments would share equally in the compensation scheme which
would be needed for pensionable expatriate officers in the public service (154). The
FCO was also of the view that Fiji did not require budgetary aid, that development aid
would continue on a renegotiated basis, and that there would be no question of a
special ‘dowry’ at independence. 112
Shepherd met with a wide cross-section of the community, especially members of
the Council of Chiefs (155) who reiterated to him familiar and perennial fears and
concerns. As expected, the minister found out that the sticking point between the
two parties was the method of election. The Alliance was adamantly opposed to the
introduction of any form of common roll. The Federation Party presented its case,
but Koya had already informed the governor where he stood on the issue. It proposed
to Shepherd that more time was needed to study the various proposals the two
parties had produced on the composition of the legislature and the method of
election. If they were unable to agree on a mutually acceptable formula at the
conference, Fiji should contest the first election after independence on a formula
approved and settled by the British government. The Alliance agreed, as did
Shepherd.
But Shepherd wanted to ensure, in advance, that both the Alliance and the
Federation parties understood clearly what that formula would be. If ‘no agreement
was reached and circumstances remained as at present,’ Shepherd told the leaders,
elections would take place under the provisions of the existing constitution (156).
This of course was the same constitution which the Federation Party had rejected
and had staged a walkout against in 1967. The death of Patel, Shepherd noted, was a
major factor in the Federation’s changed stance. Patel was steadfast in his
commitment to a common roll, and would not have accepted a constitution which
did not make at least a token movement towards that goal.
The final constitutional conference was held in London in April 1970. Before the
leaders gathered, the FCO prepared a series of briefs on issues which which still
needed to be resolved, such as the status of Rotuman and Banaban people in an
independent Fiji, the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement, a general compensation
scheme for pensionable expatriate officers, defence arrangements, and membership
of the Commonwealth (158–166). The words spoken at the opening session at
Marlborough House by both parties alluded to racial harmony, nation-building,
common future, gratitude to the UK and close links to the Crown, trust, mutual
understanding, and good will (167). 1965 seemed a distant, faded memory, along
with the political turbulence which had accompanied the enactment of the 1966
constitution and marred race relations in the country. Shepherd queried the over-
representation of the General voters in Mara’s proposal for the composition of the
House of Representatives (168). Their over-representation, Mara said, was a
reflection of their preponderant contribution to the economy. He did not mention
that General Electors nearly always sided with the Fijians.
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On a common roll, Mara resumed his old tune: common roll was a ruse for Indian
domination of Fiji, Fijians would never accept it. ‘These fears are like the devil. Many
people can prove that there is no devil, yet people are fearful of devils’, he had said on
another occasion.113 The Federation Party presented its case for a common roll, and
expected Shepherd, who chaired the conference proceedings, to impress upon the
Alliance the need to make at least some token gesture towards accepting it. The
Alliance refused, as it had always said it would, and Shepherd, seeking the middle
path, proposed that everyone accept a common roll as a long-term objective. The
Federation Party, in particular its general secretary K C Ramrakha, protested about
being misrepresented. The introduction of a common roll was their immediate, not
long-term, objective. For them to sign a document to that effect would be a betrayal
of their party’s founding principle (169).
But protest was symbolic, although Ramrakha was one of the very few in his party
who genuinely believed in the common roll cause. Both London and Suva knew
where the party leader stood. To break the impasse, Shepherd resurrected the idea of
a Royal Commission to look into the method of election after independence. Mara
and Koya endorsed the proposal, the latter on the understanding, he later claimed,
that the recommendations of the Commission would be binding.
Despite the warm words spoken at the opening session, the conference turned out
to be difficult in other ways. On defence, internal security and development aid, Mara
and Koya believed Fiji was entitled to more assistance than the UK was initially
prepared to give. In justification they argued that Fiji had no experience of internal
self-government. The country was progressing immediately to independence, with
no intermediate stage. Differences over the constitution impinged on defence and
development questions. Shepherd described the overall atmosphere at the
conference as ‘delicate and brittle’ in appealing to Judith Hart, minister for overseas
development, to be more flexible over Britain’s offer of capital aid for development
purposes (170, 171). Negotiations over defence aid—financial assistance for Fiji’s
security forces—were more protracted, and extended beyond independence in
October 1970 (177). The possibility that the UN Committee of 24 might want to
satisfy itself about the independence settlement by sending a Visiting Mission to Fiji,
did not in the event materialise (172, 174, 176). Abroad, New Zealand, closely
involved with Fiji because of a long-standing agreement to train the local armed
forces, expressed itself generally satisfied with the result of the independence
conference, and gratified that London had not forced the pace. Wellington, though,
appeared to share UK disappointment that Australia seemed little interested in Fiji
(175). Fiji’s other post-conference concern, especially after June 1970 when a
Conservative government returned to power in the UK, was with the implications for
the sugar industry of another round of negotiations for Britain to join the EEC (178,
179). The US had a nuclear test monitoring station in Fiji. Its existence was known to
Fiji ministers but not to the general public. The UK thought it prudent to leave
future discussions about it to Fiji and the US (180).
Two days before Fiji became independent on 10 October 1970—exactly ninety-six
years from the date when it had become a British Crown colony—Foster penned his
last despatch as governor. In it, he tried to capture the mood of the moment, the
sometimes tumultuous events which had led to it, embroiled it in conflict and
tension, and offered his prognosis on what the future held for the young nation
(181). ‘Seldom can a country have prepared for independence with such aplomb,’ he
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told London. However, the diverse people of Fiji ‘do not yet seem to think of
themselves as a nation’, and Julian Amery’s words about the difference between the
two main communities, written a decade ago, still retained some salience. Foster
commented on those aspects which had facilitated the smooth transition to
independence: the sobering effects of the 1968 by-elections, the compromising
posture of Siddiq Koya and his amicable relations with Mara, a keen appreciation of
the realities on the ground—about who controlled the army and the police force, and
the ‘fluffing’ of the electoral issue. The future looked reasonably bright: the civil
service was professional and apolitical, the security forces efficient and in good
morale, and industrial relations were stable.
But there were hints of dark clouds over the horizon as well. The land problem—
not ownership but leasing arrangements—remained as intractable as ever. And the
second major problem, unresolved at the conference, shelved, to be confronted after
independence, was the electoral system. ‘One is therefore bound to regret that in
effect a time bomb will lie buried in the new Constitution, and to pray that it may be
defused before exploding. The two parties have however publicly committed
themselves to an act of faith which must give reasonable ground for hope.’
Reasonable hope: that was all that could be hoped for as Fiji took its first tentative
steps into an independent future.
* * * *
V. Postscript
It is customary for country volumes in the BDEEP series to end at independence.
This volume on Fiji follows convention in that the final document is Foster’s eve-of-
independence despatch. But in Fiji’s case also, it seems not inappropriate to say a few
words about the wider significance of the constitutional settlement at independence.
In 1975, a Royal Commission was appointed with Professor Harry Street as
chairman, and recommended moving away from a communal roll to a system of
proportional representation using the STV (Single Transferable Vote).114 But the
Alliance, now firmly in control, refused to consider the report, refused even to have it
discussed in parliament. The National Federation Party cried foul, but it appears the
Federation leaders, with a few exceptions, did not mind Alliance’s about-face on its
commitment given at Marlborough House. They now accepted the argument that, in
view of the declining Indian numbers,115 guaranteed racial representation was in
their long-term interest. And it seems they were encouraged to accept this view by
India.
The final constitution was in its most fundamental aspects an extension of the
principles and interests which underpinned the 1966 constitution. It preserved the
status quo: paramountcy for Fijians, privilege for Europeans and parity for Indians.
The constitution provided for a bi-cameral legislature. The Upper House (called
Senate) explicitly recognised the principle of paramountcy. Of its 22 seats, 8 were
occupied by the nominees of the Council of Chiefs, 7 by the nominees of the prime
minister, 6 by the nominees of the leader of the opposition and 1 for the Council of
Rotuma. Given that both the prime minister and the leader of the opposition both
included indigenous Fijians among their nominees, Fijians comprised more than
half the Senate at any given time.
More important than numbers, the nominees of the Council of Chiefs were given
the power of veto over all legislation affecting Fijian interests. Section 68 of the
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independence constitution required the consent of the Council of Chiefs’ nominees
for the passage of any legislation covering the Fijian Affairs Ordinance, the Native
Land Trust Ordinance, the Fijian Development Ordinance, the Rotuma Ordinance,
the Agricultural Landlord and Tenant Ordinance, the Banaban Land and Settlement
Ordinance and the Rotuma Land Ordinance. Fijian interests were given such
watertight protection that no one apart from Fijian chiefs could alter or amend
legislation pertaining to them.
The lower house, called the House of Representatives, comprised 52 seats, with 22
each for Fijians and Indians and eight for General Electors (Europeans, Part-
Europeans, Chinese and ‘Others’). The principle of parity between Fijians and
Indians was maintained even though, at the time, Indians comprised 50 per cent of
the population and Fijians 44 per cent. So was the principle of European privilege.
Comprising only 4 per cent of the population, the General Electors were allocated
15.4 per cent of the seats in the House of Representatives. General Elector over-
representation was a concern for the UK which wanted it substantially reduced, but
Mara objected, and threatened to resign from public life after returning to Fiji from
the London conference if the UK persisted. Given their historical association with the
Fijians, and the record of their political alignment, the Fijians could always count on
the General Electors for support.
Of the 22 seats reserved each for Fijians and Indians, 12 were to be contested on
communal roll and ten on national roll, the new name for the old cross-voting seats
following the Tanganyika model. The General Electors had 8 seats, 5 national and 3
communal. The national seats gave advantage to the Fijian and General Electors—
the Federation Party had not won a single cross-voting seat in the 1966 elections.
The logic of the electoral arrangements was clear. If a political party was able to keep
its ethnic base intact and split the opposition’s, its victory was assured. In this, the
Alliance was consistently more successful than the Federation Party.
The logic of the electoral system adopted at independence was that the voters of
Fiji would continue to vote on racial lines. A racially-based electoral system
engendered racial voting, inevitably at the expense of the greater national good. Fiji
after independence was not a ‘nation’ of diverse peoples with common hopes and
aspirations but a coalition of competing ethnicities with their own communal
agendas. Elections came to be seen not as contests between political parties with
competing ideologies, but as zero-sum racial contests. An election lost was thus seen
as a loss for a ‘race’. But despite the constitutional obstacles, Fiji experienced social
and economic changes in the post-independence era that threatened its political
edifice constructed on the pillars of racial separation. Modern education broadened
horizons across the racial divide. Urbanisation and the gradual penetration of the
market economy into the hinterland of the country wrought changes in values and
expectations. The demands of modern multi-racial living in the country’s urban
centres, and the pressures of increasing unemployment and a rising cost of living in
a fragile economy dependent on global forces, were producing new outlooks and
habits of thought. Race may have been a fact of life, as Mara said so often, but for
many, it was one among many facts of life.
* * * *
It has been a pleasure and a privilege to work on the Fiji volume of the BDEEP series.
I am particularly indebted to the general editor, Stephen Ashton, for his wise counsel
06-Fiji-Introduction-cpp  10/5/06  6:54 AM  Page lxxviii
NOTES TO INTRODUCTION lxxix
and generous support. He arranged my visits to London and was always there when I
needed assistance. That made all the difference to the success of the project. The staff
of the Institute of Commonwealth Studies which offered me a Senior Research
Fellowship for the duration of my research were exemplary in their kindness and
collegiality. At The National Archives, the best research repository I have ever worked
in, I was invariably received with courtesy. The Australian National University gave
me leave to carry out the research, and my colleagues in the Division of Pacific and
Asian History bore my prolonged periods of absence from Canberra with more good
humour than I expected or was entitled to. But in the aftermath of the tragic
terrorist attacks in July 2005 on the London underground which daily ferried me
from Russell Square to the Archives at Kew, I remember especially all the people who
work on and for London trains and tubes.
Brij V Lal
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100 Norton, ‘Seldom a transition with such aplomb’, pp 170–171.
101 FCO 32/401, no 8, report by Fiji Special Branch on 1968 by-elections, 26 Nov 1968.
102 FCO 32/31, J H Lambert to J D B Shaw, 19 July 1968, on Fiji and Committee of 24.
103 Among them Dr Rusiate Nayacakalou, who was reported by Ratu David Taganivalu to have told Mara
that if the Alliance Party did not lead Fiji to independence, the National Federation Party would. FCO
32/402, Foster to Galsworthy, 2 June 1969.
104 CO 1036/1216, no E/91 Fiji Intelligence Report, Sept 1965.
105 CO 1036/1216, no E 2/88, Fiji Intelligence Report, Sept 1965.
106 Quoted in Fiji Annual Report (1968) p 7. Subsequent Indian high commissioners in Fiji urged the
Federation Party to abandon their demand for a common roll and opt instead for a communal roll and
guaranteed racial representation, especially as the Indian population was declining.
107 FCO 32/401, no 81, G T P Marshall to E J Emery, 1 May 1969.
108 A full set of the transcripts are in possession of the editor.
109 See Mara, The Pacific way, p 97, where he describes Patel as ‘a brilliant lawyer, an eloquent speaker,
a charismatic leader of his party, and doughty opponent’, but with whom political negotiation had ‘proved
difficult, and on occasion impossible’.
110 FCO 32/430, no 74, tel from Sir M James (New Delhi) to FCO, repeated to Foster, 6 Nov 1969.
111 Transcript of the inter-party talks, p 17, Mar 1970, 304.
112 FCO 32/569, FCO brief for secretary of state in Defence and Oversea Policy Committee, 15 Jan 1970.
113 Transcript of the inter-party talks, 23 Jan 1970, p 94.
114 Report of a Royal Commission Appointed for the Purpose of Considering and Making
Recommendations as to the Most Appropriate Method of Electing Members to, and Representing the
People of Fiji in the House of Representatives Fiji, Parliamentary Paper No 24/1975.
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115 After 1956 the growth rate of the Indian population of Fiji began to slow perceptibly. A decrease in
Indian fertility was explained by levels of social and economic development and an increase in the average
age of marriage. Also, the rate of emigration of those of Indian origin increased. Fijian fertility, by
contrast, was now significantly higher than that of the Indian population. The net effect was a forecast that
by the late 1980s, the Fijians would overtake the Fijian citizens of Indian origin as the largest racial group
in Fiji’s population.
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[1–8] lxxxvii
Summary of Documents
Chapter 1
The political and economic background and a cautious approach 
to Fiji’s constitutional evolution
Jan 1955 – Nov 1960
NUMBER SUBJECT PAGE
1955
1 6 Jan 1
1956
2 11 Feb 6
3 20 Mar 7
4 1 Apr 9
5 14 Oct 14
1957
6 16 Jan 19
1959
7 24 June 23
8 14 Aug 24Letter (reply to 7) explaining why in
Fiji’s case giving non-officials experience
of administrative responsibility is a
greater priority than the extension of
the electoral system, + Enclosure: ‘Note
on Tanganyika elections’
P Rogers
to Sir K Maddocks
Letter on possibility of adapting
Tanganyika electoral system to Fiji’s
circumstances
Sir K Maddocks
to P Rogers
Letter on the need for gradual
constitutional advance to avoid racial
conflict
P Rogers
to Sir R Garvey
Letter (reply to 3), + Enclosure: memo,
‘Broad lines on which constitutional
development in Fiji might proceed’
Sir R Garvey
to Sir J Macpherson
Despatch on industrial associations and
local politics
Sir R Garvey
to Mr Lennox-Boyd
Letter (reply to 2), urging cautionSir T Lloyd
to Sir Garvey
Letter recommending ‘mild steps
forward’ in constitutional development
Sir R Garvey
to Sir T Lloyd 
Despatch, ‘General survey’, on the origin
of Fiji as a colony & the general situation
Sir R Garvey
to Mr Lennox-Boyd
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lxxxviii SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS [9–20]
1960
9 21 Apr 28
10 7 Sept 30
11 20 Sept 33
12 4 Nov 35
Chapter 2
Julian Amery’s visit to Fiji and its aftermath: 
multi-racialism as a long-term goal
Nov 1960 – July 1962
1960
13 8 Nov 37
14 8 Nov 39
15 8–10 42
Nov
16 10 Nov 44
17 14 Nov 45
18 15 Nov 48
19 17 Nov 48
20 20 Dec 51Letter on introduction of a member
system
H P Hall
to Sir K Maddocks
Letter requesting governor’s views in
light of recommendations in 13
Sir H Poynton
to Sir K Maddocks
Minute on need in future for clearer
policy statements in relation to Fiji
Mr Fraser
to Mr Macleod
Minute and note on proposals in 13H P Hall & I S Wheatley
Minute, ‘Future of Fiji’, questioning
assumptions in 13
Sir H Poynton
Minutes on racial balance in civil
service & whether appointments or
promotions of Indians should be
delayed
M G Smith, W D
Sweaney, A R Thomas &
Sir H Poynton
Minute on recommendations of Burns
Commission & Mr Amery’s assessment
of the political situation
H P Hall
Note, ‘Policy towards Fiji’, written after
his visit
Mr Amery
Letter on racial balance in civil serviceSir K Maddocks
to H P Hall
Govt of Fiji brief on constitutional
reform, sent in preparation for Mr
Amery’s visit
P D Macdonald
to A R Thomas
Despatch on Fiji’s development planLord Perth
to Sir K Maddocks
Note of meeting between A R Thomas
(CO) & R W Robson (Fiji Times) on
constitutional reform & economic
development
CO
NUMBER SUBJECT PAGE
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[21–35] JULIAN AMERY’S VISIT TO FIJI lxxxix
1961
21 17 Jan 52
22 17 Jan 56
23 20 Jan 59
24 20 Jan 59
25 6 Feb 62
26 13 Feb 63
27 15 Feb 66
28 27 Feb 67
29 28 Feb 69
30 3 Mar 85
31 17 Mar 85
32 21 Mar 87
33 7 Apr 88
34 11 Apr 89
35 17 Apr 92Letter (reply to 22) on monopoly
companies, suggesting tighter
accounting procedures
H P Hall
to Sir K Maddocks
Letter on racial balance in civil serviceA R Thomas
to Sir K Maddocks
Letter (reply to 31) on universal adult
suffrage & the apparent lack of
enthusiasm for constitutional reform by
all except the Indians
Sir K Maddocks
to H P Hall
Savingram on a CD&W award for Fijian
scholarships
Mr Macleod
to officer 
administering Fiji 
government
Letter on question of universal adult
suffrage
H P Hall
to Sir K Maddocks
Letter (reply to 27) welcoming
extension of franchise to women
H P Hall
to Sir K Maddocks
Letter, ‘Fiji: review of affairs’, on
current position & future policy
Sir K Maddocks
to Mr Macleod
Statement on Fiji government’s
proposals for constitutional reform
Sir K Maddocks
Letter on resolution of Fijian Affairs
Board to extend franchise to women
Sir K Maddocks
to Mr Macleod
Despatch on structure of the civil
service & retention of a racial 
balance
Sir K Maddocks
to Mr Macleod
Letter (reply to 21) on the changes
proposed & a government statement
H P Hall
to Sir K Maddocks
Savingram applying for a scholarships
grant, + Annex
Sir K Maddocks
to Mr Macleod
Letter on interim financial support for
Fijian scholarships
F W Atwell (CO)
to D W Overington
(Treasury)
Letter on allegations of monopoly
practices by foreign companies in Fiji
E R Bevington
to H P Hall
Letter (reply to 20) on the introduction
of a member system & the composition
of the Legislative Council
Sir K Maddocks
to H P Hall
NUMBER SUBJECT PAGE
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xc SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS [36–49]
1961
36 1 May 92
37 12 July 96
38 12–13 98
July
39 21 July 100
40 8–10 119
Aug
41 2 Oct 121
42 3 Oct 123
43 28 Oct 125
44 Nov 130
45 10 Nov 131
1962
46 28 Apr 132
47 10 May 134
48 19 June 135
49 3–13 144
July
Minutes on future policy in Fiji, in
context of talks with other powers about
colonial territories in Pacific
J E Marnham, 
A R Thomas & 
Sir H Poynton
Despatch on Fijian opposition to
introduction of local government, fears
about Indian domination, & concern
that UK protection might be lost
Sir K Maddocks 
to Mr Maudling
Letter on Fijian paramounctyA C Reid
to I S Wheatley
Letter on Fijian paramounctyA C Reid
to I S Wheatley
Despatch (reply to 43)Mr Maudling
to Sir K Maddocks
Note on outcome of discussions over
constitutional reform
Pacific & Indian Ocean
Dept, CO
Letter on Fijian opposition to
membership system & divisions over
composition of Legislative Council
Sir K Maddocks 
to Mr Maudling
Letter reporting a discussion with Ratu
Mara about Fiji’s problems
H P Hall
to Sir K Maddocks
Letter reporting meeting with Andrew
Deoki on Indian perspectives on
constitutional reform
H P Hall
to Sir K Maddocks
Minutes on local reactions to
constitutional reform
H P Hall & A R Thomas
Letter from acting governor on local
reactions to constitutional reform
P D Macdonald
to Mr Macleod
Minutes on Fijian veto over
constitutional reform
Sir H Poynton & 
H P Hall
Note of meeting with Sir K Maddocks
on ways of overcoming monopoly held
by the Carpenter, Morris Hedstrom &
Burns Philip group
CO
Letter on debate in Legislative Council
on constitutional reform
E R Bevington
to H P Hall
NUMBER SUBJECT PAGE
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[50–60] FIJIAN ASPIRATIONS xci
1962
50 4 July 147
51 19 July 149
52 31 July 151
Chapter 3
Fijian aspirations, national interests and attempted solutions
Oct 1962–May 1965
1962
53 10 Oct 152
54 18 Oct 163
55 12 Nov 164
56 14 Nov 164
57 4 Dec 165
58 6 Dec 167
59 18 Dec 168
1963
60 Jan 170Memo, ‘Political future of Fiji’,
presented to Mr Fisher during his visit
Fijian Western
Democratic Party
Minute on Mr Fisher’s brief for his visit
to Fiji
J E Marnham
Minute (reply to 57)C S Roberts
to I S Wheatley
Minute asking whether the position of
Indians in Fiji is similar to that of the
Chinese in Malaya
I S Wheatley
to C S Roberts 
(Far East Dept, CO)
Letter (reply to 55), denying existence
of a pact
Sir R Garvey
to J E Marnham
Letter on 54 to former governor,
requesting information about the
alleged secret pact
J E Marnham
to Sir R Garvey
Letter on an alleged secret pact between
the Fijians and the UK
P D Macdonald
to J E Marnham
Despatch (reply to 52), arguing in
favour of gradual change & opposing a
statement about a multi-racial state, +
Appendix A: Proposed statement on
constitutional reform, & Appendix B:
Note on land use
Sir K Maddocks
to Mr Sandys
Letter on future of Fiji, arguing that
indefinite recognition of Fijian
paramountcy is impracticable
Mr Sandys
to Sir K Maddocks
Letter on introduction of provisions for
human rights in Fiji constitution
J E Marnham
to Sir K Maddocks
Letter reporting a meeting with R B
Carpenter on Carpenters’ monopoly
J E Marnham
to Sir K Maddocks
NUMBER SUBJECT PAGE
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xcii SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS [61–72]
1963
61 10 Jan 174
62 12 Jan 175
63 16 Jan 176
64 17 Jan 178
65 18 Jan 179
66 9 Apr 181
67 8 May 187
68 15 Aug 189
69 15 Oct 190
70 [Dec] 192
1964
71 19 Mar 194
72 9 Apr 195Letter (reply to 71)J E Marnham
to Ratu Mara
Letter reflecting on relations between
Fijians and Indians
Ratu Mara
to J E Marnham
Confidential note on Fiji’s future
relationship with the UK and the
member system
J N Falvey
Letter on emergence of Ratu Mara as
the leading Fijian political figure
P D Macdonald
to J E Marnham
Despatch on a proposal to convene a
constitutional conference
Mr Sandys
to Sir K Maddocks
Minutes on 66Cabinet (Official)
Committee on Future 
Policy in Pacific
meeting
Note, ‘Future policy in Fiji’, + Annex D:
Estimated voting strengths based on
universal adult suffrage
CO
for Cabinet (Official)
Committee on Future 
Policy in Pacific
Note, ‘Strategic importance and
security of the Pacific Islands Region’,
on a note by the US State Dept, +
Annex: Islands of strategic importance
CO
for Cabinet (Official) 
Committee on Future 
Policy in Pacific
Memo on Fijian rights (the ‘Wakaya
Letter’) presented to Mr Fisher during
his visit
Fijian Affairs Board
Memo, ‘Suva Indian Chamber of
Commerce’, presented to Mr Fisher
during his visit by president and
secretary of Chamber
M M Narsey & K J Patel
Memo, ‘Fijian Cane Growers’ Industrial
Congress’, presented to Mr Fisher
during his visit by the president &
general secretary of the Congress
Ratu Latianara &
Tomasi Vunisina
Memo, ‘Future development of Fiji’,
presented to Mr Fisher during his visit
H G Nicholls (chief
inspector, Fiji, Colonial
Sugar Refining
Company)
NUMBER SUBJECT PAGE
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[73–84] FIJIAN ASPIRATIONS xciii
1964
73 31 Aug 195
1965
74 18 Jan 200
75 Mar 206
76 27 Apr 212
77 27 Apr 213
78 27 Apr 214
79 28 Apr 215
80 Apr 216
81 Apr 221
82 30 Apr 223
83 1 May 225
84 6 May 229Letter (reply to 82)Sir D Jakeway
to Mr Patel
Press release on Mrs White’s comments
at a press conference on arrangements
and issues at the forthcoming
constitutional conference on London
Public Relations Office,
Suva
Letter arguing he is not in breach of
collective responsibility in his criticism
of Fiji Broadcasting Commission
Mr Patel 
to Sir D Jakeway
Brief N, ‘The Channel Islands and the
Isle of Man’, in preparation for Mrs
White’s visit to Fiji
CO
or Mrs White
Brief A, ‘General economic and
constitutional background’, in
preparation for Mrs White’s visit to Fiji
CO
for Mrs White
Minute on 76CO
for Mr Greenwood
Letter on 76, + Annex: Fiji government
press release
Sir D Jakeway 
to Mr Patel
& Mr Madhavan
Tel (reply to 76)Trafford Smith
to Sir D Jakeway
Tel on an attack by Federation Party on
the Fiji government Public Relations
Office & the Fiji Broadcasting
Commission
Sir D Jakeway
to Trafford Smith
Note, ‘Interviews with political leaders
in Fiji’, after a visit & ahead of a visit by
Mrs White
Trafford Smith
Report, ‘Fijian Association’, of a
meeting on 16 Jan, + Annex: 
translation of presidential address by
Ratu Mara
Fiji Special Branch
Letter on land tenure, + Enclosure: CO
brief
Trafford Smith
to Sir D Jakeway
NUMBER SUBJECT PAGE
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xciv SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS [85–98]
Chapter 4
The London constitutional conference
and its aftermath
July 1965–Sept 1967
1965
85 July 231
86 July 236
87 26 July 238
88 July 244
89 9 Aug 249
90 9 Aug 252
91 17 Aug 261
92 21 Sept 264
93 24 Sept 268
94 15 Nov 269
95 15 Nov 271
96 17 Nov 271
97 30 Nov 272
98 14 Dec 275Letter (reply to 97) suggesting contacts
who can advise on multi-racialism &
party organisation
Trafford Smith
to Sir D Jakeway
Letter on Indian reaction to London
conference & the need for a multi-racial
alliance
Sir D Jakeway
to Trafford Smith
Letter on discussions with Ratu Mara
on racial co-operation
A J Fairclough (Suva)
to Trafford Smith
Letter on issue of Indian emigration
from Fiji
H P Hall
to Sir D Jakeway
Letter on problems caused in Fiji by
emigration to Commonwealth countries
& the US
H P Hall
to Sir D Jakeway
Minute (reply to 92) on the strategic
aspects
Mr Stewart
to Mr Greenwood
Minute on reorganisation of South
Pacific Commission & strategic
interests in the Pacific
Mr Greenwood
to Mr Stewart (FO)
Letter criticising performance of Indian
delegation at London conference
Trafford Smith
to P D Macdonald
Report on London conferenceC B Nixon (conference
secretary)
Closing addresses by Mr Greenwood &
Sir D Jakeway
Fiji constitutional
conference
Note at London conference, on
arguments in favour of a common roll
Indian (Federation)
Group
Opening addresses by Mr Greenwood,
Ratu Mara, Mr Patel & Mr Falvey
Fiji constitutional
conference
Note for London conference on Fijian
Affairs
CO
Note for London conference, on views of
Fiji delegates on the Legislative Council
CO
NUMBER SUBJECT PAGE
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[99–110] LONDON CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE xcv
1966
99 8 Mar 276
100 27 Apr 277
101 18 July 279
102 11 Nov 282
103 15 Dec 285
1967
104 18 Jan 290
105 31 Jan 291
106 21 Mar 294
107 31 Mar 295
108 Apr 297
109 20 June 312
110 15 Sept 314Minute on issues to be discussed with
Ratu Mara during his visit to London as
part of a world tour
Sir A Galsworthy
to Mr Thomson
Minute, ‘Fiji integration proposals’, in
preparation for a meeting with Ratu
Mara
A J Fairclough
to Mr Bowden
Notes, ‘Pacific Islands talks’, on four-
power talks in Washington on the
future of the Pacific
Commonwealth Office
Letter on emigration, rejecting
emigration restrictions but considering
bonds or sureties from emigrants
trained at government expense
Trafford Smith
to Sir D Jakeway
Letter on Alliance government & local
government elections
A J Fairclough 
to Sir D Jakeway
Savingram, ‘Fiji development plan
1966-1970’, questioning economic
assumptions underlying the plan
Mr Bowden
to officer 
administering Fiji 
government
Minute, ‘Membership of the Executive
Council’, on the unexpected outcome of
the 1966 election & the Indian reaction
[Extract]
Trafford Smith
to Sir A Galsworthy
Despatch on first elections under new
constitution & outlook for Fiji, +
Minute by A J Fairclough
Sir D Jakeway
to Mr Lee
Savingram, ‘Fiji and the United Nations’FO
to diplomatic posts
Brief on staffing problems in HMOCS,
prepared for Mr Lee’s Pacific tour, +
Annex: Supplementary note on views of
Fiji Senior Civil Servants Association
Ministry of Overseas
Development (ODM)
Letter (reply to 99)A J Coles
to C A Axworthy
Letter on emigration from FijiC A Axworthy (CO)
to A J Coles (FO)
NUMBER SUBJECT PAGE
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xcvi SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS [111–122]
Chapter 5
The Alliance government: experiment and experience
Jan 1968–Sept 1969
1968
111 11 Jan 316
112 26 Feb 323
113 29 Apr 330
114 28 May 332
115 10 July 334
116 18 July 335
117 30 July 336
118 13 Aug 337
119 Aug 338
120 26 Aug 348
121 10 Sept 349
122 6 Nov 351Address of loyalty to Her Majesty the
Queen
Council of Chiefs, Suva
Letter refuting claims made by Mr Patel
in his presidential address to Federation
Party
J H Lambert (UN
Political Dept, FO)
to J D B Shaw (UK 
Mission to UN,
New York)
Letter on Australian aid to FijiSir C Johnston
(Canberra)
to J C Morgan
Report on a visit to Fiji, suggesting
alternatives to communal
representation [Extract]
Professor Stanley de
Smith
Note of meeting with Sir R Foster on
future of Fiji
Commonwealth Office
Note, ‘Fiji and Australia’, on Australian
aid
Commonwealth Office
Minute on meeting with Sir R Foster,
governor-designate of Fiji
T C D Jerrom
Minute on the prospect of a UN Visiting
Mission going to Fiji
Sir A Galsworthy
Letter on Government of India concerns
over the Legislative Council in Fiji, the
sugar industry and cane growers
A J Fairclough
to D L Cole 
(New Delhi)
Letter on merger of Commonwealth
Office & FO, expressing concern about a
betrayal of dependent territories
Sir D Jakeway
to Sir M James
Brief, ‘Fiji: Overseas Aid Scheme’, +
Annex A: ‘Pacific territories—expatriate
staffing’
Commonwealth Office
Despatch, ‘Fiji: the Alliance Party
government’, on the 1966 general
election & the government’s handling
of industrial relations
Sir D Jakeway
to Mr Thomson
NUMBER SUBJECT PAGE
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[123–133] THE ALLIANCE GOVERNMENT xcvii
1968
123 12 Nov 352
124 15 Nov 356
125 26 Nov 358
126 10 Dec 364
1969
127 4 Feb 369
128 2 Apr 370
129 9 Apr 372
130 2 May 375
131 9 May 378
132 19 May 385
133 19 May 387Minute on Ratu Sir K Mara’s doubts
about democracy & multi-racialism in
Fiji, + Enclosure: ‘Electoral
arrangements for the Legislative
Council in Fiji’
E J Emery
to Sir A Galsworthy
Record of meeting between Ratu Sir K
Mara on the chief minister’s knighthood
& the political situation in Fiji
FCO
Letter (reply to 130), on discussion with
Ratu Mara before chief minister’s visit
to London, + Enclosure: Notes by
Foster of a meeting with Mara at
Government House, 4 May
Sir R Foster
to J C Morgan
Letter (reply to 129), on the electoral
system, an upper house & the next
constitutional steps
J C Morgan
to Sir R Foster
Letter on talks with Mr Patel & Ratu
Mara on Fiji’s status & constitution
Sir R Foster
to J C Morgan
Minute ‘Constitutional development in
Fiji’, on problem of reconciling
Westminster pattern of government and
opposition with electoral safeguards for
Fijians
T C D Jerrom
to G T P Marshall
Letter on electoral system, reporting
conflicting views of ‘Kaul formula’
G P Lloyd
to T C D Jerrom
Letter on post by-election situation, +
Enclosure: Extract from ‘Report on
Fijian views expressed in the regional
meetings of the Fijian Association’
G P Lloyd
to Sir A Galsworthy
Inward savingram, ‘1968 Indian by-
elections’, + Enclosure: Report by Fiji
Special Branch (30 Sept)
G P Lloyd
to Mr Stewart
Letter on confidential paper prepared
for Council of Chiefs about internal self-
government, + Enclosure: Extract from
paper
G P Lloyd
to J C Morgan
Letter on political situation following
Federation Party by-election victories, +
Enclosures
Sir D Jakeway
to Sir A Galsworthy
NUMBER SUBJECT PAGE
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xcviii SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS [134–145]
1969
134 20 May 389
135 6 June 390
136 11 June 393
137 11 June 394
138 7 Aug 396
139 2 Sept 398
140 16 Sept 401
Chapter 6
Towards independence,
Oct 1969–Apr 1970
1969
141 3 Oct 403
142 10 Oct 405
143 16 Oct 406
144 29 Oct 412
–1 Nov
145 31 Oct 417Note of meeting between Sir L Monson
& representatives of Fiji staff
associations about service concerns
over the pace of constitutional planning
E J Emery
Records of Sir L Monson’s meetings at
Suva with the political parties, Sir R
Foster & Ratu Sir K Mara
FCO
Draft memo (not submitted) to Cabinet
Defence & Oversea Policy Committee,
advocating measured & patient means
to achieve the goal of independence
under Fijian control
Mr Stewart
Minute, ‘Fiji constitution’, on
independence & Fijian paramountcy
Sir L Monson
to Lord Shepherd
Tel on talks with Ratu Sir K Mara ahead
of Sir L Monson’s visit
Sir R Foster
to J C Morgan
Letter on the presentational aspects of
Sir L Monson’s forthcoming visit to Fiji
E J Emery
to Sir R Foster
Notes, ‘Fiji: the constitution’, on the
attitude of the Alliance Party, the
Federation Party & the UK government
FCO
Savingram on an interview with Mr
Ramrakha on the Indian view of the
political situation
J C Morgan
to Sir R Foster
Letter on the EEC & the defence of
Fijian interests
J E Killick (FCO)
to Ratu Sir K Mara
Letter, ‘Internal security—task and role
of Fiji military forces’
E J Emery
to Sir R Foster
Letter on Ratu Sir K Mara’s talks in
London
J C Morgan
to Sir R Foster
Record of meeting on communal voting
between Sir A Galsworthy & Ratu Sir K
Mara
FCO
NUMBER SUBJECT PAGE
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[146–157] TOWARDS INDEPENDENCE xcix
1969
146 3 Nov 418
147 12 Nov 420
148 17 Nov 424
149 15 Dec 426
150 23 Dec 427
1970
151 2 Jan 431
152 8 Jan 432
153 13 Jan 439
154 16 Jan 441
155 27 Jan 442
156 18 Feb 444
157 11 Mar 454Record of meeting in London with
representatives of the Colonial Sugar
Refining Company on the Denning
award, + Addendum
FCO
Minute on his visit to Fiji, + Annex:
official report on the visit published in
Fiji on 1 Feb
Lord Shepherd
to Mr Stewart
Record of meeting between Lord
Shepherd, Ratu Sir K Mara & the
Council of Chiefs in the Council Board
Room, Suva
FCO
Minutes, ‘Fiji: independence’, on 152Cabinet Defence &
Oversea Policy
Committee meeting
Minute on use of term ‘dominion status’
in the context of Fiji’s independence
H Steel (legal
counsellor, FCO)
to E J Emery
Memo, ‘Fiji: independence’Mr Stewart
for Cabinet Defence
& Oversea Policy
Committee
Letter on the UK’s conditions for the
grant of independence to Fiji
E J Emery
to Sir R Foster
Letter on future of Fiji, on a proposal
that there might not be an election
until after independence, + Appendices
Sir R Foster 
to E J Emery
Minute, ‘Fiji: constitutional advance’,
on the ‘good’ & ‘less satisfactory’ points
in the Fiji situation
Sir L Monson
Report on his visit to Fiji, the character
of Ratu Sir K Mara & the decisions to be
made by the UK government
Sir L Monson
Letter on National Federation Party’s
proposals for a constitutional
conference & Ratu Sir K Mara’s style of
leadership, + Enclosure: Draft NFP
constitutional conference proposals
Sir R Foster
to J C Morgan
Tel, ‘Fiji constitution’, on talks with Fiji
leaders [Extract]
Sir L Monson
to J C Morgan
NUMBER SUBJECT PAGE
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c SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS [158–168]
1970
158 10 Apr 458
159 11 Apr 460
160 11 Apr 463
161 13 Apr 466
162 13 Apr 467
163 13 Apr 469
164 15 Apr 472
165 15 Apr 474
166 17 Apr 475
Chapter 7
The achievement of independence,
Apr–Oct 1970
1970
167 20 Apr 477
168 22 Apr 486Record, ‘Fiji constitutional conference’,
of Lord Shepherd’s joint & separate
meetings with the two parties on a
common electoral roll
FCO
Speeches by Lord Shepherd, Ratu Sir K
Mara & Mr Koya at first plenary session
at Marlborough House
Fiji constitutional
conference
Brief, ‘Defence’, for Fiji constitutional
conference
FCO
Brief, ‘Banaban citizenship and Fiji
independence’, for Fiji constitutional
conference
FCO
Brief, ‘General compensation scheme’
for Fiji constitutional conference, on
compensation arrangements for
expatriate civil servants
FCO
Brief, ‘Banabans and Fiji independence’,
for Fiji constitutional conference
FCO
Brief, ‘Rotumans’, for Fiji constitutional
conference, + Annex: background note
FCO
Brief, ‘Commonwealth membership’, for
Fiji constitutional conference
FCO
Brief, ‘The Commonwealth Sugar
Agreement’, for Fiji constitutional
conference, + Annex A: ‘The Fiji sugar
industry’
FCO
Brief, ‘European Economic
Community’, for Fiji constitutional
conference, + Annex A: Extract from Mr
Brown’s statement to WEU ministers in
1967
FCO
Minute on defence arrangements for
Fiji after independence
E J Emery
to Sir L Monson
NUMBER SUBJECT PAGE
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[169–180] THE ACHIEVEMENT OF INDEPENDENCE ci
1970
169 28 Apr 489
170 29 Apr 490
171 30 Apr 493
172 1 May 494
173 4 May 496
174 12 May 497
175 27 May 500
176 2 July 501
177 31 July 503
178 12 Aug 506
179 14 Aug 510
180 26 Aug 512Minute, ‘Project “Blue Sky”’, on a US
nuclear test monitoring facility in Fiji
G T Marshall
Record of conversation between Mr
Rippon (chancellor of Duchy of
Lancaster) & Ratu Sir K Mara & Mr
Koya on the implications for Fiji of
Britain’s negotiations to join the EEC
FCO
Record of conversation with Ratu Sir K
Mara & Mr Koya on the UK’s
negotiations to join the EEC & the
implications for Fiji’s sugar industry
FCO
Minute, ‘Fiji: defence’, on why UK is
unable to retain responsibility for
external defence or internal security
A B Urwick (Defence
Dept, FCO)
Letter on a proposal that
representatives of the UN Committee of
24 might be invited to attend Fiji’s
independence celebrations
J D B Shaw (UK Mission
to UN, New York)
to E J Emery
Letter on reaction in New Zealand to
approach of Fiji’s independence
Sir A Galsworthy
(Wellington)
to E J Emery
Tel on a discussion on Fiji in UN
Committee of 24 & proposal that a UN
Visiting Mission should visit Fiji
Lord Caradon (New
York)
to FCO
Minute on outcome of Fiji
constitutional conference
E J Emery
Letter on how Ratu Sir K Mara might
address the Committee of 24 at the UN
J D B Shaw (UK Mission
to UN, New York)
to J H Lambert (UN
Political Dept, FCO)
Note of a meeting between Mrs Hart &
Ratu Sir K Mara & Mr Koya on aid to
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1 CO 1036/91, no 7 6 Jan 1955
‘General survey’: despatch from Sir R Garvey to Mr Lennox-Boyd on
the origin of Fiji as a colony and the general situation
I have the honour to address to you this despatch on the affairs of Fiji in pursuance of
the proposal that Governors should write periodic despatches on their territories for
circulation among other Colonial Governors, Ministers, and Her Majesty’s
Ambassadors and High Commissioners, referred to in Sir Thomas Lloyd’s personal
and confidential letter INF 90/151/02 of the 24th June.1 As this is my first despatch of
this kind, I am limiting it to a brief survey of the historical origin of Fiji as a Colony
and the general situation as it exists now because, without this background, it will be
difficult to appreciate the salient features of our particular problems.
2. Fiji is small and remote; and I am sometimes surprised how little is known
about her situation and affairs outside the South-West Pacific. She became a Colony
in 1874, when ceded to Queen Victoria by Ratu Cakobau and the leading Fijian Chiefs
of that time, and since has enjoyed peace and prosperity without any of those
exhibitions of political unrest which, incongruously, is the best way for a Colony to
advertise its existence to the world to-day.
3. Sometimes Fiji is thought to be a single island. In fact it is a group of over 300
islands, about 100 of which are inhabited. The majority of inhabited islands are
small, supporting a predominantly Fijian population in an environment not greatly
different from that before Cession. There are two islands, however, named Viti Levu
and Vanua Levu, where the Fijian way of life is rapidly being replaced by European
and Indian influence. These two islands are the largest in the group and together
form 87 per cent. of the total land mass.
4. In numbers the European population has remained fairly stable, between
4,000 and 7,000 during the past 50 years. Permanent European settlement is small
and, apart from officials, the majority are engaged in commerce and leave the
country during or at the end of their working lives. Indian settlement originated with
the indenture system at the end of the nineteenth century when they were
introduced as a remedy for the labour problems resulting from the lethargy of the
Fijians. The Indians realised the potentialities of Fiji, and most of them preferred to
remain here at the end of their indenture rather than return to the conditions of
squalor and the repressive caste system of India whence they came. They multiplied
and now number 154,000 compared to 139,000 Fijians. It is probable that the
numerical disparity between the two races will become much more marked with the
passage of years because it is only recently that the sex ratio between Indian males
and females has been equalised. Also the percentage of young Indian females is larger
1 Governors were asked in this despatch to submit periodic despatches ‘in a colloquial style’ for circulation
to Cabinet ministers and, in certain cases, among high commissioners and ambassadors. Colonial
questions were said to be attracting increasing attention both at home and abroad and mild complaints
had been expressed by other departments, especially the Foreign Office, about the lack of regular
information concerning developments in colonial territories. Governors were not asked to attempt surveys
of the entire political or economic field at any one time. Instead they were asked to submit appreciations of
a particular situation of current interest. These appreciations were requested ‘not oftener than one every
three months or more seldom than one every six months’ (CO 554/1162, no 1). See also Richard Rathbone,
ed, Ghana part II (BDEEP, 1992) 152.
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than the Fijians, and Indians marry earlier and are more productive. Fiji’s prosperity
is largely the result of their efforts, and they are acquiring an ever increasing
proportion of the Colony’s wealth for themselves. Evidence of this is becoming more
conspicuous every day.
5. The Indian rise to prominence in the affairs of the Colony, and the prospect
that they may soon occupy a position of dominance, is beginning to disturb the
Europeans and Fijians. This disquiet has been most apparent amongst a certain
section of the Europeans2 who find in the Deed of Cession an obligation on Her
Majesty’s Government to preserve Fiji for the Fijians to the exclusion of other
races—with the exception of the Europeans whose presence is justified, in their own
eyes, by their mission to educate the Fijians to assimilate their own civilised ways. In
practice their venom is solely directed against the Indians whom they consider
should be compulsorily repatriated to India without delay. They interpret the Deed of
Cession as a trust reposed in the Crown to ‘rule Fiji justly and affectionately, that the
Fijians may continue to live in peace and prosperity’ in a very narrow sense. As I have
told Mr. A. A. Ragg,3 the principal and rather muddled-headed protagonist of Fijian
rights, the result of ridding the islands of the Indians would be an immediate
disruption of the peace, and probably a final farewell to prosperity; but I do not deny
that a problem exists in adjusting the relationship between the two races in order to
ensure that each has its proper share of the country’s prosperity.
6. One of the reasons that Fiji’s short history as a Colony has been so peaceful is
probably because the spirit of the Deed of Cession has remained as an influence of
primary importance in the administration of Fijian affairs, and this has cemented
into a firm loyalty the natural respect which the Fijians have for the Crown as a
feature akin to their own chiefly system. The act for which they are most grateful is
that which, shortly after Cession, secured them in the ownership of their land by
prohibiting further alienation at a time when they still owned about three quarters of
the five million acres of which the country consists. The administration of this land
is now vested in a Board4 which leases areas outside native reserves, which are being
demarcated to members of other races, chiefly Indians. The Fijians attach very great
importance to their rights of land ownership; and I am sure that it is largely because
of the respect with which their rights have been treated in the past that their
confidence in the Crown remains so firm. Finally the Fijians have been allowed to
develop very much according to their own bent: their customs and traditions have
been respected and the system of government which they themselves enjoy and
which is the only developed system of rural local government in the Colony, is
constructed around foundations with which they are familiar.
7. By nature the Fijian is a hedonist. He is frequently condemned as physically
lethargic and politically inept and, judged by the severe standards of modern times,
he is both. His environment, however, has never demanded sustained effort for a
merely comfortable existence, let alone survival; and his traditional social system—
with its chiefly hierarchy and communal living—has provided stability and security
without having to resort to the ballot box. Unfortunately such standards can only be
2 This disquiet was expressed in a movement to have Fiji federated to New Zealand in the early 1900s.
3 European member of the Legislative Council. 4 The Native Land Trust Board established in 1940.
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retained in isolation, and the isolation of the Fijians has now been destroyed
irrevocably by the Indians. The significance of this fact is only now being generally
realised because, although the Indians have been in Fiji for many years, they have
only recently begun to assert themselves. Previously they have remained subdued,
which has given the Fijians the illusion that their own way of life could be preserved
in spite of Indian penetration. But the numerical and economic superiority of the
Indians are now too conspicuous to be ignored: they have worked themselves into a
position where the political passiveness and natural subjugation of the first
generation, which arose from their humble origin as coolies, has been abandoned.
The new generation is slowly but surely emerging with a core of wealthy, well
educated, ambitious leaders; while the whole race is hard working and progressive.
Their chief weakness is their disunity; but for this, their insistence for more political
power would be more formidable than it has yet become.
8. I hope this review give some idea of the main tensions in Fiji; their focal point
is likely to be land. The past indifference of the Fijian to the Indian, now being
replaced by concern, resulted from the absence of any reason apparent to him why he
should not be indifferent. He retains the ownership of most of the land in the Colony,
and the possession of all that he wants counts good. He derives considerable
pecuniary benefits from the Indian and finds the various services the Indians provide
convenient. But while the Fijians use their lands extravagantly and, by modern
standards, inefficiently, the Indians use any land they can acquire to the best
advantage. So far there has been enough to go round but with a rapidly increasing
population the pinch will come. Thus the problem of paramount importance in Fiji
to-day is to persuade and, if necessary, to adjust the social organisation of the Fijians
so that they can justify the retention of the land which is being put aside for them, at
a time when there is no longer a sufficient surplus to satisfy a growing Indian land
hunger.
9. We have been trying to do this in various ways, none of which have been
entirely successful. There was much enthusiasm amongst the Fijians to form co-
operative societies when the movement started in 1948, but those which were started
tended to be short lived or to have little effect on the productive efforts of their
members. Careful planning of production at a village and district level was also tried;
and so long as strong leadership was available, results were good, but it was apparent
that the foundations of such schemes were shallow. We have finally settled on the
idea of Development Officers who will be selected from the best material that the
Fijians can offer, which means men who—in ability and balance—compare
favourably with the members of any other race. I hope that these men, by their
prestige and leadership, will be able to co-ordinate, cajole and, if necessary, bully
their people into productive activity.
10. The weakness, however, lies deeper than the individual personality of the
Fijian. The best of them—as persons—could probably compete with anyone if free to
do so; but the trouble is that their customs, social organisation and the whole tenor
of their communal existence are opposed to the success of the individual, which
would be regarded as being to the detriment of the tribe, because such success
throws the communal system out of equilibrium. The apparent solution to such a
dilemma is to abolish the communal system and to make individualists of them all,
but such a course ignores the intimate relationship between the Fijians and the
system which has nourished them and their forefathers: the system in fact is in their
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blood and cannot be abolished by ukase. It must be a long treatment, performed with
their consent all the way.
11. These reflections may appear academic, but the problem with which they
deal is one which is having a definite effect on the development of Fiji, and with
which most other subsidiary problems are connected. For instance Fiji has been
guaranteed a market in New Zealand for bananas up to 750,000 cases a year for a
period of five years, with the prospect of an equally favourable market when that
period has passed. Banana production, at present, is entirely in the hands of Fijians
and it shows no prospect of being able to fulfil either the quota or the quality of
bananas which New Zealand requires. The communal system has been blamed for
this failure and it is claimed that the energies of the growers are always being
diverted by the Fijian Provincial Authorities to other work when they should be
planting and maintaining their banana groves. Indians want to enter the banana
trade and, if they do, will probably make a success of it by mechanised production, for
which they have the capital. The Fijians, however, at present occupy most of the
areas where banana planting is practicable and, unless this possession is to be
encroached upon (which would certainly have political repercussions) or their own
system of production is adjusted to make it more compatible with economic
conditions—which taken to its logical conclusion means replacing the communal
system by one in which individualism predominates—there will be difficulty in
fulfilling the New Zealand quota. Our immediate compromise solution is
Development Officers, and we hope to stimulate production considerably through
their efforts.
12. Quality is another thing which suffers from Fijians’ indifference. This is
especially noticeable with copra. Copra production in Fiji is approximately divided
between Fijian and non-Fijian producers. That produced by the Fijians is usually of
poor quality and, since all copra is marketed together, this has deterred non-Fijians,
in this case mostly Europeans and part-Europeans, from improving their product
because they feel there is no point in their doing so unless a similar improvement is
made by the Fijians.
13. The same problem retards the establishment of Fijian industries, both
primary and secondary. There are, for instance, good prospects in Fiji for cocoa,
coffee, and beef production. The land is available in quantity, but it is in the hands of
the Fijians. But as I have shown, Fijian manpower is already fully stretched, as at
present organised, and although I have hopes, again through the efforts of
Development Officers, to establish cocoa in the near future I fear that production will
be restricted so long as it is confined to Fijians. The position will be eased
considerably when the demarcation of Fijian reserves is completed, because this will
mean that large areas of land whose future awaits a decision as to whether they are to
be included in reserves, will be available for leasing. Nevertheless the reserves
themselves will constitute large areas, and the problem of developing them
economically will remain. Secondary industries are also affected because continuity
of supply is essential for the processing of raw materials; and this continuity is not
yet provided by Fijian producers.
14. The number of Europeans who are settled permanently in the country is very
small, probably between 300 and 400. Their activities are divided between farming
(mostly dairying or copra planting) and commerce. Their influence in the political
life of the Colony is considerable because of the relatively large areas of land which
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they own or occupy, and their having been traditionally associated with the
promotion of the interests of the Fijians. It is probable that the influence of the
settled European will decline with the passing of the older generation. The more
ambitious of the new generation tend to seek employment overseas where the
prospects are better and they are not faced with Indian competition, while the less
ambitious tend to inter-marry locally and achieve little of significance apart from
swelling the part-European population which now numbers about 7,000.
15. While the influence of the settled European may be in decline, European
influence as a whole is firmly established and the ties of the Colony are especially
close with New Zealand which, with its Maori population and strategic interest in
Fiji, is sympathetic and closely associated with the affairs of the Colony.
16. The only remaining racial group of any significance is the Chinese who
number 4,000. In contrast to the Indians, they are not interested in constitutional
politics, although there have been indications recently that a minority are attracted
to communism. They are mostly engaged in trade or market gardening and are very
successful at both occupations. As a race they keep to themselves and play little
part in public life. A further distinction between them and the Indians is that, while
the Indians seldom inter-marry with the Fijians, it is common for the Chinese to do
so, especially those of humble origin who garden or keep stores in the country.
Their natural affection for children appears to predominate over the abhorrence
which they must naturally have for their Fijian wives’ extravagance: the
philosophical detachment with which the Chinese country storekeeper regards the
pillaging of his store by his wife and her relations is characteristic of the
inscrutability of the race. The attraction which communism has for the Chinese
and their close relationship with the Fijians is potentially dangerous. At present,
however, this relationship is physical rather than mental, and there is no reason
why it should be otherwise unless the Chinese intentionally make it so in order to
spread communism.
17. It has been said that the prosperity of Fiji has been built on a three cornered
foundation, the Fijian providing the land; the European the money; and the Indian
the labour. Historically this is a fair statement though it is an over-simplification
when applied to present conditions, since in recent years the Indian community has
been sufficiently prosperous to invest money on a useful scale, not only in
agriculture, but also in secondary industries and such services as transport. It is an
important fact that of the capital invested in Fiji, nearly all has come from
Australasia, and of this much the greater part from Australia. It must be very many
years since any capital investment came from the United Kingdom; and there are no
indications that either private investors or public corporations in Britain are likely at
present to invest in Fiji. There is, for instance, no project sponsored by the Colonial
Development Corporation in the Colony.
18. As a result commercial practice and outlook in Fiji is far more influenced by
Australasian ideas and conditions than by those of the United Kingdom and, when
considering its financial and fiscal policies, the Government is wise to bear this in
mind. It is necessary to provide conditions for capital which are reasonably
competitive with those in the neighbouring dominions; and this applies both to such
general matters as taxation of incomes and in such special fields as the treatment of
gold mining enterprise.
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2 CO 1036/10, no 26 11 Feb 1956
[Constitutional development]: letter from Sir R Garvey to Sir T Lloyd
recommending ‘mild steps forward’
For quite a long time I have been mulling over in my mind the question of
constitutional development in Fiji; and I find that I have now come firmly to the
conclusion that it should be tackled fairly soon.
When I first came here in 1952, I found little or no interest in constitutional
advance; so I thought I would keep the matter in my own hands by taking the
initiative when it seemed appropriate to do so. Thus I proposed the appointment of a
Speaker and, a little later, suggested to the Great Council of Chiefs that they should
consider electing some of their members to Legislative Council by direct vote.
Both these ploys have partly misfired so far. We have amended the constitution to
permit the appointment of a Speaker, but owing to Sukuna’s1 ill-health he has not
yet been able to take up the appointment. The Council of Chiefs did not look with
favour on my suggestion, though the Fijian Press2 made it fairly clear afterwards that
the Fijian commoner was keenly attracted by the proposal.
The position now is that there is a slowly growing interest in constitutional
matters, both on the part of the Fijians and the Indians. I should not be surprised, for
instance, if the Fijian Chiefs change their mind about direct representation at the
next Council of Chiefs, which will be held this year; and at the last meeting of
Legislative Council the senior Indian elected member, Vishnu Deo, appealed to me to
tackle the question of constitutional change before my term as Governor expires.
There are many other indications that interest from the Fijian and Indian
directions is on the move. By and large the Europeans, with the exception of one or
two oddities, are not showing the same interest; and one can assume that they are
happy with the present state of affairs and would regard change as undesirable, and
even retrogressive. But I do not think that we should take our tempo from the
European attitude, which might well be dubbed reactionary.
As the Colony is situated at present the question of constitutional advance could
be considered in a tranquil atmosphere. Fiji is peaceful and prosperous. If one can
believe local talk, the different races of which our community is composed have
seldom been on more friendly terms. Could one, therefore, have a better atmosphere
in which to consider such a question? If we can consider changes in the constitution,
now, deliberately and calmly should we not be wise to seize this golden opportunity?
There is at present this healthy, if hesitant, trend; so should we not seize the growing
interest and turn it to our advantage?
My own feeling is that the appropriate time to make an announcement would be at
the opening Session of the new Legislative Council which will take place in about
September this year.
If you agree that we should make a move; and you will see from what I have said
above that I am emphatically of opinion that we should; then the question on which I
should like your advice is how to go about it. On the last occasion a local Committee
put forward recommendations which were debated and defeated in Legislative
1 Ratu Sir Lala Sukuna (1888–1958). 2 Fijian Press means in fact The Fiji Times.
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Council in 1949. On this occasion I feel that it would be preferable to get a
Commissioner from outside to do the preliminary job of putting forward proposals
for consideration by Legislative Council. I would like a one man commission, myself,
providing—of course—that we can find the right man. And I would like it distinctly
understood that he should let me see his report in draft before its submission to
Government, so that I could have the opportunity of deciding whether his proposals
were too advanced for local application. This could, perhaps, be better achieved if
there were constant consultation during the course of the preparation of the report
so that neither the Commissioner, nor I, were faced with a position where I might
feel bound to say that the report was one which I did not feel able to present to
Legislative Council.
In concluding this letter there is, I think, another angle which should be
mentioned. Supposing I am wrong in my assessment of the present position;
supposing the crucible, which at the moment seems to me to be simmering gently,
suddenly frothed over and we found ourselves stampeded into constitutional changes
by pressure of events, rather than by a conviction that the appropriate time has come
to make some progress. Would we not then have lost that golden opportunity about
which I spoke earlier in this letter?
After completing the drafting of this letter my attention has been called to your
confidential letter of the 1st February, 1955, which arrived here just after I had gone
on leave and to which, I regret to note, you have received no reply.
As I see it there is now insufficient latitude of time to permit a study of electoral
arrangements in Fiji independent of the general constitutional question. The
memorandum is correct in saying that ‘even should the questions of an unofficial
majority in the Legislative Council, or of the election of all unofficial members be
raised, it seems unlikely that a Common roll would be suggested, much less
generally supported.’
With this in mind I suggest that any special sociological study related to electoral
representation in Fiji should be held over until after we have taken the mild steps
forward which, I hope, will result from the appointment of a Commissioner to
consider constitutional development.
3 CO 1036/10, no 27 20 Mar 1956
[Constitutional development]: letter (reply) from Sir T Lloyd to 
Sir R Garvey urging caution
Thank you for your letter of the 11th February about constitutional development in
Fiji.1
We are not entirely surprised by your reassessment of the situation as we had also
noticed a growing interest in constitutional matters. While we share your view that it
is better for Government to take the initiative in such matters, rather than to be
forced to make changes by pressure of events, the way to set about the exercise will,
of course, require careful consideration.
1 See 2.
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As you yourself say, the interest, if growing, is growing slowly. It seems to us to be
very unwise to do anything to encourage it to grow more quickly unless we have
some fairly clear idea where we are going. In some respects Fiji is a very difficult
proposition from the point of view of constitutional advance. We are all, very
naturally, inclined to think of such advance in terms of British institutions, leading
in the direction of an elected assembly, universal adult suffrage, the party system, the
vesting of executive power in unofficial Ministers and so forth. Yet we are learning by
experience elsewhere that the traditional British pattern, however suitable for places
of a certain size, is difficult to work out in small territories, even where there is a
homogeneous and relatively well advanced population; it is still more difficult to
apply in such a place as Fiji, where race means more than party, and where a
dilemma is created by the numerical prepondance of the Indians on the one hand
and our obligations to the Fijians on the other. It may well be that what we ought to
aim at in Fiji is some form of constitution which differs considerably from the
traditional pattern. In this connection you may like to have a look at the enclosed
document2 about another of our problem places—Mauritius—not because the ideas
which are being tried out there are necessarily at all applicable in themselves to the
very different conditions of Fiji, but as an illustration of the fact that new ways are
being sought to establish forms of democracy and of representative institutions in
places where the conditions favourable to the ‘Westminster model’ do not exist.
As you know, it has been the accepted view hitherto that in the special local
circumstances of Fiji, the retention of an official majority in the Legislative Council
is essential. It may be that the ‘mild steps forward’ which you envisage do not involve
departure from this principle. What troubles me, however, is the probability that
once one starts upsetting the present position, one inevitably sets up pressure from
various quarters, and it becomes very difficult to call a halt. To appoint a
Commissioner would undoubtedly have a highly disturbing effect, and it is not a step
which the Secretary of State could be advised to take unless and until it was clear
that a position had been reached at which some action was necessary in order to
retain the initiative and to forestall even less desirable developments.
In any case it is, I think, an illusion to suppose that any Commissioner strange to
the country could be expected to produce, out of the blue, a solution for the very
peculiar problem of Fiji. (And I must here interpolate a word of warning that no
Commissioner would be likely to take kindly to the idea of having his proposals
vetted in draft.) You will no doubt agree that any ultimate and lasting solution must
depend upon the growth of a consciousness of Fijian citizenship overriding
differences of race or religion; and that such a conception is scarcely likely to be
realised for a very long time indeed. The immediate question, then, is, what kind of
short-term political development is likely to promote (or to prejudice) the realisation
of that long-term conception. It is hard to see how anyone from outside would be in a
better position than yourself and your experienced advisers to provide the necessary
basic assessment. When that assessment has been made and the broad lines of policy
have been agreed upon, there may well then be room for the constitutional expert to
advise upon the particular devices and forms of machinery best calculated to secure
progress along the determined lines.
2 Not printed.
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In short, our present view is that this is a matter to be approached with the
greatest caution and circumspection; that, while we should certainly aim to keep the
initiative, we should avoid doing anything, by way of appointing a Commissioner or
even of making an announcement, to precipitate a demand for change unless and
until it becomes clear that some action is necessary in order to forestall inconvenient
pressure; and that, in the meantime, you and we should consult together in order
that we may put before the Secretary of State as clear as possible a view, based upon
your first-hand knowledge of the local situation, both of the long-term constitutional
objective and of the limited objectives which might be considered at this juncture as
stages on the way.
For example it can be argued that Central Government can be fully democratic
only if supported by vigorous local government institutions and the first stage might
be to divert interest in constitutional matters from central to local government.
Local Government, whether urban or rural, is an essential part of the constitutional
structure and affords the people an opportunity to identify themselves more closely
with, and enables them to participate in, the actual processes of government.
It appears, however, from your despatch No. 543 of the 9th November, 1955, that
the present unofficial members of Legislative Council are unlikely to agree to the
expansion of local government in Fiji. As part of the educative process towards the
assumption of greater responsibility would it not be as well to see if the various
communities can work together at the local government level before embarking on
any major changes at the central level?
I hope that you will feel able to let us have a basic assessment of the kind I have
suggested.
4 CO 1036/91, no 12 1 Apr 1956
[Industrial associations and local politics]: despatch from 
Sir R Garvey to Mr Lennox-Boyd
I have the honour, in this, my second despatch on the general affairs of Fiji, to
address you on the subject of politics as they are related to industrial associations in
the Colony. The two matters are in many ways inseparable and defy prolonged
discussion in isolation. As a general election is to be held here in August of this year
and as, at the same time, one of the sugar-cane farmers associations holds out a
threat of a general strike on June 1st on the issue of constitutional reform,* the
moment seems opportune to describe these aspects of the Fijian scene.
2. It is first important to explain what is meant by an ‘Industrial Association’ in
Fiji; and from this it will be seen what is meant by a ‘general strike’ called by an
association of small farmers. An Industrial Association is defined as any number of
employees or employers, or other persons, in any particular industry who associate
together for the purpose of regulating relations between themselves or with other
persons or associations, and for protecting or furthering their interests and those of
their associations. Thirty-one associations are thus registered. With a few exceptions
these can be divided into three distant groups: the workers industrial associations
* But, see footnote at the end of the despatch.
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which are identical with Trade Unions; associations of persons for the purpose of
protecting their business interests, e.g., transport owners and small shop-keepers;
and the sugar-cane farmers associations, the prime function of which is to negotiate
cane harvest and harvesting conditions with the Colonial Sugar Refining Company
Limited who are the sole mill owners in Fiji. The cane farmers associations1 and their
leaders have so far supplied the political inspirations and political controls for
Indians in Fiji; and the present Indian Elected Members and, indeed nearly all the
Indian Elected Members in the past, have had very close connection with the growth
of cane-farmers associations. The ultimate strength and the most potent weapon of
the cane-farmers associations is to order their members to refrain from planting or
harvesting.
3. Until recently there was little or no preoccupation with politics by the other
two groups of industrial associations. The workers associations were disinterested
probably because none of them are exclusively Indian, although three—until
recently four—are exclusively Fijian. Of the two races, it has been the Indian who has
been concerned with politics—and then mainly with the idea of advancing the
interests of the Indian people. The small commercial associations have confined their
activities to narrow protective measures, and this group comprises members of
various political allegiances. It is, however, an indication of trends that the Fiji Taxi
Union entered into the Suva City Council elections at the end of 1955, with
considerable zest, although the candidate they supported was unsuccessful.
4. The majority of the workers associations are members of the Fiji Industrial
Workers Congress and, as this body is of considerable significance, it is necessary to
look back to the time of the late Ami Chandra and describe its progress since then.
Pandit Ami Chandra was Fiji’s most distinguished Indian trade unionist, possessing
high intelligence and a quiet but convincing personality. He strongly opposed any
participation of the trade unions in politics; and he also used his powers of gentle
persuasion to bring about multi-racial trade unionism. Despite his efforts, however,
three of the Fijian unions (two of them were ineffective bodies) would not affiliate
with the Congress, and the two unions which did so continued to limit their
membership to Fijians. Nevertheless, under Ami Chandra’s leadership the Fiji
Industrial Workers Congress could claim to represent the great majority of workers
in Fiji, only one union of consequence, the Fiji Stevedores Union remaining outside.
The Congress and Pandit Ami Chandra were practically synonymous; but in April
1954, Ami Chandra was tragically killed in an aircraft accident at Singapore while on
his way to the United Kingdom to attend a course in trade unionism. Trade unionism
in Fiji suffered a great loss in his death; and although he did not leave the Congress
leaderless, he did leave it morally rudderless.
5. Ami Chandra has been succeeded as President of the Congress by B. D.
Lakshman, a Master of Arts of an Australian University2 and, although Vice-
President, a nonentity in the Congress until Ami Chandra died. Lakshman’s
reputation is generally poor and his chief characteristics are urbane smoothness and
slickness, particularly the latter. He has been a schoolmaster, president of the Airport
Workers Union, some sort of go-between for the Kisan Sangh, and a pearl button
manufacturer. Recently he applied for and was given a licence to ship scrap-iron to
1 In particular the Kisan Sangh and Maha Sangh, formed in the late 1930s and early 1940s.
2 Lakshman was a graduate of the Benares Hindu University, Varanasi.
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Japan. He is also an urban property owner. He is an unscrupulously ambitious Indian
and a very hard worker.
6. Lakshman’s reputation should have been sufficient to ensure that he did not
succeed Ami Chandra, but there was no outstanding personality to compete with him
except, perhaps, the European president of the Seamen’s Union who was not
prepared to accept the office. After some calculated delay and smart manoeuvring by
vice-president Lakshman, a meeting was called one year after Chandra’s death, which
resulted in his election as president.
7. I have dealt at some length with the Fiji Industrial Workers Congress and its
presidents, as it is probable that the irresponsible tactics of Lakshman were
responsible for the unnecessary strike at the gold mines in June 1955, and for further
minor strikes during the ensuing three months. He was greatly helped by a revision
of civil service salaries in 1954, which gave excellent opportunity for whipping up
resentment among wage-paid workers.
8. Basilio Mata, the Fijian secretary of the Mine Workers Union, has the type of
mind which responds to the specious flattery and glib cajolery at which Lakshman is
adept. Although he contrived to keep his allegiance for Lakshman hidden from
members of his union, who were strongly anti-Indian, Lakshman’s influence can be
detected in the strike at Vatukoula minefield. Of the other minor strikes, Lakshman’s
son was the president of one of the unions concerned; and in another, a youthful
protégé was also president. No trade unions were concerned in the other two strikes.
It is significant that the two most intelligent of the union leaders in the Congress—
Ramjan3 of the Public Works Department’s Employees Union and Nand Kishor of the
Sugar Workers Union—did not involve their unions in what was, for Fiji, a spate of
strikes.
9. This is the background to 1955. Since the turn of the year the industrial
relations climate has changed radically for the better, and the attitude of Lakshman
is, at the moment, that of an apostle of industrial peace. It may be that he decided
that the substantial gains of 1955 were enough for the present: but it may also be
that he required an atmosphere of calm in which to further his desire to be a
nominee of the Industrial Workers Conference for an invitation to the Duke of
Edinburgh’s Conference in Oxford. In the event, and much to Lakshman’s surprise
and chagrin, Nand Kishor has been nominated by the Congress, Lakshman coming
second in the voting and Ramjan third. Thus the initial and incongruous result of the
proposal for a conference to better human relations in industry has had the effect of
straining relations between union leaders in Fiji.
10. But there may be a further reason for the apparent hiatus in Lakshman’s
presidential activities. He has—in his time—been a member of Legislative Council
and, with his achievements during 1955 behind him, he may well have the support of
the workers if he stands for election later in the year. In support of this view is the
fact that Lakshman refused to submit more than two names for a workers’ panel for
the purposes of the Essential Services (Arbitration) Ordinance, although he was
urged strongly to supply more. The two names are his own and that of Mr. A. D.
Patel, a former member of Legislative Council and probably the most brilliant lawyer
in Fiji. In this way they can pose as the twin champions of the workers in Fiji.
3 Mohammed Ramjan.
08-Fiji-01-cpp  10/5/06  6:55 AM  Page 11
12 POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC BACKGROUND [4]
11. Political battles are not, however, confined within each of the various
groups of industrial associations. A bitter enemy of A. D. Patel is the Honourable
Ayodhya Prasad, a cane farmer, transport operator, and politician who is general
secretary of the Kisan Sangh, which is the largest of the cane-farmers unions. He is
an emotional and, when the mood moves him, an irresponsible orator whose ability
to sway Indian audiences is tremendous. He was closely connected with the cane-
farmers strike during the war. He is self-centred and it is he who is morally
responsible for having brought about the Commission of Inquiry into the
allegations of bribery and corruption in the Police Force. It is noteworthy that he
gave evidence before this Commission on the grounds that he was (and quite
rightly) refused an application to run a bus service, and that he personally
canvassed people to make charges of corruption against the police. A. D. Patel
appeared for the police during this inquiry, and he had a battle royal with his arch
political enemy, to the general disgust of the bewildered public. However, it is
probable that Prasad was on sound ground, for whatever his motives, there is a
strong emotional dislike of the police among Indians, particularly in the Western
District from which both men operate.
12. As a matter of interest, however, Patel runs true to form in that he is closely
connected with the Maha Sangh which is the second biggest cane-farmers union.
13. So far I have referred mainly to the island of Viti Levu. On Vanua Levu, which
is much less industrialised, politics will remain cane-farming politics for some time.
The Indian sitting member for the Eastern Division is J. Madhavan, and at the last
election he had the support of the Maha Sangh, which had a substantial section in
Vanua Levu. The Maha Sangh has, since, split into two bitterly opposed factions and
Madhavan has now taken steps to form and register a new association called the
Vanua Levu Farmers Union. He has not neglected other workers in his district; and
his brother is Chairman of the Labasa branch of the Public Works Department
Workers Union.
14. With the arrival of the election year the struggle for leadership has come out
into the open in the person, oddly enough, of a European, N. S. Chalmers, President
of the Kisan Sangh. Chalmers is a locally-born European who became a sub-
inspector in the Police Force, many many years ago, and is now a solicitor practising
in Ba, in the Western District. He came to prominence as a farmers’ champion in
1949 when he threatened the Colonial Sugar Refining Company that a refusal to
grant price increases would involve a refusal to cut and plant cane. His ideas on
politics are confused and he is wrapped in some mystical admiration for Mr. Malcolm
Macdonald,4 whom he takes to be a saviour of all subject races. Apart from the
4 1901–1981, son of J Ramsay MacDonald; MP (Lab) 1929–1931, (Nat Lab) 1931–1935, (Nat Govt)
1936–1945; parliamentary under-secretary of state for dominion affairs, 1931–1935; S of S for dominion
affairs, 1935–1938 and 1938–1939; S of S for colonies, 1935 and 1938–1940; minister of health,
1940–1941; high commissioner, Canada, 1941–1946; governor-general, British territories in South-East
Asia, 1946–1948; commissioner-general in South-East Asia, 1948–1955; high commissioner, India,
1955–1960; gov/govgen/high commissioner in Kenya, 1963–1965; special representative in East and
Central Africa, 1966–1967, and in Africa, 1967–1969. In his various roles in the 1960s especially,
MacDonald was an enthusiastic admirer of the Commonwealth, believing it to be a visible expression of
how peoples of different race could come together for the common good. He was critical of the British
government’s policies over Rhodesia in the late 1960s.
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routine desire to increase the number of elected members of all races, his ideas on
political advancement are naïve to the point of childishness, being a mixture of
misconceived liberalism and misunderstood communism. He has—for some time—
periodically addressed Government on the state of the nation, making complaints
and suggestions which for the most part have already been dealt with either in the
Colony budget or in published reports. He is now elderly, but still a would-be
demagogue; and his chief danger is that his political ignorance has rare flashes of
horse-sense which are admired by the gullible. It is Chalmers, with the intriguingly
silent support of his general secretary, Ayodhya Prasad, who has sought and obtained
the permission of his association to call a general strike on the issue of constitutional
reform. He makes the claim that he can count on the support of other cane-farmers
and of other workers’ industrial associations; but from the reactions shown in the
local press, and from our general knowledge, it would appear that these claims have
little foundation. The possibilities are that the threats will fade away before the vital
day; but there is a possibility that Chalmers and Prasad, between them, can call out a
number from their own association and cause inconvenience if not trouble. To a
certain extent Chalmers has done this already by claiming to represent the ideals of
the Fijians; and then to heap insults on the Fijians when his advances were swiftly
rejected.
15. The result of the manoeuvrings of the traditional ‘politicians’ of Fiji has been
to focus the political feelings of the Fijians and to bring about the birth of the Fijian
Association. For some time many of the leading Fijians have been uneasy at the
economic advancement of the Indians and increasingly concerned at what they
consider to be similar advances in Indian political dominance. Chalmers’
fulminations have had the effect of hardening this attitude. Fortunately the
Association is going about its business of protecting Fijian interests with moderation
and dignity. It has the approval of Ratu Sir Lala Sukuna, the former Secretary for
Fijian Affairs, and probably the greatest Pacific Islander of our time, and has on its
executive some of the best Fijians, both high chiefs and commoners. As its legal
adviser it has the Honourable Maurice Scott, a European of a distinguished local
family and the senior Unofficial Member of Legislative Council. With the firm but
moderating influence of this Association and with the known willingness of the
majority of people of all races in Fiji to live in harmony, it is to be hoped that the
short-sighted political ambitions of the leaders of the industrial associations of Fiji
will become re-orientated.
16. Generally speaking the situation is not without promise. Its most healthy
angle is that it has brought the Fijian Association into being, with the intriguing
possibility that the Fijian apathy towards constitutional development may be
replaced by a quickening interest. You may remember the story of the two Irishmen
discussing the question of voting in the election. One said to the other that he would
not cross the road to register his vote. The other replied: ‘Mik, I’d walk ten miles to
register me apathy.’ That, unfortunately, has been the attitude of the average Fijian
to politics in general. But a change may be coming: a change which may be only just
in time if he is not to lose his birthright in a land which is peculiarly his own.
Footnote
Since this despatch was drafted, a letter from N. S. Chalmers has appeared in the Fiji Times and Herald in
which he calls off the general strike which he had fixed for the 1st June—tant mieux!
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5 CO 1036/10, no 33 14 Oct 1956
[Constitutional development]: letter (reply) from Sir R Garvey to 
Sir J Macpherson. Enclosure: memorandum, ‘Broad lines on which
constitutional development in Fiji might proceed’
I expect some one will be wondering when I shall reply to Lloyd’s letter of the 20th
March1 about constitutional development in Fiji. Well, the file containing that letter
has been my constant companion since the end of March; and I now have an
opportunity, while travelling in the country, to answer it.
While I was a little disappointed I was not altogether surprised to find that the
back room boys in the Colonial Office have the jitters about constitutional questions,
even related to peaceful little Fiji, so I want to start off by saying that the fears
expressed in the letter are groundless as far as we are concerned. In suggesting that
we should seize—or perhaps it is more true to say retain—the initiative I am not
playing with a scorpion’s tail. An announcement, for instance, would not precipitate
a demand for change though it would, I hope, result in some quickening of interest
in a direction where we are failing to make progress even though we are far better
equipped than many who have raced ahead of us. My own estimation of the effect of
an announcement is that it would create a sense of relief that Government had
decided to tackle the question at the right time, though some misguided people
might now interpret it to be the result of a public meeting held a few days ago to
welcome the Indian Members of the new Legislative Council. At this meeting a
number of references were made to reform of the constitution and the desirability of
early action, though most of the attack was directed against the system of nominated
members. To this extent it might have been better had I made an announcement
when I opened Legislative Council on the 14th September, for the sure way to vitiate
any proposals in the eyes of Europeans would be if it were thought that Government
were submitting to Indian pressure. But I dare say this meeting is only a flash in the
pan.
Lloyd raises the question, in paragraphs 7 and 8 of his letter, of proceeding first
with the advancement of local Government. While I agree that this is the logical way
to develop the constitution I feel that we shall have to wait too long for progress in
that direction. Apart from two new Indian nominated members the composition of
the new Legislative Council is the same as the last; and so I doubt whether the next
three years will show much change of heart there. I recently had a talk with the
Indian Association about this question and they wanted me to take a plebiscite,
which I told them I was not prepared to do, much as I desired to get on with local
Government. They had to agree with me that there was little chance of an immediate
change of climate in the legislature, though they undertook to try to educate Indian
public opinion in the right direction.
So we seem to come back to my original plea for progress independent of local
Government and independent of local pressure. And here I would like to say that I
quite agree that whatever plan we decide upon it should be built upon the premise
that a common citizenship should be our ultimate aim for Fiji. I agree, too, that we
should not slavishly follow the Westminster pattern.
1 See 3.
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I further agree that there is probably no one in a better position than myself, and
my immediate advisers, to provide a basic assessment of the broad lines on which we
should proceed; and I am attaching to this letter a memorandum giving an idea of
the direction in which we might go.
When I suggested that a Commissioner should be appointed I did so because I
wanted to avoid the sort of stalemate which occurred when the question was last
debated in Legislative Council, and I thought that the right man could make his
proposals acceptable. I was not thinking in terms of someone entirely divorced from
Fiji. In fact, I was thinking of one of my illustrious predecessors, to wit Lord
Milverton,2 but knowing that noble ex-Governor’s bull-dozing tactics, I sought to tie
him up a bit from the start! However, your suggestion of a basic assessment is a
better way of achieving the same result. Lloyd talks about a constitutional expert, but
I am not sure that we should need anything as high powered as that, though you will
be able to assess the position better after studying the memorandum; and I am quite
prepared to tackle the whole thing myself if you so wish.
The idea of a multi-racial bench, composed of members-at-large, having no
constituency, and voted for by a common vote on a proportional basis, is my own; but
I should say here that it has not found much favour with the few official advisers
whom I have consulted, though if we are aiming at a growth of a consciousness of
Fijian citizenship over-riding differences of race and religion, I think it has
considerable merit.
If you would like to get a local reaction to an agreed line of approach I could always
consult Executive Council, enlarged—perhaps—by the attendance of the senior
European elected member who is regarded as the unofficial leader of Legislative
Council. The leaders of the other two benches are already members of Executive
Council.
I had an interesting discussion with the Indian Association of Fiji a few weeks ago
on constitutional matters, and from the exchange of views at that meeting it is pretty
clear that the proposals I now put forward would meet with their general agreement.
Enclosure to 5
General
There is no evidence yet of the emergence of a party system in Fiji. At the present
time we have the officials and the non-officials, the latter being inclined to place
themselves in the position of the loyal opposition, since they are a minority in
Legislative Council, though they bring to bear considerably less antagonism than the
normal type of opposition. It would be much healthier if they identified themselves
more closely with Government.
It is however plain that—for the present—any constitutional change which
materially alters the balance, inter se, of the three races at present represented in the
legislature is impracticable. No doubt in due course of time, though it is not in
evidence yet, there will be pressure brought to achieve representation which is
democratic in the popular sense, that is to say representation by majority vote from a
common roll and, as I have said in my covering letter, our ultimate aim must be for a
2 Governor of Fiji as Sir Arthur Richards, 1936–1938.
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common citizenship. In the general life of the community slow, but fairly steady,
progress is being made in this direction. Both colour and social barriers are being
broken down and the desirability and, indeed, inevitability of unity is taking shape. It
is a policy which I constantly preach myself and it is having its imperceptible effect
throughout the whole community. Even so, at present, all races would oppose a
common roll: the Europeans because it would mean that their representation would
vanish: the Fijians because they realize that European representation is a bulwark for
them against any possibility of Indian domination; and the Indian because he is not
prepared, at this stage, to force the issue.
While this may be an over-simplification it does serve its purpose for consideration
of the present problem of constitutional progress. I should not like even to try to
guess how long this phase will last, but I think that it is desirable, and essential, if
our pledge in present circumstances to the Fijians is to be kept, that equal racial
representation should be maintained for an indefinite period.
Official majority
About four years ago I said in a letter to Lloyd that I considered that it would be
necessary to retain the official majority for many years to come, until indeed, the
Fijian could stand on his own feet (see the sixth paragraph of my personal and
confidential letter of the 7th April, 1953). I made that statement, however, before I
had much experience of the working of the official majority in Fiji. Since I came here
in 1952 I have never used the official majority to push a measure through, and the
only occasion when I might have used it to good effect, when we debated the
question of local Government, I did not—after consulting the Colonial Office—call
upon it.
Having regard to our division into different racial benches on the unofficial side I
do not think there is any danger in the Government being defeated if the official
majority were removed, always provided the Governor were invested with reserved
powers, and I consider that a healthier atmosphere would be created if it went. It
would really be giving away nothing, provided the unofficial majority was made less
than the number of any one unofficial bench, i.e. not greater than four—though I
would suggest a lesser number for some years.
Nominated members
It is suggested that these should disappear altogether. Whatever may be said about
nominated members they are always regarded as Government yes-men, even though
they frequently are among Government’s more trenchant critics, and this taint
vitiates them in the public eye. The choice of them becomes more and more difficult,
and their value just as difficult to assess, and little—if anything—would be lost if the
system were discontinued. It would certainly be a very popular move.
European elected members
Increase the number of elected members to five. This would hecessitate a redrawing
of the present divisions, but the size of the Suva European population warrants one
member for the city, and a further member could be justified on a redrawing of the
country divisions.
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Indian elected members
Increase the elected members to five. This increase is fully justified by the increase in
the Indian population, for it is a fact that at least two of the elected Indian members
cannot cope satisfactorily with the business of their present divisions—the Southern
and the North Western, where the Indian populations are now about 48,000 and
89,000 respectively.
Fijian (native) members
Keep the number at five, but alter the system of selection in accordance with the
proposals made at the recent Council of Chiefs, which read as follows:—
The Council requests that the present basis of election for the Native
Membership of Legislative Council should be amended so as to authorise the
Council of Chiefs to elect five Fijians who on election shall be the Native
Members of the Legislative Council.
Reporting on this resolution the Secretary for Fijian Affairs says that several
members of the Council expressed their strong preference for the basis of election to
be that those selected to be Native Members of the Legislative Council should
invariably be the first five names on the panel submitted to the Governor. The
Council debated a motion that the panel should contain not fewer than five nor more
than seven names, there being much difficulty at present in naming more than five
or six suitable Fijian candidates for Native Membership of Legislative Council. By an
amendment to the motion the resolution set out above was carried by 31 votes to 8. If
accepted the resolution will, intentionally, abolish the present principle of selection
by the Governor. That principle has enabled a Fijian lower in the panel than the fifth
name to be selected when a casualty has occurred among the first five during the life
of a Legislative Council. The Council of Chiefs would in future have to be recalled to
elect a candidate if a vacancy occurred during that time but members saw no
objection to such a step and stated that a vacancy for a European or an Indian elected
member of Legislative Council was filled in the same way as is now proposed for a
Native Member. If the request in this resolution is granted it will be desirable to
specify the qualifications that must be held by a Fijian Elected Member so as to
safeguard the election, by the Council of Chiefs, of suitable persons.
At the present time it would probably be unwise to proceed in advance of these
recommendations. The time will come when a more direct form of Fijian
representation will be demanded and, no doubt, conceded.
Creation of new multi-racial bench
I recommend the creation of a new multi-racial bench of four members, one
European, one Fijian, one Indian and one representative of ‘other races’—chiefly
Chinese and other Pacific Islanders—elected by voters on a common roll whose votes
would be proportionately weighted to maintain equality of racial influence on the
election, e.g., if the roll contained 1,000 Indians, 1,000 Fijians, 100 Europeans and
100 other races, the votes cast by Indians and Fijians would each count one while the
votes of Europeans and other races would each count ten. These members would not
be tied to divisions, but would be members-at-large.
This rather revolutionary idea does not appeal to my immediate official advisers
and in place of it they suggest a fourth bench composed of two elected members of
other races, culled at large, but voted for by other races only.
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Their opposition is not on the principle but on the expediency of the suggestion as
a matter of politics. They fear that such a proposal would engender immediate
opposition from Europeans and Fijians and might, on the part of Indians, stimulate
demands for reform more far-reaching than we are at present prepared to give. This,
in their view, might prejudice the present object which is to introduce quietly a
measure of reform which will stand for some time to come.
In their view Europeans and Fijians will look on the multi-racial bench as the thin
end of the wedge driving to a common roll. If adopted, they argue that it would show
up, only too clearly, the fact that a vote given for the same candidate varied in weight
according to the race of the voter who cast it. This, they feel, would provide an easy
mark upon which the Indians could base agitation to have one man one vote on the
roll. This would be opposed by the other races who would object that a European or
Fijian who was, as would be the case, largely dependent on Indian votes would tend
to vote Indian and thereby upset the balance of power.
Muslim representation
Apart from the Muslims themselves there is no support for separate Muslim
representation, and I do not recommend that their repeated requests should be
acceded to. The Indians wish them to identify themselves as Indians, and the Indian
Association has informed me that if the number of Indian elected seats were
increased a working arrangement would be come to whereby one seat would be
reserved to Muslim candidates. It naturally remains to be seen whether the
Association would be influential enough to ensure such an arrangement.
Qualifications of candidates for election
I have no strong views on this subject and see little objection to the existing
qualifications which exclude the candidature of very few.
Voters
It is considered that the time has come when European and Indian men and women
should be granted universal adult franchise, subject to a literacy qualification. If a
multi-racial bench were created it would be necessary to extend this, as far as a
common roll were concerned, to Fijians and other races, otherwise on a communal
roll basis for other races if there is to be only a two man new bench.
Speaker
Make no change, the Governor remaining President of the Council and retaining in
his own hands the appointment of a Speaker.
Executive council
At present each of the three unofficial benches proposes the name of one member for
consideration by the Governor and he normally recommends their selection. It is
suggested that each bench should elect one member to the Executive Council, and
that the Governor should retain his right to nominate one or more unofficial
members—without pre-selection by anyone.
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Committee system
I have considered whether the time has not come to experiment with the Committee
system, even on a small scale related to certain Government departments only, but I
have come to the conclusion that this could be left for a later stage. I imagine that
any change in the constitution now would stand for at least five years, and that there
would be unlikely to be strong pressure during that period for any further advance,
unless some unexpected demagogue arises.
Allowance to unofficial members
The time has come when there should probably be some upward revision of the
allowance which, at present, is relatively small. At present an Unofficial Member of
Legislative Council is eligible for the following allowances:—
(a) Consolidated allowance at the rate of £150 per annum;
(b) Travelling allowance at the rate of £25 per annum;
(c) Attendance allowance for attending sessions of Legislative Council or meetings
of Committees of Council (including one day’s travelling each way where necessary)
£2. 2. 0. a day. Unofficial Members who live more than 5 miles from the Council
Chamber are eligible for an additional allowance of £1. 1. 0. while in attendance for
sessions of Legislative Council or meetings of Committees of Council;
(d) Members using their own cars are eligible for mileage allowance at
Government mileage rates for journeys exceeding ten miles each way.
Name of legislature
I suggest that the title of Legislative Council should be retained for the time being. At
a later stage the name Legislative Assembly might be adopted.
Life of legislature
After twelve years experience as President of Colonial Legislatures I have formed the
firm opinion that three years is too short a period of life. The first year is taken up by
the elected members looking back over their shoulders at their election promises,
the second year is one of sound application, while the third year they are
apprehensively craning their necks round the corner at the next election.
I would therefore advocate a life of five years, which would give a better chance of
continuity of policy.
6 CO 1036/10, no 36 16 Jan 1957
[Constitutional development]: letter from P Rogers to Sir R Garvey
on the need for gradual advance to avoid racial conflict
As promised in Macpherson’s letter of the 13th November your proposals for
constitutional development in Fiji have now been submitted to Ministers and what
follows regarding our views has received their approval.
Our general attitude towards the problem is this. We all entirely agree with you
that we should seek to keep the initiative in our hands and guide developments in the
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way we think most suitable. Clearly that means that we must not wait until the
pressure for constitutional change has been built up in a way which means that we
are always behind with our reactions. On the other hand we do not feel it desirable to
stimulate constitutional change purely for its own sake, for the possibilities of racial
conflict in Fiji are obviously such that we should look to a gradual advance to find a
solution for them, rather than possibly exacerbate them by being two steps, instead
of the desirable one step, in advance of local opinion. All this is trite enough but what
it boils down to is that before stimulating a demand by any form of public
announcement, we would like you to confine your exploration of proposals in the
first stage to personal and confidential consultation with your closest official and
unofficial advisers. We should be grateful if you would let us know the outcome
before anything is said publicly.
To turn now to the general policy, there is I think broad agreement between us
here. We envisage it being necessary to maintain a parity of representation in the
legislative Council between the three main races for a considerable time to come. We
also agree that we should look to a time when elections will be on a common roll,
rather than by communal electorates, and we agree with your view that, despite the
doubts of your official advisors, we should at the next stage of constitutional advance
in Fiji take an experimental step in that direction, though we have a slightly different
view about the manner of taking it as is explained below.
I turn now to the main details of any change which might be made in the light of
the above. The comments follow the specific proposals made in the memorandum1 in
your letter:—
(a) Official majority
I fear we differ from you in your view that the official majority should no longer be
retained. You are, if I may say so, clearly right in thinking that in a Colony at the
present stage of development of Fiji, the official majority might normally be
expected to go. Our reasons for thinking that it should be retained are rather
different from the usual ones, however. It is not that we fear that the result would
be a possible failure on occasion to carry through important Government
measures, for we recognise and accept the force of what you say on this aspect.
Our objection is a different one and services from experience elsewhere in this
field which on the face of it seems to be applicable to Fiji. That experience, for
example in East Africa, suggests very strangly that the more elimination of the
official majority may have an unsettling effect on racial groups within a Legislative
Council and exacerbate the racial differences between them. Without the official
majority there is inevitably a greater competition for power between the unofficial
groups and since Government measures must perforce tend from time to time to
be passed with the votes of one particular group, there are inevitably accusations
that Government is a depting a policy of “divide and rule” with all the increase in
racial bitterness to which that gives rise. In such a situation the use of the reserve
powers by the Government is no adequate substitute. We recognise that this
position has not yet been reached in Fiji: our point is that the abolition of the
official majority is likely to give rise to it and we consider therefore that the official
majority should be retained at the next stage.
1 See enclosure to 5.
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(b) Nominated members
Again we recognise the force of your criticism about their role at the recent stage
in Fiji, but looking further ahead and bearing in mind experience elsewhere, for
example, even at the present advanced constitutional stage in the West Indies, we
still think that the nominated members have an important role to play. Even in
advanced constitutions they are frequently most useful, not in the role for which
they were originally created but as advisers to the elected politicians themselves.
This does not always work and clearly depends on personsalities, but examples of
the usefulness of nominated numbers in this role are sufficiently numerous to
make us most reluctant to see them disappear at the present constitutional stage
of which we are thinking in Fiji.
(c) Elected members
In the light of this we would prefer the number of elected members to be
increased only on the basis of an experiment in a common roll on the general
lines you suggest in what you say about a multi-racial bench. With very much
the same end in view, we would ourselves prefer a slightly different arrangement
as follows:—
(i) We would, as explained above, propose to retain the three elected European
and Indian members elected by the present communal electorates, with two
nominated members for each.
(ii) We would also suggest an additional elected member for each group, and for
the Fijians (but not, for reasons explained in the later section of this letter
for the ‘other races’), elected on a common roll, to be balanced by an
equivalent increase in the official members to retain the official majority,
though we recognise that it may be difficult to find enough officials of
suitable seniority to add to the Council, and that there are objections to
tying them up in Council deliberations.
(iii) We do not care for the system of weighting votes which you propose, largely
because they would highlight the disparity in size of the electorates and lead
to probably irresistable pressure for a, possibly gradual, whittling down of
the relative weighting. We would prefer instead to try out on experiment
rather on the lines proposed for Tanganyika with a relatively high electoral
qualification.
I enclose a table setting out the proposed qualifications for electors and candidates
in East African territories.2 Tanganyika intend to go in for three-member
constituences in which one African, one Asian and one European will jointly
represent the common interest of their constituency and in which each voter must
record one vote for each of the three seats. The qualifications for vote are relatively
high, so reducing to some extent the disparity in size of each racial section of the
electorate. In order to ensure that a candidate has backing from his own race, and
is not merely a stooge for another, he must be nominated by not less than 25
registered voters of whom not less than 15 must be the candidate’s own race. We
would like you to consider the possibility of adapting this idea to circumstances of
Fiji with either a Colony-wide constituency or one more restricted constituency in
the first instance. European and Indian candidates being nominated for election
2 Not printed.
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on the Tanganyika model and Fijian candidates nominated for election by the
Council of Chiefs. Alternatively you might possibly prefer, instead of having two
different systems of election, to have all the present elected members and three
Fijians elected on a common roll in this way with no increase in the total number
of elected members or corresponding increase of the official side. The arguments
in favour of such a step, if it were successful, are obvious. As against that you may
feel that it is making too big an experiment initially and that it might not be
acceptable locally. Moreover, there would be difficulty this way in laying down
sufficiently high qualifications for the vote, something which may well be decisive
in the success or otherwise of the experiment, since it would hardly be possible to
disenfranchise existing voters. However, the possibility is something which you
may care to think on.
(d) Muslim representation and other races
We would on the whole prefer to see the other races represented by nominations,
at this stage, until there is experience of how the admitted experiment of a
common roll would work for the others. Furthermore, we think that the Muslim
should, if necessary, be represented by nomination rather than by the working
arrangement referred to in paragraph 15 of your memorandum, by which one seat
would be unofficially reserved for a Muslim representative. Despite the good
intentions of the Indian Association there is always the risk that an independent
Hindu might put his name forward as a candidate and be elected by the
predominant Hindu Electorate. To reserve an Indian elected seat for a Muslim
whether on a communal or a common roll would be contrary to our main aim of
minimising racial and religious differences. In particular we do not think that
Muslims could be included with the other races if it is decided to extend elections
on a common roll to them, since on the basis of your own numerical proposal at
any rate the others would be disenfranchised if a Muslim were elected and vice
versa. The resolutions of the Muslim Conference forwarded with your despatch No.
551 show that the Muslims, or at any rate the more vocal who speak for them,
would wish to remain separate from the Hindus. On balance we think, therefore,
that the continued nomination of a Muslim member if a Muslim is not elected to
one of the Indian seats would, despite Muslim objection to this course, be the best
way out.
(e) Fijian representation
Your proposals for the selection of the Fijian (Native) members amount broadly to
a public acceptance of the present position and we agree with them, subject to
what is said above about the election of one Fijian on the common roll.
We accept your views on all the other points raised in your memorandum
regarding the Speaker, the Executive Council, allowances to unofficial members
and a period of five rather than three years for the life of the Legislature. In
particular we think that it would be premature to adopt a Committee system at the
next stage until there is experience of the outcome of the system of the common
roll election.
In some ways these suggestions do not provide as big a change as your own
proposals, but they do provide, in common with your own, a very important step
toward a common roll and the basis for growth of a consciousness of Fijian
citizenship, overriding differences of race and religion. In this field we think it
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necessary to walk warily if we are not to heighten differences rather than minimise
them and present conditions in Fiji suggest that there is still time to do so.
We should be grateful for your views on all this after whatever consultations you
see fit to have in the light of what is said in the first part of this letter.
7 CO 1036/307, no 32 24 June 1959
[Constitutional models]: letter from Sir K Maddocks to P Rogers on
the possibility of adapting the Tanganyika electoral system to Fiji’s
circumstances
In your letter of the 16th January, 1957,1 to Garvey about constitutional development
in Fiji, you said that you would like consideration to be given to the possibility of
adapting the Tanganyika electoral system2 to the circumstances of Fiji. The
suggestion was that we might have at any rate some elected members of each racial
group elected on a common roll. We discussed the subject generally when I was in
London and I expressed the fear then that this procedure would be likely to result in
the election of the wrong type of European as the Indians would inevitably vote for
the candidate who promised them the most support. It seems that my fears have
been borne out by the results of the Tanganyika elections, where the nationalist party
was returned with a thumping majority. In the circumstances of Tanganyika, which
is clearly moving fairly rapidly towards self-government, this may have been no bad
thing but I should be interested to learn whether the experiment is considered a
success, and whether you still think that something along these lines could be of
value here. Any form of common roll would certainly be bitterly opposed by the most
influential sections of the European and Fijian communities, and I should like to
know more about the effectiveness of the Tanganyika system before I go further into
the possibilities here.
Another matter about which I should be grateful for information is whether in any
of our Colonial territories there is, or has been, an unofficial majority in the
Legislative Council and at the same time an official majority in the Executive
Council; and if so, whether this arrangement was found workable. You will
remember that Garvey was strongly in favour of having a small unofficial majority in
our Legislative Council and my official advisers still feel that there would be much
advantage in this. No-one, however, has suggested that we should have an unofficial
majority in Executive Council at this stage, and I have considerable doubts whether
it would be satisfactory to give the Legislative Council power without responsibility.
But it may be that other territories have tried this experiment and it would be helpful
to me to know whether or not it was successful.
1 See 6.
2 The Tanganyika system provided for 30 unofficial members in the Legislative Council—10 each for the
Africans, Asians and Europeans. In 27 of the constituencies members were elected by communal voting
but in one constituency, 3 members were elected on a common roll with seats reserved, one for each
ethnic group.
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I have not yet got down to considering any detailed proposals for constitutional
reform, but I should like to collect all relevant information as soon as possible.
8 CO 1036/307, no 34 14 Aug 1959
[Constitutional development]: letter (reply) from P Rogers to Sir K
Maddocks explaining why in Fiji’s case giving non-officials experience
of administrative responsibility is a greater priority than the 
extension of electoral representation. Enclosure: ‘Note on 
Tanganyika elections’
I am sorry not to have replied earlier to your letter of the 24th June about
constitutional development in Fiji.1 Although the factual answers to your questions
are not in themselves difficult to provide, the interpretation of them in Fiji
conditions and the best course to adopt is not easy and has given us much food for
thought.
2. I enclose a copy of a note on the Tanganyika elections, which was prepared for
use in the Office just after the first round of elections, and you will see that it
confirms your fears that the Tanganyika African Nationalist Union (TANU)2 African
votes decisively influenced the election for European and Asian seats.
3. I think we must agree that in any common roll system where there is a great
disparity in the voting strength of different communities, a majority community will
inevitably have a decisive influence on the election of minority representatives,
unless his franchise qualification was made very high indeed. In Fiji there might not
be much difference between the numbers of Indian and Fijian voters but the
European voters would probably be many less. A European candidate could not
therefore hope to be successful only on winning a majority of the European votes and
the Indian and Fijian votes would carry the day. It might happen that European votes
could just tip the scale in favour of one of two European candidates—one supported
by Indians and the other by Fijians—if the voting strength of these two races were
nearly the same. The short answer is I think that under the Tanganyika system there
is no guarantee whatsoever that a minority community would be in a position to
return a candidate of their own choice, though it does of course ensure
representation of members of all races.
4. The crux of the matter is whether representation is to be on a racial or a party
basis. If the intention is that the Fijians, Indians and Europeans should have the
opportunity to return candidates acceptable to the majority of their respective races,
thereby perpetuating communal divisions, then the Tanganyika system does not
appear to be the solution.
5. If, however, some form of party system is to be built up, then the Tanganyika
system is more likely to encourage this than a communal system of voting. In this
case, however, although the Indians and Fijians, if reasonably well organised, may be
1 See 7.
2 Tanganyika was divided for electoral purposes into 10 constituencies. Elections in five were held in Sept
1958, and for the others in Feb 1959.
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able to return candidates reflecting their first choices, the successful European will
most likely be the candidate who has the support of the Indian or Fijian voters and
not necessarily that of the European voters.
6. Your second request was for information about territories with an unofficial
majority in Legislative Council and an official majority in Executive Council. This is
the case in Aden Colony, Gibraltar, Tanganyika and Uganda. The Gold Coast, Nigeria,
Northern Rhodesia, Gambia and Singapore went through this stage. In the light of
experience generally we do not think such a system is likely to prove healthy, and if
we were starting all over again (or afresh, as we have the chance to do in Fiji) I think
we should take a different course. The method in question has tended to produce
frustration and to strengthen premature unofficial demands for greater executive
representation and authority. It would be necessary to give the Governor reserve
legislative powers and the very existence of these might add to the feeling of
frustration. My views on this question have already been given in detail in my letters
of 6th January, 1957, 4th June, 1957, and 30th September, 1957, and our collective
advice is that it would be most undesirable to introduce an unofficial majority in
Legislative Council without at the same time associating unofficials with the work of
some departments, i.e. a quasi-ministerial system.
7. Our own views now tend tentatively in the following direction. Very difficult
problems beset any attempt at present to extend elected representation on other than
a racial basis, and we would not be in favour of any large extension on such a racial
basis. We think the important thing is to keep the way open for the development of
non-racialism in Fiji politics and not to take any avoidable action which involves
establishing or confirming institutional forms embodying the racial division. We
should, on the contrary, seek constantly to edge the community in the way of non-
racial attitudes and behaviour, political and social, and to afford it time to develop
and adopt such attitudes and behaviour. On our reading of the situation extension of
elected representation is not the really important thing for most of those who urge
constitutional advance; the difficulties and implications of this in Fiji must be
apparent. What is really wanted is the chance for unofficial representatives to have an
effective say in administration and the opportunity of responsibility. This cannot be
given by establishing an unofficial majority in the Legislative Council alone: it would
be more valuable and acceptable that unofficial members be associated with the work
of some of the departments of Government.
8. Our present feeling is, therefore, that when the time comes for a move forward
in Fiji in the constitutional sphere it would probably be wiser to take the step of
adopting a Ministerial or quasi-Ministerial system without necessarily establishing
an unofficial majority in the Legislative Council (or the Executive Council) and
without making any immediate change in the electoral boundaries. In referring to
the absence of an unofficial majority in the Legislative Council, I should qualify that
by saying that we would not see objection to a move by which the Unofficials as a
whole were in the majority provided that there was also a Government majority, i.e.
the Unofficial Members who were Ministers or quasi-Ministers would, together with
the Official Members of the Council form a majority of it. If this were done it might
be possible later in a few years time to experiment with a three-member constituency
for say, Suva, with elections on a common roll.
9. These thoughts differ somewhat from those which we have put forward in
earlier correspondence. It is not that our essential standpoint has been changed. This
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still is that we do not wish to hasten the pace of constitutional change in Fiji for its
own sake, but we certainly on the other hand do not wish to lag behind events and
delay change until local feeling turns sour. In other words we want to keep one pace,
but not two paces, in front of real local political feeling and we certainly want to
avoid widespread feelings of frustration. We have, however, come to the view, based
largely I admit, on experience elsewhere but related, I hope, to the circumstances of
Fiji, that when the time comes for a move it would be better to make that move
through the association of Unofficials with the processes of Government by the
introduction of a quasi-Ministerial system rather than through the creation of an
Unofficial majority in the Legislative Council.
10. We remain, as you will remember from your discussion in London, anxious
to keep the initiative in this matter and we still feel that it is essential to keep the
political temperature in Fiji as low as possible and to work out any constitutional
changes most carefully before they are made public.
11. Apart from having given you our own tentative views—we felt to do less
would be cowardly!—the only suggestion we can make is that you should, as you say,
collect all relevant information and then if you consider some changes are necessary,
set out your proposals in detail and see what they look like then. You might, as we
have suggested, begin with Executive Council and examine how unofficials could be
associated with the work of some of the departments. In so doing it would be most
desirable not to produce portfolios on a racial basis though “Fijian affairs” is
obviously a difficulty here. You might then consider what changes are required in
Legislative Council and if you decide on an unofficial majority, whether this could be
achieved by merely reducing the number of officials, rather than increasing the
number of unofficials. The decision here will depend on the number of unofficials
required to support a ministerial system e.g. 15 may be adequate if you only have 3
unofficial ministers but may not be enough if you have 6 or more. If you consider the
number of unofficial members of Legislative Council should be increased, this could
be done either by increasing the present number of European and Indian
constituencies by one each and appointing an additional Fijian, or by experimenting
with a three-member constituency in, say, Suva.
12. In the absence of political parties, the objective might be to encourage elected
members of Legislative Council to regard themselves as representing the interests of
the country as a whole and not any particular party or race and to try and establish a
form of responsible coalition government and not a party or racial government.
13. These are only suggestions and it is for you and your advisers to work out
what, if any, changes should be made, but we should of course like to be kept
informed of your plans, and suggest they be cleared with us before any public
discussion is invited.
Enclosure to 8
Although the level of qualifications for the vote has been set fairly high in
Tanganyika compared with other East African territories this has not prevented the
emergence of a majority of African voters in all constituencies compared with
European and Asians separately; in some constituencies the Europeans and Asians
combined might number more than the Africans if all those eligible registered and
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voted. This situation, combined with the compulsory cross-voting system, would
appear to have produced the following effects in the recent elections:—
(a) in contested seats organised African votes (i.e. T.A.N.U.) decisively influenced
the elections for European and Asian seats;
(b) support was given to the successful Asian and European candidates not so
much on account of their individual merits but because of opposition to the U.T.P.
candidates;
(c) the European candidates for the Northern Southern Highlands and Tanga
constituencies are not really representative of their respective communities; but
the Asian candidates are more representative of theirs;
(d) while the compulsory cross-vote did not in the event discourage Africans from
voting, it may well have affected the size of the European vote since many of the
latter, particularly in the Northern Province, may not have been prepared to vote
for an African or an Asian.
2. In a note on the elections, Mr. Fletcher-Cooke3 has taken the view that two
important points emerged:—
(a) that T.A.N.U. as an African nationalist movement is the only really strong
political force to be reckoned with in Tanganyika;
(b) that the steps which T.A.N.U. took to secure the registration of its supporters,
to ensure that they knew how to vote properly and did in fact vote, clearly
indicated the strength, efficiency and discipline of T.A.N.U. as a rapidly developing
political machine.
Comment on this is that T.A.N.U.’s task in influencing and organising their
supporters may have been simplified by the decision to hold elections in two parts
and by the small number of voters involved. Elections in all constituencies at once
and a lower level of qualifications producing a larger number of voters might throw a
strain on the party organisation which it was unable to bear. This factor might be of
importance if another party emerged in Tanganyika.
3. With regard to the future, the question has been posed whether the system of
the common roll with reserved seats should be retained. Assuming for the moment
that there is no serious political detorioration in the territory, there is probably a
good deal to be said for making as few changes as possible in the present
representational arrangements. In particular, there is much to be said for keeping
the franchise fairly simple; it does not seem likely that the complicated systems
which have been found suitable elsewhere would produce any appreciable benefit in
Tanganyika so far as the representation of minorities is concerned and, with the
representative side of the Legislative Council almost entirely elected, any proposals
for a revision of the franchise which did not aim at a liberalisation of the existing
provisions would certainly meet with strong opposition.
4. The Tanganyika Government is committed to remit the question of the
continuation of the parity system to the Post Elections Committee and there seems
little doubt that the end of the present equality of representation is in sight. An
alternative which would still preserve a certain measure of Asian and European
elected representation would be for Government to create a number of purely African
3 J Fletcher-Cooke, chief secretary, Tanganyika, 1959.
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single seat constituencies in areas where there is a very small or non-existent non-
African population, but to continue with tripartite representation and voting in areas
where there are relatively substantial European and Asian populations. This idea was
favoured by Lord Twining, and Sir Richard Turnbull,4 as indicated in discussion that
he is thinking along similar lines himself. It would, of course, entail an increase in
African representation in the Legislative Council at the expense of the Asians and
Europeans.
5. On the question whether the representation of these minority interests should
be secured by nomination, it would seem better if at all possible for minority
representatives to be elected. In that event they are more or less equal in status with
the other elected representative members of the Council and not so open to the
charge of being Government stooges. Under the present system of compulsory cross-
voting, however, there is the disadvantage that the Asians and Europeans elected will
almost certainly not be the persons who would be the first choice of the majority of
their respective races; indeed there is the risk that, notwithstanding the requirement
that candidates must have the support of 15 members of their own race when
nominated, undesirable characters will be put up by T.A.N.U. with the object of
keeping more representative candidates out. On the other hand, although the
present system may produce T.A.N.U. sympathisers it would seem that provided they
are reasonable people there is thus some measure of homogeneity on the
representative side of the Council, and, in the absence of any outstanding Europeans
or Asians who are likely to be kept out of the Council by the system, it may well be
that no great harm is being done and that in fact some good may result.
4 Twining and Turnbull were governors of Tanganyika, 1949–1958 and 1958–1961, respectively.
9 CO 1936/811, no 52 21 Apr 1960
[Constitutional reform and economic development]: CO note of a
meeting between A R Thomas and R W Robson
Mr. R.W. Robson, a newspaper proprietor in the Pacific who publishes among other
things ‘The Fiji Times and Herald’ (the main Fiji newspaper) and ‘The Pacific Islands
Monthly’, called on the 21st April to see Mr. A.R. Thomas.1 Mr. Abbott was also present.
2. After giving a brief outline of the basic problems in Fiji as he saw them—very
much on the lines described in the Burns Commission Report2—and adding that he
had been urging for twenty years or more that something should be done about
them, Mr. Robson went on to express wholehearted support for the Burns
1 Robson was the highly influential publisher of Fiji’s only daily, The Fiji Times, and a conservative
commentator on local and regional issues through his Pacific Islands Monthly.
2 The Burns Commission, chaired by Sir Alan Burns, former governor of the Gold Coast (Ghana), to
inquire into the natural resources and population trends of Fiji, made sweeping recommendations for
change and reform in the administrative structures of Fijian society, for the promotion of greater
individualism and personal freedom among Fijians, the introduction of multi-racial local government, and
the gradual erosion of a separate system of Fijian administration (Report of the Commission of Enquiry
into the Natural Resources and Population Trends of the Colony of Fiji, 1959, Fiji Legislative Council
Paper No 1, 1960).
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Commission’s recommendations. In his view it was essential that the
recommendations should be adopted in full, and that there should be no question of
the Fijians opting out of recommendations which they did not like. He undertook to
lend what influence he could in full support of the Report through his newspapers.
3. If he had one criticism of the Report it was that the Burns Commission, when
dealing with constitutional matters, had omitted to give any lead about advance in
the future towards self-government. He felt it would be a good thing if Government
were to supplement the Commission’s recommendations by making an official
statement to the effect that although circumstances were not at present propitious
for any constitutional changes apart from those recommended by the Burns
Commission, the eventual aim, as in the case of other dependent territories, should
be one of self-government for Fiji; and urging all races to work in harmony towards
that end.
4. Mr. Robson expressed himself to be against a common roll, at least at this
stage, and thought that representation should be on a communal basis. Mr. Thomas
mentioned that in certain cases where representation on a communal basis had been
tried elsewhere it had not worked out entirely satisfactorily and was being dropped in
favour of a common roll; and he pointed out that the communal system was inclined
to develop racial, rather than nationalistic, sentiment. Mr. Robson agreed that this
was a disadvantage, but felt that the disadvantages of a common roll would be
greater, at least until such time as it had become possible to develop greater unity
among the races in Fiji.
5. In answer to a question from Mr. Thomas, Mr. Robson said that at present
there was no sign of overt hostility between the races, but he warned that bad feeling
could develop. The Fijians and the Indians did not merge socially; each held the
other in a certain amount of contempt; and he had heard responsible Fijians say that
if the Indian population continued to increase at the present rate an open clash
would be inevitable.
6. In answer to a further question from Mr. Thomas, Mr. Robson said he fully
supported the recommendation in the Burns Report that firms and organizations
operating in Fiji should employ local personnel to a greater degree.
7. Mr. Robson said that he regarded the proposal to appoint a Development
Commissioner as the Chairman of a Natural Resources Council, as one of the most
important of the Burns Commission’s recommendations. He could not over-stress in
his view the importance of encouraging the Australian corporations with large
interests in Fiji to increase their investment there, and he felt that the right man in
the post of Development Commissioner could do invaluable work in that direction by
co-ordinating development, by showing that Government was really tackling the
problem, and by gaining the confidence of the business community. He felt it was
essential that the person appointed as Development Commissioner should have a
sound knowledge of Fiji and its particular racial problems, and he had himself given
a lot of thought to the question of finding a suitable man. He had at first felt that
Grainger Johnson, Managing Director of W. R. Carpenters, would be the man for the
job; but on second thoughts decided that Johnson would be too closely under the
thumb of Carpenters’ interests and in any case he had heard that Johnson had
decided to sell out his interests in Fiji following the December riots. In a
conversation which Mr. Robson had recently had with Sir Ronald Garvey, the latter
had suggested Mr. Sykes who had previously served in Fiji and was at present
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Colonial Secretary, Bermuda, for the post of Development Commissioner, and Mr.
Robson, who had recently visited Mr. Sykes in Bermuda, was most enthusiastic about
this idea.
8. Mr. Thomas thanked Mr. Robson for his interesting views and suggestions,
and for his offer to help through his newspapers in advocating acceptance of the
Burns Commission Report. Mr. Thomas went on to explain, however, that at present
the question of implementing the proposals in the Report was one for the
Government of Fiji, who were actively considering the matter, and that the Secretary
of State could not take action on any of the proposals until he had received the views
and recommendations of the Governor of Fiji. Mr. Robson said that he fully
understood that that was the position; that he had already written privately to the
Governor; and that he hoped to be seeing the Governor in Suva in the latter part of
May.
9. Finally, Mr. Robson drew attention to the other Western Pacific territories, i.e.
the New Hebrides, the British Solomon Islands and the Gilbert and Ellice Islands,
where, he said, ‘nothing was being done and the people were starving’. He urged that
consideration should be given to the possibility of getting Sir Alan Burns to do a
similar job for those territories as the one he had recently done for Fiji. Mr. Robson
added that in his view the best course would be to transfer our interests in the New
Hebrides and the B.S.I.P. lock, stock and barrel, to the Australians, and to join the
G.E.I.C. with the Fijian Administration.
10 CO 1036/865, no 12 7 Sept 1960
[Development plan]: despatch from Lord Perth to Sir K Maddocks1
I have the honour to refer to your despatch No. 448 of the 30th June forwarding for
my consideration and approval a Draft Development Plan for the period 1961–70,
based on the recommendations in the Report of the Burns Commission but
containing also provision for other capital works which the Fiji Government
considers it essential to undertake within the period.
2. The Draft Development Plan is being considered by my Advisers and I will
inform you of their observations in due course. In the meantime, I note that your
despatch does not directly discuss the technical merits, or political social or
economic advantages of individual projects within the Plan, and I will confine my
remarks in this despatch solely to the question of the provision of finance of the
order of magnitude needed for the implementation of the Plan as a whole.
3. I would say at the outest that I am not in a position to undertake to provide
any specific sums of money from United Kingdom funds beyond the period covered
by the Colonial Development and Welfare Act, 1959, that is to say, the period ending
on the 31st March, 1964. The Fiji Government can however undoubtedly count on
sympathetic consideration by her majesty’s Government of her needs for financial
assistance towards the continuing development of the Colony after that date.
1 The Fiji government’s ambitious and far-reaching development plan followed the Burns Commission’s
recommendations for rapid agricultural development of the colony and for a speedy upgrading of the
public infrastructure such as expanding telecommunications, building bridges and wharves and improving
rural transportation.
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4. In the period up to the 31st March, 1964 (taking into account one-quarter of
the sum estimated for 1964) the Draft Development Plan provides for capital
expenditure of a little ever £F10.1 million. This assumes a yearly rate of expenditure
on capital development considerably in excess of what it has been possible to achieve
so far. However, it is prepared that more than half the capital expenditure envisaged
in the ten year plan should take place in the first three years. As you recognise in
paragraph 10 of your despatch, such a pattern raises considerable doubts both as to
the territory’s capacity to achieve such a target and as to the wisdom of attempting to
crowd so much into the first few years with the consequent danger of under-
employment in the years to follow.
5. You will recognise that the calls on the funds available under the Colonial
Development and Welfare Act are many and heavy, and I could not see my way to
allocating to Fiji more than the territory could reasonably be expected to spend
within the period concerned. With the above considerations in mind, and having
regard to the levels of capital expenditure achieved in recent years, as set out in
paragraph 3 to Appendix A to your despatch, I consider it reasonable to assume an
average annual expenditure on capital development of £F2.5 million a year, totalling
approximately £F8 million in the period up to the 31st March, 1964.
6. The estimated receipts set out at Table IX of the Draft Development Plan,
when adjusted to cover the period up to the 31st March, 1964, appear to be as
follows:—
SF million
C.D.C. Finance .280
Local loans for Agricultural and Industrial Loans Boards .425
Local loans for other capital projects 1.080
Telecommunications loan .325
Loan repayments .130
Existing C.D.W. allocations .815
TOTAL: 3.055
Assuming total expenditures of £F8 million, there is a gap of approximately £F5
million, and, subject to other resources not becoming available and to the
qualification in paragraph 10 below I am prepared to undertake that Her Majesty’s
Government will ensure that the letter amount is made available from the Colonial
Development and Welfare vote and external borrowing at then by way of Exchequer
Loans, or otherwise.
7. I note that, as recommended by the Burns Commission, you have sought
assistance from the United Kingdom in the form of grants only. From a persusal of
the various projects set out in the Plan, however, many do not appear likely to qualify
for grants under Colonial Development and Welfare Scheme and some, such as the
renewal of the Suva wharf, in which reference is made in paragraph 8 below, do not
appear to qualify for assistance under Section 1 of the Act at all. On the face of it, and
subject to examination of detailed schemes, the element which can be regarded as
‘C.D.W.-worthy’ appears to total roughly £F4 million in the period up to the 31st
March, 1964 (this includes items of recurrent as well as capital expenditure but
excludes items that would be more suitably financed by loan). Bearing in mind that
estimated expenditure of approximately £F0.8 million is already covered by provision
from existing Colonial Development and Welfare grants, there remains a balance of
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about £F3.2 million towards which a further Colonial Development and Welfare
grant allocation might be made. That figure will itself require some further
reduction, however, to allow for the deferment of sums of the expenditure planned in
the first few years, as envisaged in paragraph 5 above, and to take amount of the fact
that it is not the normal practice to meet by means of Colonial Development and
Welfare grants more them 90 per cent of the expenditure on any particular scheme. I
should be grateful to receive your comments on these figures in due course and to
have your own assessment of the amount of grant assistance needed so that the
amount of the supplementary Colonial Development and Welfare allocation can be
determined.
8. As mentioned above in assessing the likely ‘C.D.W.-worthy’ projects, no
account has been taken of the Suva Wharf Scheme (which is a very large item on the
Plan) since although you have indicated that the scheme will not be capable of
bearing full loan charges, it is, I understand, largely a replacement project and, as
such, ineligible for Colonial Development and Welfare assistance. It is conceivable,
however, that the scheme will contain some improvement element which will enable
it to be financed in part from Colonial Development and Welfare funds, and in that
event I should be glad to receive in due course your assessment of what the
improvement element might be.
9. As regards the balance of the proposed assistance of £F5 million, you will be
aware that I presently announced in Parliament that it is Her Majesty’s
Government’s intention to assist Colonial Governments in meeting the expenses of
employing overseas staff, and the relief which this should afford to the Fiji budget
should enable the Fiji Government to service additional loans over and above those
at present contemplated in the Draft Development Plan. I hope that examination will
show that it will be possible in that way for Fiji to finance by loans the difference
between the amount which can be made available from the Colonial Development
and Welfare Vote and the external finance of £F5 million referred to in paragraph 6
above.
10. Finally, it is clear from the Burns Report that expenditure under the Draft
Development Plan will not in itself be sufficient to ensure the necessary expansion
of the Colony’s economy. The Commission expressed the view that unless their
major recommendations were viewed as inter-dependent parts of an integrated
plan the development of the Colony’s economy as a whole would not be possible
and the money which the Commission had proposed should be spent on
development will largely be wasted. Before finally committing Her Majesty’s
Government to the provision of assistance of the substantial order envisaged, I
should wish, therefore, to be assured that it is intended to implement those
recommendations of the Burns Report, including the proposals for land reform,
which the Commission considered essential to the development of the Colony’s
economy. With that qualification, I see no objection to your informing the
Legislative Council that Her Majesty’s Government will be prepared, subject to
more detailed examination of individual projects in the usual way, to ensure that
there is available to Fiji in the period up to the 31st March, 1964, external finance
of up to £F5 million in the form of grants and loans and that Fiji can count on her
needs for further assistance after that date being sympathetically considered by Her
Majesty’s Government.
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11 CO 1036/612, no 6 20 Sept 1960
‘Brief on constitutional reform’: Fiji government note sent by 
P D Macdonald to A R Thomas in preparation for Mr Amery’s visit1
At the time of the general elections last year, the feeling in Fiji, except amongst a
limited number of Indian politicians, and a few militant trade unionists, was that no
major change in the constitution was yet wanted, and the Burns Commission in its
report stated, ‘we do not consider that any change in the general constitutional
position is desired by more than a small minority of the population’. Since then, the
greatly increased politics-industrial activity in the Colony, and the recent unrest and
disturbances in the sugar industry, have clearly indicated that a more advanced form
of Government is overdue. There are indications that politico-industrial unrest will
continue unless local politicians are given greater responsibility and unless they are
more closely associated with, and can be brought to appreciate the workings of, the
administrative machine.
2. The present constitution provides for a Legislative Council, presided over by a
Speaker, and consisting of 16 official members (of whom the Colonial Secretary,
Attorney-General and Financial Secretary are ex efficio members), and 15 unofficial
members, of whom 5 are Europeans, 5 Indians and 5 Fijians. Both the European and
Indian representation is made up of 3 elected members and 2 nominated members.
The 5 Fijian members are elected by the Council of Chiefs.
With regard to the franchise, European electors are required to be sons of parents
of European descent, British subjects, aged over 21 years and in receipt of an income
of £75 per annum, or owning property of an annual value of not less than £20.
Similar qualifications are required of Indian electors, except that they must be of
Indian descent, and in receipt of an annual income of £75, or owning property of an
annual value of not less than £5 a year, and they must be able to read and write either
English or one of six specified Indian languages.
3. As indicated above, the desire for change comes almost exclusively from a
small section of the Indian community, (generally speaking, the intelligensia), and
militant trade unionists, mostly of the same race. The Fijian fears any advance lest it
might lead to domination by the Indians. The vast majority of Europeans are also
strongly opposed to change; although there are a few who now realise, and openly
acknowledge, that change must come, it is significant that many intelligent
Europeans refuse to face up to this fact.
4. Two solutions have been put forward at the official level. Mr. Weston, the
Assistant Colonial Secretary, who has spent some 18 years in Fiji, believes that the
opportunity should now be taken to introduce a constitution which recognises the
direction in which politics in Fiji should develop, i.e. towards a multi-racial society.
He feels that this should be done by introducing a few common roll constituencies
on the Tanganyika model,2 though he would retain elected representation on a racial
basis in most areas. He recognises that the Fijians are strongly opposed to any move
in the direction of a common roll but proposes that this opposition should be
1 Amery visited Fiji between 13 and 28 Oct 1960 as part of a familiarisation tour of the UK’s Pacific
territories which began on 12 Sept.
2 See 8.
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placated by providing that 5 Fijians should be especially chosen by the Council of
Chief’s for membership of the legislature, in addition to the present 5 Fijian
members who ero elected by the Council of Chiefs (it is now proposed that of the
latter five, only two should be nominated by the Council of Chiefs, and that three
should be properly elected). The effect of this proposal would be that the Fijians
would have twice as many members as the Indians, although their population is
already less, and becoming increasingly so. It is, of course, essential to protect Fijian
interests, but this solution would inevitably lead to great difficulties later on, since, if
Fijian representation were weighted in this way, it would be exceedingly difficult to
reduce it later, and, in any case, it could hardly be regarded as a permanent feature of
the constitution. Whilst such a solution might be acceptable to European public
opinion now, it seems very dubious if it would be acceptable to Indian public opinion.
5. Mr. Weston would also like to see the present official majority changed into a
large unofficial majority and official membership reduced to five. He believes that the
reason for the present dissatisfaction with the present constitution is that the
legislature has too many officials, too many Europeans, and an official majority. He
further believes:—
(a) that the interests of the Fijians must remain paramount and that their
paramountcy must be recognised, not merely cursorily, but effectively in the
Legislature; and,
(b) that parity of European elected representation in the Legislature with that of
Fijians and Indians should cease forthwith and that the number of Europeans
therein from whatever source should be very substantially reduced.
6. As regards (a) above, he points out that the Deed of Cession is acknowledged
as conferring a moral obligation to ensure that Fijian rights are protected, that the
Fijians are the indigenous race, that they legally own 80% of the land, that they form
an integrated race with deep roots in the country, and that they have been
consistently loyal to the Crown.
7. The view of Mr. P.D. Macdonald, the Colonial Secretary, with which the
Governor is in general agreement, is that, in the present political atmosphere, it
would be impossible to gain acceptance by the Fijians or Europeans of the principle
of the common roll (particularly in view of what has happened in Tanganyika), and
that, whilst a multi-racial society must always be the aim, it is regrettably
unavoidable to continue electing members from separate communal rolls, for the
present. They consider that the official majority should be abolished forthwith, but
that, until the stage of full ministerial responsibility is reached, there should be an
appreciable unofficial majority, but that the elected majority should be a small one
(with appropriate checks and balances in the constitution), and that for the life of the
next Legislature, it will be necessary to maintain European parity of representation,
both in order to protect the Fijian, and in order to ensure that the confidence of
European businessmen and investors in Fiji, now already shaken, does not result in a
flight of capital and the cessation of investment. The kind of constitution which they
have in mind is on the following lines:—
(i) Legislative Council:
5 European elected members
5 Fijian elected members (or 3 elected and 2 nominated by the Council of Chiefs)
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5 Indian elected members
3 Nominated members
11 Official members;
(ii) Executive Council: A ‘member’ system to be introduced. The Council to
consist of 4 officials and 4 unofficials (the ‘members’), the ‘members’ being
elected by the whole body of the unofficial members of Legislative Council, and
not by the racial benches, as at present. It would be provided that 1 European, 1
Fijian and 1 Indian should be elected but the fourth person might be of any race.
Each member would have supervisory (but not executive) responsibility for a
group of Departments;
(iii) Franchise: This has not yet been fully considered, but it is understood that
the existing property franchise is, owing to the fall in the value of money, so liberal
that comparatively few are excluded from voting. There might, therefore, be little
objection to universal free adult franchise. They feel strongly that the time has
now come for women to be given the vote.
8. These proposals have not yet been discussed other than between the Colonial
Secretary, the Assistant Colonial Secretary and the Governor, but the matter will
certainly be raised by the Indian Association, and possibly other bodies, during the
visit of Mr. Amery.
12 CO 1036/800, no 1 4 Nov 1960
[Racial balance in the civil service]: letter from Sir K Maddocks to 
H P Hall
[The preservation of a racial balance in the civil service between Fijians and Indians,
always a sensitive issue, gained particular salience and urgency when talks about possible
constitutional reform began. Both the CO and the Fiji government were concerned that
unless appropriate measures were taken there would be an ‘Indianisation’ of the civil
service because Fijians were fewer in number and under-prepared to compete.]
With reference to our discussions in Suva on the 26th October, concerning the
question of retaining a balance in the Fiji Public Service between Fijians and Indians,
we agreed that before making any announcement at the opening of the Budget
Session on the 25th November, it would be necessary to ensure that the policy has
the approval of the Secretary of State.
2. I attach a note1 on the conversation, which has been made by Bevington, who
made no notes at the time. I think, however, it is substantially correct.
3. I now propose that a statement along the following lines should be included in
my address at the Budget session:—
‘Members of Council are aware that in recent years Government has pressed
forward with the appointment of local residents to the Fiji Civil Service
wherever possible. Indeed, it has been the Government’s aim to make the
maximum possible use of, and to give every possible opening to local
residents in the Civil Service. Not only is it right that the people of the Colony
1 Not printed.
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should be actively associated with Government on the executive side, but it is
also a matter of plain economics. However, it is clear that if this policy is
pursued without any limitation it will result in there being a serious
imbalance in the Civil Service as between the two major races in the Colony.
After consultation with the Secretary of State, therefore, I have issued a
directive to the Public Service Commission informing them that
recommendations for appointments and promotions to posts in the Public
Service should be made in such a way as to preserve, as far as possible, the
balance between the two main races in the Colony. This will mean that for
some time the number of posts available to the Indian community will be
limited, while posts which we hope will, in due course, be filled by Fijians,
will have to be held for the time being by European or expatriate officers.
A White Paper has recently been published in the United Kingdom outlining
an offer of financial assistance to Colonial Governments designed materially to
reduce the additional cost to them of employing overseas officers. I realise that
there is some fear that this may result in the retention of expatriate officers to
the detriment of the policy of creating a local service. While saying that this
Government will certainly wish to take advantage of this generous offer,
acceptance of it will not in any way retard the policy of localisation of the Civil
Service: local residents will continue to be appointed wherever suitably qualified
officers are available within the requirement of maintaining the balance
between the major races to which I have already referred.
The slowing down of the recruitment and promotion of civil servants from
the Indian community will, I fear, be a disappointment to many who have worked
hard to equip themselves for senior posts in the Government service. I ask them
to be patient and to understand that this qualification of the policy of localisation
is, in present circumstances, essential to the healthy and harmonious
development of the Civil Service and indeed of the Colony as a whole.
This measure of restriction imposes a responsibility on Government to do
everything in its power to hasten the training of members of the Fijian
community to enable them to take their rightful place in Government. To
this end, I propose that a number of scholarships should be reserved for the
Fijian people, as recommended by the Burns Commission, and I am hopeful
that it will be possible to obtain a Colonial Development and Welfare grant for
this purpose.’
4. I attach great importance to the proposal in the last paragraph that
scholarships for Fijians should be paid for from Colonial Development and Welfare
funds as this will deny the Indian community the opportunity of saying that Fijians
are being granted preferential treatment at the expense of local taxpayers. The
proposal to send Fijians to the United Kingdom was recommended at paragraph 671
of the Burns Commission Report. However, if approval of this point is likely to delay
approval of the statement I would be prepared to omit it, although regretfully as I
regard it as being of considerable importance in allaying the inevitable criticism.
5. I shall be grateful if the statement may be examined as a matter of urgency,
and if I may have the Secretary of State’s approval by telegraph at the earliest
possible date, and in any event well before the opening of the Legislative Council
session on the 25th of this month.
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13 CO 1036/612, no 11 8 Nov 1960
‘Policy in Fiji’: note by Mr Amery arguing against multi-racialism and
a common roll and in favour of a ‘quasi-ministerial system’1
The Fijians and Indians are more distinct as communities than Jews and Arabs in
Palestine, Greeks and Turks in Cyprus or even Europeans and Bantu in South and
Central Africa. Intermarriage, business associations, even personal friendships are
rare.
2. In the past, so long as we have held the undisputed power, relations between
the communities have been good if distant. In the last few months this has changed.
The December riots and the sugar dispute have made the Fijians fear that the Indians
are out to bring the wind of change to Fiji and use it to establish Indian
preponderance. Their fears have been further increased by the Burns report which
they regard as an attempt to give the Indian community control of the land by
breaking up traditional Fijian society. The resentment aroused by the Burns report
has been to some degree extended to Government and for the first time for many
years, has shaken Fijian confidence in British intentions. The point is crucial when it
is remembered that the Fijians are the ‘loyal’ community providing 75% of the
security forces. The islands could hardly be governed without them, let alone against
them.
3. In this climate the Fijians have become increasingly communally minded.
They have also become more resistant than before both to constitutional changes for
the Colony as a whole and to the modification of their own traditional system. In the
face of what they regard as the Indian threat, there has been an instinctive closing of
the ranks around their traditional Chiefs.
4. The Indians on their side are sharply divided over the sugar issue and over the
proper course to follow in their relations with the Fijians. The more moderate
leaders among them realise that they have antagonised the Fijians and would like to
heal the breach. At the same time they are subject to fairly strong pressures from
within their own community; and the more extreme elements are thinking in terms
of self-government on the basis of a common roll which would enable the Indians to
rule the roost.
5. How then should we proceed in the constitutional field and in regard to the
Burns recommendations about the Fijian administration?
6. To begin with, we must, I think, accept that it is impracticable to think in
terms of a single Fijian nation or of a common roll at any rate for the foreseeable
future. Any suggestion of this is bound to arouse Fijian suspicions that the Indians
would dominate by counting heads. The moderate Indian leaders recognise this. This
points to the conclusion that we shall have to recognise not just the equality of
individuals before the law but the equality of the Indian and Fijian communities
irrespective of their numbers. There is no other way of reconciling both the pledges
in the Deed of Cession and those in Lord Salisbury’s despatch, let alone the need to
keep communal peace. We should, therefore, let it be known that any constitutional
advance must be so designed as to preclude the domination of one of the two main
communities by the other.
1 Amery addressed his note to Hall, Thomas, Fraser and Macleod.
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7. The European Community (20,000) can hardly expect, in the long run, to
maintain their position as a community equal in importance to Fijians and Indians.
For the time being, however, the Fijians insist that they should be so regarded. The
Indians for their part have not asked for any change in the status of the European
Community.
Leg. Co. and Ex. Co.
8. The Indians have asked, but not pressed, for an unofficial majority on Leg. Co.
and Ex. Co. while preserving the present communal composition of both. The Fijians
are flatly opposed to any reduction in the Governor’s powers.
9. After full discussion with the Governor and his advisers we came to the
conclusion that the best way to proceed would be to reverse the traditional Colonial
pattern and introduce a quasi-ministerial system while preserving the official
majority in the Leg. Co. The ‘Ministers’, who would be bound by the ordinary
doctrine of collective responsibility, would count as officials for the purpose of
securing the official majority. They would of course be dismissed and replaced by
others if they ceased to support the Governor. Leg. Co. itself would be somewhat
expanded, though on a communal basis, to balance the expansion of Ex. Co. resulting
from the introduction of the Ministerial system. The composition of Ex. Co. would
not be laid down, so that, if all members of the Community refused in certain
circumstances to serve, the Governor could still govern with the help of the other
two Communities and his officials.
10. A change of this kind is likely to be criticised by Patel and those Indians who
consider that their numbers entitle them to a predominant position. The Governor
and his advisers, however, believe that the ‘jobs’ created by the introduction of a
ministerial system will be popular with leading men in both communities and that
there will be little difficulty in maintaining the official majority in Leg. Co. They
consider that such a system might work for a number of years.
11. If this general principle is accepted, its implementation might be carried out
in two phases. In the first, the Governor would simply invite existing members of Ex.
Co. to assume ministerial functions on a basis of collective responsibility. In the second,
and only after the next election, the number of seats in Leg. Co. would be increased.
12. The Public Service. Just as the Fijians will not accept a common roll, so they
will not accept that recruitment for the public service should be solely on a basis of
merit regardless of race. The Indians are probably abler and certainly have more
graduates than the Fijians. On this basis they would soon dominate the
Administration. This the Fijians will not accept. In the long run, it will probably be
necessary to have some rule—as in Cyprus now or in India in the old days—under
which government jobs would be divided in some such proportion as Indians 45%,
Fijians 45%, Europeans and others 10% in each grade of each department. For the
time being there is no need to be so precise and we can probably continue on the
present basis of promotion according to merit subject to a public assurance that
neither community will get more than 45% of the jobs in any grade or department. It
will be some time before the Fijians can hope to provide suitable candidates to fill
their quota and meanwhile Europeans will have to fill their places. Later on it will
from time to time become necessary as good Fijians come forward to pass over
Europeans who are marginally better qualified. This will raise problems of
compensation and it is for consideration how far these could be covered under the
terms of the new White Paper as applied to Fiji.
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13. The Fijian Administration. I see no future in the Burns recommendation
that the Fijian administration should be wound up as soon as possible. The Fijians
are determined to resist any move in this direction. They realise that whatever its
defects the tribal system does provide a leadership capable of defending the Fijian
communal interest against what they regard as the Indian threat. Without their
chiefs they would be leaderless. In many respects, of course, the Fijian
administration is old fashioned and we should seek opportunities of modernising it.
But rather than curtail its activities I would be inclined to give it more
responsibilities particularly in the sphere of local government. It may still be possible
to develop multiracial local government in the main towns; but much of the Colony
is purely Fijian; and in the mixed rural areas we are unlikely to get multi-racial local
government except in a second tier (i.e. delegations of Fijian and Indian local
government bodies meeting in joint conference). In each case the Fijian
Administration could play a valuable part.
14. I would personally be inclined to go further and encourage the development
of some Indian counterpart to the Fijian Administration. This would offer Indians
opportunities for public service which they both want and need. The existence of two
communal organisations moreover would help us to overcome a major problem. At
the present time, many necessary development or administrative projects tend by
their nature to favour one community rather than the other. ‘Fair shares for all’ is a
slogan which makes government hesitate to do anything for anybody. If roughly
equal subsidies could be given to both communities to spend as each thought best
there would be less cause for jealousy. Scholarships are a case in point. A number of
Indian children are educated abroad at their parents expense. Few Fijians can afford
this. The Fijians are thus keener on scholarships than the Indians. Yet at present
scholarships which are centrally administered have to be given on a basis of merit;
and the Indians—deservedly on this basis—tend to scoop the pool. If scholarships
were a communal matter, the Fijians would probably spend more on them than
would the Indians who could then spend the money on other projects of which they
are in greater need.
15. Hitherto we have held up the concept of a single multi-racial community as
the goal towards which Fijians and Indians alike should strive. The Fijians will no
longer accept this; and the more we lay the emphasis on multi-racialism, the more
suspicious they will become that we plan to sell them out to the Indians. The only
way, in my view, to exorcise the fear of communal domination is to make it clear ‘as
of now’ that we stand for equal rights for both communities as communities and that
we shall not pull out until both ask us to do so.
14 CO 1036/865 8 Nov 1960
[Burns Commission]: minute by H P Hall on Fijian reactions to 
the recommendations and Mr Amery’s assessment of the political
situation
The unfortunate fact is that for a number of reasons it is not now possible to
persuade the Fijians to accept all the recommendations in the Burns Commission
08-Fiji-01-cpp  10/5/06  6:55 AM  Page 39
40 JULIAN AMERY’S VISIT TO FIJI [14]
Report. The Burns Mission were in Fiji in July to September 1959 and,
unfortunately, since then relations between the Fijians and the Indians have
deteriorated. This began with the riots in Suva in December and was further
aggravated by the dispute in the sugar industry which is regarded by the Fijians as
an Indian attempt to gain control of the sugar industry which is vital to Fiji’s
economy. These fears of the Indians have consolidated the Fijian ranks and made
them most reluctant to give any concessions which they think would be to the
advantage of the Indians. From their examination of the Burns Commission Report
it seems to them that the Fijians have been asked to make all the concessions and
the Indians would get all the benefits.
There is another factor also to be taken into account. Mr. Amery, as a result of
meeting quite a large cross-section of Fijian opinion, has come to the conclusion
that our present goal of a multiracial society in which all men and women would
have equal and ‘democratic’ rights and in which the communities, as such, would
have no official status, is an ideal which is unlikely to be achieved in the foreseeable
future.1 He came to the conclusion that the Fijian and Indian communities are as
oil and water: much more so than Hindus and Muslims in the old India, Jews and
Arabs in Palestine, or Greeks and Turks in Cyprus. In Mr. Amery’s opinion, to
proceed on the assumption of ‘one man, one vote’ seems likely to invite political
division on racial lines, and as soon as the Indians are an absolute majority of the
population to establish Indian domination over the other communities. In Mr.
Amery’s opinion the better course is to recognise the existence of the communities
as communities, and in every step towards self-government to guarantee, at any
rate to the two main ones, equal rights as communities irrespective of their
numbers. This would involve each community equal representation in any central
legislative or executive bodies, an equal number of appointments in all grades of
the public service, and the delegation of as much administration as possible on a
communal basis.
It follows from this that in Mr. Amery’s opinion it would be a mistake to attempt to
abolish the Fijian Administration. In his opinion, for the foreseeable future there will
be a need for a department to look after specifically Fijian interests. The Fijians
themselves are agreed that the Fijian Administration should be modified and brought
up to date, and they hope that in so doing they will be able to streamline it by
handing over to the central government responsibilities for health and education,
and allow the Fijian Administration to concentrate on development.
The Fijian Affairs Board are anxious, and have been for a number of years, to make
full use of Fijian land. The Council of Chiefs have already accepted the Burns
recommendation to grant long leases which, in the present circumstances, is a
considerable concession on their part. They are not prepared to accept that a penal
tax should be payable in respect of unused native land. They point out that in
paragraph 142 of the Burns Commission Report, the Burns Commission themselves
have not attempted to lay down any criterion for a penal land tax and have suggested
that this should be the subject of investigation by an independent expert. The
Governor and his officials do not accept the Burns Mission conclusion that there is a
shortage of land in Fiji. They admit that there are one or two isolated cases in which
1 See 13.
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land which has gone into reserve is probably not now being as fully utilised as
before—this also applies to one or two European estates—but in their opinion these
are only isolated incidents and should not be taken as of common occurrence. They
point out that there is land in Vanua Levu which is available for leasing but has not
been taken up. The Indians are apparently only interested in cane land, and as Fiji is
already now fulfilling its sugar quota, there is no possibility of further extension of
sugarcane crops. The Fijians also point out that they cannot reasonably be penalised
for not using land if they are unable to sell the produce, and before this particular
recommendation can be implemented, they consider that the question of marketing
additional crops should first be considered.
The Fiji Government intend to improve the utilisation of land by setting up
organisations to assist in the cultivation of land within the reserves and land
settlement schemes outside the reserves. The land within the reserves would of
course be reserved for Fijian schemes, but that outside the reserves would be open to
all races. They hope that the C.D.C. will be able to participate in these schemes, and
the local representative of the C.D.C., Mr. Firmston-Williams, is anxious to help. This
is being looked into separately.
As regards the major land recommendation therefore, the proposal is to review
this in 5 years’ time to see whether the proposed arrangements for better utilisation
of land have been successful or not. If they have not been successful, then the
question of a penal tax will be looked at again. On present information, the Governor
and his advisers do not see how they could possibly implement this recommendation
as most of the Fijian land is of poor quality and it would be an extremely difficult task
to formulate a practical penal land tax code.
On the broad issue, the Fijians and the Fijian Government are agreed that
assistance from the United Kingdom can only be provided if full use is made of local
resources,2 and this in fact is mentioned in the last sentence of the proposed
announcement in paragraph 2 of (21) opposite. Mr. Amery felt that this was the right
approach. His view was that any mission’s report was in the nature of
recommendations and it was up to the governments to take decisions on those
recommendations. He felt at this stage, when the Burns Commission’s
recommendations were still under consideration by the Fiji Government and had
still to be considered by the U.K. Government, it was premature to tie any assistance
from H.M.G. to the Burns Commission Report as such. On the other hand, he fully
agreed that one of the conditions should be that the fullest possible use is being
made of all local resources.
In the light of this explanation I hope we can agree to something being said on the
lines of the proposal in paragraph 2 of (21). The Government proposals mentioned in
that are the decisions on the Burns Commission Report and the Development Plan.
Incidentally, the Governor pointed out that even if the Burns Commission had not
reported, the Fiji Development Plan would have been broadly as it is now being
submitted. He thought it was therefore unfortunate that assistance towards this plan
should be related directly to the Burns Mission as it was only coincidental that the
two have come forward together at this stage.
2 cf 10, para 10.
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15 CO 1036/800 8–10 Nov 1960
[Racial balance in the civil service]: minutes by M G Smith, 
W D Sweaney,1 A R Thomas and Sir H Poynton on whether
appointments or promotions of Indians should be delayed
The question whether further appointments or promotions of Indians in the Fiji Civil
Service should be delayed to ensure a proper distribution of posts in that Service as
between Indians and Fijians is primarily a political one and if you consider that such
an arrangement is essential then I do not think O.S.D. could question it.
But the statement proposed by the Governor is in general terms and I am not clear
that he has taken all the difficulties fully into account. I note in the first place that
Fijian public opinion seems, at least in some measure, to have been consulted. But
there is no indication that either the general public opinion of the Indian community
in Fiji or the opinion of any Association representing Indian officers in the Civil
Service has been consulted. Subject to your guidance about the political difficulties
of doing this I would have expected that the Governor would at least have consulted
the Civil Service Associations before making this sort of statement.
The proposed directive to the Public Service Commission is also rather vague. It
seems to me insufficient to tell them that ‘the number of posts available to the Indian
community will be limited . . .’. The Commission will not know as between one post
and another where the limitation should fall and the proposed policy could only be
understandable, and therefore effective, if there were some survey of Departments to
enable the directive to be pretty specific about the future position of each
Department. It is also not clear how long the limitation is to last. It may, for example,
mean that some Indian officers who were recruited to the Public Service in the full
expectation that the normal promotion criteria would be applied throughout their
career may now be facing the possibility that, on racial grounds, any prospect of
further promotion has come to an end. A fairly senior Indian officer cannot be
expected to stay in his present post without further prospect waiting 10 or 15 years
for a young Fijian to catch up with him and then to be measured against that young
Fijian for further promotion. If the Government is going to freeze the careers of a
good many officers each officer concerned is entitled to know that he has been
selected for freezing so that he can consider what further steps to take.
While, therefore, if the proposed course of action is politically essential it should
no doubt be taken I suggest that the statement should be somewhat amended and
specific action should take place. I suggest that before the statement is made the
Governor should consult the Staff Associations likely to be affected and that the
statement should then include an undertaking that the position of the whole Service
will be reviewed so that all officers likely to be affected by this promotion bar will be
aware of their prospects. In the course of this review it may be apparent that a
number of officers have no further prospect of promotion until retirement. It may be
that the review will suggest that some form of compensation should be made
available to these officers for this discrimination against them perhaps in the form of
offering them retirement with abolition of office terms. The Governor’s statement
1 Smith and Sweaney were CO assistant secretaries and the respective heads of Overseas Service Division
Department ‘A’ (conditions of service) and Department ‘B’ (general recruitment policy).
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should therefore say that the Reviewing Committee will be invited to advise whether
any special steps should be taken to compensate any officer whose career may be
seriously prejudiced by the new arrangements.
I am passing this through Mr. Sweaney who may wish to refer to the question of
further overseas recruitment as a consequence of this restriction on the promotion
of Indian officers.
You will no doubt be dealing separately with the question of a C.D. and W. grant
for training purposes and will be having these papers registered in your Department.
M.G.S.
8.11.60
It is one thing to restrict recruitment of Indians in order to build up the recruitment
of Fijians, and meanwhile to step up the training of Fijians by special scholarship
schemes. That is primarily a local political matter and I do not think that so far as
O.S.D. is concerned there would be any objection.
It is another thing to restrict the promotion of Indians already in the Civil Service
pending the availability of suitably qualified and experienced Fijian Officers who
would then be promoted exceptionally over the heads of their Indian colleagues. It
might even mean promoting serving European Officers over the heads of Indian
Officers as a stop-gap arrangement to keep the posts warm for Fijians; or importing
newly recruited Europeans on contract with the same object. Under Colonial
Regulations the claims of officers for promotion are considered on the basis of
experience, qualifications and merit. Any departure from these criteria would cut at
the root of the career structure of the public service and the consequences would be
widespread.
It does not seem to me advisable for the Governor to issue directions to the Public
Service Commission on this matter or for him to make a statement on the lines he is
proposing without a good deal more thought than has been given so far. I agree with
Mr. Smith that the problem requires detailed examination locally.
Would it not suffice for the Governor to announce, after consultation with the
Staff Associations, that the problem of ‘imbalance’ in the Civil Service as between the
two major races is one which he feels should now be the subject of a detailed
examination by an authoritative committee with the object of reviewing the subject
and recommending what steps should be taken.
As regards recruitment from the United Kingdom to vacancies in Fiji, we have
been handicapped by the unattractive salaries and so forth but if these are improved
under the Overseas Service Aid Scheme it may ease our recruitment difficulties since
the image of Fiji and the Pacific in the minds of candidates is not unattractive.
W.D.S.
9.11.60
This is another of the particular recommendations, arising from Mr. Amery’s visit to
Fiji, on which I feel some difficulty in recommending action in isolation (as it were)
of his proposals as a whole.
Taken on its own, this recommendation, with the proposed statement by the
Governor in No. 1, obviously bristles with difficulties, notably such questions as what
happens to Europeans when the places they are keeping warm for Fijians have to be
surrendered? What happens to Indians who are held back from promotion until
Fijians are available for it; what instructions are to be given to the Public Service
08-Fiji-01-cpp  10/5/06  6:55 AM  Page 43
44 JULIAN AMERY’S VISIT TO FIJI [16]
Commission etc? It seems to me to be a matter to which the most detailed and
careful consideration needs to be given before it is launched as a scheme. I agree
therefore with the O.S.D. comments and, with one important qualification, with the
line of the draft reply.
My qualification is whether even the attenuated statement suggested in paragraph
5 of the draft does not go too far. My difficulty here arises not so much from the
technical (though important) difficulties of a personnel character, so much as from
the fact that the recommendation to have a balance of races in the Public Service is
one facet of the wider recommendation by Mr. Amery that our policy in Fiji should be
for the foreseeable future based on a communal system and not on the idea of an
ultimate multi-racial nation. I would consequently myself prefer to see the draft
attenuated still further by the pencial amendments which I have suggested. If it were
to go in this form it might be wise to accompany it by a separate telegram explaining
that Mr. Amery has made a number of important recommendations with which we
understand the Gov. to be broadly in agreement, of which this is one, and to which
the Secretary of State needs to give careful consideration since they amount to a
radical modification, if not change of policy, and indicating that, for this reason, he
may find our replies on detailed proposals a little unforthcoming for the present etc.
I find loose opposite a number of comments by Mr. Amery which cover some of the
most important recommendations. I shall probably wish to comment on these more
generally but not delay to do so now since Fiji matters are to be discussed with Mr.
Fraser at 10 a.m. tomorrow and I also understand that he has arranged with the
Secretary of State to have a meeting next Wednesday at 3 p.m.
A.R.T.
10.11.60
I share Mr. Thomas’s reluctance to deal with these items piecemeal. I have minuted
in general terms on the papers about the Fiji Development Plan which I sent forward
earlier today. This particular recommendation about the Civil Service bristles with
inherent difficulties—though not necessarily insuperable ones—but only arises, I
suggest, if Mr. Amery’s main contention is accepted—viz to abandon all hope of
bringing the races together into a ‘non-racial’ community & instead to base all our
future policy on a constitutional & administrative (though not geographical)
partition. This is if I may say so a highly controversial proposition.
A.H.P.
10.11.60
16 CO 1036/865 10 Nov 1960
‘Future of Fiji’: minute by Sir H Poynton questioning the suggestions
made by Mr Amery after his visit to Fiji
Mr. Fraser
I am afraid I shall not be able to be present at your meeting with the department
tomorrow morning since, on present plans, I have to attend the Secretary of State’s
meeting with Baileys (Malta) Ltd. I have not had time to study these papers fully but
on a cursory reading I must confess that I am a bit worried over the suggestions
made by Mr. Amery as a result of his visit to Fiji and recorded in Mr. Hall’s minute of
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the 8th November.1 The specific proposals which Mr. Amery has put forward and
which in some respects differ fundamentally from the recommendations of the Burns
Commission, all derive from his conclusion that our present goal of a multiracial
society in Fiji (I would prefer to call it non-racial myself) is unlikely to be achieved in
the foreseeable future. I recognise that it is obviously going to be a very difficult and
very slow task. On the other hand, to decide now that we should abandon the attempt
and base all our future policy on a constitutional and racial partition of Fiji (even
though not a geographical one) seems to me to be a counsel of despair. It would
mean, I suggest, that we should be left perpetually holding the ring between what in
effect amounted to two separate administrations and communities in Fiji. This might
be all right for a time and might get us out of some immediate political difficulties.
But the time is bound to come when there is a demand for at least full internal self-
government in Fiji and possibly even for national independence—especially when
New Zealand grants Western Samoa independence next year. I should hate to find
ourselves in the kind of position that we were faced with in Palestine between Jews
and Arabs or in Cyprus between Greeks and Turks with the racial antagonism
aggravated and, indeed, officially recognised in the constitution and ourselves unable
to let go without leaving Civil War in our trail when we went. To abandon our
policies for such a counsel of despair is a very big decision to take and I should have
thought myself that the Secretary of State would have wished to consult his
colleagues on the C.P.C. before we reverse the engines. If we do reverse them I doubt
whether we would ever be able to re-reverse them again. The specific
recommendations about parity in the Legislative Council or in the Executive Council
or in the public service, and the question whether or not to abolish the Fijian
Administration are really all subsidiary to this major issue of long term policy.
I should like to see comprehensive proposals in writing from the Governor for the
whole political and economic policy in Fiji. I find it very difficult to deal with this
problem on the basis of views expressed on particular recommendations here and
there and I am not entirely convinced that the Governor and his local officials have
really got a firm grip on this problem. In any case we have recently learned that the
Governor is a sick man and will have to come home for medical examination while
the Colonial Secretary is just coming on badly needed leave. These are the points
which I should have made at the meeting had I been able to be present and I hope
they will point the way to some comprehensive exercise about future policy in Fiji
which can be properly worked over in this Office and submitted to Ministers.
1 See 13 & 14.
17 CO 1036/612 14 Nov 1960
[Future of Fiji]: minute by H P Hall and note by I S Wheatley1 on 
Mr Amery’s proposals
Mr. Wheatley has prepared the note below in the light of the meeting in Mr. Fraser’s
room on Friday, 11th November.
1 Principal, Pacific and Indian Ocean Dept, CO.
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I think the conclusions reached at the meeting were that although it was realistic
to assume that for the foreseeable future Fiji should remain on a communal basis, it
would be undesirable to state this publicly as a firm decision as it might lead to
difficulty at some future date. It would however be realistic to make any
constitutional changes on this basis but as modifications of the present constitution
which recognises parity between the three races.
The Public Service. Here again the meeting thought that it would be undesirable
to make any dogmatic statement at this stage. Recruitment on a racial basis was one
thing but restriction of promotion of people already in the service was quite a
different matter. On the other hand, it did appear from the Staff Lists that the
majority of the more senior posts in all departments were still held by Europeans and
it might well be possible to implement this policy without too much difficulty. It
would however be desirable for the Governor to examine the implications of the
change of policy more closely before a final decision was reached.
Fijian Administration and Local Government. The idea of extending the activities
of the Fijian Administration and of setting up a separate Indian Administration was
not attractive. An officer had been placed on special duty to examine the question of
Local Government and it was considered that the best course would be to await his
report before reaching any decision on this particular point. In any case the Fiji
Government would be fully occupied over the next few months in dealing with the
sugar dispute, the Burns Commission report and the proposed ‘administrative’
introduction of a Ministerial system, and the question of Local Government, which
was not a live issue locally, could be left for a few months.
The Fijians should be encouraged in every possible way to progress economically
and educationally. The Fiji Government should also be pressed to increase the
number of multiracial schools in order to bring the races closer together. This
should also apply to Staff Associations, Trade Unions and possibly an Economic
Advisory Council.
Please see drafts on PAC100/335/04 and PAC 36/1/03 below.
H.P.H.
14.11.60
Comments on Mr. Amery’s Fiji minute 2
Paragraphs 1 to 5
The assessment of the separateness of the Fijian and Indian communities, and the
present state of Fijian opinion, seem certainly right. It follows, in particular, that it is
not now possible (if indeed it ever was, and even though ‘in isolation’ economically
desirable) to implement the Burns proposals for land reform in entirety or those for
the abolishment of the Fijian administration.
Paragraphs 6 and 7
It is also agreed that it is not practicable to think in terms of a common Fijian nation
in the foreseeable future. But, despite this, it is felt that our long-term policy must be
a non-racial Fiji. Otherwise it is feared that we should in effect be commiting Her
Majesty’s Government to holding the ring indefinitely between the Fijians and the
2 See 13.
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Indians, so that it would be impossible to quit Fiji without leaving civil war behind us.
The time is bound to come when there is a demand for at least full internal self-
government, and we would probably then be faced with the very Palestine or Cyprus
situation which Mr. Amery is seeking to avoid. If we accept then that our long-term
policy must be non-racial, we must tailor our short-term policy accordingly. Some of
the implications of this are set out below; but it may be said here that, though in fact
it will doubtless be necessary for a time to preserve the balance between the races, it
would be wrong to make any firm announcement, as Mr. Amery seems to suggest, that
constitutional advance must be designed so as to preclude the domination of one of
the two communities. Such an announcement might be embarrassing in the long-
term future, and in any case, fortunately, it seems unnecessary to go to such lengths
publicly to reassure the Fijians or to ‘challenge’ the politically ambitious Indians.
Paragraphs 8 to 11
The recommendations for Executive Council seem exactly right. They will give
members of all races some executive responsibility without altering the official
majority in Legislative Council. There should however be no public commitment to
expand Legislative Council only on a communal basis (even though in practice this is
how it may for a time be done).
Paragraph 12
The Fijians are certainly very perturbed about the preponderance of Indians in the
Civil Service, though they are still only in the executive and lower grades. Something
must be done to restore the balance at least to some extent but again it is felt that it
would be wrong publicly to announce anything nearly as definite as fixed percentages
for the communities. Detailed proposals will have to be worked out both for
recruitment and promotion, and directions given accordingly to the Public Service
Commission. It will probably be sufficient to announce that Government is
concerned with the present imbalance and will be consulting staff associations and
responsible members of both communites about it.
Paragraphs 13 and 14
It is quite impossible to do away with the Fijian administration. But to extend its
activities, and to promote a parallel Indian administration, would be working for,
rather than against the separateness of the two races. There is in any case no local
demand for it. The Fijian administration is inefficient, and the Fijians themselves
have suggested that it should be streamlined and that the central administration
should resume control over health and education services, leaving it with ‘custom’
and economic matters. This seems right for the present; our ultimate goal would
probably be to remove economic matters also from it. It is possible that a parallel
Indian administration covering the same limited field might be set up out of the
existing Indian Advisory Councils. But it is suggested that no action should be taken
on any aspect of this question until the local government commissioner (who is at
present examining it) has reported.
Paragraph 15
It is agreed that there is no point at present, and probably harm, in plugging the multi-
racial line. But it is felt that it might well be embarrassing for the future, and that there
is in any case no need at present to make any firm commitment as suggested.
Additional comments
If the general thesis is accepted that we should go in the long run for a non-racial
Fiji, this makes it even more essential that we should, in whatever time may be
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available to us, do everything possible to bring the Fijians up to the level of the
Indians, and encourage contacts between the two races. Thus:—
(1) the Fijians must be taught to face up to modern economic realities, chiefly by
a better use of their land.
(2) the Fijians must be given every educational opportunity, including
scholarships to this country:
(3) attempts should be made to get the two races together ‘functionally’—in
schools, staff associations, trade unions, economic advisory council etc.
18 CO 1036/612 15 Nov 1960
[Future of Fiji]: minute by Mr Fraser to Mr Macleod on the future
need for clearer policy statements
By all reports Fiji is the area most likely to cause trouble in the Pacific. Before I leave
for the West Indies therefore I have suggested a short meeting. This I believe should
discuss three points:—
(1) The sugar dispute.
(2) The question of temporary or permanent gubernatorial replacement in the
event of the Governor being absent through ill health.
(3) An interim discussion of policy. It is my belief that the position can be held
temporarily by pursuing a middle course between what I might term the Burns
non-racial line and the Amery communal approach. Whilst offering some
constitutional advance the Governor has been instructed to mute his approach to
these problems in his Budget speech. But I suspect that next year, once the sugar
dispute is out of the way, and with decisions having to be taken on Burns’ major
recommendations, clearer policy statements will have to be made.
19 CO 1036/612, no 17 17 Nov 1960
[Future of Fiji]: letter from Sir H Poynton to Sir K Maddocks
requesting the governor’s views in the light of Mr Amery’s
recommendations
You will by now have received telegrams giving the Secretary of State’s comments on
your proposed statements in the Speech from The Throne at the Budget Session on
(a) interim constitutional changes
(b) the Fiji Civil Service
(c) the terms on which H.M.G. will provide financial assistance towards the
Development Plan.
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Fiji affairs have been discussed with the Secretary of state and Hugh Fraser, and
the Secretary of State would very much like to receive your views on future policy for
Fiji in a comprehensive document so that the picture can be seen as a whole. The
basis of the discussion with the Secretary of State was a note prepared by Julian
Amery on ‘Policy in Fiji’ and I enclose a copy of this for your information.1 I think it
might be useful to you if I set out our preliminary views on this.
We accept Amery’s assessment that for the foreseeable future Fiji should continue
to develop on a communal basis but we still think that the long term objective
should remain the ideal of what is usually called a multiracial state but what would
perhaps better be termed a ‘non-racial’ state. We feel however that this should be
accomplished by a ‘withering away’ rather than an overt extinction of the communal
roots of society. It follows from this that we should avoid any statement which
commits us forever to communal representation.
So far as constitutional changes are concerned, we understand that the Fijians, the
Indians and the Europeans are all at present agreed that parity between the races
should be retained. The introduction of a Ministerial system by administrative action
will not of course affect the present constitution but we must be careful how any
increase in membership of Legislative Council to take effect after the next elections is
presented. At present it seems inevitable that this increase will be on a communal
basis and parity between the three races will be maintained in the next Legislative
Council. For presentation purposes, however, we think it should be made clear that
this is purely a continuation of the present set-up, and not be drawn into any
statement that this is to be the pattern for all time.
For the longer term the Secretary of State would also like to have your views on
the method to be used for arriving at any changes in the constitution. Would you
propose to put forward suggestions after discussion with the various groups in Fiji,
or would you propose to ask for the appointment of a constitutional commissioner,
or would you propose to hold some sort of constitutional conference either in Fiji or
in London? We expect the answer to this will depend to some extent to the degree of
change envisaged and whether this is likely to prove readily acceptable to all
concerned or not.
The proposal which has caused us a certain amount of concern is the future of the
Civil Service. We agree that unless some steps are taken to protect Fijian interests,
the Civil Service might well become mainly Indianised. On the other hand, we think
the problem should be examined in some detail before any definite pronouncements
are made. There is a difference between such a scheme so far as recruitment is
concerned and so far as it might affect the promotion prospects of serving officers. It
would appear from the Staff List that it is probably early enough to introduce such a
scheme without any serious repercussions on serving officers as most of the more
senior appointments are still held by Europeans—although many of these are
Australians and New Zealanders. When this examination is being carried out it will
also be necessary to consider carefully what sort of instructions should be issued to
the Public Service Commission.
The next point which was considered in some detail was the future of the Fijian
Administration and its effect on Fijian political and economic development. We
1 See 13.
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accept the fact that in present circumstances the abolition of the Fijian
Administration is just not on. On the other hand, we do feel that something should
be done to streamline and modernise it insofar as it affects the development of
individualism amongst the Fijians. We consider that the Fijians must be taught to
face up to modern economic realities, chiefly by the better use of their land. We know
that you intend to do everything you possibly can on the question of the full use of
the land, and the encouragement of galala.2 We think that an increase in the number
of galala would encourage enlightened self-interest amongst the Fijians and
probably bring them into greater contact with the realities of life and possibly also
with Indians and Europeans. This, in due course, should have some effect on their
political outlook. We also hope that the Native Lands Trust Board will play their part
by granting leases to galala and facilitating the exchange of such leases between
galala if at any time this seems desirable. In short, we think the time has come to
bring home to the Fijians that they must learn to stand on their own feet to a greater
extent and to put their own house into order.
On the question of Local Government we are of the opinion that it would be as well
to await the report by Seller3 who is at present investigating this problem. As I have
already said, we are not in favour of extending the activities of the Fijian
Administration and we are not at all happy about the suggestion that a separate
Indian Administration should be set up. On the other hand, the present Indian
Advisory Councils are not regarded as satisfactory and it will be necessary before long
to come to some conclusion about the future of Local Government.
Although, therefore, we are agreed that for the immediate future anyway
development should be on communal lines, we do think that every effort should be
made to bring the races together in other ways. We feel that non-racial schools,
particularly at the Secondary level, is one way of doing this and that so far as possible
all Staff Associations, Trade Unions, Chambers of Commerce and Advisory Councils
of various sorts should be non-racial.
We note that a White Paper on the Burns Commission Report is to be debated in
Legislative Council early in December. We are not sure just how wide a field this
debate will cover but I hope that this letter will at least give you some idea of the
lines on which we ourselves are thinking. We assume you will report to the Secretary
of State the result of the debate and your views on the recommendations of the
Burns mission. You might, of course, cover some of the points in this letter in that
report but on the other hand, you may prefer to let me have your views on how you
see the future of Fiji developing in a separate letter.
For your own information we shall be carrying out an interdepartmental study, in
conjunction with the Foreign Office and Commonwealth Relations Office, to try and
reach some conclusions about future developments in the Pacific area. This will of
course take into account developments in Dutch and Australian New Guinea and
Western Samoa as well as our own particular territories and of course the position in
the area of the French, with whom we run the New Hebrides condominium. Your
own views on the future of Fiji will be a very valuable contribution to this exercise.
2 Galala refers to an independent Fijian farmer who pays a commutation tax to be released from
communal duties imposed by the village.
3 C A Seller, Fiji administrative officer.
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20 CO 1036/612, no 27 20 Dec 1960
[Member system]: letter from H P Hall to Sir K Maddocks on the
introduction of a member system
For the reasons given in my telegram No. 264 I am sorry it was not possible to give
you clearance in time to make the statement on constitutional changes proposed in
your letter of the 2nd December during the recent session of Legislative Council.
2. The Secretary of State has now seen your letter and although he is in general
agreement with the terms of your draft statement, he would prefer to reserve the title
of ‘Minister’ until the persons concerned are doing full-time work as such. Your
letter makes it clear that in the interim period, anyway, the unofficial members of
Executive Council will only be part-time and will not be required to give up their
normal occupations. This, and the fact that they will not possess executive authority
over their departments brings out clearly, as you yourself mention in your draft
statement, that the first stage corresponds more to the old ‘Member system’ than to
what is now accepted in most territories as a ‘Ministerial system’.
3. The Secretary of State knows that in the conversations with Mr. Amery it was
agreed that unofficial members of Executive Council should be referred to as
‘Ministers’ but unless you are already committed locally to the use of the title
‘Minister’ he would prefer to reserve this title till decisions have been taken about the
second stage mentioned in paragraph 3 of your letter and in the first paragraph of the
draft statement. It would be in keeping with respectable precedence elsewhere if in
the first stage ‘Member in charge of (subjects to be named)’ were used.
4. The Secretary of State would prefer to omit the penultimate sentence of the
draft statement ‘that the number of Official Members attending Council should be
reduced’. This is partly for the reasons given in paragraph 9 of your letter and also
because this, too, is really more applicable to the second stage than to the first, which
is being made by administrative measures without any amendments to the
Constitutional Instruments.
5. The next point concerns guidance for members on their code of conduct. The
usual practice is to set these out in a despatch in terms similar to despatch No. 52 of
the 10th February, 1956, to Mauritius, of which I sent you a copy last month on my
return from Fiji. At that stage in Mauritius some members were to be Ministers with
Portfolio (i.e. full-time) and some were not, and this is brought out in paragraph 7 of
the despatch to Mauritius. In the case of Fiji your draft statement proposes that
although members will be paid an adequate remuneration ‘they will not, at this
stage, be required to forego their other profession or occupation’. Although they will
serve part-time only, the Secretary of State considers that a Code of Conduct
despatch would be desirable and perhaps something on the lines of the Mauritius
despatch, with paragraph 7 modified to take account of the position in Fiji, would
meet the case. If you agree, would you please produce a draft?
6. The Secretary of State would also like to see how you propose to group
departments under the ‘Members’. The position of Cayzer as Managing Director of
the Emperor Gold Mines might cause some difficulty here.
7. Your telegram No.226 of the 13th December mentions that unofficial
members of Legislative Council have asked for permission to consult their
constituencies about the constitutional proposals. We are not clear just what is
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involved in this or how they will go about it and in what detail. Are they, for example,
limiting their consultations to the first stage of the introduction of a ‘membership
system’ or will they also take into account the less immediate future referred to in
paragraph 3 of your letter? On the assumption that the consultation will be on the
basis of your proposed statement as amended in the light of the comments made in
this letter, there would be no objection.
8. As it is now too late to make any statement in the current session of
Legislative Council we are not sure how you propose to announce the changes.
Whatever announcement is made now should, we think, in due course be followed by
an exchange of despatches which could then be published. Perhaps you could let me
have your views on this?
9. We note that you were hoping to send us draft amending instruments before
going on leave next May. It should not however be necessary to submit the amending
instruments providing for the main constitutional changes you propose to Her
Majesty in Council until shortly before the elections take place, so that if the
elections are to take place in August, 1962, it would be sufficient if the instruments
were submitted in June or July, 1962. We appreciate that you will wish to put in hand
preparations for the elections well before that date (i.e. registration of voters and the
like) but this need not await the submission of the main instruments since it should
be a fairly simple matter to submit a short preliminary Order in Council to cover
these preperations some time next year, say, in June or July, 1961. Our legal advisers
will have many heavy preoccupations during next year and while of course it is most
desirable that the first drafts of the main instruments should be in our hands well in
advance of the date proposed for their submission, we should be reluctant to ask
them to deal with these drafts next year if, as appears to be the case, they need not be
settled until the first half of 1962. In the circumstances you may care to send us a
first draft of the preliminary Order by next May and defer sending us first drafts of the
main instruments until later in 1961.
21 CO 1036/612, no 29 17 Jan 1961
[Constitutional development]: letter (reply) from Sir K Maddocks to
H P Hall on the introduction of a member system and the
composition of the Legislative Council
I think it will be convenient if I reply to your letter of the 20th December1 about
constitutional changes, point by point.
2. ‘Ministers’ or ‘Members’. While I quite realise that the term ‘Minister’ would
be unusual in the circumstances of our proposed first stage, the title ‘Member’ is a
very colourless one and has little meaning here. Fiji inevitably relates its own affairs
to those in Tonga and Samoa where there are Ministers and some of the Fijians left
me in no doubt that the word ‘Minister’ has considerable attractions to them. I think
that the period of transition may be longer in Fiji than has been usual elsewhere, and
this may be all to the good: the use of ‘ministers’ might make it more acceptable and
also inculcate a greater sense of responsibility. However I would not wish to stand on
1 See 20.
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this point. In the light of our talks with Mr. Amery I explained in conversation with
unofficial members that at the first stage members of Executive Council will be given
quasi ministerial functions and would probably be referred to as ‘Ministers’; but we
are not wholly committed to this and I may be able to get acceptance to the word
‘Member’ if the Secretary of State feels that the use of ‘Minister’ would cause
difficulties elsewhere. I will certainly try to do so but in the local context the latter
term has distinct advantages and I would prefer to be given a free hand to adopt it if
public opinion indicates a strong preference for it.
3. Number of official members attending Council to be reduced (para. 4 of your
letter). I trust that there would be no objections to a de facto absence of some
members. One of the attractions to those who seek constitutional change is that the
procedure now proposed gives the appearance of an unofficial majority—an objective
long sought in some quarters. Furthermore, if Government shows in practice that it
is prepared to rely on collective responsibility and does not insist upon ensuring a
strictly official majority, it is much more likely to impart a sense of genuine
responsibility. Without this move the ‘member’ or ‘minister’ system seems little
better than window-dressing. I consider it is wise to give responsibility and to
demonstrate clearly in a manner that all can see, the binding nature of collective
responsibility while we still have the official majority in the background. Under the
system I propose official absenteeism would be under strict control.
4. Code of Conduct (your para. 5). I agree that an exchange of despatches will be
necessary and I will send you drafts as soon as we have cleared up the points referred
to in your letter.
5. Groups of departments under Members or Ministers (your para. 6). In the initial
stage I would propose to group subjects and departments on the following lines:—
C.S. The Public Service, Police and Prisons, Defence, Public Relations.
F.S. Accountant-General, Audit, Customs, Inland Revenue, Supplies, Printing.
A.G. Legal, Judicial, Registrar-General.
S.F.A. Fijian Affairs.
1 Agriculture, Lands, Forestry, Geological Survey (Natural Resources)
2 Health and Education (Social Services)
3 Commerce & Industry, Cooperative and Labour (Commerce and Labour)
4 Works, Communications and P. & T (Works and Communications).
The question of Local Government will have to be considered in the light of
developments.
6. Consultation (your para. 7). The normal procedure in most territories would
be to canvass the views of the various political parties or their leaders. Here, because
there are no parties and no truly representative political leaders—the European and
Indian unofficial members of Legislative Council are for the most part independent
opportunists with no coherent or sustained policy—it will be necessary for
Government to give the lead and to tell the general public what is proposed and why.
In effect, this would mean an open discussion with all members of the public
concerning both the stages envisaged. Indeed to try to deal with the first stage
without reference to the second would only give rise to numerous questions, and
involve non-disclosure of the reason for stage 1, which is training for and a quiet
transition to stage 2, instead of a sudden radical constitutional change.
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Conversations I have had with unofficial members lead me to believe that stage 1
might well be unacceptable unless it was clearly understood that it is transitional and
a training for stage 2.
7. Indeed, the idea of the unofficial side being only an opposition has become so
entrenched by the unusually lengthy period of over 30 years without major
constitutional change, that some European members of Legislative Council have gone
so far as to say that it would be political suicide for them to ‘join the Government’.
Kermode2 told me that he could not hope to be re-elected if he constantly supported
Government and that Falvey took the same view. That is the measure of constitutional
stagnation in Fiji and shows that we may not be able to go very far at this stage. I believe
nevertheless, that we must try to break down this feeling.
8. I realise that what I am now proposing goes farther than the proposed
statement in my letter of the 2nd December, but my discussion with members of
Legislative Council leave me in no doubt that both stages must now be brought into
the open. The alternative is a danger of stage 1 being unacceptable, and the
continuation of constitutional stagnation which has tended so much towards
irresponsibility on the part of unofficial members.
9. I therefore attach a revised statement which I should hope to issue.3 It is
worded as simply as possible as it will have to be translated into Fijian and
Hindustani, and is intended for folk who have little or no knowledge of the processes
of Government. It would be my intention to give this the widest publicity and, owing
to the widespread lack of understanding of the functions and procedures of
Government, to follow it up with question and answer broadcasts, meetings by
Commissioners with the people, and use of all other media of information.
10. Unfortunately the time-table outlined in paragraph 10 of my letter of the 2nd
December is now unattainable. It will take considerable time to ascertain public
reaction, and even then it will be necessary to determine whether there should be
five members from each race or six. The present constituency boundaries are
unsatisfactory and I envisage one of the three following schemes (or variations
thereof):—
(a) 6 Fijians (4 elected by constituencies, 2 elected by the Council of Chiefs)
6 Indians (4 elected and 2 nominated)
6 Europeans (4 elected and 2 nominated)
(b) 5 Fijians (3 elected by constituencies, 2 elected by the Council of Chiefs)
5 Indians (4 elected, 1 nominated)
5 Europeans (4 elected, 1 nominated)
or
(c) 5 Fijians (3 elected by constituencies, 2 elected by the Council of Chiefs)
5 Indians (all elected)
5 Europeans (all elected)
up to 3 nominated (for minority groups).
Scheme (a) could be varied by reducing the nominations to 1 Indian and 1 European
leaving 2 nominated seats available for Other Pacific Islanders, Chinese, or other
minority groups or special interests. Official membership would comprise the
2 Ronald Gordon Kermode, elected European member of the Legislative Council.
3 Not printed. After revision (see 25) the statement was published on 27 Feb (see 28).
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Colonial Secretary, Attorney-General, Financial Secretary and the Secretary for
Fijian Affairs, plus a sufficient number to ensure, with Ministers, a voting majority.
11. This will involve new electoral boundaries, almost inevitably an extension of
the existing limited franchise, and new electoral rolls. I must presume that before
new electoral regulations can be made and new electoral rolls can be compiled (a
process which I am advised will take not less than one year) the Letters Patent would
require amendment and that such amendment should follow an exchange of
despatches written for publication.
12. Taking a realistic view of the speed at which things move in Fiji, I would not
now expect our proposals to be available much before September 1961 and if the
Letters Patent can be amended by, say, July 1962, it would be necessary to extend the
life of the present Legislative Council by a year. But even this procedure may not give
adequate time.
13. For reasons given in paragraphs 12 to 15 of my despatch No. 943 of the 30th
December, I consider that elections for Fijian members should be held as soon as
possible. The Fijian Affairs Board are at present considering electoral boundaries
(which will have to be different from the European and Indian boundaries for reasons
of population distribution) and electoral qualifications, and I would hope to have a
draft amendment to the Letters Patent ready in respect of the Fijians by July 1961.
Thus, if the hoped for progress is not achieved, and elections have to be held in 1962,
because constitutional amendments would not be ready for a delayed election in
1963, the Fijians at least would have a chance to start the election process. I regard it
as of the utmost importance that Fijians should elect representatives on a
constituency basis at the earliest possible opportunity.
14. Line 6 of paragraph 9 of your letter does not appear to take into account the
major work involved in making new electoral rolls, and I suggest my assumption is
correct that the Letters Patent would have to be amended before new electoral
regulations and new electoral rolls could be prepared.
15. The changes I now propose are made in the light of conversations I have had
with all unofficial members of Legislative Council. Even with the promise of full
Ministerial responsibility in the foreseeable future it is not certain they will be
accepted. There is an unthinking demand for nothing more than an unofficial
majority which would only accentuate present irresponsibility. In my view, it is
imperative that it should be clearly understood that there can be no constitutional
advance without the acceptance of responsibility.
16. The situation is made the more difficult by racial division and the complete
absence of any political party remotely able to form a government although there is
considerable latent and individual ability available. The Europeans in particular are
likely to drag their feet and in this they may well influence the Fijians. But the
continuation of the present apathy can do no good and is particularly trying to the ex
officio members of Legislative Council who have constantly to face criticism from
persons who are at the same time reluctant to shoulder the responsibility officials at
present carry. If after public discussion, these proposals are found to be unacceptable
to both European and Fijian opinion and we are forced to maintain the
constitutional status quo (except for the election of Fijian members), no great harm
will have been done. We shall at least have taken the initiative and shown both to the
peoples of Fiji and to the world at large our willingness to give greater
responsibilities to the elected representatives of the public.
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22 CO 1036/988, no 1 17 Jan 1961
[Monopoly companies]: letter from E R Bevington to H P Hall on
allegations of monopoly practices by foreign companies. Annex
We are getting more and more worried by the ever-increasing monopoly exercised by
the Carpenter, Morris Hedstrom, Burns Philp group, and I am coming to the
conclusion that their strangle-hold contributes to the high cost of living in Fiji and
to the general distortion of our economy.1
2. This operates, of course, partly by way of stifling competition, and generally by
inhibiting initiative. In addition to this, they have managed over the years to obtain
the great majority of the worthwhile agencies so that virtually all proprietary
brands of goods in every-day use go through their hands and result in a
commission to themselves. If that were not enough, they are both wholesale and
retail houses so they themselves sell the same proprietary brands at the full retail
price in their stores, and also supply them to small local traders at wholesale prices
for further retail. Over the years, there have been a number of small independent
importers who, operating one-man businesses, have held a number of valuable
agencies, but as these die out or the owners go elsewhere, the agencies have all too
often fallen into the hands of the ‘octopus’, as it is so often called. Following the
1959 disturbances, one or two small businesses sold out, but instead of Morris
Hedstrom’s financing local people to carry on those businesses and giving them a
chance to own the business themselves, they have been swept into the maw of the
octopus.
3. It is possible to give numerous examples of the sort of thing which goes on: I
can give you one or two off hand. The brewery which is a Carpenter subsidiary will
not sell beer direct to the hotels because Morris Hedstrom, Carpenters and Burns
Philp previously had a monopoly of the importation of beer. To keep them happy
therefore hotels may only buy beer from Morris Hedstrom, Burns Philp or
Carpenters, and although they may in fact carry the beer direct from the brewery, 3d
a bottle is paid to the firms. The result of this is that there is a smaller profit margin
on Fiji beer than there is on imported beer and publicans press the sale of the
imported beer which admittedly is slightly more expensive.
4. The firms in question hold a virtual monopoly of the shipping of copra and in
fact are the agents of Carpenters copra mill. They have been charging £4 per ton
freight until the middle of last year when a pitiful letter came out saying that
shipping was not paying and much as they regretted etc. etc. etc., freight rates would
go up to £4.10. A local man then entered the business with small and inefficient
vessels and started freighting at £3 per ton. Immediately the freight rates of the Big
Three came down to the same figure.
5. Recently when Government decided to stop importing timber on its own
account and called tenders, we were informed that the timber importers, Carpenters,
Millers and Burns Philp, had formed a conference, and we could buy from the
conference or any member, the price would be the same.
1 The government’s concern about monopoly companies was aroused by the riots in Suva in 1959 and the
strike in the sugar industry in 1960 against the Colonial Sugar Refining Company.
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6. More recently, a firm called U.N.O. entered the copra-buying business and
Carpenters told Government that they would raise their prices and in fact start a
price war. They immediately raised prices at Levuka where U.N.O. are operating.
7. Were these firms using their large accumulated reserves for any worthwhile
developments, one would have less to quarrel with, but with the exception of
Carpenters who have ventured risk capital here in the oil mill, the margarine factory
(failed), and the brewery, the others have largely stayed in the wholesale and retail
business purveying what in America would be called drug-store lines: in other words,
essential commodities in every-day use which are ‘fast moving’ and entail little or no
risk. In this business they have accumulated large reserves. I attach a plan showing
the holding structure between these companies.
8. Of course I have painted here only the black side of the picture, for many of
their actions may have, no doubt, rational explanations which are not immediately
apparent to the outside observer.
9. Many of the activities we complain about are fairly common-place in highly-
developed countries, but there it is not so immediately apparent and is often done
through trade associations, conferences, cartels, etc.
10. One of the major problems is that there is so little published information
about the activities of our companies. This is either because the local capital
structure is arranged so that it can register as a private company or because the local
concern is simply a branch which does not publish separate figures for its Fiji
business.
11. Their strangle-hold has resulted in the Asiatic community being unable to
offer price competition such as is offered by Asiatics throughout the East. (I realise,
of course, that Hong Kong and Aden are extreme examples, being duty-free ports and
in no way comparable.)
12. Sir Kenneth Maddocks informs me that in West Africa the Unilever group had
a similar monopolistic position and at one time were exceedingly unpopular. They
overcame this by the formation of local companies, the appointment of local
directors and by the training of local personnel for managerial positions. Sir Kenneth
added that this was all done because the London directors read the political score
correctly and in time. We here are doing our best with the educational process but it
is rather slow and in the meantime there are sundry questions, such as taxation and
our Company Law, which could well be discussed.
13. Parkinson, our Commerce and Industries Officer, is coming home on leave
towards the end of May and I am wondering whether there is anyone amongst your
trade experts with whom he could usefully have discussions. No doubt he will be
calling at the Colonial Office quite early on his leave and I shall be grateful if you
could arrange for him to meet somebody to discuss this problem.
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23 CO 1036/752, no 8 20 Jan 1961
[Scholarships for Fijians]: letter F W Atwell (CO) to D W Overington
(Treasury) on interim financial support
The Fiji Government’s policy when appointing local residents to the Fiji Civil Service
is to preserve a balance between Fijians and Indians and, to this end, the Governor
proposes to submit an application for a C.D. and W. grant towards the cost of a
Scholarships Scheme under which Fijian students will be trained overseas—either
in the United Kingdom or Australasia. This proposal has the support of the Fijian
Great Council of Chiefs and of the Burns Commission which conducted an enquiry
into the natural resources and population trends of the Colony in 1959.
2. We have informed the Governor that his proposal for scholarships for Fijians
is approved; that a scheme must be drawn up and approved here before any
scholarships are awarded, that it must be financed from the Colony’s territorial
allocation and that the scholars concerned must undertake to return to Fiji after
their course is completed and to accept appointments in the public service on their
return.
3. The Governor has now informed us that he expects shortly to submit an
application for C.D. and W. assistance. However, some immediate payments are
necessary to scholars who are leaving soon for the commencement of the
Australasian academic year and the Governor has therefore sought a telegraphic
assurance that such payments will not be debarred from reimbursement from C.D.
and W. funds if the application is subsequently approved.
4. We see no objection to the Governor’s proposal and, subject to your
agreement, we propose to inform him that such expenditure may be met from local
funds in the first instance, subject to reimbursement from C.D. and W. funds if and
when a C.D. and W. scheme is approved.
24 CO 1036/752, no 9 20 Jan 1961
[Scholarships for Fijians]: inward savingram no 69 from 
Sir K Maddocks to Mr Macleod applying for a grant. Annex
Your saving telegram No. 511 of 24th November, 1960.
2. I forward herewith an application for a grant of £Stg. 13,212 (£F. 14,665) as a
90% grant from Colonial Development & Welfare funds towards the cost of financing
scholarships for Fijians to enable them to undertake studies in the United Kingdom
between 1st April, 1961 and 31st March, 1964. The scheme was not included in the
draft Development Plan for 1961–1970, but will be included in the revised plan now
being prepared. The scheme for ‘United Kingdom Scholarships for Fijians’ has been
approved by all races in the Legislative Council and local funds cannot be found for it
other than the 10% contribution proposed in the application.
3. I consider it of great importance that everything possible should be done to
hasten the training of members place in Government, commerce, industry and in the
running of their country generally. To this end the enclosed application proposes a
scheme of awards to be known as the ‘United Kingdom Scholarships for Fijians’
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which provides for a number of scholarships to be reserved for the Fijian people as
recommended by the Burns Commission.
4. The first need is undoubtedly to train Fijians so that they may be more fitted
to fill senior posts in the Civil Service, but it is also very important that more of the
senior openings in the professions and in commerce and industry should be filled by
Fijians. For this reason the proposed scheme is for scholarships to Fijians to enable
them to take up studies in the United Kingdom which will be of benefit to them and
to the role to be played by Fijians as a whole in the administration of the Colony.
5. It is proposed that those Fijians, to whom scholarships under the scheme may
be granted, should be required to enter into an agreement that they will on the
completion of their studies return to work in Fiji for a period of at least three years. I
would, however, mention that in the case of Fijians I consider that it would be
unlikely that there would be any important wastage even if this requirement were
not made.
6. I should be grateful for your support to this application for assistance from the
supplementary allocation of Colonial Development & Welfare funds to Fiji, which
was the subject of your despatch No. 384 of the 7th September, 1960. A request for
Colonial Development & Welfare assistance towards scholarships in Australia, New
Zealand and elsewhere is the subject of a separate savingram.
Annex to 24
The Report of the Burns Commission recommended (paragraph 671) that a group of
Fijian students should be sent to a United Kingdom University. Fijians are anxious to
strengthen existing ties between Fiji and the United Kingdom and there is little
doubt that the higher education of selected Fijians in the United Kingdom would do
much to achieve this end.
2. It is desired to establish a separate Scholarship Scheme to be known as the
‘United Kingdom Scholarships for Fijians’, financed with the aid of a 90% grant from
Colonial Development & Welfare Funds. In the recent debate in the Fiji Legislative
Council on the report of the Burns Commission, members of all races supported the
recommendation that Fijians should receive preferential treatment in this respect in
order to enable them to play a fuller part in the Government of their own country.
3. The recommendation of the Burns Commission that Fijian students should be
sent to a ‘United Kingdom University’ could be taken to imply that the Commission
was thinking solely in terms of the production of graduates. It is proposed, however,
that the Scholarship Scheme should be open to any Fijian whose value to his country
could be improved by a course of instruction or attachment in the United Kingdom
even though this may not be up to full university level. It is also considered that
while these proposed scholarships should be open to students leaving school, they
should mainly be used for the further training of Fijians already employed either in
the Civil Service or in some other approved profession or trade, in order that they
might be better qualified for promotion or for transfer to other work. (Fijian school-
leavers will, of course, be eligible for the award of scholarship under a general
scholarships scheme in competition with applicants of all races.) While the majority
of Fijians trained in the United Kingdom will doubtless join Government service, it is
considered that these scholarships should also be open to those not in Government
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service (e.g. Fiji Broadcasting Commission, Suva City Council, etc.) and to persons
who seek non-Government employment.
4. In general, therefore, it is considered that the proposed ‘United Kingdom
Scholarships for Fijians’ should be open to any Fijian for any course of instruction or
attachment lasting at least one year which will be of value to Fiji.
5. As an indication of the need to give preferential treatment to Fijians, it is
worthy of note that of 113 locally-born people known to have university degrees, only
11 are Fijians; and of 200 now known to be attending Universities overseas, only 18
are Fijians.
6. It is proposed that the selection of candidates for scholarships awarded under
the scheme should be in the hands of the existing Scholarship Selection Committee
under the chairmanship of the Director of Education which selects recipents for the
bursaries awarded annually by the Government of Fiji to persons of all races for
overseas study.
7. It is difficult to estimate approximate expenditure. What follows is based on
the assumption that a tourist air-fare to United Kingdom costs about £F.320, that
living expenses in the United Kingdom (based on information from the British
Council) will amount to about £F.660 a year; that fees, etc. (of which full details are
unavailable here) will average about £F.80 a year; and that a clothing allowance of
about £F.50 will be paid in the first year of any award. On this basis, a one-year
course in the United Kingdom (with return passage) would cost about £F.1,430,
including return air-fare within twelve months; a two-year course would cost about
£F.1,110 in the first year and about £F.1060 (no clothing allowance) in the second
year; and a three-year course would cost £F.1,110 in the first year, £F.1060 in the
third, and £F.740 (i.e. neither passage nor clothing allowance) in the second. It
would, therefore, seem reasonable to estimate the cost of United Kingdom awards at
a round figure of £F.1,110 or £STG.1,000, each a year. It has also been assumed in
the calculations which follow that the number of holders of these awards will rise
from 4 in the academic year 1961/62 to 6 in 1962/63, and to 8 in 1963/64.
8. In estimating the cost in each financial year, it has been assumed that awards
would be tenable from September to August; that the value of each award Would be
approximately £STG.1,000 a year; that seven-twelfths of this amount (£STG.585)
would fall in one financial year and that the remaining five-twelfths (£STG.415)
would fall in the next. There is obviously considerable scope for variation in these
assumptions, especially when it is impracticable to estimate in advance the length of
the course which each holder would follow. But on this basis the cost of the Scheme
in the next three financial years would be approximately as follows:—
1.4.61– 1.4.62– 1.4.63– TOTAL
31.3.62 31.3.63 31.3.64
£STG. £STG. £STG. £STG.
April–Aug. 4 × 415 = 1,660 6 × 415 = 2,490
Sept.–Mar. 4 × 585 = 2,340 6 × 585 = 3,510 8 × 585 = 4,680
2,340 5,170 7,170 14,680
9. The usual Financial Summary (Appendix I) is attached.1
1 Not printed.
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25 CO 1036/612, no 30 6 Feb 1961
[Constitutional development]: letter (reply) from H P Hall to Sir K
Maddocks on the changes proposed and a government statement
Thank you for your letter of the 17th January about constitutional changes and the
revised statement which you would like to issue.1
2. The Secretary of State has seen your proposals again and, subject to the points
which follow, he approves them.
3. The Secretary of State would still prefer the title of ‘Member’ to be used in
Stage 1. Your draft statement clearly brings out that this is a preliminary stage to
give unofficials experience of working the ministerial system and to give the Civil
Service experience of working with Ministers—in fact a training period for all before
the introduction of a full ministerial system. You could say, however, that the title
‘Minister’ will be used, if and when Stage 2 is introduced. The Secretary of State
agrees, however, that you should have discretion to decide this in the light of local
reactions as proposed in the last sentence of paragraph 2 of your letter.
4. While it is clear from the penultimate sentence of paragraph 3 of your letter
that you still intend to retain the official majority in the background, we assume you
are satisfied that the last paragraph on page 2 of your draft statement will not cause
you any difficulty if the need to use the official majority does in fact arise?2 The usual
practice is to give the Governor reserve legislative powers when an unofficial
majority is introduced and at present the Governor of Fiji does not have this power.
In Mauritius, for example, where there is an unofficial majority, the Governor has
been given reserve powers; as you will see from section 43 of the Mauritius
(Constitution) Order in Council 1958. As you say, so long as the ‘Members’ accept
collective responsibility and vote the right way in Legislative Council, 8 official
should ensure a government majority. Until, however, the constitutional
instruments are amended to provide the Governor with reserve powers, it would be
unwise to give the impression publicly that the official majority no longer exists for
use if necessary. Some such provision will have to be written in to the Constitution
when we come to Stage 2 proper.
5. I am sorry if paragraph 9 of my letter of the 20th December was not entirely
clear to you. The purpose of the preliminary Order in Council is to enable all
necessary preparations for the elections to be carried out, including the delimitation
of new electoral boundaries and the drawing up of new electoral rolls. The
preliminary Order in Council can be made as soon as decisions have been taken
about the number of elected members of Legislative Council. Again this was done in
the case of Mauritius and I enclose a copy of the Mauritius (Electoral Provisions)
Order in Council 1958.3 If a similar procedure is adopted in Fiji it will not be
necessary to make the main Order in Council until shortly before the election.
6. There are arguments in principle against extending the lives of Legislative
Councils and we suggest a decision on this should be postponed until you know
1 See 21.
2 This is a reference to the point about collective responsibility in the statement as published, see 28,
Stage 1, para beginning, ‘On appointment members . . .’
3 Enclosures not printed.
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whether your proposals are likely to be readily accepted or not. In the case of
Mauritius, the Mauritius (Legislative Council—Extension of Duration) Order in
Council 1958 was only made a month or two before the Legislative Council was due
to be dissolved. We suggest, therefore, that we see how matters develop before
deciding whether or not the life of the present Legislative Council should be
extended, and if so for how long.
7. Some time could be saved if consideration could be given now to first drafts of
constitutional instruments and electoral regulations, leaving the actual numbers of
elected members, etc., to be filled in at a later stage. Similarly as soon as the
composition of the new Legislative Council has been decided, preliminary work
could begin on electoral boundaries and rolls and a preliminary Order in Council
could be made.
8. Incidentally, when your Legal Advisers come to draft the amendments to
implement Stage 2, they might also wish to consider whether it might not be
desirable to revoke and replace the present instruments in their entirety.
26 CO 1036/800, no 7 13 Feb 1961
[Fiji civil service]: despatch from Sir K Maddocks to Mr Macleod on
the structure of the civil service and the retention of a racial balance
I have the honour to refer to your confidential telegram No. 244 and to the paragraph
in Sir Hilton Poynton’s letter of the 17th November, 1960,1 concerning the structure
of the Fiji Civil Service and the retention of a balance in the Service as between
Fijians and Indians. I have now given a great deal of thought to this somewhat
intractable problem and, with the exception of the reserved posts mentioned at
paragraph 7 below, have come to the conclusion that the question of promotion
generally can be placed under no restriction.
2. Consideration has therefore been given to some form of control over entry
into the Service. Before going into detail however, it may be as well to give the
background which has given rise to the present somewhat urgent consideration of
this matter.
3. As long ago as 1933, the Council of Chiefs passed the following resolution
XVIII:—
‘That this Council records its strong and unanimous opinion that Fiji, having
been ceded to Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain and Ireland, Her heirs
and successors, the immigrant Indian population should neither directly nor
indirectly have any part in the control or direction of matters affecting the
interests of the Fijian race.’
In his address to that meeting of the Council of Chiefs, the Governor made the
following statement:—
‘The Government is also endeavouring to formulate a definite scheme to
increase the number of Fijians in its employment, and all Heads of
Department are being asked to state to what extent, bearing in mind the
1 See 19.
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claims of European and Indian candidates, they consider that it may be
possible to increase the number of Fijians who serve in their Department.’
It appears that action on this Resolution yielded only minor results, but it must be
borne in mind that at that time the number of Fijians and Indians offering for posts
above the clerical grades could be numbered in mere ones and twos. However the Civil
Service Staff Board of the period adopted a policy of trying to keep a rough balance
between Fijians and Indians entering the Service. At times there were difficulties in
obtaining sufficient Fijians, whereas the number of Indian applicants was always in
excess of the requirements. Nevertheless, the Staff Board found itself able to follow a
broad policy of maintaining a balance in the Service between the two main races.
4. In 1956, however, the Civil Service Staff Board was disbanded and
Departmental Staff Boards were established, and with their establishment the policy
of maintaining a balance in the Service lapsed. The result has been that the number
of Indian entrants into the Service has increased, though even now there are still
more Fijians than Indians in the Service. But the numerical superiority of the Fijians
is in the lower ranks of the Service. As soon as any serious effort was made to localise
the Service and reduce the number of expatriate officers, it became apparent that
local candidates suitable for the middle and upper grades of the Service would be
predominantly Indian. This point is clearly demonstrated in the enclosure to my
saving telegram No. 69 of the 20th January, 1961, making application for a Colonial
Development and Welfare grant for Fijian Scholarships: paragraph 5 of the
memorandum shows that 113 locally born persons have university degrees, of whom
only 11 are Fijian. Of 200 locally born persons now attending universities overseas
only 18 are Fijian.
5. These factors have alarmed the Fijians and occasioned the rider which the
1960 Council of Chiefs added to its comment on Resolution III of the Burns
Commission proposals. Their rider reads:—
‘That the senior posts in the Government should continue to be filled from
the United Kingdom until such time as they can be filled by Fijians.’
A pre-requisite of the implementation of this request is to ensure that adequate
numbers of Fijians secure appointment to all grades in the Service and thus receive
in-service training, and opportunity for promotion to the highest posts.
6. There is an unfortunate disparity in the ability of the two races for certain
types of work: the Fijian is particularly weak in matters of accounting or in work
such as engineering, surveying and radio technology, all of which require some
knowledge of higher mathematics. Also the Indian, by and large, has a much greater
application to study and a greater tenacity of purpose. On the administrative side,
however, Fijians have shown themselves to have marked ability and considerable
gifts of leadership, particularly if they are supported by loyal and able European
officers: unfortunately, however, a large proportion of able Fijians has been drawn
into the Fijian Administration, and have thereby been denied the experience of
general administration which they would otherwise have gained. One of the purposes
of the constitutional proposals outlined in my letter to Mr. H.P. Hall of the 17th
January, 1961,2 is to move Fijians forward into positions of responsibility and
2 See 21.
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leadership. It is necessary also to ensure that they are brought forward in adequqte
numbers in the Civil Service and that a balance is maintained.
7. If, in accordance with the Resolution of the Council of Chiefs, a schedule of
reserved posts were to be prepared, it would include the following:—
Chief Justice and Puisne Judge
Colonial Secretary, Financial Secretary
and Secretary for Fijian Affairs
Attorney-General and Solicitor-General
Class I Administrative Officer
Commissioner of Police and Deputy
Director of Medical Service and Deputy
Director of Education and Deputy
Director of Agriculture and Deputy
Director of Lands and Deputy
Director of Public Works and Deputy
But it will be noted that the Council of Chiefs wish these posts to be held by
Europeans until such time as they can be held by Fijians. I consider that this position
is not defensible and that the most Government should agree to is that they should
be held by Europeans until such time as Fijians and Indians are available to take
them on a basis of balance between races.
8. On the question of entry into the Service, the Chairman of the Public Service
Commission has given it as his opinion that it would be unwise to have a fixed ratio
as this cannot in practice be applied with uniformity to all departments without a
significant lowering of standards. He considers that the Public Service Commission
should be given a directive which might read as follows:—
‘In making its recommendations for the selection of candidates for entry into
the Public Service, the Commission shall have regard to the need for securing
a balanced distribution of posts as between Fijians and Indians.’
I attach a schedule3 showing the composition of the Service at the time when the
1960 Civil List was prepared: there have been minor changes since then but there has
been no marked change in the overall picture. This shows that it is by no means too
late to bring in some form of control, that the great majority of senior posts are still
held by Europeans and that so long as posts held by Europeans are considered to be
in due course available to Fijians and Indians on a basis of parity, it should be
possible to retain a balance within the Service.
9. In this connection I am given to understand that prior to independence there
was a rigid ratio of no less than six to one maintained in the Federation of Malaya as
between Malays and Chinese and while I do not think that any rigid ratio is applicable
in the circumstances of Fiji, I consider that we have a responsibility to the Fijian people
to do everything in our power to ensure that they have a voice commensurate with
their position in the Legislature, in the Executive and in the Civil Service as a whole.
10. In my Budget speech on the 25th November, 1960, the following was
included:—
3 Not printed.
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‘Honourable Members are aware that in recent years Government has pressed
forward with the appointment of local residents to the Fiji Civil Service
wherever possible. Not only is it right that the people of the Colony should be
actively associated with Government on the Executive side, but it is also a
matter of plain economics. However, because of the small number of Fijians
who have received higher education there is a danger that unless special
measures are taken there will soon be an undesirable imbalance in the higher
grades of the Civil Service as between the two major races in the Colony. This
is a problem which is receiving careful examination. It imposes a
responsibility on Government to do everything in its power to hasten the
training of members of the Fijian community to enable them to take their
rightful place in Government. To this end, I propose that a number of
overseas scholarships should be reserved for the Fijian people, as
recommended by the Burns Commission, and the use of Colonial
Development and Welfare funds for this purpose has been approved in
principle by the Secretary of State.’
While this has naturally given satisfaction to the Fijian community, it has inevitably
caused uncertainty amongst the Indian community and amongst Indian Civil
Servants and I think it is important that Government should reach an early
conclusion on this point and make its intentions known. I would therefore propose
that an announcement should be made to the effect that the posts listed in paragraph
5 above will be reserved for members of Her Majesty’s Overseas Civil Service
appointed by the Secretary of State until such time as local residents are available for
promotion to them in such a way as to maintain a balance between the races. I would
further announce that instructions have been issued to the Public Service
Commission that entry to the Civil Service should be controlled in such a way as to
secure as far as possible, a balance between the number of Fijians and Indians within
the Service.
27 CO 1036/612, no 36 15 Feb 1961
[Franchise]: letter from Sir K Maddocks to H P Hall on a resolution 
of the Fijian Affairs Board to extend the franchise to women
At the meeting of the Fijian Affairs Board held at the beginning of this month, the
Board passed some interesting resolutions on constitutional matters. They had been
considering the question of electoral boundaries in the light of the Burns
recommendation and the resolution of the Council of Chiefs. A discussion of this
subject inevitably led to the broader question of electoral qualifications and they
came out with the strong recommendation that the franchise should be extended to
women. The property qualifications required by the existing Letters Patent are so
small as to be virtually meaningless and they have recommended that there should
be universal adult franchise, the sole qualification being the ability to write in the
vernacular. They further recommended that the qualifications for candidates for
election should be the same as those required for electors except that a knowledge of
English should be required. In other words they considered that women should be
allowed to stand for election. This is, of course, already the case in Tonga but it is a
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major step forward in the attitude hitherto prevalent in Fiji. It is true that they were
considering only the Fijians but they recognise that the same rules would have to
apply to all races.
2. You will remember that Amery was against the granting of votes for women
though he did not make it at all clear why he took this view except on the general
grounds that one should not progress faster than was necessary. My own view is that
to give women the vote would be a thoroughly good thing. Fijian women in
particular are far more stable than the men and they would be likely to exert a
healthy influence. As Reid put it, one could not imagine Fijian women voting for
Tora.1 We should like to get this proposal before the public as rapidly as possible but
in view of Amery’s comments I should be grateful if you would confirm that the
Secretary of State would not oppose an extension of the franchise of this kind if there
is general support for it.
1 Mohammed Apisai Tora, a Fijian convert to Islam, a trade union leader and leader of the Fijian Western
Democratic party in the Apr 1963 election. His party joined the Federation Party in 1969 to form the
National Federation Party.
28 CO 1036/612, no 52 27 Feb 1961
[Constitutional reform]: statement published by Sir K Maddocks on
the Fiji government’s proposals
In his Address to the Legislative Council at the opening of the Budget session, the
Governor referred to the desirability of closer association of the elected
representatives of the public with the framing and implementation of policy and said
that he believed that the time had come to consider some modification of the present
constitution, and to give more responsibility to unofficial members without making
any radical alteration in the composition of the Legislative Council. There has been
public discussion from time to time on the desirability of eliminating the official
majority in the Council and there are those who would like to see an unofficial
majority without any change in the composition or functions of the Executive
Council. Any Government must, however, have the power to govern and it is clear
that if unofficial members are to play a greater part in the administration of Fiji, they
must be given and must accept greater responsibility for the formation and
implementation of policy. They must be given an opportunity not merely to form an
‘opposition’ to Government, but to be members of the Government. Government
therefore has in mind an advance towards a ministerial system. The proposals, which
are in broad outline only and may well need modification in the light of public
discussion, are in two stages:—
Stage 1
At a time to be agreed the Governor will invite unofficial members of the Executive
Council to undertake supervisory functions over groups of Government
departments. If they decline other Members of Legislative Council will be invited to
serve. There might for instance be a Member for Natural Resources, a Member for
Social Services, and so on. Such Members will be provided with offices in the
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Government Buildings. At this stage they would have no executive authority, but all
policy matters relating to their departments would be referred to them. They would
have a large say in policy-making and would be expected to take an active interest in
all aspects of the work of the departments in their portfolio. Policy questions coming
from departments which are at present dealt with in the Secretariat would be
referred to the Members. Where necessary Members would take policy matters to
Executive Council. They would be expected to introduce Bills dealing with their
departments in the Legislative Council and to take them through all stages of
Council.
On appointment Members would be required to give an undertaking to accept
collective responsibility: that means that when policy matters are considered in
Executive Council, all members, both official and unofficial, would, as at present, be
free to advise and express their views according to their conscience. Once a decision
has been taken in Executive Council however then all would be bound by it, whether
it represents their personal views or not. At present only the official side is so bound.
If an unofficial member of the Executive Council should be irrevocably opposed to a
decision of the Council on a matter of major policy he would have no alternative but
to resign from the Council.
Given collective responsibility, Legislative Council would then normally consist
of:—
8 officials
4 unofficial Members of the Government and
11 other unofficials.
During this stage the official majority would still be available but the other 8 officials
would not normally be required to take their seats.
It is recognised that the work would take a substantial proportion of the time of
Members and that a suitable salary would have to be paid in order to compensate
them for loss of earnings.
The foregoing stage is intended purely as a preliminary stage to give unofficials
experience of working the ministerial system and to give the Civil Service experience
of working with ministers.
While it may be thought that unofficial members would thereby merely be joining
the Government side this is by no means the way it works in practice. The Executive
Council has at present equal numbers of officials and unofficials, and all advise the
Governor according to their conscience and there is respect for every view expressed.
Members of Legislative Council accepting Member status would therefore have a real
say in Government at policy-making level: they would also receive that training in
responsibility which is essential to a full ministerial system. Stage 2 cannot be
operated unless there are persons willing to accept collective responsibility.
Stage 2
The second stage which it is hoped would follow in due course after the introduction
of the first stage would be for a full ministerial system with executive responsibility.
In this stage, Ministers will receive salaries in keeping with their position, and full
responsibility for one or more departments. Government would retain the present ex
officio posts of Colonial Secretary, Attorney-General and Financial Secretary and
they would rank as Ministers. The number of Ministers from the unofficial side could
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be either four, five or six. On the basis of six, Executive Council would then consist
of:—
The Governor
3 ex officio Ministers
1 official Minister
6 unofficial Ministers
Members of Executive Council would be selected by the Governor, from the elected
members of Legislative Council, and would be required to accept collective
responsibility for the decisions of the Council and vote accordingly in Legislative
Council. The Legislative Council would then consist of:—
6 Fijians (4 elected, 2 elected by the Council of Chiefs)
6 Indians (4 elected and 2 nominated)
6 Europeans (4 elected and 2 nominated)
7 official members.
As six of the Legislative Council unofficials would be Ministers there would only need
to be seven official members in the Legislative Council who, voting with the six
unofficial Ministers, would form the Government majority. The remaining twelve
unofficials would form the ‘opposition’. The Governor would have reserve powers.
The figure of six for each group is put forward because it is becoming evident that
the present electoral boundaries are not entirely satisfactory and some sort of
boundary revision is necessary. The Western Division, in particular, is over-large.
A further alternative which can be considered is that the Europeans and Indians
should have only 5 elected representatives each, and that there should be 3
nominated members to be selected from minority groups or others not represented
in Council. These are points for consideration.
These proposals have already been outlined to all members of Legislative Council.
Their purpose is to associate the people of the Colony more closely, not only with the
Legislature, but with the Executive in its day to day functions. It is considered that
the time has come when the Government of the Colony should be slowly transferred
from the hands of senior civil servants to the representatives of the people.
The object is to ensure that this process is undertaken in an orderly manner and in
a manner which places true responsibility upon the elected representatives of the
people.
29 CO 1036/74, no 8 28 Feb 1961
‘Fiji: review of affairs’: despatch from Sir K Maddocks to Mr Macleod
on the current position and future policy
During the last 15 months Fiji has been passing through a somewhat difficult period
in which industrial disputes and the forthright report of the Burns Commission have
combined to increase racial feeling and in consequence to draw attention to the
long-term problems of this complex group of islands and encourage speculation
about its future. In this despatch I will describe the present situation in the Colony
and outline my views on a future policy for Fiji.
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Part I.—The present
(a) The peoples of Fiji
2. The Fiji group of some 300 islands has a total land area of 7,055 square miles
and a population which at the end of 1960 was estimated to be 401,018, made up as
follows:
Approximate Percentage
Number of Whole
Fijians 167,473 41·7
Indians 197,952 49·4
Europeans 10,667 2·7
Part-Europeans 8,696 2·1
Chinese 4,943 1·2
Other Pacific races 11,285 2·8
Total 401,018
3. At the time of Cession in 1874 Fiji was populated almost entirely by Fijians
whose estimated number was 200,000. This number was subsequently reduced by
epidemics until in 1905 it was only 87,000. It then remained constant until 1919,
when it was again reduced by the influenza epidemic to its lowest point of 83,000.
Since 1919 it has increased steadily and the vital statistics of the Fijians now
compare favourably with those of similar races. Their gross reproduction rate is 2·31.
4. Indians first came to Fiji in 1879 as indentured labourers, and continued to do
so until 1916 when this form of immigration ceased. By 1916, 50,000 Indians had
been introduced into the Colony. These Indian immigrants arrived with few women
and at first reproduced slowly. Now, however, the Indian population is increasing
more rapidly than the Fijian: their gross reproduction rate is 3·24. In the short space
of 75 years, the Indian population has risen from a mere fraction to almost half of the
total population. During the last decade, it has increased by nearly 50,000, the same
increase in the Fijian population taking 20 years. The main reasons for the present
more rapid increase in the Indian population are:
(a) the fertility rate of Indians is higher than that of the Fijians;
(b) Indian women bear children at an earlier age; and
(c) Indian women have apparently given birth to a high, and Fijian women to a
low, proportion of female children.
5. It is estimated that, if conditions remain as they were in 1959, the Indian
population should exceed a quarter of a million by 1966; the Fijian population
reaching that figure by about 1976. By 1968 the total population of the Colony
should exceed half a million, and by the end of this century it is likely to be between
1.2 and 1.4 million.
6. Fijians are an integrated, united people, subject to a social organisation which
remains deeply influenced by custom. Until recently, they have been encouraged to
preserve their traditions, which have enabled them to remain united, but at the
expense of the growth of individual initiative. It is now recognised that their
traditional way of life places them at a serious disadvantage in the modern and
materialistic environment of Fiji, particularly in comparison with Indians. Although
the Fijians are aware of this disadvantage, they realise also that the strength of the
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Fijian race rests upon its unity which offers the best chance of retaining the
privileged treatment to which they feel entitled by the Deed of Cession, and the
undertakings arising from the Deed which were subsequently given to them. They
are loyal, courageous and capable of very hard work for short periods, but they are
not good at sustained effort or at looking ahead and making provision for the future.
Individual responsibility, and the progress of the individual at the expense of the
group, is a new and alien concept in Fijian society which is improperly understood
and seldom followed. This continued dependence of the individual on the group, and
the reluctance of the individual to offend public opinion by prospering in advance of
the group, has retarded the progress of the Fijians, which lags seriously behind that
of the Indians. Nature prompts them to attach more importance to the happy
carefree life than to one burdened with the anxiety and responsibility of a monetary
economy. In this, their attitude is in direct contrast to that of most Indians.
7. The Indian indentured labourers who migrated to Fiji between 1879 and 1916
came from depressed circumstances in India; they also came from various parts of
India and represented various castes. However unsatisfactory the conditions under
which they were required to work during the period of their indenture in Fiji, these
conditions were superior to what they had been used to in India and, at the
conclusion of their indenture, when they were offered the opportunity of settling in
Fiji as free citizens, they were confronted with prospects for progress and prosperity
more favourable than anything they could have thought possible. The Fijians, at that
time, did not regard the Indians as a threat to their own position and were indifferent
to their progress. Land was leased to Indians in areas where the most economic and
remunerative crops could be grown, chiefly sugar cane on the rich alluvial soils of
the coastal plains and river valleys, particularly in the Western Division. The Indians,
for centuries prevented by caste and other factors from improving their condition,
took full advantage of their emancipation from these traditional restraints and seized
the opportunities presented to them in Fiji. Their prosperity and their numbers
increased accordingly.
8. However, the nature of their origins is reflected in their social and political
organisation, the predominant characteristic of which is disunity. While the unity of
the Fijians is the source of their strength, the disunity of the Indians is their
weakness. It is seldom that an Indian leader can command the support of a majority
of Indians, or retain it for long if he does. Sectional bickerings are endemic in Indian
social, political and religious life in Fiji; a tendency which has diverted men of quality
from entering Indian politics, and which largely explains the dearth of able and
respected Indian leaders. The quality of Indian leadership is therefore poor and it also
changes frequently; this is accentuated by the total absence of political parties.
9. On the whole Indians are good and hardworking citizens. They are anxious to
get on well with Fijians and usually succeed in doing so. They are thrifty: consider
the welfare of their children; are usually restrained in their behaviour and are
moderate in their habits. In these respects they are more mature than the Fijians,
whose domestic behaviour is frequently irresponsible, whose addiction to alcohol is
becoming serious and whose general behaviour, particularly when it concerns
money, is too often irresponsible. Of the two races, therefore, the Indians are more
advanced and, with their increasing numerical superiority and other attributes, they
can hardly fail to succeed eventually in becoming the dominant race in Fiji.
Unfortunately there is virtually no inter-marriage between Indians and Fijians.
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10. The fact that so many Indians have been highly successful in commerce and
the law, while Fijians have turned mostly to clerical and administrative posts in the
Civil Service and Fijian Administration, has resulted in the building up of a strong,
independent and influential Indian middle class while there is no comparable body
amongst the Fijians.
11. There are very few pure Europeans permanently domiciled in Fiji, probably
not more than 300 including women and children. The remaining 10,300 are
temporary residents, many for substantial periods: these look upon Fiji as a pleasant
place in which to live and earn their living but they regard it only as a temporary
home. Their roots are elsewhere, and their children seldom remain in Fiji, even to
complete their education. Their knowledge of the country is confined to those
aspects which affect their own interests and they support policies which favour these
interests. On the whole, they are not much concerned with the ultimate good of the
Colony, being content to support the maintenance of the status quo as providing the
best chance of retaining a favourable environment for the pursuit of their own
interests. In doing this, their attitude, for different reasons, conforms to that of the
Fijians, who suspect any disturbance of the status quo as a possible move towards
strengthening the Indian cause at the expense of their own.
12. The Europeans have an important part to play as a balancing influence
between the Fijians and Indians, as the providers of capital and as a source of
business, organising and technical acumen; but the feeling is prevalent amongst the
Indians, and is spreading amongst other races domiciled in the Colony, including the
Fijians, that the grip of European vested interests, mostly of overseas origin, on the
Colony’s economy is excessive. The future for Europeans in Fiji would be more
secure if they recognised that the country must ultimately be controlled by those
domiciled within it and if they accepted a subordinate but still influential part in
maintaining harmony between the two dominant races and were less grasping in the
measure of financial return they expect.
13. In addition to pure Europeans, there are about 8,500 ‘part-Europeans’ who are
domiciled in Fiji. They are particularly hostile to any increase in Indian influence, but
they are not an articulate section of the community and their influence, except in
association with European and Fijian policies, is negligible. A substantial proportion
of them are more Fijian than European. They occupy very few senior positions of
responsibility in the Colony and work mostly in agriculture or as artisans.
14. The Chinese form a small but strong minority of about 5,000 which exhibits
no outward interest in politics and whose attentions are devoted almost entirely to
making money, at which their success is much the same as that of the Indian
population.
15. The remainder of the population is composed of a selection of Polynesians
and Melanesians, or similar strains, originating from other Island Territories in the
South-West Pacific; these include the Rotumans. These people are more vigorous
and independent than the Fijians but their progress is hampered by having
insufficient land at their disposal and no access to capital. They work mostly as
artisans, or in clerical positions with the Government or commercial firms.
(b) The land
16. Not only are there marked differences in the characteristics and rate of
increase of the two main races, but land tenure, educational standards and economic
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factors accentuate the effect of these differences. All the land in Fiji other than
Crown lands and those areas of land that had been alienated to foreigners at the time
of Cession, is recognised as belonging to the Fijian people and it may not be sold to
non-Fijians. It is held communally by extended family groups. Fijians own 83 per
cent. of the Colony’s land, though much of this is mountainous or of poor quality.
The 10 per cent. of land held under freehold includes most of the alluvial plains and
richer farm land. The Indians with half the population own only 1.7 per cent. of the
land and hold under leases only 8 per cent., but it is, generally speaking, of good
quality and accessible to markets. There is as yet no real shortage of land—it is
estimated that in 1966 when the population should be over 500,000 there will be the
equivalent of 10·8 acres of reasonably good land available for every adult male and
17·5 acres for each person engaged in agriculture—but the leasing of Fijian land has
been delayed both by the long-drawn-out process of creating reserves to provide for
Fijian needs and by the reluctance of Indians to settle anywhere but in the rich sugar
areas. Meanwhile the Indians complain of inability to obtain leases while the Fijians,
fearing the numerical preponderance and economic domination of the Indians, are
more than ever determined to hold on to their one great asset—their land.
(c) Education
17. As regards education, the numbers of children attending primary schools is
high in comparison with many dependent territories, being 95 per cent. in the case
of Fijian children and between 80–85 per cent. for Indian children; but of the 14–17
age group only 14 per cent. of the Fijians and 16 per cent. of the Indians receive a
secondary education. At higher levels the disparity between the two races is much
greater. Only 13 Fijians have obtained university degrees compared with some 200
Indians; and there are 10 Indians on overseas courses to every one Fijian. This is due
to the greater wealth of the Indian community which enables them to find or borrow
money to finance their own higher education, while Fijians depend almost wholly on
scholarships.
(d) The economic position
18. Despite efforts to diversify the economy and introduce alternative cash crops,
sugar remains the staple export and for this reason the basis of the Colony’s financial
and economic structure remains vulnerable. The main exports are sugar (50 per
cent.), coconut products (16 per cent.), and gold (8 per cent.). The only others of any
significance are manganese and bananas. The average income is about £70 per
annum, considerably above that of many Asian and African countries but very low in
comparison with that of Fiji’s Australasian neighbours.
19. Although Fiji is one of the more highly taxed of the dependent territories,
expenditure on social services has for many years been at such a high level that the
Colony’s financial position progressively weakened from 1949 onwards and in
1958–59 stringent measures were necessary to build up reserves. Unhappily the
sugar dispute of 1960 made it necessary to budget for a deficit in 1961 and
expenditure on development is now largely dependent upon grants and loans from
the United Kingdom. The Colony has reached what I regard as a direct taxation
ceiling; and no material increase is possible in this field at present. It is probable that
within a few years the Colony will have to be grant-aided.
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20. The Colony is affected by two main streams of external influence. While its
administrative structure is that of a developing British Crown Colony, the key
Government posts in this respect being held by officers recruited to Her Majesty’s
Overseas Civil Service from the United Kingdom, there are large numbers of
Australians, New Zealanders and locally-born Europeans in the professional and
technical branches of the Service. External economic influences are predominantly
Australasian. Apart from grants from the Colonial Development and Welfare fund to
the Government, capital investment from abroad is mainly from Australia.
Unfortunately the main Australian-based European commercial firms are becoming
increasingly monopolistic in character and this tends to stifle natural competition
and to inhibit initiative.
21. Industrial development in Fiji is hampered by the absence of a sufficiently
large local market for many manufactured goods, and by the fact that the nearest
major outlets are the American Continent to the north-east, Australia to the west,
and New Zealand to the south, all of which are difficult markets to penetrate. Power
supplies are limited to a few urban areas and in some cases costs per unit are
sufficient to discourage the establishment of light industry.
22. Nevertheless, there has been substantial expansion of secondary industries.
In recent years two cigarette factories, a brewery, a concrete products plant, a paint
factory and a clothing factory have been established. A cement plant is in course of
erection, one new hotel has recently been completed, two existing hotels have been
extended, and another new hotel is under construction. Other ventures under
investigation include saw milling, fish canning, flour and peanut oil milling.
Construction is nearing completion on two slipways, the largest of which will take
vessels up to 1,000 tons in order to provide facilities for the expansion of the small
ship construction and ship repair industry based on Fiji.
23. There are marketing problems for primary products which remain to be
solved. Sugar is tied to quota, and the Burns Commission drew attention to the need
for stimulating co-operative marketing for other crops. The proximity of Fiji to
Australia and New Zealand is, in this respect, of little help. Fijian bananas are limited
by quota in New Zealand and are priced out of the market in Australia by freight
charges and import duty. Fiji has a large (1 : 4) unfavourable balance of trade with
Australia. Generally, visible imports continue to exceed exports, although this is to
be expected in the early years of economic expansion of an underdeveloped country.
24. Although there are adequate ore beds remaining for exploitation, the lack of
development capital raises doubts about the future of the gold mining industry. The
surface deposits of manganese are of limited scope and the present price is poor.
Copra production may decrease over the next few years until plans to stimulate
replanting and new planting take effect. Rice production should increase but it is too
early to say when the Colony may become self-sufficient in rice. Cocoa shows
promise, but will take some time before it can become a substantial export crop.
25. The Colony’s economic life therefore seems likely to continue for some time
to be dominated by sugar. Employer–employee and miller–producer relationships in
this industry will continue to have an important effect on the social and economic
life of the Colony. The industry is vulnerable to political and social upheaval,
industrial disputes and natural phenomena such as earthquake and hurricane. In
this it is no different from any other important industry; but Fiji’s present reliance
on the £F.8 million per annum sugar industry is such that a serious upset in its
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production would be a major setback to the Colony as a whole. Provided there is no
large-scale disaster, there is no reason, however, why the Colony’s economic future
should not be regarded as reasonably good so long as capital for major works remains
available from overseas.
(e) The present system of local government
26. The system of local administration is unusual. While there are multiracial
councils in the urban areas (Fijians have not hitherto been eligible to election to
these councils but this is shortly to be corrected), in the rural areas the
administration of Fijians is quite separate from that of the other races. Originating
from the policy of Sir Arthur Gordon immediately after Cession, that the Fijian way
of life should be preserved, and that their administration should be based on existing
Fijian institutions, work continued to be organised through the communal system,
and land continued to be held communally through the extended family unit known
as the mataqali. Individual interests continued to be subordinated to those of the
group whose opinions, from the village, through the district and province to the
Council of Chiefs, were formally recorded after bose or meetings had been held at
these different levels. By this system, the wishes of the people were expressed, and
they were given effect through what is now described as the Fijian Administration.
27. At the head of the Fijian Administration is the Secretary for Fijian Affairs
who is President of the Council of Chiefs and Chairman of the Fijian Affairs Board, a
body composed of the five Fijian Members of the Legislative Council and a Financial
and a Legal Adviser. This Board, like the Council of Chiefs, submits to the Governor
such recommendations and proposals as it considers to be for the benefit of the
Fijian people, and it is empowered to make regulations for the peace, order, welfare
and good government of the Fijians, and for the observance of Fijian customary
rights, ceremonies, obligations and conduct.
28. Any bill introduced into the Legislative Council which affects any important
rights or interests of the Fijians, must be referred to the Board for its consideration,
and the Board may advise the Governor that any bill in this category should be
referred to the Council of Chiefs, which may require that a memorandum expressing
its views should be presented with the bill to the Legislative Council. This procedure
provides the Fijians with a very full opportunity for ventilating any objections which
they may have to a bill affecting their interests.
29. The Fijian people are administered through officials known as Rokos, one of
whom is placed in control of each of the fourteen Fijian Provinces, with Bulis in
charge of districts; and Fijian magistrates preside over Fijian district and provincial
courts. There are provincial councils which make by-laws and impose rates, and
district councils, which may make orders for such purposes as house building,
maintenance of village paths and bridges, and planting for food or profit.
30. As Professor Spate describes it in paragraph 184 of his report on the Fijian
people:—
‘The Fijian Administration, which is to a large extent a State within a State, is
the organisational expression, at all levels from the koro (village) to the
centre, of the “communal system”; each supports and is supported by the
other. In the Fijian village, very little or nothing can be done in the way of
social or economic activity—not even, in theory, the holding of a dance—
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without the support or at least the tacit approval of the Fijian Administration,
except by those—the galala or independent farmers—who contract out of the
village system.’1
31. Although the Fijian Administration is designed as a system of local
government, and is usually regarded as such, it in fact provides little local
government, as the provincial officers are largely controlled from headquarters and,
where the population is mixed, the Administration is entirely racial, and not local, as
it deals with Fijians only.
32. Whatever the scope of local government provided by the Fijian
Administration, there is no other local government organisation except in the
suburban and urban areas, where township boards and town councils operate
respectively. Government of the widely scattered settlements of non-Fijians in the
rural areas (Indians do not live in compact villages as Fijians do but on isolated
farms) is conducted through the district administration with the assistance of a
number of Indian advisory committees and of multi-racial ‘rural local authorities’,
constituted under the Public Health Ordinance, whose authority is confined to
administering and enforcing public health regulations.
(f) The constitution
33. Constitutionally Fiji is governed through an Executive Council and a
Legislative Council both of which have official majorities. The Executive Council is
presided over by the Governor and consists of the Colonial Secretary, the Attorney-
General and the Financial Secretary as ex officio members. There are five other
members, who are appointed by the Governor. These include three elected members
of the Legislative Council, one of whom is a European, one a Fijian, and one an
Indian. The Legislative Council is presided over by a Speaker and consists of sixteen
official members and fifteen unofficial members. Five of the unofficial members are
European, five are Indian and five are Fijian. The European and Indian
representation respectively is made up of three elected members and two nominated
members. The five Fijian members are indirectly elected by the Council of Chiefs:
they include two commoners.
(g) Race relations
34. Before December 1959, when disturbances occurred in Suva, racial relations
were a dormant issue. Fifteen years of post-war prosperity had given the impression
that the economy of Fiji was capable of supporting all races at a reasonably high
standard of living, and little attention was paid to the expanding population and to
the fact that increased prices from primary products, rather than increased
productivity, was responsible for the boom. The attitude of many Fijians was then
probably as antipathetic to Europeans as it was anti-Indian, although, whatever their
feelings about both these races, they were given little outward expression and the
general opinion was that in Fiji a variety of races were capable of living together in
harmony. Even at that time, however, racial relationships were not on a sound
foundation. In all the sugar cane growing areas, the Colonial Sugar Refining
Company continued its traditional policy of excluding coloured persons from
1 O H K Spate, The Fijian people: economic problems and prospects (Suva: Government Press, 1959).
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working in a clerical, or more senior capacity, in any of the Company’s offices, and
they were also excluded from joining the Company’s golf and tennis clubs, and from
all social events. It was a policy of strict racial exclusiveness, which, since most
amenities were usually provided by the Company in the sugar growing areas, was
deeply resented. A somewhat similar attitude was adopted by all the big Australian
companies which between them dominate both industry and commerce.
35. Fiji’s prosperity started to decline in 1957 and, by 1959, although the local
standard of living remained relatively high compared to that in other tropical
countries, the economic effects were beginning to be felt by individuals, especially
those living in urban areas. Dissatisfaction with current wages which was aggravated
by brash trade union leaders, by poor employer–employee relationships, and anti-
European and anti-colonial propaganda from overseas, culminated in the
disturbances in Suva in December 1959. These disturbances, insignificant by world
standards but portentous in the normally placid atmosphere of Fiji, were caused by a
short-lived alliance between the Indians and the Fijians against the Europeans; the
first time in the history of the colony that this had happened. Those taking part were
predominantly urbanised Fijians; the property damaged, and the persons abused or
assaulted, were almost exclusively European.
36. After order had been restored, it began to be popularly supposed that the
disturbances had been initiated by Indians, who had made use of the Fijians to oppose
the Europeans. This view was supported by the Fijian leaders, who did not wish to
undermine the traditional Fijian–European alliance, and also by the Europeans,
particularly through their main organ of expression The Fiji Times. Events during the
past 12 months have provided material which has been used to substantiate this view.
When, early in 1960, negotiations started between the Colonial Sugar Refining
Company and the principal growers’ associations over a new agreement for the
purchase of sugar cane, the Fijians who produce only 7 per cent. of the crop were
indifferent. Although they had cane growers’ associations of their own, these were of
recent growth and because of their keenness to increase the Fijian share of this
remunerative crop they were ready to accept the Company’s terms. As harvesting time
came and passed a split occurred amongst the representatives of the Indian
associations, some wishing to harvest and others not, and the 1960 crop was
accordingly placed in jeopardy. It was apparent that the continuation of this dispute
threatened the economy of the Colony, and no longer concerned the Indian
community alone. At this point the Fijian leaders, encouraged by some Europeans,
became violently anti-Indian, whose stand over the sugar negotiations they interpreted
as an attempt to dominate the economy of the country and, through that, a means to
dominate the Government. During this period, the report of the Burns Commission
was also published, and certain of its recommendations were regarded by the Fijians
as inherently likely to promote Indian interests at the expense of their own. The result
was a further hardening of anti-Indian feeling. Within a year of the 1959 disturbances,
the traditional Fijian-European alliance had been restored, and the attitude of both
these races towards the Indian was that their presence was only tolerable if they were
content to accept the continuation of the status quo. Most Indians now appear willing
to do so, but only as an interim measure based on expediency.
37. The trenchant criticism of Fijian customs and institutions made by the Burns
Commission led for a time to a noticeable loss of confidence by Fijians in British
intentions and to a general closing of their ranks to resist innovations which might
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weaken their position. Deferment of some of the most controversial recommendations
and modification of others has largely restored the position but the Fijian leaders
remain watchful. It would be wrong to imagine that they love the European. They are
intensely loyal to the Crown and are likely to remain so as long as their interests are
protected but the individual European is judged upon his merits and all too often he
is found wanting—largely because of the grasping attitude, and the aloofness and colour
consciousness of the representatives of Australian big business. The traditional alliance
has become one of convenience —of mutual support against the Indian—rather than
of affection. Beneath the friendly surface there is, particularly in the urban areas, a
growing envy of the wealth and security of Europeans and if leading Fijians turned
against Britain the spark that showed itself in December 1959 could quickly be fanned
into flame. It should be noted here that 75 per cent. of the Colony’s regular security
forces and virtually all the Army’s reservists are Fijian.
Part II.—Future policy
38. Any policy for the future of Fiji must be based on an assessment of the
possibility of improving racial relations. Can the widely different components of this
rapidly-growing population be welded into a cohesive body of people acknowledging
common citizenship and working in close co-operation towards a common
purpose—the development of the land and the maintenance of a reasonable standard
of living? Or will relations between the two major races grow steadily worse with all
the makings of another Cyprus? Genuine integration can be ruled out completely: as
Mr. Julian Amery graphically put it—‘The Fijians and Indians are more distinct as
communities than Jews and Arabs in Palestine, Greeks and Turks in Cyprus and
some Europeans and Bantu in South and Central Africa. Intermarriage, business
associations, even personal friendships are rare’.2 There are some who believe
therefore that any talk of building up a non-racial community is unrealistic and that
the only alternatives are complete political and economic domination of the Fijian
population by the Indian, with the former becoming no more than hewers of wood
and drawers of water for the latter; or, as they think more likely, a rising of the
Fijians in desperation against the Indians before it is too late. While I certainly do not
exclude the possibility of these alternatives, I do not believe that it is impossible, by
promoting mutual understanding and removing the more potent causes of friction,
to develop a society in which Fijian and Indian will live and work together in peace.
That, without any doubt, must be our aim. We have clear obligations to the Fijians
through the Deed of Cession. We also have obligations to the Indians who we
brought here and to the Europeans who we encouraged to settle here. Our policy in
Fiji must therefore be directed both at removing interracial fears and suspicions and
at fostering interracial co-operation. Ways in which these objectives may be yet
achieved will be discussed in succeeding paragraphs.
(a) The development of Fijian initiative
39. Perhaps the first essential is to develop among the Fijians the self-reliance
and individual initiative which they at present lack and without which they can never
hope to hold their own with the Indian. Fijians react well to strong leadership but too
frequently relapse into apathy when this leadership is removed. It is for this reason
2 See 13.
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that the many attempts which have been made in recent years to further their
development by projects organised on group or communal lines, have either failed or
have been only partially successful.
40. It is understandable that the Fijians, as a race, should lack individual
initiative, particularly those within the communal system, because their social
organisation has rested on the belief that the interests of the individual should be
subordinated to those of the group. This view is deeply ingrained in the Fijian
character so as to be almost instinctive. An abrupt change is therefore unlikely, and,
it must be assumed that, however earnestly “individualism” is promoted, it will take
a long time before the Fijians as a race exhibit those qualities of self-reliance,
initiative and responsibility which are associated with the Western use of the term.
To be successful, this process of changing the nature of the Fijians to enable them to
fend for themselves in modern life, will have to be slow. Emancipation from
communal obligations does not in itself make a successful individualist of the Fijian;
it too often leads to mere aimlessness, of which there is ample evidence at present.
Nevertheless many Fijians are already operating successfully as individual farmers
and have done so for many years, in spite of difficulties arising from their status and
background. The chief of these have been:—
(i) Fijian individualists have been tolerated but not encouraged by the Fijian
Administration;
(ii) they have had difficulty in acquiring a secure title to the land which they
cultivate;
(iii) they have remained subject to the levelling influence of custom;
(iv) they have lacked capital;
(v) their release from communal obligations has been on an annual basis and
subject to abrupt termination.
41. Prospects for these people are now better. The Council of Chiefs, at its
meeting in 1960, recorded its support of the Burns recommendation ‘that the
independent farmer should be actively encouraged by Government’. Following
Professor Spate’s report on the Fijian people, Fijians may now commute their social
services for an initial period of five years, after which they are eligible for a further
extension of five years. It is true that this exemption remains subject to annual
review, and may be cancelled if it appears that the farmer lacks the ability to fend for
himself; but the old rule that a galala must produce a gross income of £100 per
annum has been dropped. The grant of individual leases to Fijians is being made
more easy and funds are being made available for the assistance of Fijian
smallholders. It is proposed shortly to introduce large-scale land development
schemes (it is hoped with assistance from the Colonial Development Corporation)
which will provide substantial opportunities for eligible Fijians (as well as Indians) to
establish themselves as independent farmers.
42. In addition to those Fijians who are becoming individualists as farmers, an
increasing number are obtaining regular employment in commerce or with the
Government. The recently introduced scheme for the training of apprentices, and the
Technical Training Institute, will provide further opportunities for Fijians who want
to get away from communal life and are capable of living independently.
43. Notwithstanding these opportunities, and the gradual increase amongst
Fijians of responsible individualists, the majority of Fijians, if they are not to become
08-Fiji-01-cpp  10/5/06  6:55 AM  Page 79
80 JULIAN AMERY’S VISIT TO FIJI [29]
decadent, will require some form of control in addition to that provided for the
ordinary citizen. At present, the restraints provided by the communal system and
custom have become largely ineffective, especially in the more closely settled areas.
Unhappily, the less commendable aspects of custom such as kerekere (the right to
‘borrow’) appear to remain vigorous, while the more healthy ones, such as respect of
children for their parents, have lapsed. In fact, Fijian society, like so many others
that have been exposed to alien customs, is losing one way of life, popularly called
‘the Fijian way of life’, without adequately acquiring another. In consequence, Fijians
too often lack purpose, convictions, and confidence in themselves and in their race.
Unless this situation is remedied, they are in danger of disintegrating, and becoming
increasingly addicted to drink, aimlessness, hooliganism, and general irresponsibility.
It will be very difficult for the spirit of the Deed of Cession to be fulfilled in these
circumstances.
(b) Local government
44. For the foreseeable future, many Fijians will require a form of protection,
guidance and control such as that which used to be effectively provided by the Fijian
Administration, but which is at present lacking. A second method of rehabilitating
Fijian society, therefore, appears to be to adapt the Fijian Administration so that it
can function constructively in modern conditions, and not remain an expensive and
largely ineffectual liability.
45. The Fijian Administration in its present form is ineffectual because it was
designed to be based on the communal system. With the onset of disintegration in
the communal system, and the movement towards individualism—both the
responsible and irresponsible variety—the foundations on which the Fijian
Administration rests are being eroded. To become an efficient instrument of local
government, it will have to be recast and decentralised. If this is done, it can be either
confined to Fijians alone, whatever their status, or its scope can be extended, even
though only in a limited way, so as to include other races, and thereby form the basis
for the growth of a system of multi-racial local government. It should be mentioned
here that the Burns Commission recommended that the Fijian Administration
should be replaced as soon as practicable by a system of multi-racial local
government. The Fijians, conscious as they are of the faults of the present system,
were almost unanimous in their firm rejection of this proposal and it was decided to
take no action until an officer3 who has been making a study of local government in
the context of Fiji had reported. Present indications are that this officer will be
unable to secure support for any major change that would involve the abandonment
of the Fijian Administration. He is experimenting with a multi-racial advisory
committee but even this is viewed with some misgiving by Fijians and he is having to
tread warily. The suspicion created by the events of the past 12 months has for the
time being made his task almost impossible. It may be therefore that the only
possible line of advance will be to bring the Indian communities into a modernised
Fijian Administration, at any rate in the predominantly Fijian areas. In areas where
Indians are more numerous different arrangements may be necessary. These
possibilities are now being explored.
3 See 19, note 3.
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46. An alternative would be to develop local government on communal lines,
with separate systems for the Fijians, and for the remainder of the community. This
course might have some advantages on the grounds of expediency, but it would
perpetuate existing differences, it would be unsatisfactory administratively,
extravagant financially, and probably, ultimately, detrimental to Fijian interests
because they should benefit from association with other races in matters of this kind,
while too much isolation and protection will remove the incentive to progress, and
might well result finally in indifference and stagnation.
(c) Land
47. With a population increasing at a rate that will double itself within 20 years,
with growing unemployment and with little scope for a rapid expansion of secondary
industry and paid employment, the need to settle the younger generation of all races
on the land is already urgent. Many recommendations made by the Burns
Commission to this end have been accepted and the legislation and other measures
needed to put them into effect are being worked out as rapidly as can be expected
with a small and hard-pressed staff. The Reserve Commissioners are concentrating
their activities in areas best suited to development so that land may be made available
for long-term leases at the earliest possible date. Proposals for a Land Development
Authority are in draft and increased funds are being made available for agricultural
loans. Our policy here must be, while assuring the Fijians of the continued
ownership of their land, to ensure that the maximum use is made of it by both Fijians
and Indians. The Burns solution of a penal land tax is not at present practicable. The
carrot rather than the stick is likely to prove the more effective weapon. At the same
time there is a growing need to facilitate the marketing of crops and to take
constructive steps to improve the poorer land.
(d) Education
48. Most of the Colony’s schools are at present run on racial lines, mainly
because of language difficulties. Multi-racial education should obviously be adopted
without delay if Fiji is to progress towards a harmonious multi-racial society but
there is at present much opposition to it by Fijians. Nevertheless, useful progress is
being made: of 325 Fijian primary schools, 83 have non-Fijians on their rolls; of 166
Indian schools, one-third have non-Indians; and nearly half the 20 European schools
include pupils of other races. In many cases of course the schools could not be multi-
racial because the local population is all of one race. Agreement has been reached
that the use of English as the medium of instruction should be extended to the most
junior classes as more trained teachers become available and it must clearly be the
policy of this Government to attain as early as possible a position where language no
longer makes it necessary to have separate racial schools.
49. At the higher levels the need to push on the more able Fijians to qualify them
for senior posts both in Government and in commerce is such that it has been agreed
that special scholarships should be awarded for this purpose.
(e) The Civil Service
50. The great preponderance of Indians amongst those who have received a
higher education means inevitably that unless special steps are taken the higher
ranks of the civil service will ultimately be filled almost exclusively by Indians. The
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Fijians are acutely aware of this and in their view the undertakings which have been
given that the United Kingdom Government would protect their rights, include the
obligation of ensuring that the senior and influential posts in the service should be
filled either by Europeans or by Fijians, and a Resolution to this effect was passed at
the last meeting of the Council of Chiefs. I do not agree that these posts should be
reserved indefinitely for Europeans or Fijians, but I consider it reasonable that they
should be occupied by Europeans until a sufficient number of Fijians have acquired
the qualifications and ability to fill them on a basis of parity. I have addressed you on
this question in my secret despatch No. 171 of the 28th February, 1961.4
51. In regard to the remaining posts in the civil service as a whole, the Fijians
are already in a slight preponderance although there are certain departments, such
as Audit, Customs and that of the Accountant-General, where the nature of the work
is more suited to the Indian temperament and abilities, and in which Indians are
tending to monopolise the more senior posts. It would be very difficult in practice to
maintain a balance between the Fijians and Indians in departments in this category,
and my present view is that, apart from reserving the selected number of senior and
influential posts to which I have referred, Fijian interests will be adequately
protected if a direction is given to the Public Service Commission that, when
considering the appointment of new entrants to the Service, an approximate balance
between the two races should be maintained.
(f) Constitutional reform
52. The present constitution which gives no responsibility to local residents and
excludes the Fijian from the ballot box, tends to accentuate racial differences. Probably
the best way in which racial relations can be substantially improved in Fiji is to give
the responsibility of the running of the country to those who are domiciled here.
53. You have recently approved proposals that unofficial members of Executive
Council should be invited to undertake supervisory functions over groups of
Government departments and that if this arrangement proves successful to progress
to a Ministerial form of government with executive responsibility. It has also been
agreed that some at least of the Fijian members should be directly elected in the
same way as members of other races; and it seems probable that there will be a
demand for a major extension of the franchise. (This is at present confined to males
and there is a small property qualification.) Both Fijians and Europeans are
adamantly opposed to any progress towards a common roll and the Fijians, fearful as
always of Indian domination, are insistent upon the maintenance of parity in
representation between the three main racial groups. Realising the strength of this
feeling, the Indian delegation, which discussed constitutional reform with Mr. Julian
Amery when he was in Fiji last October, accepted the position and agreed that
numerical equality should remain. It will nevertheless be difficult for much longer to
justify an equality of representation for Europeans and part-Europeans, who between
them number only 4.8 per cent. of the population, with Indians who form 49 per
cent. and Fijians who form 41 per cent. of the population, even allowing for the fact
that such a high proportion of capital invested in Fiji is ‘European’, i.e., Australasian.
It is to be expected therefore that with the passage of time the number of European
members will be reduced while maintaining parity between Indians and Fijians.
4 Not printed.
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54. It is probably premature to consider the constitutional developments which
should follow the introduction of these proposals but, bearing in mind the objective
of the peaceful attainment of self-government, and the need to encourage the
formation of political parties, it may before long prove desirable to introduce the
principle of the multiple vote by which each elector would be entitled to cast three
votes, one for a Fijian candidate, one for an Indian candidate, and one for a candidate
representing other races in the Colony which, I suggest, might be grouped together
and added to the Europeans. The number of Members of Legislative Council
representing this multi-racial group should probably be less than those representing,
respectively, the Indians and the Fijians. This would be a move towards the common
role. It is, however, unrealistic to think on these lines in practical terms at the
present time. The Fijians, with reason, remain highly suspicious of any move which
will increase the influence of the Indians, and they feel that their strength rests upon
their ability to remain an integrated racial group, to which the United Kingdom has
particular obligations arising from the Deed of Cession.
Part III.—Fiji and her neighbours
55. Consideration of a policy for Fiji must take into account the future role of the
Colony in the South Pacific. Fiji is historically the bridge between Melanesia and
Polynesia. She was the eastward limit of Melanesia settlement in the South Pacific
and she has had contact for centuries with Polynesia, particularly through the
Kingdom of Tonga. Since the Cession of Fiji in 1874, various factors have reduced
the significance of this natural geographical advantage.
56. A climate and topography that suited the large-scale development of a sugar
industry, led not only to the introduction of Indian labour but, in conjunction with
the copra and gold mining industries, gave Fiji an economy based on overseas
investment mostly from Australia and operated in the executive and technical grades
largely by Australians. Because of her geographical position Fiji has also maintained
close associations with New Zealand from whom many officers in the civil service,
especially in the medical and education departments, have been recruited. Fiji is in
the New Zealand defence area and a Royal New Zealand Air Force squadron is based
on Suva. The New Zealand Government also administers the Nadi airport on behalf of
the South Pacific Air Transport Council. With Fiji’s principal export markets in the
United Kingdom, and a large proportion of her imports coming from the United
Kingdom (29 per cent.), Australia (31 per cent.) and New Zealand (8 per cent.), a
system of four-way trade has developed with the result that Fiji has tended to become
identified with these countries rather than with her traditional neighbours in the
South Pacific and for her to look outwards, especially towards New Zealand and
Australia, rather than inwards towards Melanesia and Polynesia. This has affected
wage and price structures, managerial methods and labour organisation, education
and the evolution of social theory.
57. Because Fiji has developed an economy which is far in advance of that of
most of her neighbours, her historic position as a bridge between Melanesia and
Polynesia has undergone a change. The introduction of a large Indian community
has complicated her racial pattern and indeed that of the Pacific and other territories
are inclined to look askance at the price paid for her economic progress. At the same
time this social and political disadvantage has given Fiji, by virtue of an export and
re-export trade of nearly £1 million a year with her neighbours to the east and north,
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the opportunity to be the economic hub of the eastern half of the South Pacific. The
situation is, however, precarious, since reciprocal trade is almost totally lacking.
58. By her ability and willingness to offer educational facilities to students from
other islands, Fiji has made a useful contribution to regional welfare. Schools and
training institutions, particularly the Central Medical School, have drawn students
from all over the South Pacific thereby earning for Fiji considerable goodwill and
widening the limits of her influence. It must be recognised nevertheless that Fiji has
in neighbouring islands a certain reputation for aloofness due in part to her
preoccupation with her own intractable problems. This impression has been
emphasised by the immigration restrictions imposed by Fiji which, although
directed primarily at the immigration of persons from Asia, have been applied
without discrimination and have therefore interfered with the free movement of
South Sea islanders into Fiji.
59. With its scattered and small territories, administered by six metropolitan
powers; its still imperfect system of ‘internal’ communications; its great distances
and high cost of travel; and its diverse racial and cultural composition, it is by no
means an easy task to develop closer association in the Pacific. The best instrument
to hand at the moment is the South Pacific Commission in which all six
administering Powers—Australia, France the Netherlands, New Zealand, the United
Kingdom and the United States—participate and with which the territorial
administrations are, in varying degrees, associated. Within the next 12 months the
constitution of the Commission is to be reviewed, consequent upon an unexpected
application for membership by Western Samoa when she becomes independent on
1st January, 1962, and it is probable that the opportunity will be taken to identify all
territories, self-governing and dependent, with the administration of its regional
programme of social welfare and economic development.
60. An opportunity may therefore be presented to Fiji to adopt a more positive
approach to her position in the South Pacific, and for all territories to break through
the barrier of parochialism that geography has forced upon them. It would be
premature to forecast what part Fiji might actually play: there may be opportunities
for furthering economic consultation and co-ordinating regional research; for
developing sub-regional facilities for higher and technical education; and for
improving cultural contacts. In all of these fields Fiji, with Papua-New Guinea, is
well situated to provide leadership, and a positive approach should bring her
benefits, among which not the least might be the gradual assimilation of her Indian
community into the broader Pacific scene. The psychological effect of closer
association upon both the Fijians and Indians might well be considerable; the
former might feel their isolation less keenly, and the latter come to appreciate that
their future lies wholly in a Pacific where native races predominate, and where the
penalty of non-conformity may have adverse political and economic repercussions
on them.
61. Speculation about the possibilities of ultimate federation of Pacific island
territories would be premature. It must be remembered that distances here are
vast—some 6,000 miles separate the eastern and western limits of the area of the
South Pacific Commission—and the communications though improving rapidly
with the development of air travel are still poor. Meanwhile I believe that our policy
should be to work for closer understanding and closer contacts between the islands
and that Fiji should play its part by continuing to provide all possible assistance in
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the way of educational and training facilities of neighbouring territories and by
endeavouring to promote inter-island trade which alone can lead to a true sense of
common interest.5
5 Paras 62–63, summarising the review, not printed.
30 CO 1036/612, no 40 3 Mar 1961
[Franchise]: letter (reply) from H P Hall to Sir K Maddocks
welcoming the extension of the franchise to women
Many thanks for your letter of the 15th February reporting on discussions at the
meeting of the Fijian Affairs Board when they came out with a strong
recommendation that the franchise should be extended to women.1
Office policy is to encourage the extension of the franchise to women and we
therefore welcome these proposals. Paragraph 3 of the circular despatch 617/58 of
the 28th May, 1958, expressed the hope that wherever possible the franchise should
be extended to women and there are in fact now only one or two territories where
there is still discrimination against women in the matter of the franchise.
I am not sure that Julian Amery meant some of his remarks about women’s place
being in the home, etc., to be taken seriously. On the question of votes for women his
main point was that in the case of Fiji he did not think that the rate of constitutional
advance should be very rapid. So far as he could ascertain at the time there was no
real demand locally for votes for women—if you remember, it was only the Indians
who had mentioned this—and he did not think therefore that Government should
offer this at the present stage. He thought it might be kept in reserve to be given
away as a ‘further advance’ when changes in the constitution were being made.
You may therefore take it that the Secretary of State will not oppose an extension
of the franchise to women if there is general support for it. In fact, he would welcome
it.
1 See 27.
31 CO 1036/612, no 47 17 Mar 1961
[Franchise]: letter from H P Hall to Sir K Maddocks on the question
of universal adult suffrage
I am sorry if we misunderstood the purport of your letter of the 15th February1 but
from the terms of paragraph 2 we assumed you were only asking whether there
would be any objection to the extension of the franchise to women and only this
aspect was considered here. Incidentially if you refer to paragraph 4 of Macdonald’s
letter S.5/27 of the 22nd September, 1958, to Rogers you will see that it is not only in
voting that there is discrimination against women in Fiji.
1 See 27.
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We do not think Ministers will be prepared to give an answer about universal adult
suffrage without considering a detailed submission. It was not raised in the recent
correspondence leading up to the issue of your statement on ‘Fiji Government
Proposals for Constitutional Reform’ which was only published on the 27th
February2 and there is only a passing reference to it in paragraph 53 of your despatch
No. 175 of the 28th Februrary. Paragraph 54 of that despatch mentions the possible
need to introduce the multiple vote and a move towards the common roll.
Our impression, which I admit may be wrong, is that the earlier correspondence
on constitutional reform might have been overlooked, if indeed your letter of the
15th February was intended to raise the question of electoral qualifications and
universal adult franchise. Particularly if you are thinking also of multiple votes and
common rolls. You might care to look at paragraph 4(c) (iii) of Rogers’ letter of the
16th January, 1957, to Garvey which brought out the need for a relatively high
electoral qualification.3 That letter also enclosed a table setting out the proposed
qualifications for the East African territories.
Again paragraph 3 of Rogers’ letter of the 14th August, 19594 to you touches on
this question of franchise qualifications as a method of reducing the disparity in
voting strengths of the various communities.
Apart, however, from the need to approach this problem with caution in
multiracial communities, in case at some future date you may wish to move over to
some form of common roll, but not universal adult franchise, we here do not know
whether the Fijian Affairs Board are correct in saying that the existing qualifications
are ‘virtually meaningless’.
Macdonald’s letter 38/4 of the 22nd September, 1959, to me does mention that the
percentage of registered voters who used their vote in the 1959 election showed a
distinct improvement on the 1956 election figures. On the other hand the reports of
the Returning Officers at the elections show that seemingly small numbers of people
actually voted. For example, in the Southern Division only 645 votes were polled for
the European seat and only 3,285 for the Indian. Similarly in the North-Western
Division, the figures were 532 and 6,951 respectively and this, I believe, has the
largest Indian population.
Although, as Macdonald says, the percentage of registered voters who used their
vote might be high, we do not know how many people who were entitled to register
did in fact take the trouble to register. On the other hand, unless large numbers did
not register who were entitled to do so, the existing qualifications cannot be regarded
as ‘virtually meaningless’. Or the electorate are not particularly interested in
exercising their right to vote?
Before we would feel able to recommend to Ministers that there should be any
change in the present qualifications we would like an assessment of the present
position on the basis of the 1959 election figures to show why the actual number of
votes polled seem so small compared with the population figures. Perhaps this could
be set out by races:—
(a) estimated adult male population,
(b) estimated number entitled to register,
2 See 28. 3 See 6. 4 See 8.
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(c) number actually registered,
(d) number who voted in 1959;
how these would be expected to change:—
(e) by the extension of the present franchise to women,
(f) the further increase if there is universal adult franchise, the sole qualification
being the ability to write in the vernacular.
Again, if you are seriously contemplating a change to the multiple vote and common
roll, there is, for the reasons set out in detail in the earlier correspondence, some
advantage in retaining a higher qualification for candidates for election.
In the case of the Fijians who are to elect three members at the next election, there
are of course advantages in ensuring as far as possible that the electoral
qualifications are similar to those of the other races. On the other hand the Fijians
have been out of step in the past, and will continue to remain out of step in that three
will be elected and two ‘selected’ by the Council of Chiefs (and not nominated by the
Governor as will the Europeans and Indians), and different qualifications for the
Fijians could probably be defended.
I am sorry to have written at some length but our experience in multiracial
territories has brought out the need to go into questions of franchise very carefully.
32 CO 1036/752, no 13 21 Mar 1961
[Scholarships for Fijians]: outward savingram no 133 from 
Mr Macleod to the officer administering the Fiji government on a
CD&W award
Your savingram No. 69 of the 20th January.1
United Kingdom Scholarships for Fijians.
I approve a grant of £Stg. 13,929 from the Fiji territorial allocation of Colonial
Development and Welfare funds as a 90% contribution to the cost. The scheme
number is D.4691. Copies of the scheme memorandum and financial summary are
enclosed.2
You will note that the grant approved is slightly more than that sought in your
savingram under reference and that detailed estimates have been compiled showing
the costs on which the approved grant is based. You will note that the amount for
fees has been increased to bring it more into line with United Kingdom costs and the
maintenance allowance per student has been revised to the approved United
Kingdom student rate per year.
In operating this scheme you will wish to hear in mind the numbers of students per
annum on which the estimates are based and also that the approved United Kingdom
outfit allowance is £Stg.40 for a one year course and £Stg.45 for a two year course.
Since the bulk of the expenditure will be disbursed in the United Kingdom I have,
in accordance with normal practice for accounting convenience, arranged for the
Scheme to be administered centrally. Arrangements generally will be those
1 See 24. 2 Not printed.
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applicable to the £1,000,000 scholarship scheme (D.694) and salary in excess of local
commitments should be oredited to the scheme up to the amount of maintenance
allowance issued. In order that credits of salary may be made to the scheme a
statement of maintenance allowance issued will be sent to you at the end of each
financial year and in this respect your attention is drawn to my predecessor’s
Circular Savingram No. 910/54 of September, 1954.
Disbursements in the United Kingdom will be made by my Accountant and in
order that the Colonial Office may be aware of the amount of any advances made, and
so that the question of adjustment can be followed up on the student’s arrival, it is
requested that in all cases the student, before leaving the Colony, may be furnished
with a form of Last Pay Certificate duly signed by the responsible officer. This
certificate should include details of any advances issued locally in respect of such
items as Warm Clothing allowance and incidental travelling expenses.
Students should be told to report immediately on arrival in the United Kingdom to
the Accounts Branch, Colonial Office, 3 Sanctuary Buildings, London S.W.1. where
detailed information will be given to them and a cash payment made in respect of
maintenance allowance and any other payments due.
The rates of maintenance allowance depend on the place of study but basically are
as follows:—
Oxford and Cambridge £552 per annum
London and Dublin £468 per annum
Provinces £444 per annum.
Nurses in training do not receive maintenance allowance but in certain
circumstances are eligible for a supplementary allowance of £40 per annum to the
pay received from the hospital where training is being undertaken.
Rates of allowance are subject to revision from time to time and any form of bond
or undertaking signed by the scholar should avoid mention of any specific amount of
allowance.
Reimbursement in respect of expenditure incurred locally should be the subject of
a vouched claim submitted through the Crown Agents in the usual way.
As only 90% of expenditure is to be met from Colonial Development and Welfare
funds a recovery of 10% of gross expenditure will be made quarterly from your funds
in the hands of the Crown Agents under savingram advice to you.
33 CO 1036/312, no 48 7 Apr 1961
[Franchise]: letter (reply) from Sir K Maddocks to H P Hall on
universal adult suffrage and the apparent lack of enthusiasm for
constitutional reform by all except the Indians
Thank you for your letter of the 17th March1 about constitutional reform with special
reference to electoral qualifications. My letter of the 15th February2 was not of
course intended as a definite recommendation in favour of universal adult suffrage;
nor had I overlooked the earlier correspondence. I wished merely to know whether
1 See 31. 2 See 27.
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the Secretary of State would have any objection to the giving of free rein to public
discussion of the rather surprising resolutions of the Fijian Affairs Board.
2. I do not propose in this letter to take the constitutional discussion further.
That must await the debate in the Legislative Council meeting which begins on the
18th April, the report on the debate, and my own return to the United Kingdom on
leave in May. At this stage I may say that events which have occurred since December
1959 have given rise to much new thinking, and whereas a common roll previously
seemed an attainable if distant objective, it must now be regarded as little better than
an ideal to which we can work only in a negative manner, by not taking any step
which would militate against its achievement should events take a favourable turn.
3. As regards electoral qualifications, the position is complicated by the fact that
nearly all Fijians are property owners by virtue of their communal ownership of land
and I have no doubt that unless the property qualification is dropped altogether it
will be proposed that all Fijian adults appearing in the “Vola ni Kawa” or register of
native owners, should have the vote. This would give almost universal adult suffrage
to Fijians. In the case of Indians the present small property qualification, although
comparatively insignificant in the case of men, would rule out nearly all the women.
However, we can leave this point until I have had an analysis made of the last election
as requested on page 2 of your letter.
4. Indications are that the debate on the Government statement will indicate
that there is little enthusiasm for constitutional advance by any except the Indians.
Big business has come down on the side of no change and the Fijians may well refuse
to commit themselves without reference to the Council of Chiefs. This unwillingness
to accept any responsibility is one of the regrettable facts of life in Fiji.
34 CO 1036/800, no 10 11 Apr 1961
[Fiji civil service]: letter from A R Thomas to Sir K Maddocks on the
racial balance
Please refer to your Confidential despatch No. 135 of the 13th February,1 Bevington’s
letter to Hall of the 16th March and our telegram informing you that we saw no
objection to your announcement that instructions have been issued to the Public
Service Commission that entry to the Civil Service should be controlled in such a
way as to secure as far as possible a balance between the number of Fijians and
Indians within the Service; but stating that we saw much greater difficulty over your
companion proposal for the reservation to H.M.O.C.S. officers of the posts listed in
paragraph 7 of your despatch.
2. Let me say at once that we regard these proposals as a marked improvement on
the earlier proposals, following Mr. Amery’s visit, for quotas or for a system of control
which applied to promotions generally in the Service. Your present proposition has, if
I may say so, the merit of being specific and limited. We also wholly endorse your view
that, should it be proved necessary to have a schedule of reserved posts, the purpose
should be for them to be held by Europeans until Fijians and Indians are available on
a basis of balance and not held exclusively for the benefit of Fijians.
1 See 26.
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3. Even so, however, it is the sort of proposition which makes us raise our eyebrows
pretty high because of the experience which we have had of the repercussions which
have flowed in other territories from measures, however limited, to discriminate in
favour of one section of the Public Service against another. This is quite apart from
the need to be fully convinced that the measure is what the situation requires.
4. We have studied the useful table enclosed with your despatch and it does not
suggest that at present the Indian element in the Public Service is predominant over
the Fijian element, but we do not question the assumption that the difference in the
ability of the two races will lead to disparity in future unless something is done to
check the process. But it is precisely this possible difference in ability which makes
the solution of the problem so difficult. No doubt it is mechanically possible to block
the promotion of Indians to a reserved list of posts until Fijians are able to compete
for them on equal terms but it would be very difficult to operate such a system fairly.
It is likely to mean that some Indians of ability will have their promotions artificially
checked and when the time comes for the reservation of these posts to be removed it
may still be necessary to promote Fijians, not merely out of turn but above the
natural level of their ability, to preserve a balance of posts with the Indians.
5. If it became necessary to accept this discrimination against Indian members of
the Service, we consider that the decision ought to be taken only after a detailed
examination of what the implications would be. We ought to know what practical
effect the decisions would have on future recruitment over the next few years (e.g. it
might result in good quality Indian candidates not coming forward); on the careers
of serving Indians and Fijians—there may be men of ability already in the Service
who would be denied promotion they would otherwise deserve; and the sort of period
for which these top posts would have to be reserved. They are posts which an officer
expects to reach only after perhaps 20 years’ service and if there are few Fijians with
the ability to fill the posts, we might well be committing certain qualified officers to a
generation of waiting.
6. There are certain other particular points on which we should welcome elucidation.
7. Would it be the intention to treat all the scheduled posts as reserved until
such time as it was possible to promote Indians and Fijians on a balanced basis over
the whole field and then ‘de-reserve’ the posts en bloc; or would the system be
worked more flexibly in the sense of de-reserving particular posts as and when it was
possible to promote an Indian and Fijian ‘as a pair’ (not necessarily in the same
Department)? We imagine however that the possibilities of this more flexible
approach would be very limited since otherwise there would not be much of a
problem to deal with and we should be left with the difficulty that a number of
Indians would have to be held back until suitable Fijians could be promoted
alongside. This would mean a substantial loss of prospects for those affected.
8. What would be the position of local Europeans? There would seem to be no
justification for holding them back in favour of H.M.O.C.S. officers provided that
they did not come to hold more than a very few top posts, since they would
presumably be regarded as ‘neutral’ by Fijians and Indians. This may however be a
purely theoretical point since I realise that local Europeans are very few in numbers
and possibly there are none in the upper-middle reaches of the Service.
9. Would the intention be that after a period of reservation of the top posts,
individual H.M.O.C.S. officers should be required to retire prematurely in order to
make way for Fijians and Indians as and when the latter become qualified for
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promotion on a balanced basis? Or would at that stage the promotion of Fijians and
Indians depend on natural wastage of H.M.O.C.S. officers? We assume the latter
would be the case, since it would unsettle H.M.O.C.S. officers and bring up the
question of compensation if they were liable to be replaced as and when local officers
became qualified to take their places.
10. I am sorry to raise so many difficulties but we really feel that a more detailed
and scientific enquiry into the problem is necessary before the Secretary of State
could be advised to agree to a policy which cuts right across the provision of Colonial
Regulations under which the claims of officers for promotion are considered on the
basis of experience, qualifications and merit. Any departure from these criteria would
cut at the root of the career structure of the Service and would contravene the
understandings on which serving officers were recruited. It seems to us that it would
first be necessary as a result of such an examination to establish beyond reasonable
doubt that the problem does exist in a sufficiently serious form to justify such radical
measures. It appears from your despatch that a policy of balance in recruitment was
followed between 1933 and 1956 and that at the present time there are more Fijians
than Indians in the Service. We are now agreeing to a resumption of a policy of
balanced recruitment and in addition you have announced a decision (which we
wholly support) that a number of overseas scholarships should be reserved for the
purpose of bringing forward more qualified Fijian candidates. It would be useful to
review the problem of balance in the light of these measures in relation to the higher
grades and undertake a detailed examination of of Indian and Fijian officers capable
of rising to posts of higher responsibility in the Service, taking due account of the
possible effects of the scholarship scheme and the balanced recruitment programme.
11. If the result of these enquiries pointed to the need for special additional
measures, ought not consideration first to be given to making good the deficiency on
more positive lines? One possibility which occurs to us is to introduce special in-
training schemes from which Fijian officers could particularly benefit. Another
possibility, which may or may not have merit, is that the Fijian Affairs Board should
be drawn upon more than it appears to be at present as a source of Fijian officers for
higher Civil Service appointments for higher branches of the Service. (If the Fijian
community is pressing to play a fuller part in the Public Service it would seem
illogical for them to resist the release of able Fijian officers from employment of the
Board for employment in the Central Government.)
12. If you agree that all these implications should be studied by some sort of
authoritative committee (and I feel sure that the Secretary of State will wish to be
satisfied that they have been fully studied), you might feel that it would be useful for
somebody from outside with personnel experience and a wide approach to come out
for the purpose and head such a Committee which might have a Fijian and Indian
assessor. If so, we should be glad to consider whom we could suggest.
13. A final point is that we would hope that any measures of this kind
(particularly measures affecting serving officers, but also we suggest, affecting
recruitment by the Public Service Commission) should be discussed fully and frankly
with the Staff Association. As we all know, the presentation of controversial Service
measures can be so much easier if the Staff Associations have been taken into
confidence and feel that they have been effectively consulted.
14. Once again, I apologise for being so ‘difficult’.
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35 CO 1036/988, no 2 17 Apr 1961
[Monopoly companies]: letter (reply) from H P Hall to 
Sir K Maddocks suggesting tighter accounting procedures
Thank you for your letter of the 17th January about the monopoly position exercised
by the Carpenter group.1 This is a big and disturbing problem, and from what you say
the strangle-hold seems possibly worse than U.A.C. formerly exercised in West Africa:
eventually of course they seem to see the red light and concentrated on the exporting
side, contracting out substantially from retail business.
Our own impression is that one potential weapon might be to provide by
legislation that separate returns, balance sheets, and Profit and Loss Accounts, etc.,
be submitted annually to the Registrar of Companies by each company registered in
Fiji, including private companies with share capital over a certain limit. The light of
day sometimes helps in itself, both directly and indirectly. We are looking into this
very complex problem and we shall be very happy to discuss with Parkinson2 when he
is over here. Please ask him to give us an early call, if convenient, letting us know if
possible in advence.
1 See 22. 2 R W Parkinson, commerce and industries officer, Fiji.
36 CO 1036/612, no 50 1 May 1961
[Constitutional development]: letter from E R Bevington to H P Hall
on the debate in the Legislative Council
Before he left, Sir Kenneth asked me to send you a letter giving impressions of the
constitutional debate in the Legislative Council which took place on the 21st and
24th April. This I now do, and I also enclose a copy of the Public Relations Officer’s
broadcast summary of the debate:1 these are put out at 1.15 p.m. and 7.15 p.m. each
day Legislative Council is sitting.
2. On the eve of the debate, a widely attended meeting of the Fijian Association
passed resolutions strongly opposing the Government’s constitutional changes and
demanding a statement of the paramountcy of Fijian interests. This had been
preceded a few days before by a resolution of the Suva Chamber of Commerce to the
effect that no constitutional change was required.
3. The debate therefore was set to open in an atmosphere where it appeared
likely that the five European and five Fijian members would vote against the
Government motion and only the five Indians would vote for it—obviously this was
not a case where the official majority could be used.
4. I therefore discussed the handling of the debate with the three leaders, as we
felt that a negative vote of the Legislative Council should be avoided because if such
vote were registered, in the days ahead many would point to this vote and deny
Government any right of action. It was therefore agreed with unofficial members
that the Government motion welcoming the proposals should be introduced and by
1 Not printed.
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leave withdrawn and this was the tactic which in the event was adopted. It resulted
also in a completely dispassionate and more relaxed atmosphere in the House. It is
the first time within my knowledge of the Fiji Legislative Council that a debate has
been entered on in the knowledge that the motion would be withdrawn.
5. In opening the debate, I tried to stress that change is inevitable, especially in
the circumstances of the world today, and therefore the need should be recognized
and changes should be made slowly and at our own pace. It was far better to
introduce change in a planned way rather than be forced to do it in a hurry. At the
same time, the opinions of members were sought on the immediate issues which
have been agreed, namely, the extension of direct election to the Fijian community,
constituencies, and suffrage. Clearly, if female suffrage, as had been asked, was given
to the Fijian community, others also would demand it. For obvious reasons no other
officials spoke and I think it would be best, in dealing with the speeches of unofficial
members, to deal with them not in chronological order, but by racial groups.
6. The debate was opened by Ratu Mara who strongly opposed the motion which
he said he regarded as merely a step on the road to complete independence. This was
wholly unacceptable. He quoted extracts from a speech given by Ratu Cakobau to the
Council of Chiefs in 1875 from which it was clear, he maintained, that Cakobau regarded
Fiji as being handed over to Britain and as becoming virtually a part of the United
Kingdom. Ratu Mara’s mention of the need for a common roll before constitutional
change was doubtless a tactic. He knows that the very words ‘common roll’ are
anathema to the Fijians and by using this phrase in the early stages of his speech, he
probably intended to consolidate opposition amongst the Fijians to the motion. His
plea was that Fiji should become another Channel Island, but unfortunately he failed
to deal with the question of how that ‘Channel Island’ should govern itself.2
7. With the exception of Semesa Sikivou,3 who took a courageous and
independent line supporting the motion, the other Fijian speakers largely followed
Ratu Mara’s line.
8. Ratu Edward Cakobau emphasized that where moves towards self-government
had succeeded, the people concerned had been largely of one race, making political reform
more easy. Edward’s was not a notable contribution to the debate but he too ended by
underlining that under no circumstances could the connection with the U.K. be broken
and definite undertakings and safeguards should be written into the constitution.
9. Ratu Penaia Ganilau supported this general line and took the view that first of
all the proposals for direct election of Fijians should be implemented and only
thereafter should consideration be given to further constitutional advance. Ratu
Penaia speaks on few occasions and he is always short and to the point and the House
listens to him with the greatest respect. His remarks which then followed were
therefore the more pointed: he went on to say that the people who should run the
2 The Channel Islands are part of the British Isles, not Great Britain or the United Kingdom. They are
located in the English Channel in the Gulf of St Malo and they are closer to France than England. They
consist of two separate UK dependencies—Jersey and Guernsey. Guernsey in turn has dependencies of its
own, principally Alderney and Sark. The islands have their own legislatures and judicial systems. They
were the only part of the British Isles to come under German occupation during the Second World War
(see also 81).
3 Semesa Sikivou, MA, was a member of the Legislative Council as nominee of the Council of Chief,
1956–1962, and an elected member, 1963–1970. He was assistant director of education, 1961–62, and
deputy director, 1962.
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country should be prepared to bear arms in the defence of the country, a pointed
reference to the Indian community’s war record, and lack of representation in the
Fiji Military Forces.
10. It was noteworthy that this was the first debate in which the word ‘fear’ was
freely used by the Fijians and they made it clear that their fear was of domination by
the Indians. It was therefore more pointed when someone of Penaia’s military record
and standing went on to draw a parallel between the Jews and Arabs, and Britain’s
withdrawal from Palestine. He observed that the more nimble-witted Jews had
gained the advantage.
11. Semesa Sikivou made an astonishingly courageous lone stand for the
constitutional proposals. His line was simply that changes must come and that we
must be prepared. He spoiled it, however, by adding the proposal for a broadly based
conference of all the various groups in the Colony with a view to seeking a common
basis. It is well known to members that in present circumstances such a conference
would be nothing more than a sounding-board for differences.
12. Unfortunately the last of the Fijian speakers in the debate was Ravuama
Vunivalu,4 and he came near the very end. His line was simple, sincere, and forthright.
In his view, there had been an imperceptible weakening of the links between the Fijians
and the Crown, and the Fijians would not consent to change the status quo in any way
until an unequivocable statement had been made by Government as to the place of the
Deed of Cession in the Colony today. Furthermore, he said that whatever changes are
made in the constitution, the indigenous Fijians wanted a majority of the
representation in Executive and Legislative Councils. In short, Ravuama, like the great
majority of Fijians, interprets the Deed of Cession as being a contract between the
United Kingdom and the Fijians with no one else a party to it, and while in his more
liberal moments he may concede rights to the Indian community in the territory, the
Fijians now have an explicit fear of Indian domination and are determined that there
shall be no change until safeguards are written into the constitution. Furthermore,
they are determined that those safeguards shall be maintained by a permanent link
with the United Kingdom: if that link were severed, they see the loss of their safeguards.
Whatever the rights or wrongs of this may be, and undoubtedly the Fijians read into
the Deed of Cession more than the cold meaning of the words, there is no question
that Ravuama crystalized in a few words the feelings of the great majority of Fijians,
and we can only ignore this at our peril.
13. The Europeans were disappointing to put it mildly. They spoke for the
Europeans who see in the official majority the entrenchment of white Government
and there is little doubt that they spoke largely for their electorate who, it must be
remembered, consist of only some 350 locally-domiciled Europeans and some 7,800
part-Europeans. The remaining full European population are in Government, the
Services, or in commerce; and they are transient.
14. Kermode was the first speaker amongst the Europeans and he entered a plea
that there should be no constitutional change until there was local government, being
well aware that in the present atmosphere of mistrust between the communities at the
lower levels, there is little hope of getting local government going except by a very
gradual process. J.N. Falvey spoke almost last and his contribution was not up to his
4 Ravuama Vunivalu, BA, was a member of the Legislative Council as nominee of the Council of Chiefs,
1950–1962, and elected member, 1963–64 (deceased).
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usual standard. He too voiced the fear that the ultimate result of the step proposed was
independence—an independence not wanted by either the European or Fijian
communities and supposedly not wanted by the Indians. J.A. Moore, a nominated part-
European member, wanted to ‘hasten slowly’ and ‘move only with caution’. The other
two European contributions were of little note.
15. In short, the Europeans fell in behind the four Fijians, who were against
constitutional change, because it suited them to do so.
16. As was to be expected, all Indian members broadly supported the
constitutional changes proposed. B.D. Lakshman spoke for nearly two hours, the
usual rambling, far-ranging and hard to follow diatribe. His remarks, as expected,
were fatal to the cause of Government’s constitutional change in that he could not
resist harping on the eventual need for a common roll. At various times, Indian
members have denied wanting a common roll but inevitably in some way or another
they come back to it and thereby ensure that the Fijians will not budge. The same
applies to the Europeans whose small numbers would be swamped in a common roll.
17. Deoki’s contribution, in common with other Indian members, was not a
notable one, except that he proposed that each group should elect 5 members and
one additional member should be on a common roll basis thus again raising the fears
of the Fijians, and, to a lesser degree, Europeans. Any mention of the common roll,
in no matter what form, the Fijians regard as being the thin end of the wedge.
J. Madhavan, recently returned to Legislative Council on a by-election, made no
useful contribution except to put the Fijians further on their guard with references
to a common roll.
18. Dr. Sahu Khan5 also welcomed the Government’s proposals but then moved
into the expected plea for special Muslim representation. He, too, could not resist
reference to a common roll.
19. To sum up, the debate got off on a false trail led by Ratu Mara, which
nevertheless expressed the feelings of the mass of Fijians who see little hope in the
future without a binding link with the U.K. The whys and where—fores of this were
not clearly brought out until Ravuama spoke and his speech was indeed a notable
contribution.
20. The Europeans reacted as demanded by their electorate and showed no
appreciation of the inevitable effects of changes in the world today. As usual when a
Fijian position is threatened, they supported the Fijians and indeed were given a
clear lead by them in this debate: the Fijian wish was ad idem with their own. The
Indian members were in an undoubtedly difficult position in that their electorates,
being ignorant of the niceties of debate and feelings of the House, would expect them
to claim immediate ministerial status and major advances. This temptation was
resisted successfully, but having resisted it they did no less damage by their constant
references to the common roll in one form or another. Pleas that the Indians do not
wish to dominate the community, no matter what claims of sincerity are made, just
do not hold water and indeed are regarded as an indication of insincerity.
21. The only other point which came out in the debate was the complete
acceptance by all of the idea of votes for women and that the present property and
income qualifications should be swept away. Indian women are unlikely to have
5 Dr A H Sahu Khan, a Muslim, was the second Indian nominated member of the Legislative Council. One
of the two nominated seats was ‘reserved’ not by law but by practice for a Muslim.
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either property or income while nearly all Fijian women would have sufficient rights
in communal land to give them the vote. This was not exhaustively explored but
there can be no doubt that all members accepted the proposition of adult suffrage.
37 CO 1036/988, no 8 12 July 1961
[Monopoly company]: CO note of a meeting with Sir K Maddocks 
on ways of overcoming the monopoly held by the Carpenter, 
Morris Hedstrom and Burns Philip group1
The meeting was held to consider possible ways of overcoming the monopoly held by
the Carpenter, Morris Hedstrom, Burns Philp group in Fiji.
Mr. Parkinson thought that the present public feeling in Fiji against the group
resulted at least partly from the group’s poor public relations. So far as basic
consumer goods were concerned there is no significant monopoly problem. There
are quite a number of small firms operated by Indians, Chinese and local people in
this trade. But apart perhaps from paint and cement, the group held the monopoly in
trade of virtually all other types of goods, of which perhaps tools vehicles and
machinery were of particular importance to many purchasers; moreover, between
them the associated companies held the agencies for overseas companies. The group
also has a monopoly of local shipping. New firms dare not start up in Fiji unless they
were assured of support by the group. (In discussion it was mentioned that
immigration restrictions on expatriate staff might also be some minor deterrent to
outside investment but in general permits would be issued when needed.)
Mr. Surridge thought that the rural people in the outer islands were completely
dominated by the group in the matter of shipping. Copra producers were forced to
use the group to ship their copra to the factory and at the same time the group
shipped to these islands the goods purchased by the copra producers.
Thus the group have a double benefit. Sir Kenneth Maddocks agreed that this was
so but pointed out that other people had attempted to provide cut price shipping but
without success. Mr. Surridge recalled that at least one co-operatively owned ketch
was operating in the Gilberts. It was agreed that this needed consideration.
Mr. King said that a similar position had arisen in West Africa with U.A.C. Sir
Kenneth Maddocks said that there U.A.C. had met the position substantially by
appointing local directors and contracting out of most of the retail trade. Mr. King
said that there was no comparison between the present situation in Fiji and that in
the U.K. There was ample opportunity for the small trader to open up a business in
the U.K. and to be successful. He wondered whether a mail-order business might be
the answer in Fiji. If a reputable mail-order house in the U.K. could be interested in
the Fiji market, it might help break the monopoly in day-to-day goods.
In discussion it was felt that the problem did not lay [sic] in day-to-day goods but
rather in those which did not pass over the counter quickly and which it was
necessary to hold a stock.
1 The meeting was chaired by H P Hall and attended by Sir K Maddocks, R W Parkinson (Fiji commerce and
industries officer), R H King and H D G Collins (Board of Trade), and B J Surridge, W G Boss and F J
Holloway (CO).
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Mr. King then suggested that possibly something on the lines of the U.K.
Monopoly Commission might prove suitable. This Commission is an administrative
body under the direction of the President of the Board of Trade who, if he considers
that monopoly conditions prevail, instructs the Commission to investigate the
supply of goods of any description. As an administrative body the Commission cannot
take action against any monopoly concern. If it decides that a monopoly exists to the
detriment of the public good, then any steps to divest the concern of its monopoly
must be by negotiation. Ultimately, however, it would be the force of public opinion
which would decide the issue. It would be true to say, however, that the mere fact of
the existence of a Monopoly Commission can be sufficient to cause monopoly
concerns to tread carefully. It is possible that if a Commission was set up in Fiji the
effect could be the same. The Commission could, for example, examine the
production and processing of copra, the price charged, shipping rates, etc. If the
findings of the Commission were to the effect that certain aspects of the trade were
to the detriment of the public, public opinion could if the Commission’s report was
published, make itself felt and the group might itself decide that changes were
indicated. (It was also agreed that if, on the other hand, such an investigation
vindicated the group, this would also be of value.)
It was agreed that this might well be a solution which merited further thought in
Fiji, although it would be difficult to find suitable people locally to serve on the
Commission. (It was suggested that a retired judge from Australia might be found to
serve as chairman.)
Mr. King added that there would seem no objection to introducing legislation to
provide powers for an Order to be made, as under U.S. law, e.g. for a Company to
divest itself of shareholdings in another company: but local circumstances might not
be propitious.
Mr. King then went on to describe the U.K. Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1956,
which sets up in effect a judicial body and is universal in its application. All trade
agreements between companies etc. which might be of a restrictive nature have to be
registered, and every registered agreement is brought before the Restrictive Practices
Court, where it has to be justified as being in the public interest in the ways set out in
section 21 of the Act: the onus lies on the parties to the agreement. If not shown to
be in the public interest, the Court has the power to nullify such an agreement. (On
the other hand, it must be admitted that the parties concerned cannot effectively be
debarred from continuing to operate a nullified agreement from habit.)
In reply to a question, Mr. King said that the 1956 U.K. Act did not apply to
services and therefore not to shipping; the Ministry of Transport might be able to
offer some advice on this aspect.
There was some discussion on the possibility of legislation in Fiji requiring
separate returns, balance sheets, profit and loss accounts to be submitted annually to
the Registrar of Companies by each Company, including private companies, with a
share capital over a specified amount. (This was thought to be the usual position in
the U.S.). It had been suggested that this would deter overseas investment, but it
might be further considered.
The Chairman suggested that the Fiji Government should consider further
whether any of the foregoing suggestions could be implemented.
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38 CO 1036/612 12–13 July 1961
[Fijian veto over constitutional reform]: minutes by Sir H Poynton
and H P Hall
The Governor of Fiji is asking for a formula which will reassure the Fijians in Fiji
that they will not be forced to go faster then they wish towards internal self-
government or independence. The formula already used for this purpose in
paragraph 3 of (19) reads:—
‘There is no intention of forcing the pace of constitutional advance in Fiji and
H.M.G. will only decide on any major changes after full consultation with
representatives of the various communities in the Colony’.
I gather that the Governor does not think this goes far enough and indeed as Mr. Hall
says in his minute of the 5th July what the Fijians really want is to be able to veto
indefinitely changes which they do not like.
One can do a great deal by clever draftsmanship but there are some points of
principle that cannot be ‘fluffed’ by draftsmanship. This question of ‘imposed
constitutions’ versus changes made by consent is a common feature of almost all our
recent constitutional discussions. The doctrine of consent is an admirable one if you
can get consent; but if you cannot then the Secretary of State cannot escape the
responsibility for taking a decision. To give one community in a colony a power of
veto over constitutional changes even when that community is the indigenous race
in a multi-racial community, is tantamount to an abdication by the Secretary of
State of his responsibility to Parliament for the orderly constitutional development of
the territory. The point of principle is just the same whether we are talking about the
Fijians in Fiji, the Dominion Party in Rhodesia or the late Group Captain Briggs1 in
Kenya.
I conclude therefore that it is impossible by any feat of draftsmanship to give the
Fijians (and therefore the Governor) a formula that will satisfy them. That being so I
would far rather stand on the formula already used in (19) which was approved by
Mr. Fraser, than to start glossing it by new variants such as that suggested in Mr.
Hall’s minute of the 10th July at ‘A’. And indeed if the Governor does not think that
even this will go far enough to reassure the Fijians I see no purpose at all in putting
it forward.
I recommend that we should tell the Governor quite candidly that it is not possible
to go beyond the formula already approved in (19).
A.H.P.
12.7.61
Sir Hilton Poynton
Mr. Fraser saw Sir Kenneth Maddocks, the Governor of Fiji, this morning and after
some considerable discussion on the constitutional problem, Mr. Fraser instructed
me to attempt a redraft of the statement the Governor wishes to include in his
Cession Day broadcast (an annual affair on the 10th October). The Governor had
proposed:—
1 C R Briggs, who opposed concessions of any kind to Africans before independence in Kenya.
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‘H.M.G. have no intention of forcing the pace of constitutional advance. They
believe that it is in the general interest that some measure of increased
responsibility should be given to unofficial members as soon as they are ready
to accept it but do not intend to hand over power until a substantial measure
of agreement has been reached among the different races. Before self-
government could be contemplated agreement would have to be reached
about the safaguarding of legitimate Fijian interests after the transfer of
power.’
I have attempted to follow the previously approved statement reproduced at X of your
minute of 12th July2 and at the same time to include a little of the Governor’s proposed
statement. The Governor has seen and has accepted the draft which reads:—
‘H.M.G. has no intention of forcing the pace of constitutional advance in Fiji.
The extent and timing of such advance will continue to take into account the
need to safeguard legitimate Fijian interests and H.M.G. will only decide on
any major changes after full consultation with representatives of the various
communities in the Colony. H.M.G. believe however that it is in the general
interest that some measure of increased responsibility should be given to
unofficial members as soon as they are ready to accept it.’
The Governor realises that it is impossible to accede to the Fijian request to receive a
categorical statement from H.M.G. (and prefrably the Queen) that H.M.G. will not
withdraw from Fiji or alternatively that power will only be handed over to the Fijians.
I have suggested to the Governor that it should be got across to the Fijians that their
real safeguard lies not so much in any form of words but in the good faith of H.M.G.
(whatever political party is in power). It is inconceivable that any Government in the
U.K. would force self-government or independence on Fiji against the wishes of the
Fijians who form a very large section of the population. On the other hand H.M.G.
could not accept a Fijian veto on any changes whatsoever e.g. the introduction of a
membership system. The Governor accepts this view but does not think it will be
easy to get across to the Fijians.
Apart from the question of the Governor’s statement, he will wish to touch on the
points raised in the telegram at (57).
When Mr. Amery was in Fiji in October last year all three races accepted ‘parity’ as
desirable for the next few years. The Governor’s own Stage 2 proposals in (52)
followed this line.3 It now seems from paras 3 and 5 of (57) that it is being proposed
that all three races should have 4 elected representatives each, the Indians and
Europeans should have an additional hominated member each but the Fijians should
have 2 members elected by the Council of Chiefs. This would give:—
Fijians 6 (4 directly elected and 2 elected by the Council of Chiefs)
Europeans 5 (4 elected and 1 nominated)
Indians 5 (4 elected and 1 nominated)
Para 2(a) of (57) also proposed virtual universal adult suffrage.
2 X refers to the formula quoted by Poynton in his minute beginning, ‘There is no intention of forcing the
pace . . .’
3 See 28.
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It has been suggested to the Governor that it would be desirable to await the despatch
promised in para 5 of (57) before the Secretary of State could give a definite reply to
these points. The Governor accepts this but would like to have a further opportunity
of discussing this problem before he returns to Fiji in early September. He will be back
in the U.K. from the 28th August and would be available for discussions then.
The next general election is due in August 1962 and the Governor doubts whether
new electoral regulations and constituencies can be drawn up in time and it may
therefore be necessary to extend the life of the present Legislative Council for up to a
year. This again is a matter which can be gone into when decisions are taken on the
points raised in the despatch.
The Secretary of State is to see the Governor at 11 a.m. on Friday 14th July.
H.P.H.
13.7.61
39 CO 1036/613, no 67 21 July 1961
[Constitutional reform]: despatch from P D Macdonald (acting
governor) to Mr Macleod on local reactions [Extract]
I have the honour to refer to correspondence ending with my saving telegram No.
555 of the 7th July, 1961, under cover of which I forwarded for your information
printed copies of the debate on constitutional reform, which took place in the
Legislative Council on the 21st and 24th April, 1961,1 and to address you further on
the same subject.
In this connexion, I should interpolate here that this despatch has been drafted
during my recent tour of the Lau Islands, from which I returned last night. That
explains the absence of references to your telegram No. 165 of the 11th July, 1961,
and my Deputy’s telegram No. 147 of the same date. Further, upon my return to
Suva, a letter on this subject of constitutional reform from the Hon. J. Madhavan was
awaiting me. He has clearly had second thoughts since our discussions, and I have
incorporated his revised views later in this despatch in the appropriate places.
2. I was not unfortunately present in the Legislature on that occasion, since I
only resumed duty on my return from leave on the 27th April, 1961. The Governor
left the Colony, en route for the United Kingdom on leave, on the 30th April, and,
prior to his departure, advised me that it would be necessary for me to hold
discussions with the Unofficial Members of the Legislature in order to determine
their views on constitutional reform and decide precisely what recommendations I
should submit to you in this respect.
3. After careful consideration, I decided that rather than hold a meeting or
meetings with the fifteen Unofficial Members representing the three racial groups—
European, Fijiand and Indian—it would be preferable in the first instance to hold
meetings with each racial group separately, and thereafter a plenary session with all
fifteen Unofficial Members.
4. The first meeting, with the Fijian Members, and with the Secretary for Fijian
Affairs in attendance, was held on the 15th May—only three weeks after the debate in
1 See 36.
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the Legislature. All the Unofficial Members had spoken in that debate and it appeared
to me that, having ‘nailed their flags fairly firmly to the mast’, it was unlikely that
there would be much change in their opinions such a short time afterwards.
Certainly, it seemed to me that to hold a full meeting of all Unofficial Members would
only invite lengthy and discursive discussions on the same lines as the debate in the
Legislature, and that the results would be unprofitable.
5. The Fijian Members, in particular, in opposing the Government motion on
constitutional reform in the Legislature, had stated their case both vigorously and
forthrightly. This was particularly true in the case of the Hon. Ravuama Vunivalu,
who is the best orator amongst the five Members. In a vigorous and somewhat
emotional speech, in answer to his own question as to what the Fijians sought in
respect of constitutional changes, he replied as follows:—
‘One condition is an unequivocal statement from Government as to the
interpretation of the place of the Deed of Cession in the affairs of this Colony
today, and the other is that whatever changes are made to the constitution of
the Colony, the Fijian people, being the indigenous people of this land, have
the majority of representation in the Executive and Legislative Councils.’
6. The other Fijian members had spoken earlier in the debate, all placing great
emphasis upon the obligations of Her Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom
towards the Fijian race under the terms of the Deed of Cession, and whilst the speech
of the Hon. Ratu K.K.T. Mara, O.B.E., was perhaps somewhat fanciful in suggesting
that Fiji should be linked with the United Kingdom in a manner similar to the Isle of
Man or the Channel Islands, that of the Hon. Semesa Sikivou was particularly
interesting, inasmuch as, unlike his four Fijian colleagues, he supported the motion
for constitutional reform in general terms, and has since confirmed to me that he
supports the introduction of a ‘membership’ system. (Unfortunately, it seems likely
that his attitude may sound his death knell at the next elections.)
7. In consequence of the variety and forcefulness of the views expressed by the
Fijians, I felt that it was imperative to discuss constitutional reform with them first
in order to gain some idea of what were the maximum changes which would be
acceptable to them. I therefore saw them, as mentioned above, on the 15th May; this
was necessary since the Hon. Ratu Penaia Ganilau, D.S.O., O.B.E., left for Australia
with the Fiji Rugby Football XV for a period of some six weeks two days later.
8. I decided to hold discussions with the European Members next since it was
fairly clear from the debate in the Legislature that the Europeans would ‘go along’
with the Fijians in this matter. That in fact proved to be so. It was not possible,
however, unfortunately, to hold a meeting with the Europeans until the 8th June,
since the Hon. J.N. Falvey, O.B.E., was absent in the United Kingdom as a member of
a delegation to the Colonial Office to discuss the Overseas Service Aid Scheme.
9. I next held discussions with three of the Indian Members—the Hon. J.
Madhavan, (3rd Indian Elected Member), and the Hon. Dr. A.H. Sahu Khan and the
Hon. S. Narain (the two Indian Nominated Members)—the Hon. A.I.N. Deoki being
absent in Australia for a period of some weeks as Manager of the Fiji Indian Football
Association XI, and the Hon. B.D. Lakshman having been a member of the
abovementioned delegation to London. On the return of the Hon. A.I.N. Deoki, I held
a further meeting with the Indian Members on the 16th June, at which he was
present. The Hon. B.D. Lakshman has, however, unfortunately not yet returned from
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the United Kingdom and it has not been possible for him to participate in any of the
discussions.
10. In view of the time factor, to which I shall refer again below, and ignorance
here of the date on which the Hon. B.D. Lakshman will return to the Colony, it
seemed to me that no useful purpose would be served by delaying the plenary
discussions further and they were held at the earliest possible moment at which all
Members in Fiji could conveniently attend, on the 30th June, 1961.
11. In the event, I am glad to be able to report that this method of approach to
the problem proved profitable for, at the plenary session, unanimous agreement was
reached on all points, save the major one concerning the numbers of members of the
different races, and one particular aspect of the qualifications for candidates.
12. The subjects were discussed at the various meetings in the following order:—
(a) the order of precedence;
(b) the seating of Members in the Legislative Council Chamber;
(c) the life of the Legislature;
(d) the qualifications for candidates;
(e) the deposit by candidates;
(f) the disqualification of Elected Members;
(g) the qualifications of electors;
(h) the composition of the Legislative Council; and,
(i) constituencies.
The reason for the order in which these subjects were discussed was because it was
hoped that, if it proved to be possible to reach agreement on the rather less
contentious subjects, it might pave the way for agreement on the major issue—the
composition of the Legislative Council. In the event, these hopes were somewhat
disappointed but I am glad to report that a very wide measure of agreement in
respect of constitutional reform was achieved. . . .
The life of the legislature
19. There was unanimity that the life of the Legislature—a period of three years
as at present provided in the Letters Patent—was too short. In this connexion, I
would draw your attention to the remarks of the Hon. R.G.Q. Kermode on page 137
of the Hansard Report referred to in paragraph 1 of this despatch. First, it has been
found in practice that the present period is inadequate, in that it sometimes takes a
Member up to a full year to acquaint himself with the somewhat complicated
procedures of the Council and to take a really effective part therein. Secondly, there
is the disadvantage that, whilst the second year of a new Member may be both
constructive and productive, he will probably spend most, if not all, of his third year
with his eyes on the forthcoming general elections. Thirdly, a quinquennial period is
far more suitable from the point of view of developmental planning. Fourthly, it is far
more suited to a ‘membership’ or ministerial system, if and when that is introduced.
Fifthly, after the riots of December, 1959, the industrial troubles of 1960, and the
degree of emotion engendered in consideration of this problem both in and out of
the Legislature, a quinquennial life for the next Legislature will provide a much
needed degree of stability at the present time.
20. As it is hoped that, sooner or later, it will be possible to move towards the
introduction of a ‘membership’ or ministerial system, it is obviously preferable that a
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longer life should be fixed for the Legislative Council. With the exception of the Hon.
Ratu Penaia Fanilau and the Hon. B.D. Lakshman, who were absent, all Unofficial
Members agreed with my suggestion that the life of the next Legislature should be
for five years duration, and I so recommend.
The qualifications for candidates
21. At the discussions with the Fijian Members, it was agreed that the following
qualifications should be required for candidates, who might be either men or
women. Candidates should:—
(a) be qualified to be registered and vote as electors (subject to the different
residential qualification mentioned in (b) hereunder) and be on the electoral roll;
(b) have a minimum of two years’ residence in Fiji during the three years
preceding nomination as a candidate;
(c) be able to speak and understand the English language, as already provided for
in Article 26 of the Letters Patent; and,
(d) be in possession of a net annual income in his or her own right of not less than
£400.
22. With regard to the qualification at (b) in the preceding paragraph, the
present provision in this respect (which applies to both Europeans and Indians) is
that they should have been ‘continuously resident for two years in the Colony’
preceding the date of their nomination as a candidate (see Articles 25 and 26 of
Letters Patent). That qualification was not, however, considered to be satisfactory
inasmuch as it might well happen that a person intending to submit himself (or now,
herself) as a candidate might well leave the Colony for social, business, health, or
other reasons during the period of two years before the next elections. It was
therefore felt that this qualification should be liberalized and that it should be
incumbent on a candidate only to reside for a minimum total period of two years in
the Colony during the three years preceding his nomination as a candidate for
election. There was unanimous agreement on this point.
23. With regard to the qualification at (d) in the preceding paragraph, the Hon.
Semesa Sikivou thought that the figure should remain at £200 inasmuch as, whilst
admitting the great change in the value of money since the present Letters Patent
were enacted 24 years ago, he considered that to insist on a net annual income of
£400 might well prevent such persons as Fijian pastors or retired Fijian civil servants
from standing as candidates. The other Members felt, however, that, in view of the
great change in the value of money over the past 24 years, and in order to discourage
irresponsible candidates, the income qualification should be raised to £400.
24. Insofar as the property qualifications were concerned, the Fijian Members
stated that they had not considered this aspect of the matter at that stage.
25. The Fijian Members emphasized that it should be permissible in their case,
for civil servants, for the time being at any rate, to stand for election, whether elected
directly or by the Council of Chiefs. They considered that there were special
circumstances in this respect in regard to the Fijians and that such a special
concession should not be extended to the other races.
26. At the meeting with the European Members, the latter agreed to the
qualifications proposed by the Fijian Members (including the candidature of
women). They were inclined to think that an income qualification of £400 would be
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reasonable, although they did not feel strongly on this point. They stated that they
would agree with whatever figure should be decided upon by the Fijians and Indians.
27. One of the European Members considered that it should be a requirement
that a candidate should only stand in the constituency in which he resided. His
colleagues felt, however, that the fact that a candidate did not reside in the
constituency for which he was standing was a sufficient weapon in the hands of his
opponent at an election to ensure that absentee candidates were discouraged from
standing. I also pointed out that such a condition could not possibly apply to Fijian
candidates, if it were agreed that Fijian civil servants might stand (see paragraph 25
above). It was accordingly unanimously agreed that this qualification should not be
required.
28. At the first meeting with the Indian Members, the qualifications for
candidates suggested by the Fijian Members (including the candidature of women)
were accepted, but it was felt that the income qualification should not be raised, so as
to give a greater opportunity for any who might wish to stand to do so. These views
were also expressed at the second meeting of the Indian Members, which was
attended by the Hon. A.I.N. Deoki.
29. At the plenary session with all Unofficial Members there was considerable
discussion as to the income and property qualifications. Mr. Deoki considered that
the property qualifications should be as in Article 25 (3) of the Letters Patent, as an
alternative to the income qualification. But he later stated that, in the interests of
compromise, he and his colleagues would be prepared to accept an income
qualification of £300 per annum. After further discussion, it was finally unanimously
agreed that the qualifications required of candidates should be income or property—
the property qualifications being as set out in Article 25 (3) of the Letters Patent.
30. On the question of the level of the income qualification, the European
Members adhered to their previously expressed view that they would accept the
majority opinion and the Indian Members stood by their figure of £200 per annum.
The Hon. Ratu Edward Cakobau and the Hon. Ravuama Vunivalu adhered to their
view that a figure of £400 was appropriate; the Hon. Semesa Sikivou adhered to his
view that a figure of £200 was desirable; and the Hon. Ratu Mara stated that, if
income was the only qualification, it should be £400, but that, if property was an
alternative qualification—as had been decided—the income qualification should be
£200. It was not possible to reach a unanimous compromise on this point but I feel
confident that an income qualification of £300 per annum will be generally
acceptable. There must be few avenues of employment in this Colony today in which
a person seeking to stand as a candidate for the Legislature cannot fairly easily make
£300 in the course of a year.
31. It was unanimously agreed that no residential qualification should be
necessary for a candidate.
32. The question was also raised as to whether a woman candidate should possess
the income or property qualification in her own right or be enabled to stand as a
candidate on the basis of her husband having the income or property qualification.
After discussion, it was finally unanimously agreed that a woman candidate should be
required to have the income or property qualification in her own right.
33. It was also unanimously agreed that Fijian civil servants should, for the time
being, be permitted to stand as candidates for election, whether elected directly or by
the Council of Chiefs. . .
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The qualifications of electors
39. The Fijian Members were quite unanimous that the introduction of universal
adult suffrage was the wish of the vast majority of Fijians. In response to my enquiry,
the Members also stated that Fijian public opinion was now strongly in favour of
women being granted the vote, and it was pointed out that women were now
participating in Fijian Provincial Councils.
40. It was considered that the qualifications of electors should be as follows—
that he or she:—
(a) is a British subject by birth;
(b) is of the age of 21 years or upwards;
(c) is of sound mind;
(d) has been resident in the Colony for twelve months during the three years
preceding the closing of the electoral rolls; and,
(e) can read and write a simple sentence and sign his name in English or his own
language.
41. With regard to the qualification at (d) of the preceding paragraph, the
present provision in this respect (which applies to both Europeans and Indians) is
that they should have been ‘continuously resident in the Colony for the preceding
twelve months’ (i.e. preceding the date on which the electoral rolls are closed). In
this connexion, I would invite your attention to paragraph 22 above. The same
objection, as set out in the second sentence of that paragraph, obtains in this case,
though with rather more force. It was therefore felt that this qualification should be
liberalized—more so than the qualification dealt with in paragraph 22—with the
result set out in (d) of the preceding paragraph. After some discussion, there was
unanimous agreement on this point.
42. The above qualifications of electors were accepted by the European Members
at my meeting with them. They too all agreed that the introduction of universal adult
suffrage was most desirable.
43. At the two meetings with the Indian Members, it was also agreed that the
introduction of universal adult suffrage was most desirable. The qualifications
suggested at the meeting with the Fijian Members were also accepted, save that the
Hon. J. Madhavan had a slight doubt about the retention of the literacy qualification.
If it was to be retained, he considered that the Malayalam language should also be
included, with Hindu, Urdu, Tamil, Telegu, Gurmukhi and Gujarati. This is a
reasonable and acceptable suggestion.
44. At the separate meetings with the three racial groups, the view was also
unanimously expressed that neither income nor property qualifications should any
longer be necessary for electors.
45. I shall be addressing you in a separate letter on the subject of the
introduction of universal adult suffrage, dealing in particular with the points raised
in Mr. H. P. Hall’s secret and personal letter No. PAC.36/1/03 of the 17th March,
1961.2 I would only say at this juncture that the Members of the three groups whom
I have consulted attach the greatest importance to this electoral measure. I
personally consider that its introduction will be particularly beneficial, having regard
to the fact that there is at present no prospect whatever of the introduction of a
2 See 31.
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common roll, or even of having any of the Members of the Legislature elected on a
common roll, or the introduction of a ‘membership’ or ministerial system.
46. To summarize, therefore, it is recommended that the qualifications of
electors should be as follows—that he or she:—
(a) is a British subject by birth;
(b) is of the age of 21 years or upwards;
(c) is of sound mind;
(d) has been resident in the Colony for twelve months during the three years
preceding the closing of the electoral rolls; and,
(e) can read and write a simple sentence and sign his name in any one of the
following languages:— English, Fijian, Hindi, Urdu, Tamil, Telegu, Gurmukhi,
Gujarati, and Malayalam.
The composition of the Legislative Council
47. The present Legislative Council consists of:—
(a) sixteen Official Members;
(b) three European Elected Members and two European Nominated Members;
(c) three Indian Elected Members and two Indian Nominated Members; and,
(d) five Fijian Members elected by the Council of Chiefs, acting in the form of an
electoral college.
There is thus an official majority of one in respect of the Official Members over the
Unofficial Members, and the Elected Members are in a minority of 11 to 20.
48. The following is a summary of the views expressed by the Fijian Members at
my meeting with them on the 15th May, 1961:—
(a) that four Fijian Members should be directly elected by popular election, and
that two should be elected by secret ballot by the Council of Chiefs;
(b) that there should be four Elected European Members and four Elected Indian
Members, and one Nominated European Member and one Nominated Indian
Member;
(c) that the election by popular election of three Fijian Members—as proposed in
the report of the Burns Commission and agreed to by the Council of Chiefs in
1960—was not acceptable, inasmuch as it would be difficult to demarcate
satisfactorily three such constituencies as, no matter how arranged, they would
cut across traditional provincial boundaries and prove geographically awkward. On
the other hand, four constituencies fitted almost ideally into the present pattern of
Fijian population, such constituencies being based on the present Administrative
Divisions. The divisional population of each such Division at the last Census in
1956 was as follows:—
Northern Division — 28,466
Eastern Division — 29,035
Western Division — 42,633
Central Division (including Suva) — 47,982
(d) it would immediately be seen that the pattern of representation now proposed
provided for one more Fijian representative than was the case for the other two
races. (This idea was first mooted by the Hon. Ravuama Vunivalu during the
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constitutional debate abovementioned—see paragraph 5 above—as being
necessary to emphasize the paramountcy of Fijian interests and in recognition of
the Fijians being the indigenous people of the territory. Unfortunately, he spoke
late in the debate, but it became clear that, whilst the Indians viewed the proposal
with some misgivings, it was readily acceptable to the Europeans);
(e) in connexion with (d) above, the Hon. Semesa Sikivou considered that
increased Fijian representation was necessary ‘to protect the Fijian way of life’ and
he wondered if an expression of the paramountcy of the interests of the Fijian race
could not be written into the constitution. (I believe that the Governor is to
discuss the question of recognition of the paramountcy of the Fijians with you
during his present leave in the United Kingdom.) I expressed considerable doubt,
however, whether such a declaration could properly be incorporated in the Letters
Patent;
(f) the Fijian Members considered that representation could not, and should not,
be on a basis of numbers. They pointed out that the economic contribution of the
Europeans in Fiji was out of all proportion to their numbers and that they were
not prepared to accept the slogan of ‘one man, one vote’ as a basis for racial
representation in the Legislative Council. In particular, they stated that they
would not agree to a reduction in the number of European Members below that of
the Indians. In this connexion, it will be noted from the constitutional debate that
the Hon. J. Madhavan had suggested that there should be eight Fijian Members
and six Indian Members, but only four European Members;
(g) the Fijian Members expressed their strong opposition to the introduction of a
common roll, wholly or in part, or in any form whatsoever; and,
(h) they emphasized that they desired the retention of the official majority.
49. At the meeting with the European Members, the latter agreed that there was
no objection whatever to the Fijians having one more Member than either of the other
two races. The Hon. H.B. Gibson at first stated that he had some reservation about
departing from the rule of parity, which had hitherto been observed between the three
races, but that, after hearing the opinions of his colleagues, he would not press his
viewpoint. The European Members stated that they appreciated that an increase of one
in the Unofficial Members of the Council would entail a similar increase in the number
of Official Members. The retention of the official majority was desired.
50. At the first meeting with the Indian Members, the Hon. S. Narain agreed to
the proposals of the European and Fijian Members regarding the composition of the
Legislature. The Hon. J. Madhavan stated that he disagreed in principle with the
nomination of Members of Council and considered that there should be five Elected
Members in respect of each of the three races.
51. The Hon. Dr. A.H. Sahu Khan, the First Indian Nominated Member and
himself a Muslim, persistently advocated the formation of a separate Muslim
electoral roll with the right to return one Muslim Member. It was his contention and,
so he argued, that of his community, that the Muslims in Fiji were entirely separate
from the rest of the Indian community, that there was certain discrimination against
the Muslims by other Indians, and that no Muslim could ever hope to be elected on
either an Indian communal roll, or on a common roll.3 There is some substance in
3 S M Koya did, in 1963, form a predominantly Hindu constituency in western Viti Levu.
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his remarks—the last assertion is undoubtedly correct. But, unfortunately, the
isolation of the Muslim community is, in part, of its own making for they do in fact
do a great deal to preserve themselves as a separate entity; the exclusiveness is
mutual and there has been little real attempt to break it down. I informed the Hon.
Dr. Sahu Khan that it would be a retrograde step to provide for members to be
elected on a religious, as well as a racial, basis and that any such proposal stood little,
if any, chance, of acceptance. Failing a Muslim electoral roll, he then asked for an
assurance that, if Indian representation was to be confined to four Indian Elected
Members and one Indian Nominated Member, the latter should be a Muslim. I stated
that I could give no such assurance. He requested that his views on this issue should
be made known to you and this I now do. In this connexion, I would refer you to the
petition laid before Mr. Julian Amery by the Muslim Association during his visit to
Fiji in October, 1960, and to the reply returned to the Association after consultation
with you. The Association was informed that you had noted the contents of its
memorandum but that it was your wish, as far as possible, to avoid the introduction
of constitutional measures which would associate political representation with
religion.
52. At the second meeting with the Indian Members, the Hon. A.I.N. Deoki stated
that he was unable to agree that the Fijians should have an additional Member. Nor
could he agree with a proposal that there should be six Fijian, five Indian and four
European Elected Members.
53. Mr. Deoki repeated the somewhat ingenious proposal which he made in the
constitutional debate in the Legislative Council, namely, that there should be five
Members elected for each race, on its own communal roll, and that, in addition,
there should be three Members, one from each race, elected on a common roll. Thus,
each elector would have four votes to cast, one for a constituency candidate of his
own race, and one each for a European, Fijian and Indian candidate elected on a
common roll. He then argued that even if the preponderant Indian population
(greater than the Europeans and Fijians combined) enabled it to elect three pro-
Indian Members on a common roll, those three, together with the five Indian
Members elected on a communal roll, would only represent eight votes, against
which there would be five Elected European Members and five Elected Fijian
Members, representing ten votes. In this way, he argued, domination by the Indian
race, which he knew to be feared by both Europeans and Fijians, would be precluded.
He added that he considered that there should at the same time be no official
majority in the Legislature but that official membership should be reduced to
approximately eight.
54. At the plenary session of all the Unofficial Members, both the Hon. H.B.
Gibson, O.B.E., and the Hon. R.G.Q. Kermode, stated that, though they had carefully
considered this particular aspect of the problem, they thought it was highly unlikely
that any further measure of agreement could be reached even after further
discussion. The first-named therefore suggested that the views of Members, as
expressed at the meetings, should be conveyed to you forthwith so as to enable you to
reach appropriate decisions.
55. Unfortunately, at this point, the Hon. A.I.N. Deoki stated that he wished to
make his viewpoint clear over this matter of the composition of the Legislature. He
stated that he firmly believed that the time had come for an unofficial majority and
reiterated the views expressed in paragraph 53 above. He added that he considered
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that the Governor should have the power of veto if those proposals as they stood were
unacceptable, and, if an official majority were insisted upon, then he agreed there
would have to be nineteen Official Members.
56. Finding these proposals unacceptable to all, even including his own
colleagues, the Hon. A.I.N. Deoki then suggested that there should be five Members
of each race, elected on their respective communal rolls, three Members, one from
each race, elected on a common roll, and three Nominated Members. If necessary,
he stated that he would agree to the official membership being increased to twenty-
two, so as to give an official majority of one. Unfortunately, Mr. Deoki expressed
himself—as so often happens—both forcibly and tactlessly, referring to the
‘ganging-up’ of European and Fijian Members against the Indians. From that
moment, there was little hope of agreement or compromise at the meeting on this
vexed question.
57. The European and Fijian Members at once expressed their strongest
opposition to the introduction of the common roll, either in whole or in part, or in
any shape or form. The Hon. Ratu K.K.T. Mara strongly dissented from both sets of
proposals of the Hon. A.I.N. Deoki. The Hon. J.N. Falvey strongly deprecated the
suggestion that European and Fijian Members had ‘ganged-up’ in the past or would
do so in the future. The Hon. Semesa Sikivou stated that he considered the proposals
of Mr. Deoki most ill-advised and that the terms in which he had expressed his view
quite deplorable, thereby rendering any further discussion on such a problem
nugatory at the present time.
58. Thereafter, the Hon. J. Madhavan, while reaffirming his dislike of the system
of Nominated Members, stated that he would reluctantly accept the proposals for a
single European and a single Indian Nominated Member as already agreed to by the
Europeans, Fijians and the Hon. S. Narain, in order to secure the widest possible
measure of agreement, provided of course that there were only four Elected Members
of each race.
59. The Hon. Dr. A.H. Sahu Khan then asked that he be allowed to re-state his
own position, which he did as follows:—
(a) ideally, there should be a separate Muslim electoral roll returning a Muslim
Member; or failing that,
(b) he would wish to see three Europeans, three Fijians and three Indians all
elected on a common roll, with two Nominated Members from each race, and the
Governor having the power of veto; or, failing that,
(c) he would wish to see the retention of a nominated seat for the Indians, as at
present, this seat being filled by a Muslim.
60. This aspect of the matter was concluded with a general discussion in which it
quickly became apparent that the European and Fijian Members were still
unalterably opposed to a common roll, and supported the proposals mentioned in
paragraph 48 (a), (b), (c) and (h). Neither the Hon. J. Madhavan (somewhat
surprisingly) nor the Hon. S. Narain felt able to support the introduction of a
common roll at the present time. The Hon. A.I.N. Deoki and the Hon. Dr. A.H. Sahu
Khan, reaffirmed their respective positions.
61. Unfortunately, the Hon. J. Madhavan later had second thoughts—doubtless
after consultation and discussion with others—for, on the 5th July, 1961, he wrote as
follows:—
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‘. . . although there has been a great degree of agreement on most of the
details the disparity in the number of members as between the Fijian
community and the Indian and as well as the European certainly without
doubt will bring about serious repercussions by the Indian community much
more than the Muslim question; I think it is quite justifiable; why should a
minority community like the Europeans have proportionately a bigger
number of seats in the Legislative Council and why should we allow the
biggest community like the Indians get proportionately a lesser number and
why should the Fijian community which is smaller than the Indians get the
biggest number of seats.
I feel now that the over-all number of members for each race should be six
as the Fijians but in the case of Indians and Europeans five elected members
and one nominated member . . .’.
62. The proposal that there should continue to be one seat filled by a Nominated
European Member and one seat filled by a Nominated Indian Member gave rise to
discussions as to whether one of the two seats for the Nominated European Member
or the Nominated Indian Member could be used in conjunction for the
representation of the Chinese and Rotuman communities and other Pacific
Islanders. But the seat for the Nominated Indian Member is most likely to have to be
continued to be used for a member of the Muslim community, as has been the
invariable practice for almost a quarter of a century. The suggestion that the seat for
the European Nominated Member should be used either for the representation of
racial minorities, or in conjunction with the representation of such minorities, was
quite unacceptable to the European Members.
63. Consideration was then given to the possible provision of an additional seat
for a Nominated Member to represent specifically the Chinese and Rotuman
communities and other Pacific Islanders. Whilst, at first sight, it may seem wrong
that such persons should be disenfranchised, it is necessary to consider the small
numbers involved. The total Chinese population in 1956 was only 4,155; Rotumans
only numbered 4,422; and other Pacific Islanders, 5,320. Further, none of these
groups has in fact any affinity with the Europeans or Indians, nor indeed has there
been any pressure for special representation in the Legislative Council. In view of the
small numbers involved and the fact that there have been no requests for
representation in the Legislature, Members unanimously agreed that an additional
seat for a Nominated Member to represent these minorities should not be created at
the present time.
64. Clearly, such minorities will have to be accorded representation sooner or
later, and in my own view, it may well be that, after the next quinquennium, the
Europeans may well have to surrender the seat of their Nominated Member in order
that such minorities can be represented. The enfranchisement of such minorities
may well be the easiest way in due course to persuade all races to accept some
experiment in common roll representation.
65. To summarize, therefore:—
(a) the European and Fijian Members and the Hon. S. Narain were agreed that the
Legislature should be composed as follows:—
(i) four European Elected and one Nominated Members;
(ii) four Indian Elected and one Nominated Members;
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(iii) four Fijian Members elected by popular vote and two elected by secret
ballot by the Council of Chiefs; and,
(iv) seventeen Official Members, (so as to give an official majority of one);
(b) in the initial stages, the Hon. J. Madhavan disagreed that there should be an
extra Fijiah Member, preferred that there should be no Nominated Members, a and
that there should be no official majority, but reluctantly and in a spirit of
compromise agreed to the Legislature being comprised of:—
(i) four European Elected and one Nominated Members;
(ii) three Fijian Members elected by popular vote and two by the Council of
Chiefs, or four Fijian Members elected by popular vote and one by the Council of
Chiefs;
(iii) four Indian Elected and one Nominated Members; and,
(iv) sixteen Official Members as at present;
Subsequently, Mr. Madhavan advocated:—
(v) five European Elected and one Nominated Members;
(vi) four Fijian Members elected by popular vote, and two Fijian Members
elected by the Council of Chiefs; and,
(vii) five Indian Elected and one Nominated Members.
(Note:—He expressed no opinion as to whether or not there should still be an
official majority in the Legislature;
(c) the Hon. Dr. A.H. Sahu Khan preferred:—
(i) three European and three Fijian and three Indian Members, all to be elected
on a common roll;
(ii) two European, two Fijian and two Indian Nominated Members; and,
(iii) the Governor to have the power of veto.
(Note:—He would prefer that there should be a separate Muslim electoral roll
returning a Muslim Member, but I do not consider this can possibly be
accepted. If each race was to be represented by four Elected and one
Nominated Members, then he would claim that the one Nominated
Member should be a Muslim);
(d) the Hon. A.I.N. Deoki considered that the composition of the Legislative
Council should be as follows:—
(i) five European Elected Members;
(ii) five Fijian Elected Members;
(iii) five Indian Elected Members;
(iv) one European, one Fijian and one Indian Member, each to be elected on a
common roll; and,
(v) eight Official Members.
Alternatively, Mr. Deoki suggested:—
(vi) five European Elected Members;
(vii) five Fijian Elected Members;
(viii) five Indian Elected Members;
(ix) one European, one Fijian and one Indian Member, each to be elected on a
common roll;
(x) three Nominated Members, one of each race; and,
(xi) twenty-two Official Members.
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66. As mentioned earlier in this despatch, the Hon. Ratu Penaia and the Hon.
B.D. Lakshman are at present absent from the Colony. It may safely be assumed,
however, that the former would hold the same views as his Fijian colleagues on this
question. The views of the other Member will be found set out in extenso in the
copies of the debate already sent to you. However, he is such a political weathercock
that it is not possible to predict whether or not he still adheres to such views. As he is
still, so far as is known, in London, it is possible that you may wish to seek his views
direct. He has requested me to send him notes of the meetings with Members but I
consider that it would be indiscreet to meet his request since there is no knowing to
whom he might show them and discuss them. I therefore propose to inform him that
I have addressed you at length on this subject and that if you desire his views you will
doubtless address him direct.
67. Apart from the Hon. Dr. A.H. Sahu Khan and Hon. A.I.N. Deoki, the
differences in viewpoint are not large. It is crystal clear that the European and the
Fijian Members would contest either of the propositions of Mr. Deoki very strongly
and very bitterly; and, in the present political and economic climate of this Colony, I
do not see how they can profitably be pursued at the present juncture. The proposals
of the Hon. Dr. Sahu Khan are in reality nothing more than special pleading for the
Muslim community and cannot in my view be accepted. His proposal at paragraph 59
(b) represents very muddled thinking and is far, I think, from what he really desires.
68. The question then really resolves itself into whether or not the Fijians should
be given an extra seat in the Legislature. In this connexion, they have made it quite
clear that the election of only one Member by the Council of Chiefs would be quite
unacceptable to that Council. The Fijian Members also made it clear that it would be
difficult, if not impossible, to have only three electoral constituencies (see paragraph
48 (c)).
69. A possible solution would, of course, be to give the Fijian Members what they
desire and, at the same time, increase the number of European and Indian Members
to five Elected and one Nominated Member (as subsequently suggested by the Hon.
J. Madhavan). In present circumstances, and having regard to the debate in the
Legislature, I very much doubt whether this would be acceptable to the Fijian
Members, (and possibly the European Members), or their communities.
70. After careful consideration, I am inclined to recommend for your approval
that the Letters Patent should be amended to provide for:—
(a) four European Elected and one Nominated Members;
(b) four Fijian Members elected by popular vote, and two Members to be elected as
at present by secret ballot in the Council of Chiefs;
(c) four Indian Elected and one Nominated Members; and,
(d) seventeen Official Members.
71. In making this recommendation, it must be frankly admitted that the
Indians are at present in the majority and that therefore logically the membership in
the Legislature should, if anything, be in favour of the Indians. Further, it is likely
that the Indian community will say that my proposal is contrary to the terms of the
late Lord Salisbury’s despatch of 1873 [sic: 1875] in which the proposal was made to
the Government of India that emigrants would be:—
‘in all respects free men, with privileges no whit inferior to any other class of
Her Majesty’s subjects resident in the Colonies’.
08-Fiji-01-cpp  10/5/06  6:55 AM  Page 112
[39] JULY 1961 113
This point was in fact made in the Legislative Council when increased representation
for Fijian Members was suggested. The Hon. J.N. Falvey, however, when endorsing
that proposal, unfortunately used the phrase that the Europeans and Indians would
become ‘second-class citizens’. He was immediately reminded by the Hon. A.I.N.
Deoki of the terms of the despatch last-mentioned, to which he replied that the
proposals in that despatch were declined by the then Government of India.
72. It is, however, a fact that the Fijians have to a considerable extent over the
years received different, and more favourable, treatment in many ways to that
accorded to the immigrant European and Indian races. I suggest therefore for your
consideration that the Indian community can have no especial valid ground for
complaint at the proposed one extra Fijian Member in the Legislature so long as all
non-indigenous communities are treated on the same basis and if their continued
protestations, both in the Legislature and outside, that they do not wish to acquire
the birthright of the Fijians, are taken at their face value. In addition, although it is
true that two Members are to be elected by the Council of Chiefs by secret ballot, in
fact it is by no means unlikely that the names of those elected have been discussed
and decided upon before the ballot and that they are more in the nature of
nominations. This, I suggest, renders the proposal for one extra Fijian Member less
objectionable.
73. By the grant of one additional Member, the Fijians will see in this a token of
positive recognition by Her Majesty’s Government of the rights of the Fijians in their
own country, and also of their loyal, spontaneously offered, and meritorious services
in two World Wars and in the emergency in Malaya, in which conflicts the Indians in
Fiji contributed virtually nothing. Indeed, without some such recognition, it may
well be that the Fijian community will be unprepared to move forward towards a
‘membership’ or ministerial system in the foreseeable future, or even, indeed,
liberalize their policy in relation to native lands. They have, as you will be aware, a
deep-seated and by no means unreasonable fear that the Legislature will one day
come under the control of the Indians, who will amend legislation in such a way as to
remove from the Fijians, not only the control over, but also the title to, their lands.
Their loyalty is, of course, closely related to the undertakings concerning their land
which they read into the Deed of Cession and it seems certain at present that there
will be no further measure of constitutional advance in the foreseeable future unless
firm safeguards are written either into any future constitution or proclaimed in some
other way so as to ensure that the title to their lands cannot be taken from them. The
grant of an additional Member in the Legislature will do much to restore in the mind
of the Fijians the confidence in the Crown which in recent months has wavered as a
result of apprehension on this question.
74. If, on the other hand, you are not fully persuaded that a case has been made
out for the grant of one extra seat to the Fijians in the Legislature, then I can only
suggest that the present parity between the three races be maintained—thus, that
there should be five Elected and one Nominated Europeans, five Elected and one
Nominated Indians, and four Fijians elected by popular vote and two elected by the
Council of Chiefs by secret ballot. There are, however, unfortunately in my view two
slight disadvantages to this suggestion. First, the Europeans, save from the viewpoint
of their economic contribution, are already really overrepresented with five seats; to
grant them yet another seat would merely tend to emphasize the present disparity in
respect of numbers. Secondly, under the new proposals (see paragraph 70), it will be
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necessary, if the insistence of the European and Fijian Members is to be met, to
increase the number of Official Members from the present sixteen to seventeen. If,
however, the proposal made earlier in this paragraph is accepted, this will entail a
further increase in the Official Members from sixteen to nineteen. This is not merely
undesirable in principle and a ready target for adverse criticism, but it also means
appointing as Members of the Legislature less senior officers whose services are far
better employed in the more continuous and active fulfilment of their official duties.
75. A variation of the proposal in the preceding paragraph—and one which
appeals more to the Secretary of Fijian Affairs, with whom I have discussed these
matters generally—would be to continue the present principle of parity of
representation, but with four European Elected and two Nominated Members, four
Indian Elected and two Nominated Members, leaving four Fijians to be elected by
popular vote and two by secret ballot at the Council of Chiefs. This has certain
advantages; parity of representation is maintained and the number of Elected
Members of all races is increased slightly, which is as it should be in view of the
increase in population. On the other hand, it does not diminish the number of
Nominated Members as at present—I think a desirable aim in itself—and the
number of Official Members still has to be increased from sixteen to nineteen to
ensure that there is an official majority, on which there is insistence by the European
and Fijian Members. Nevertheless, the single seat for an Indian Nominated Member,
as suggested in the preceding paragraph, must, I think, under present
circumstances, be awarded to a Muslim (until such time as some common roll
arrangement can be made, in which they might have the option to be included or
excluded), whereas, with two Indian Nominated Members as is suggested in this
paragraph, it would undoubtedly be easier vis à vis the public, and especially the
Indian community, to award one of the two seats to a Muslim.
76. To agree to a Legislature of 6 Fijians, 6 Indians and 5 Europeans, with one
seat reserved for Chinese, Rotumans, and other Pacific Islanders would be more
logical by any standards, but the Fijians insist that the Europeans retain parity of
representation and the Europeans would certainly be unwilling to surrender the
principle of parity, at any rate at the present juncture.
77. With an Indian leader of riper political experience and greater wisdom, such
as the Hon. Vishnu Deo, O.B.E., I doubt if the present impasse would have arisen and
I think the proposal for an extra seat for the Fijians in the Legislative Council might
well have been conceded with amicability. Indeed, even now, it is doubtful to what
extent real Indian opposition to such a proposal exists. Certainly, the proposal is
opposed by the Hon. A. I. N. Deoki, as might have been expected; certainly too the
Hon. J. Madhavan supports, not so strongly at first (see, for example, paragraph 58),
though more strongly later (see paragraph 61); the proposal; but the Hon. B.D.
Lakshman is unpredictable, the Hon. Dr. Sahu Khan is really only interested in
Muslim representation, and the Hon. S. Narain supports the proposal for increased
Fijian representation.
78. But it is the riots of December, 1959, the enduring industrial troubles of
1960, the shock of some of the recommendations in the report of the Burns
Commission relating to their Administration and their lands and the tactlessness,
brashness and arrogance of the Hon. A. I. N. Deoki which have thrown the Europeans
and Fijians together with such force and rendered agreement on constitutional
reform impossible at the present time. Indeed, those four circumstances have done
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more; they have aroused the Fijians to the possible loss of their heritage. That is why
I am sure that no fancy or complicated franchise or constitution will be acceptable in
present circumstances. The high hopes of four years ago have been dispelled. The
Fijians are awake but, unfortunately, apprehensive, worried and suspicious. The
immediate necessity is for their self-confidence to be restored and increased, and for
every measure to be undertaken to aid their progress in the shortest possible space of
time so that they can stand up for themselves in this new politico-economic world in
which they are, understandably, frightened strangers. Meanwhile, in my view,
nothing but a breathing space will suffice, and this in turn means an interim
constitution which will fulfil their present needs and also, if possible, represent
simultaneously, some degree of advancement.
79. It may be argued that a recommendation for the continuance of any system
involving parity of representation, without regard to such factors as population
ratios, is a policy of defeatism—that the continuance of a system involving the
continuance of an official majority is an anachronism in the second half of the 20th
Century. Such critics may well have some right on their side. But it must be
remembered that Fiji constitutes an especially singular problem. It is not merely that
the three races exist here—the same might be said of other territories such as
Tanganyika. But it is the obligations offered and accepted under the Deed of Cession,
the introduction of an alien race at the instance of Her Majesty’s Government
without consultation with, and the concurrence of, the Fijians, and the fact that that
alien race will soon be in a position to make, and may well make, a further ‘take over
bid’ for Fiji, that renders this problem unique in the British Commonwealth.
80. The proposals advocated in this despatch need therefore to be considered
against the background sketched in the two preceding paragraphs. It is true—and
disappointing—that it has not been possible to move forwards to a ‘membership’ or
ministerial system; that there will exist in the near future no greater opportunities
for partnership of Unofficial Members with Government officials in the
administration of government than now exist; that it has not been possible to
introduce any element of multiracialism into the constitution; and that the
continuance of an official majority will still breed a degree of irresponsibility
amongst Unofficial Members, who have unfortunately shown on several occasions
during the past few years that they are happily prepared to jettison some of their
more unpleasant or onerous responsibilities and be rescued by the official majority
which can always be made into an acceptable scapegoat with the electorate.
81. On the other hand, there is much on the credit side in the proposals now
submitted, and on which there has been agreement between Members of the three
racial benches. There has been proposed and accepted an increase in Elected
Members of all races; the Fijians have accepted that the majority of their Members
must be chosen by popular election; (this, in my view, may have even more far-
reaching consequences than a change in the balance of racial numbers in the
Legislature); at least one Fijian Member, the Hon. Semesa Sikivou, has recognized
the necessity for a ‘membership’ or ministerial system and has told me that he hopes
it will still be possible to introduce it administratively during the life of the next
Legislature; universal adult suffrage is greatly desired by all; qualifications for
candidates for election to the Legislature have been reduced; qualifications for all
electors have been reduced to an absolute minimum; qualifications for candidates
and electors, which used to be on a racial basis insofar as Europeans and Indians
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were concerned, will now be the same for all races, a useful step towards
multiracialism; women are to be permitted to stand as candidates and vote at
elections; all races agree that Fijian civil servants should be permitted to stand as
candidates for the time being; and the vexed question of an order of precedence of
Members has been determined. Those represent substantially progressive steps,
especially the election of Fijian Members and the introduction of universal adult
suffrage.
82. It is true that the presence of the official majority in the Legislature and the
results of the introduction of universal adult suffrage may produce strange and
awkward bedfellows but I think that will prove useful experience for the future, when
a ‘membership’ and/or ministerial system is introduced.
83. Apart from the possible drawback mentioned in the preceding paragraph,
perhaps the most unfortunate aspects of the proposals now made is that they indicate
no clear direction in which the Colony is likely to travel constitutionally. True, there
is considerable advancement in several directions but they do not clearly point to any
definite political future for the Colony. But, in view of the factors mentioned in
paragraph 78, it is inevitable that this should at present be a holding operation.
Constituencies
84. As it was not possible to reach unanimity in respect of the numbers of
Elected Members in the Legislative Council, discussions relating to constituencies
were, as might be expected, somewhat superficial and unreal. The views of the Fijian
Members, on the basis of the election of four Members by popular vote, are set out in
paragraph 48 (c) above. I see no good reason to dissent from their suggestions.
85. Insofar as the Europeans are concerned, the Members considered that a
proportion of four Elected and one Nominated Members would suit their population
distribution equally well. They the refore whole-heartedly endorsed the Fijian
proposals for representation. Using the 1956 Census figures, the European
constituencies were recommended by the Members as follows:—
Western Constituency — 3,641
Vanua Levu and Taveuni — 2,245
Southern Division (less Suva) with Lomaiviti and Lau — 2,743
City of Suva — 5,488.
Whilst the City of Suva constituency is considerably larger than the others, it should
be mentioned that many of the Europeans are transients, for example, some civil
servants, bank clerks, employees of merchant houses, personnel of the Royal New
Zealand Air Force, etc.
86. It is when the Indian population is considered that a more difficult pattern
comes into view, owing to the great concentrations of their population around Suva
and the Lautoka/Nadi area. However, a reasonably satisfactory solution can, I think,
be found in the following proposed constituencies, again using the 1956 Census
figures:—
Western Constituency (Ba and Ra) — 39,388
Western Constituency (Lautoka, Nadi and Sigatoka) — 50,016
Vanua Levu and Taveuni — 27,395
Southern Constituency (including Lomaiviti and Lau) — 52,060
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87. All the Indian Members at my discussions (save the Hon. B.D. Lakshman
who, though absent put forward the suggestion in the debate in the Legislature)
agreed that the Western Administrative Division ought to be divided into two
constituencies. And all agreed that, for compelling geographical reasons and despite
the smaller number of the electorate, Vanua Levu and Taveuni should constitute one
constituency. Numerically, there is no reason why the Southern constituency,
including Suva, should not constitute a single constituency, since its number of
voters approximates very closely to the number in the Western Constituency
proposed for Lautoka, Nadi and Sigatoka.
88. The Hon. A.I.N. Deoki, who desired five Indian Elected Members (see
paragraphs 55 and 56) wished the Western Administrative Division to be divided into
two as above, returning two Members, the Northern Division to remain also as
proposed above, but the City of Suva to return one Member, and the remainder of the
Southern Division, including Lomaiviti and Lau, but excluding Suva, to return one
Member. I feel pretty sure that this proposal was solely dictated by the Hon. A.I.N.
Deoki rating very highly his chances of being returned in the City of Suva, but not
necessarily if the rest of the Southern Division (including Lomaiviti and Lau) is
included, since he has little support outside Suva. (In fact, I doubt whether he will be
returned at all at the next election, howsoever the constituencies are constituted).
89. In view of his second thoughts regarding Indian representation (see
paragraph 61), wherein he sought five Indian Elected Members, the Hon. J.
Madhavan now suggests—somewhat on the lines proposed by the Hon. A.I.N.
Deoki—that the Southern Constituency should be divided into two electoral
divisions—Suva City with that part of the Southern Administrative Division lying to
the westwards towards Navua; and Nausori, Tailevu, Lomaiviti and Lau. The latter
would be a much smaller constituency numerically than the former however.
90. I have incorporated the foregoing notes regarding constituencies in this
despatch since, although they must necessarily be somewhat vague for the reason
given in paragraph 84, they may be helpful in any consideration of the number of
Members of each race in the Legislature. Further, the question of actual electoral
boundaries is a matter for the Governor in Council under the provisions of Articles
14 and 18 of the Letters Patent. It is presumed that similar provision will be
incorporated in the new Letters Patent.
91. There now remains to be considered the question of the timing of such
recommendations as you may approve. The life of the present Legislative Council
ends on the 15th September, 1962, and I am advised by the Registrar-General that
the preparation of new electoral rolls and the resulting elections will take a
minimum of 12 months. It is therefore clear that the life of the present Legislature
will have to be extended for, I suggest, a period of some six months, since any change
in the period during which the budget is under preparation and consideration would
be very unsatisfactory (i.e. October—December), and it is not wholly satisfactory in
any case that a newly constituted Legislature should immediately have to consider a
budget, particularly as, in consequence of universal adult suffrage, there may be a
number of new members, with ‘new’ ideas and ideals.
92. In this connexion, I should also mention that the present Fijian Members are
insistent that another Legislature should not be constituted on the present basis and
that the life of the present Legislature should, if necessary, be extended. This
viewpoint is also shared by the Indian Members.
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93. In the circumstances outlined above, I would therefore request that an Order
in Council, to be entitled ‘The Fiji (Electoral Divisions) Order in Council, 1961’,
should be enacted in terms of the Mauritius (Electoral Divisions) Order in Council,
1958, referred to in paragraph 5 of Mr. H.P. Hall’s secret letter No. PAC.36/1/03 of the
6th February, 1961. This would permit all necessary preparations for the elections to
be carried out, including the delimitation of new electoral boundaries and the
drawing up of new electoral rolls, as soon as you have reached decisions on the
questions of the composition of the Legislature and universal adult suffrage. I
presume also that those Letters Patent would provide for the extension of the life of
the present Legislature.
94. In this connexion, I should perhaps also add here that, in making certain
recommendations, for example, in paragraphs 14, 40 (a) and 46 (a) (with the latter of
which is connected the provisions of Article 34 (2)), I have not deemed it necessary in
this despatch to include mention of the adaptations which will be necessary when the
principal Letters Patent are redrafted.
95. If the foregoing procedure is agreed to, it would be my intention, on receipt
of advice from you, to request my Legal Advisers to proceed forthwith with the
drafting of new Letters Patent for submission to you before the close of the year.
96. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the Governor as you will no doubt
wish to discuss this subject further with him. Thereafter, I shall be grateful to learn
as soon as possible your decisions on the various points in issue. There are two
reasons for this. First, it is undesirable in principle to extend the life of the present
Legislature more than is absolutely essential. Secondly, there is a widespread feeling
that, consequent upon the rejection of the Government proposals at the recent
debate in the Legislature on constitutional reform, the existing period of stagnation
and unease may worsen and it is accordingly most desirable that publicity should be
given with the least possible delay to the approved measures of constitutional reform.
In addition, it is hoped that the introduction of universal adult suffrage and the
increase in the number of Members will result in much greater interest in the
forthcoming elections than has been evinced in the past. The comparative lack of
interest in the 1959 elections was an unhealthy sign in the body politic and it is
essential in my view that such interest be stimulated. The only community who are
giving active and anxious thought towards the next elections are, somewhat
paradoxically, the Fijians and it is desirable that this trend should be encouraged. I
trust therefore that the recommendations may receive your earliest consideration
and that your early approval of the appropriate changes will be forthcoming, despite
your preoccupation with urgent constitutional problems in respect of other
territories.
97. The picture in respect of constitutional reform would not, however, be finally
complete unless I also commented upon the composition of the Executive Council,
which has not, of course, however been discussed with the Members of the
Legislature.
98. In view of the recommendation for the maintenance of the official majority in
the Legislature, I do not see how it is possible to recommend that its composition be
changed. Clearly, the membership of the Executive Council—three ex officio Members
and one Official Member, in addition to three Elected and one Nominated Members of
the Legislature—could not be changed by the addition of an Official Member. Equally,
it could hardly be changed by the addition of another Unofficial Member of the
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Legislature lest the advice tendered by the unofficial majority on the Council to the
Governor should at times result in conflict and embarrassment owing to the fact that
there is an official majority in the Legislature.
99. Nevertheless, I consider that one change is possible and could with advantage
be made. A convention has become established in recent years that, after a general
election, each racial bench of Unofficial Members ‘elects’ and nominates to the
Governor the Member whom that bench desires should serve as a Member of the
Executive Council. This leads to an unfortunate amount of ‘politicking’ and it is very
doubtful if the most suitable persons become Members of the Executive Council.
(The Governor, I should interpolate, has hitherto accepted the expressed wish of each
racial bench and appointed the Member accordingly). This system encourages
Members to think and act racially, whereas I consider it is most desirable that such
Members should feel, or be made to feel, in present circumstances that they are
responsible to, and rely on the support of, all other Members of the Council.
100. I therefore recommend for your consideration that the appropriate
legislative provision should be made for the four Unofficial Members of the Executive
Council to be elected by the Council as a whole, such names to be submitted to the
Governor for formal appointment. Four Members should be elected, one from each
racial bench of Elected Members, and one from amongst the Nominated Members by
secret ballot, such to be provided for legislatively. In other circumstances, I would
have recommended that such elections should be carried out by the Unofficial
Members only, but as there is to be an official majority in the Legislature, and as it is
most desirable to associate the Unofficial with the Official Members (see, for example,
paragraph 79), I consider that at this stage such four Members should be elected by
the whole Council.
40 CO 1036/613 8–10 Aug 1961
[Constitutional reform]: minutes by H P Hall and A R Thomas on
local reactions
Mr. Thomas
The Acting Governor’s despatch on constitutional reform has now come in and is at
(67).1 There is also a letter from him at (66) which deals with the question of the
franchise.
You will recall that Sir Kenneth Maddooks had hoped to discuss the question of
constitutional changes with Ministers when he was here in July but, unfortunately,
the despatch from Fiji did not arrive in time. Sir Kenneth Maddocks did however see
Mr. Fraser and, later, the Secretary of State and the only point on which any decision
was taken was the short passage which Sir Kenneth wished to include in his Cession
Day broadcast. This is reproduced in my letter at (61).
Sir Kenneth Maddocks will be returning to London on the 28th August for a few
days before he leaves for Fiji. He asked that he should be given a further opportunity
1 See 39.
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to discuss the proposals in the light of the Fiji despatch, a copy of which has already
been sent to him.
The despatch is somewhat long and I have therefore prepared a note—now at
(68)—which attempts to summarise the main points and to recommend action on
them. There are really only 2 points on which I do not think we ought to accept the
Acting Governor’s advice.
Firstly, in paragraph 70 he proposes that the Fijians should have one additional
Member, making a total of 6 against a total of 5 each for the other races. My own
feeling on this is that, for the time being, anyway, parity between the races should
remain and I suggest therefore that each of the races has 6 Members, 4 elected, and 2
appointed by the Governor, the 2 Fijians to be appointed on the recommendation of
the Council of Chiefs. This is in fact in line with the recommendation made by the
Secretary for Fijian Affairs in paragraph 75. The composition of Legislative Council is
discussed in paragraphs 6 to 8 of my note at (68).
The second point is the method of appointment of members of Executive Council.
This is discussed in paragraphs 98 to 100 of the despatch and the proposal is that the
4 Unofficial Members of Executive Council should be elected by the Legislative
Council as a whole and that this provision should be written into the constitution.
The Acting Governor has not discussed this with the members of Legislative Council
in Fiji—see paragraph 97 of his despatch. I think this would be a mistake and I think
the far better course would be to leave the appointment of members of Executive
Council at the Governor’s discretion after such consultation as he considers
necessary. This is in fact the present legal position but some years ago Sir Ronald
Garvey, without prior consultation with the Colonial Office, introduced a convention
under which the 3 racial groups in Legislative Council each elected a representative
to Executive Council. I think this is a mistake and the present opportunity should be
taken to discontinue this practice. There is no reason why the Governor should not
consult the members of Legislative Council and make the appointments after such
consultation but I think any system of election as such should be discontinued.
I would in the ordinary course have submitted these papers to you through
General Department and Legal Advisers. But as I shall be away on Thursday and
Friday and you yourself go on leave on Friday, I am sending them straight to you.
I do not know yet what the leave arrangements for Ministers are at the end of
August. When however some preliminary thought has been given to these proposals,
arrangements for discussion with Sir Kenneth Maddocks between the 28th and 30th
August will have to be made. These could be at the official level but if it is possible, I
think he would like to have a further discussion with Ministers before he returns to
Fiji.
H.P.H.
8.8.61
Mr. Hall
Thank you for your very clear note and minute.
I agree with you that there are only the two points you mention on which we need
consider departing from the Acting Governor’s advice.
On the first, I agree that it would be needlessly provocative to Indians to have
anything short of parity of representation between them and the Fijians. It does not
matter so much how this is achieved but it looks to me that your view is right
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namely, that in spite of certain difficulties referred to in para. 74 of the despatch the
best arrangement would be to establish parity on a basis of 6 representatives each, of
whom 4 would be elected. (N.B. while it is clear that Mr. Deoki’s recommendation in
favour of a small proportion of the elected Members being elected on a common role
are clearly unacceptable at present because of the attitude of the Fijians and the
Europeans, it seems to me that it might be well worth while giving thought to the
possibility of evolving some arrangement on the lines worked out in East and Central
Africa as a ‘bridge’ between the communal roll and the common roll attitudes.)
On the second point I agree—unless the Governor can convince us to the
contrary—that it would be a mistake to provide constitutionally that the unofficial
Members of Executive Council should be elected to that position by the Legislative
Council. The suggestion has, of course, the advantage that it would to some extent
get away from the practice of following the advice solely of the racial group in the
appointment of each representative. It does however appear to conflict with the
constitutional theory that the Executive, while responsive to the Legislature, is not
responsible to it. It might also make it more difficult, if and when a full Ministerial
system should come to Fiji, to establish the pattern elsewhere of the Chief Minister
being appointed by the Governor as the person most likely to command a majority in
the Elected House and the other Ministers being appointed on the Chief Minister’s
advice.
I take it that all you wanted at this stage were my provisional views since I am
going on leave. I should be glad if the papers could now be referred to General
department and Legal Advisers. You will then wish to submit to higher authority at
least some days in advance of the 28th August. I think that Sir Kenneth should be
given the opportunity of discussion with a Minister as he has asked for this, but after
the matter has been discussed with him by you at official level.
A.R.T.
10.8.61.
41 CO 1036/1002, no 5 2 Oct 1961
[Constitutional reform]: letter from H P Hall to Sir Maddocks
reporting a meeting with Andrew Deoki on Indian perspectives
Andrew Deoki looked in to see me this afternoon and I thought I had better report to
you straightaway the gist of our discussions.
2. Unfortunately, his visit did not get off to a very good start as he was expected
by the British Council to arrive with Mara on Sunday, 24th September, and was not
on the plane. Apparently he had written to the British Council to say that he would
be arriving later as he was stopping off in San Francisco and New York but the letter
did not reach London until Monday noon, 25th September. The result was that his
accommodation at the Howard Hotel had to be cancelled and they have not been able
to accept him again: and secondly, the provisional engagements arranged on his
behalf have had to be altered and whereas he was to see Ambler Thomas last week,
Ambler Thomas cannot see him this week. I gather Deoki is still having difficulty
about finding proper hotel accommodation as the hotel in which he stayed on first
arrival also cannot continue to have him.
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3. We had a short discussion about constitutional changes and Deoki stressed
that he thought the Fijians and the Europeans had made a mistake in resisting the
introduction of the Membership system. Decki felt that unless some changes were
made there might be trouble. He also was unhappy at the way in which some of the
recommendations of the Burns Commission Report had been shelved. I took the line
with him that action on both these subjects was a matter of timing and it was just as
dangerous to try to force the pace as to go too slowly. He admitted that the Burns
Commission Report had come as a shock to the Fijians but he felt that, nevertheless,
Government ought to force through various measures. I pointed out that one of the
Burns Commission recommendations was that apart from the election of 3 Fijian
Members of Legislative Council, the Commission did not think that there was any
real demand for constitutional change. Inevitably, in dealing with these matters,
other factors have to be taken into account, and one important factor was the views
of the Fijians.
4. Deoki would very much like to visit Singapore and Malaya on his way back to
Fiji. He thought he would like to spend 5 to 6 days in Malaya, arriving there at the
end of the first week of November. He thought a visit would be useful but he
particularly wished to study their land development projects. I pointed out that we
were not in a position to approach Malaya direct about such a visit but I would
willingly take it up through the Commonwealth Relations Office. He then raised the
question of paying for the visit and said that the Fiji Government had financed a visit
by Ratu Mara and also a later visit by Ratu Penaia and Ratu George, and this was
another example of the Fijians getting preferential treatment. I replied that I could
not accept this and that I felt sure that if he had raised this question before he left Fiji
that [?then] the Fiji Government would have dealt with the request on its merits, and
discrimination would not have entered into it. I also said that so far as I was aware
the Mara and Penaia visits were arranged direct by the Fiji Government and not
through the Colonial Office but I was only speaking from memory and my
recollection might not be entirely accurate. However, I did agree to consult you
about his request, and in the light of that consultation if you approved the visit also
to find out whether the Fiji Government would make the arrangements direct or
would like the Colonial Office to do so through the Commonwealth Relations Office.
5. I should be grateful for a very early reply on this point because if we have to
take it up through the C.R.O., there is not much time.
6. The next point raised by Deoki was the filling of two vacancies—one as Crown
Counsel and the other as Magistrate. He said that although there were Indians in Fiji
qualified to hold these posts, he had learned that the vacancies had been advertised in
the U.K. but not in Fiji. Deoki himself mentioned the agreement which had been
reached about the distribution of posts between Indians and Fijians but did not think
that the filling of these two posts would affect the balance in any way. He did say that
there were a number of Fijians employed in the Secretariat and in the
Administration generally, and on his return he was proposing to suggest that Indians
should also be so employed. We did not discuss this in any detail except that I
brought out the Fijian fear of the Indians becoming predominant in the Civil Service.
On the question of advertising in the U.K. I said that in general the arrangement was
that the Colonial Office would not agree to simultaneous recruitment in the U.K. and
in a territory. We did not enter into any argument about whether there were suitable
local people available for a post or not but if we were asked to recruit we naturally did
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our best. I also said that although he, Deoki, did not think that either of these posts
were particularly important, it could be argued that they did concern law and order
and the administration of justice, and it might not be desirable that all such posts
were held by one section of the community.
7. I expect O.S.D. have information about this and I will call for the papers but if
you have any comments, I shall be grateful for them as Deoki is coming to see me
again towards the end of his visit and will undoubtedly raise the matter again.
8. The final point raised by Deoki was the question of assistance from United
Nations agencies. He spent a day in New York and seemed to be under the impression
that the United Nations had considerable information about a number of colonial
territories but very little about Fiji. He was also given the impression that there was
some surprise that Fiji had not asked for assistance and Deoki proposed to take this
up with Eric Bevington on his return. I explained that information about factual
matters concerning colonial territories was provided through the Colonial Office and
that my impression was that the information was given in a form which was
generally applicable to all the territories. It seemed a little strange to me, therefore,
that less was known about Fiji than about other territories. However, I would also
look into this.
9. The only urgent point in the letter is the suggestion of a visit to Malaya and, as
I have already said, I should be grateful for early advice on this.
42 CO 1036/1001, no 5 3 Oct 1961
[Ratu Mara]: letter from H P Hall to Sir K Maddocks reporting a
discussion with Ratu Mara about Fiji’s problems
Mara arrived safely on the 24th September but, as you probably know, had run into
some difficulty as the convent had at the last minute said they could not take the 3
girls as boarders. If this latter arrives before Adi Lala leaves could you please get a
message to her to say that the convent have now agreed to take the children as
boarders, and they are joining on Tuesday, 3rd October.
2. We have been looking after the children ourselves for the last week and have
found them most delightful but quite a handful. We drove Mara and the children to
see the convent on Sunday and delivered some of the bedding, etc., which they
required, by car. We also looked at a house which Mara was proposing to take over in
November but he has since come to the conclusion that it is too far away from the
school and he is now trying to find one in the Sunningdale area. I have said that if we
could help in any way we shall be delighted to do so.
3. Mara spent the weekend with us and we had quite a long discussion about the
problems of Fiji. The main discussion concerned the future of the country, and Mara
himself said that he was sorry that the Fijians had not been able to accept the motion
in April for the introduction of a Membership system. He said that he and his
colleagues had been put on the spot over this because they had spent most of 1960
trying to persuade the Fijians to go as far as they could in the acceptance of the
recommendations of the Burns Commission Report. You will yourself recall that
Julian Amery and I were informed in Fiji that it was because of intervention of Mara,
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Edward,1 etc., that the Council of Chiefs approved by 26 votes to 20 (I think) the
recommendation that 3 Fijian Members of Legislative Council should be directly
elected. The Fijian members of Leg. Co. therefore felt that they had received no
mandate from the Fijian people to go further than this and agree to the introduction
of a Membership system. He felt, however, that given time the Fijians would certainly
agree to a change of this nature and he himself was in favour of it.
4. Mara was convinced that the Fijian Administration had to be overhauled and
he was in favour of the establishment of Local Government. He had, in fact,
undertaken to prepare a paper on this subject but he doubted whether he would have
time to do much about it for the next 6 months.
5. Mara felt that there were a number of misconceptions about the organisation
of the Fijian community. He felt that both Spate and Burns had been led astray to
some extent by implying that there was a Chiefly group separated from other
members of the Fijian community. Mara said that there were in fact a series of
pyramids which were entirely separate, each with its own chief at the top. He
thought that in some ways Lala Sukuna2 had wrongly given the impression that
there was a Fijian chief over all other Fiji chiefs. Sukuna had achieved his position
merely because of his own strength of character and personality and a mistake had
been made in assuming that there should be a natural successor as Chiefly leader of
the Fijians when Sukuna died. Mara himself would welcome some breaking down of
this pyramid structure and said that the changed conditions of today had made the
life of a chief extremely difficult. The followers performed certain customary duties
for the chief but the chief was also under obligations towards his own people. In the
olden days when a communal existence with a subsistence economy was the way of
life, this exchange of obligations was not too difficult to fulfill. In these days,
however, there were considerable demands on the chief which were difficult to fulfil,
particularly if they involved money. The main burden of his remarks boil down to the
fact that whereas Burns and Spate seem to give the impression that the Chiefs got a
lot out of their followers, in Mara’s opinion it is really new the other way round and
the followers expect far more from the Chiefs then the Chiefs are able to give.
6. The other point of interest is that Mara himself is a strong believer of District
Commissioners being wholly responsible for the areas which they command. He was
impressed by a young District Commissioner whom he met in Malaya who seemed to
be fully responsible for everything happening in his district, including such things as
the provision of roads, agricultural development, and education. He thought the
weakness in the present Fiji Administration set-up was that the District
Commissioners were no longer in fact entirely responsible for their areas, and he
himself would very much like to see the authority of the District Commissioners
increased. He also said that he saw no objection, and would in fact welcome the
introduction of Indian district commissioners.
7. Mara felt that the present way of social life, particularly in Suva, did not really
enable the various communities to get to know each other. He said that Suva was
divided into a series of groups who tended to stay within the group and not mix with
other groups because all their time was taken up with social activities within their
1 Ratu Edward Cakobau.
2 Ratu Sir Lala Sukuna, senior chief, former secretary of Fijian affairs, speaker of the Legislative Council.
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own particular group. This applied mainly to entertainment where, by convention,
they were obliged to entertain within the group, and it was very difficult to get away
from this. He thought in particular that the Civil Service tended to have a very
restricted circle. He fully realised that it was very difficult to do anything about this
but he would very much like to see greater contact between the Civil Services and
the local people, both Fijians and Indians.
8. I hope to see more of Mara while he is over here and will try and keep you in
touch with any points which may arise in discussion with him.
43 CO 1036/613, no 94 28 Oct 1961
[Constitutional reform]: despatch from Sir K Maddocks to 
Mr Maudling on Fijian opposition to a membership system and
divisions over the composition of the Legislative Council
I have the honour to address you on the subject of the composition of the Legislative
Council in Fiji.
2. Under the present constitution, which has remained virtually unchanged for
twenty-four years, the Legislative Council consists of 16 official and 15 unofficial
members, the latter being composed of 5 Europeans, 5 Fijians, and 5 Indians. In
the case of both the European and the Indian members, three are directly elected
on separate communal rolls, and two are nominated by the Governor. The franchise
is restricted to males and electors must be literate and have certain property or
income qualifications. The Fijian members are indirectly elected by the Council of
Chiefs.
3. During the past few years the question of constitutional advance has received
considerable attention and has been debated by the Council on several occasions. The
Burns Commission, though not directly concerned with constitutional matters,
received a number of representations on this subject, and in the course of its report
observed that while there appeared to be no general desire or need for major
constitutional reform, it was not in the interest of the Fijians that they should be
treated differently from the other races. It recommended that three of the five Fijian
members should be directly elected, and two should be elected by the Council of
Chiefs.
4. This recommendation was discussed by the Council of Chiefs in August, 1960,
and was accepted by a small majority. It then became necessary to consider what
were to be the electoral qualifications of Fijian electors, and the practicability of
dividing the Colony into three satisfactory Fijian constituencies. These matters were
referred to the Fijian Affairs Board, which recommended that no property
qualification should be required, and that all adults, both male and female, who are
over 21 and can read and write a simple sentence in the vernacular, should have the
vote. They pointed out that all Fijians share in the ownership of the land of the
proprietary units of which they are registered members, and that it would be
unnecessary and inappropriate to require any further property qualification. As
regards the number of elected members, they found that it would be difficult to
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demarcate satisfactorily three Fijian constituencies as, no matter how arranged, they
would cut across traditional boundaries, and prove geographically awkward. If the
number could be increased to four there should be less difficulty. The Board
accordingly recommended that there should be four directly elected Fijian members
and two members elected by the Council of Chiefs.
5. Discussions with leading representatives of the other principal racial groups
made it clear that there was general support for an extension of the vote to women,
and a wish that the changes should be introduced before the next General Election,
which would normally take place in August 1962. These changes, if approved, would
clearly require considerable amendment of the Letters Patent, and I therefore
considered whether the opportunity should be taken of making other amendments.
In particular I believed that the time had come for unofficial members to assume a
further increase of responsibility for the government of the Colony. The matter was
discussed during Mr. Julian Amery’s visit to Fiji last October,1 and as a result of
subsequent correspondence you authorized me to propose to the Legislative Council
that Fiji should proceed at an early date to the ‘Member’ system of government,
under which unofficial members of the Executive Council would be invited to
supervise groups of Government Departments and to accept collective responsibility
for the Council’s decisions. If this were done, the number of official members of the
Legislative Council could be substantially reduced, while still retaining a
government majority. I believed that such an arrangement would provide a valuable
training both for members of the Legislature and for the Civil Service in the working
of a ministerial system of government; and that in due course it would be possible to
proceed to a full ministerial system. A Government Motion welcoming this proposal
was debated in the Legislative Council in April, but nearly all the Fijian and
European members strongly opposed any such change at the present time. The
unhappy atmosphere created by the events of the preceding eighteen months made it
difficult for such a major step forward to gain ready acceptance, and fears were
expressed by Fijian members that their special positions as owners of the land, which
has been recognised ever since the Deed of Cession, might in some way be
endangered. In the circumstances the Motion was withdrawn and it is clearly
impossible to take the matter further at the present time, though there may well be a
change of view when time has been given for further consideration in a more normal
atmosphere, and when it is more generally understood that the Governor with his
reserved powers can protect legitimate Fijian interests.
6. My recommendation regarding the Executive Council, therefore, is that there
should be no change at the present time in either the composition or functions as set
out in Article 9 of the Letters Patent and in the Royal Instructions, but I continue to
hope that a Member system will become acceptable within the next few years, and I
suggest that this should be borne in mind when a revised constitutional instrument
is drafted.
7. In order to ascertain to what extent agreement could be reached about the
changes that are desirable before the next election, Mr. P.D. Macdonald, C.M.G.,
Acting Governor, held a series of meetings of all available unofficial members in May
and June during my absence on leave. (Mr. B.D. Lakshman was in England at this
1 See 13.
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time and could not be consulted.) I am glad to report that on every important
question except that of the composition of the Legislative Council, there was
complete unanimity of view. I will deal with these in turn.
The qualifications for electors
8. All three racial groups were in favour of the introduction of literate adult
suffrage. I support this proposal and recommend that the qualifications for electors
should be as follows:— that he or she—
(a) is a British subject;
(b) is of the age of 21 years or upwards;
(c) is of sound mind;
(d) has been resident in the Colony for twelve months during the three years
preceding the closing of the electoral rolls; and,
(e) can read and write a simple sentence and sign his name in any one of the
following languages:— English, Fijian, Hindi, Urdu, Tamil, Telegu, Gurmukhi,
Gujarati, and Malayalam.
The qualifications for candidates
9. It was agreed that women as well as men should be allowed to stand for election,
and that the only other changes necessary were an increase of the income qualification
from £200 to £300, to take account of the changed value of money, and a relaxation of
the past requirement that candidates should have been continuously resident for two
years in the Colony (Articles 25 and 26 of the Letters Patent). The reason for the latter
proposal is that it would appear unreasonable that a candidate should be disqualified
merely because he has left the Colony for business, health or other reasons during the
period of two years before the elections. It was also unanimously agreed that in the
special circumstances prevailing, Fijian civil servants, but not those of other races,
should be allowed to stand for election, whether elected directly or by the Council of
Chiefs. The present Letters Patent already make special provision for Fijian civil
servants to be appointed to the Legislative Council, and I agree that the lack of educated
Fijians outside the public service make it necessary to retain this provision for the
present. I accordingly recommend that the qualifications to be required of candidates
should be as follows:— they should—
(a) be qualified to be registered and vote as electors (subject to the different
residential qualification mentioned in (b) hereunder) and be on the electoral roll;
(b) have a minimum of two years’ residence in Fiji during the three years
preceding nomination as a candidate;
(c) be able to speak and understand the English language, as already provided for
in Article 26 of the Letters Patent; and,
(d) be in possession of a net annual income in his or her own right of not less than
£300, or have a property qualification as set out at Article 25 (3) of the Letters
Patent.
The deposit by candidates
10. Article 28 of the Letters Patent requires that any candidate nominated at any
election of a Member of the Legislature shall deposit the sum of £25 within forty-
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eight hours after his nomination has been accepted. It is now recommended that the
deposit should be increased to £50 in view of the changed value of money.
The life of the legislature
11. There is general agreement amongst unofficial members that the period of
three years at present proposed in the Letters Patent is too short a term. I agree with
this view. It inevitably takes new members a little time to become accustomed to the
procedures of the Council, and in the third year the approaching general election has
an unsettling effect. I therefore recommend that the term be extended to five years.
This would be in line with the practice adopted in most other Colonies.
The composition of the Legislative Council
12. I now come to the one important question on which unofficial members are
divided—the composition of the Legislative Council.
There is a wide measure of agreement that separate communal rolls must be
retained. Some Indian members would like to see the experimental introduction of a
common roll constituency, and it was suggested by one member that there should be
five members elected for each race on separate communal rolls, and that in addition
there should be three members, one from each race, elected on a common roll. The
European and Fijian Members are, however, utterly opposed to the introduction of
the common roll in any form and two of the Indian members have said that they are
unable to support the introduction of a common roll at the present time. I believe
that the great majority of the general public of all races would be well content to see
the continuance of separate communal rolls, and I recommend that no change
should be made in this respect.
13. The view of unofficial members on the numerical representation of the main
racial groups differ considerably. The Fijians consider that there should be four
directly elected Fijian members and two elected by secret ballot by the Council of
Chiefs. (As stated in paragraph 4 above, traditional boundaries make it desirable that
there should be four constituencies and not three, as recommended by the Burns
Commission.) They suggest that the Europeans and Indians should each be
represented by four elected members, and one nominated member. Their proposal is,
therefore, that Fijians should have one more representative than those of the other
two races. This, in their view, is needed as a token of the recognition by Her Majesty’s
Government of the special position of the Fijian people derived from the Deed of
Cession and subsequent promises. They would like to see some definite indication of
this written into the constitution. They expressed strongly the view that European
representation should remain equal to that of Indians and that the official majority
should be retained.
14. The European members raised no objection to the Fijian proposal. They, too,
want the official majority to be retained. They would welcome the suggested increase
in the number of elected members from three to four.
15. The Indian members, with one exception, were opposed to the suggestion
that the Fijians should have an additional member, but there was no unanimity of
view about the composition of the Council. One member, as already stated, urged
the introduction of a common roll constituency; he also wished to see an unofficial
majority. Another member was opposed to the continued appointment of any
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nominated members. A third has asked that you should be informed of his strongly
held view that there should be a separate Muslim electoral roll and the right to
return one Muslim member. The latter argued that no Muslim member could hope
to be elected on either an Indian communal roll or a common roll.2 It would
however, in my view, be a retrograde step for members to be elected on a religious
as well as on a racial basis. Failing a Muslim electoral roll, this member would
wish to see three Europeans, three Fijians, and three Indians all elected on a
common roll with two nominated members from each race; and failing that, the
retention of a nominated seat for the Indians which would be reserved for a
Muslim.
16. The chief question for decision is whether or not the Fijians should be given
an extra seat. While I consider it most important that they should be reassured about
the continued safeguarding of Fijian interests, I do not think that this is the best way
of doing it. One additional seat would not, of course, provide any safeguard. It is the
duty of the Governor to ensure that the legitimate rights of all the peoples of Fiji are
protected; but he has special obligations to the Fijians by virtue of the Deed of
Cession and the promises made by successive Governors about the ownership of
Fijian land. You have already informed me—and I so announced in my speech on
Cession Day—that, in considering the extent and timing of constitutional changes,
Her Majesty’s Government will continue to take into account the need to safeguard
legitimate Fijian interests.
17. If parity is to be preserved, and if there are to be 4 directly elected Fijian
members and 2 members elected by the Council of Chiefs, there will also have to be 6
European and 6 Indian members. It remains to consider how many of these should
be elected and how many nominated. There is a fairly widespread feeling that the
number of nominated members is too great and at first sight it might seem
preferable that five of the six in each racial group should be elected, and only one
nominated. On the other hand, it would be difficult to devise five suitable
constituencies, and the lack of a second nominated member of each race might make
it difficult to ensure the representation of interests that are not adequately
represented by any of the elected members. In a small Council this is of considerable
importance. I have in mind particularly the commercial and industrial interests
which are of such importance to the Colony’s economy and other special interests.
On balance, therefore, I recommend that for both Europeans and Indians there
should be four elected and two nominated members.
Electoral boundaries
18. The question of electoral boundaries is, under the provisions of Articles 14
and 18 of the Letters Patent, a matter for the Governor in Council. I do not expect
any great difficulty over this and I recommend that the Governor in Council should
remain the authority.
Official members
19. While I am reluctant to propose any increase in the number of official
members, I could not recommend the abandonment of the official majority until
unofficial members have accepted a greater measure of responsibility and have
2 S M Koya, a Muslim, was in fact elected to the Legislative Council in 1963.
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indicated their willingness to see some of their number included in the Government
as members or ministers accepting collective responsibility, for its actions and
decisions. In the circumstances I have no alternative but to recommend that
provision should be included in the constitutional instrument for a maximum
number of 19 Official Members. This would enable me to reduce the number of
Official Members at my discretion if Unofficial Members of Executive Council accept
collective responsibility.
Timing
20. There now remains to be considered the question of the timing of the
implementation of such recommendations as you may approve. The life of the
present Legislative Council ends on the 15th September, 1962, and I am advised by
the Registrar General that the preparation of new electoral rolls and the resulting
elections will take a minimum of twelve months. Both the Fijian Members and the
Indian Members feel strongly that another Legislature should not be constituted on
the present basis and that the life of the present Legislature should, if necessary, be
extended. I agree with this view. It is therefore clear that the life of the present
Legislature will have to be extended. I suggest that the extension should be for a
period of some six months, since any change in the period during which the budget
is under preparation and consideration would be very unsatisfactory (i.e.
October–December), and it is not wholly satisfactory in any case that a newly
constituted Legislature should immediately have to consider a budget.
21. I would therefore suggest that the draft of an Order in Council, to be entitled
‘The Fiji (Electoral Provisions) Order in Council, 1961’, should be submitted to Her
Majesty for approval. This would permit all necessary preparations for the elections
to be carried out, including the delimitation of new electoral boundaries and the
drawing up of new electoral rolls, as soon as you have reached decisions on the
questions of the composition of the Legislature and the extension of the suffrage. I
assume also that, in addition to the amendments to the existing constitutional
instruments necessary to implement the other proposals in this despatch, the draft of
an Order in Council would later be submitted to Her Majesty providing for the
extension of the life of the present Legislature. If the foregoing procedure is agreed
to, it would be my intention, on receipt of advice from you, to request my Legal
Advisers to proceed with the necessary drafting.
44 CO 1036/613, no 93 Nov 1961
[Constitutional reform]: note by Pacific and Indian Ocean
Department, CO, on the outcome of the discussions
Constitutional changes for Fiji have been discussed with the Governor while he was
on leave. It is proposed to publish the changes in an exchange of despatches at the
opening of the Budget Session of Legislative Council, about 28th November.
2. There are only three main changes proposed in the constitution to which
attention need be drawn:—
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(i) The introduction of votes for Fijians, and for all women, and the dropping of
property and income qualifications. This will mean, apart from a simple literacy
qualification which is retained, universal adult suffrage for the three main racial
groups, Europeans, Fijians and Indians. Certain minorities, the Chinese (few of
whom are British subjects) and the Rotumans and other Pacific islanders,
amounting to only a few thousands, will still be excluded from the vote because
there is at present no possibility of attaching them to one of the three racial rolls.
No representations have been received from them for the vote, and this piece of
undemocracy must just be allowed to continue for the time being.
(ii) There is to be one extra elected seat in Legislative Council for each of the three
racial groups (with an increase of three in the official members in order to keep
the official majority of one). The reason for the increase is simply that electoral
boundaries can be better drawn for four rather than three constituencies. There
were several suggestions for altering the balance of the membership. But it is
essential to keep an official majority to reassure the Fijians and Europeans; and
also parity between the three races, at least until we can see our way ahead (which
we cannot at present) towards the establishment of some form of common roll.
Once we get off parity, it would be extremely difficult to justify any other basis of
representation for the races except one reflecting numerical strength, especially
now that universal adult suffrage, with only a literary qualification, is to be
introduced. It is not expected that there will be much opposition to the
maintenance of the status quo.
(iii) The life of Legislative Council is to be extended from three to five years, which
has been found in most other territories to be a more useful length.
3. It seemed necessary to give the Fijians some reassurance, in the Governor’s
despatch, if we are to hope for any constitutional advance in the future—for none
can be made without their agreement. The Governor had hoped that some guarantee
about the future of their land could be written into the constitutional instruments,
but it proved impossible to find a form of words which did not either promise too
much or too little. The Governor has therefore used instead a sentence already
agreed by the Secretary of State—that in considering constitutional changes H.M.G.
will continue to take into account the need to safeguard legitimate Fijian interests.
4. Drafts submitted for approval.
45 CO 1036/613, no 95 10 Nov 1961
[Constitutional reform]: despatch (reply) from Mr Maudling to 
Sir K Maddocks
I have the honour to refer to your despatch No.813 of the 28th October on the
subject of constitutional change; in Fij.1 I should like to express my appreciation of
the effort which was evidently made to formulate proposals which would have a very
wide measure of local support.
1 See 43.
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2. I am glad that the discussions of these proposals with leading representatives
of the principal racial groups have in fact led to unanimity of view on all these of
importance except one. Apart from it, I have no comments to make on any of them;
they are all acceptable to me.
3. On the one proposal where agreement could not be reached, the composition
of Legislative Council, I agree with your comments on the various suggestions put
forward. I agree with your recommendation, and your reasons for it, for an increase
in the number of seats but with the preservation of parity between races and the
official majority.
4. I note that it has not proved possible to set up a Membership system. I, too,
hope that the system may become acceptable within the next few years, but, though I
agree that this should be borne in mind when drafting the new constitutional
instruments, I would not wish to press it until there is a greater measure of opinion
in its favour. I notice that one of the Indian members wished to see an unofficial
majority in Legislative Council in order to give unofficials a greater measure of
responsibility in government, and I am aware that similar proposals have been made
in the past. It should be borne in mind that there is a distinction between the
functions of Executive Council and of Legislative Council. A greater degree of
political responsibility and influence can be attained by the unofficial members of
Executive Council taking a fuller part in the work of Executive Council through the
Membership system than by increasing the number of unofficial members of
Legislative Council. For it is in Executive Council that the formulation of policy and
the decisions of government are for the most part made.
5. On procedure I agree that there should be an Electoral Provisions Order in
Council, and it will be drafted by my Legal Advisers. The life of the present Legislative
Council will, as you say, have to be extended, and my Legal Advisors will draft a
constitutional instrument for this purpose also. When your legal Advisors are
drafting new constitutional instruments for the other changes required, I suggest
that they should take the opportunity of recasting the existing instruments in
entirety into a more modern form.
46 CO 1036/775, no 5 28 Apr 1962
[Fijian paramountcy]: letter from A C Reid to I S Wheatley
I am sorry that I have not replied to your letter before this, but I went on a tour of
relatives and friends and did not get it until this week when I have been rather
absorbed in the task of putting my youngest to school. We have incidentally been
having the most wonderful weather in the North: Loch Eam has been drowsing in
mid-summer temperatures and is still very lovely, modern developments
notwithstanding.
However, to try to answer your questions, I would say that the Fijian view on
paramountcy is simply the putting of Fijian interests first in their own country—in
its strongest form similar to ‘Tonga for the Tongans’ and ‘Samoa for the Samoans’.
After all, the Groups are not far apart and there are kinship ties between them. The
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Fijians are a proud people: they ceded sovereignty to H. B. M., her heirs and
successors, but at the first Council of Chiefs after Cession there was considerable
argument whether the ‘tama’ or traditional shout of greeting for a paramount chief,
should be given to Sir Arthur Gordon. The Vuriwalo [sic],1 Ratu Cakobau,2 eventually
swung them in favour of according this salutation to the Governor as the Queen’s
Representative; and they expected him to rule them, not as a distant bureaucrat in an
office, but personally as a chief, with firmness and affection, looking after their every
interest. In those days they were in and out of Government House and they
considered His Excellency as one of themselves. Gifts of islands in various parts of
the Group were made to him to confirm him as a ‘Tankei’ [sic]3 or Landowner. The
significance of the latter was lost sight of and they became absorbed in the Stanmore
Estate; being eventually disposed of on the open market. I recollect, however,
discussions them with the late Sir Lale Sukuma [sic]4 who agreed that they were
intended as giving the Governor a personal foothold in Fiji—making him a
‘Tankei’—and should more appropriately have passed to each successive Governor.
Although the original close relations that existed between Gordon and his immediate
successors and the Fijian chiefs, have not been maintained into this century,
nevertheless there is still a feeling among the Fijians that the Governor belongs to
them and that he personally, or though his British Officers, looks after them first and
foremost: and they are not interested in what happens to the others! When the Burns
Commission recommended that His Excellency should no longer be President of the
N. L. T. Board, it met with unanimous opposition from the Fijians. When I attempted
to explain to the meetings I attended that it might embarrass His Excellency to
represent, as it were, the interests of a section of the people of Fiji, they could not see
how it should as they conceived it his duty to look after them first. There you have
it—from ancient to modern times. You ask me about documents to support the
Fijian claim to prior consideration in their own land. I am not able here to look up
references but there is probably little in the sense you mean. The other day I was
asked by a young Fijian student, who was writing a thesis on the political career of
Sukuma, to help him trace records etc.5 There was precious little to be found of any
use, and yet, for a generation at least, Sukuma was a power in the land. My point is
that in the Pacific Islands at any rate personalities are more than paper, and the
emotional feeling of a people more than reasoned argument. Regarding the chances
of getting the Indians to recognise Fijian claims to paramountcy, I feel sure I
mentioned in our talk in London that I believe the average Indian had more
confidence in the Maras6 and Penaris7 and would probably rather be led by them than
by their own miserable leaders. From my own personal experience of the Fiji area the
Fijians have more political ‘nous’ than the Indians, who at times are particularly
inept, and I should like to see a political party launched under Fijian leadership with
decent Indian and European support, who I am sure, would welcome giving priority
to Fijian interests as the corner stone to the building of a more solid future for Fiji.8 I
feel that this rather long screed should go off to you now and I will follow it up with
another in a day or so. Again sorry for the delay.
1 Vunivalu or warlord. 2 Ratu Seru Cakobau. 3 Taukei, that is, indigenous Fijian.
4 Ratu Sir Lala Sukuna. 5 The young Fijian student was Filipe Bole. 6 Ratu Kamisese Mara.
7 Ratu Penaia Ganilau, 8 This eventually came about with the formation of the Alliance Party.
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47 CO 1036/775, no 6 10 May 1962
[Fijian paramountcy]: letter from A C Reid to I S Wheatley
I wound up my last letter with the promise of a sequel.1 I am conscious of the
fact that I did not answer you (a) (b) and (c) etc., but I did try to give you the
Fijian background on this question of paramountcy. Regarding the constitutional
aspect of it, don’t forget that the Fijians had a battalion in Malaya for 41⁄2 years,
that three of the present M.L.C.’s served with the battalion and that Fijian leaders
have paid quite recent visits to the Federation. They see the Malays faced with a
situation similar to their own—sharing their homeland with a foreign race better
equipped for the cold war of economics. I have not had an opportunity of studying
the Constitution of Malaya and I have no access to such documents here, but it is
certainly the Fijian impression that safeguards for the Malays have been well and
truly built into it. I recollect that, following Malayan example, the Fijian M.L.C.’s
[sic] sometime ago pressed for amending legislation to enable the Transport
Control Board to give special consideration to Fijian operated bases. I do not
think for a moment that the Fijians are satisfied with the Governor’s assurance
that the Public Service Commission will work to maintain a 50/50 balance in the
Civil Service as between Fijians and Indians. It is said that in Malaya the
proportion in favour of Malays is much higher. You are aware that during the
Constitutional discussions a year ago the Fijian leaders put forward the proposal
that there should be an extra Fijian member in Legislative Council. This, as I see
it, was to symbolise their priority, paramountcy, call it what you will—because in
reality one extra member would make very little difference in voting. I may say
(and as Chairman of the F.A.B. I have good reason to know this) they were pretty
hurt that the proposal was turned down. They considered it was a moderate one,
deserving of better consideration than Government gave to it and I do not think
we have heard the last of this. Next time the demand may not be so moderate.
After all the extreme view (which has been expressed) is that Leg. Co. should be
all Fijian! When one remembers that just across the water the membership of the
Tongan Legislative Assembly is solely Tongan and the non-Tongan population
have no representatives, it is perhaps not surprising that there are such views,
however different the population ratios may be. The longer Britain’s future
intentions remain obscure (and the rapidity with which she appears to be
divesting herself of Commonwealth responsibilities, gives a territory like Fiji not
much ground for confidence!), the stronger will grow the Fijians’ demand for
constitutional recognition of their priority status. At the moment it is more a
matter of feeling than formula, but the latter will no doubt evolve. You may or
may not know that they do not call themselves ‘Fijians’ in their own language—
that is what we call them—their own name for themselves is the ‘Owners’, a
proud name which faithfully reflects their thought. I trust these notes may be of
some use to you.
1 See 46.
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48 CO 1036/775, no 8 19 June 1962
[Local government]: despatch from Sir K Maddocks to Mr Maudling
on Fijian opposition to the introduction of local government, 
fears about Indian domination, and concern that UK protection 
might be lost
I have the honour to address you on the subject of the introduction of further
measures of local government in this Colony and to record the reasons which have
led me to the conclusion that any attempt at the present time to introduce a
comprehensive scheme of inter-racial rural local government, even though confined
to certain areas, will be unsuccessful.
2. I have reached this conclusion very reluctantly because, since my arrival, I
have been convinced of the value that a substantial advance in local government
would be to the people of this Colony, both as a means to enable them to accept more
responsibility for the administration of their own affairs, and because it would
provide the basis for closer cooperation between the races. If there had been a
reasonable prospect for its success, I would have been prepared to risk the chance of
failure but a close, prolonged and patient analysis of local opinion discloses the
continued existence of that racial conflict and suspicion between the Fijians and
Indians, which was the underlying cause which prevented the adoption of the
proposals for local government submitted by Mr Cooper in 1946, and of the Rural
Councils Bill which was moved in the Legislature by Mr Henderson in 1953.
3. I do not propose to reiterate in detail the complicated issues raised by the
extension of local government in Fiji which have been admirably set out in Sir
Ronald Garvey’s confidential despatch No. 507 of the 29th August, 1958. I also
informed you of my first impressions of the prospects for local government in my
confidential despatch No. 245 of the 2nd April, 1959 and experience confirms the
general validity of these first impressions. But I was then naturally unable to assess
the strength of the deeper under-currents of feeling which I now propose to consider,
together with a review of certain relevant factors and events which have occurred
during my period of office here, which will affect the possible introduction of a
further measure of local government at some future date, and indeed any other inter-
racial measures of similar importance.
4. The insurmountable obstacle to the introduction of local government is the
fear of the Fijians that any advance towards inter-racialism in matters of importance
is a step towards Indian domination. The Fijians judge this proposal, as they did
proposals for an extension of inter-racial education, the abolition of the Fijian
Administration, and constitutional reform, not on logical or utilitarian grounds, but
from the point of view of the effect which such proposals will have on the status of
the Fijians in relation to the Indians. Any reform or innovation calculated in their
opinion to undermine the racial identity of the Fijians is condemned irrespective of
its merits, and any significant development towards inter-racialism is liable to be
regarded by the Fijians as having this tendency.
5. In the past, it has been possible to reconcile the principle that Fijian
interests should receive special protection with other measures found necessary to
promote economic development because circumstances have allowed Fijian Affairs
and economic development to be conducted largely in separate spheres. I am
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speaking of the period up to the end of the Second World War. The seeds of conflict
were, of course, always there in embryo but it has been only during the past few
years that they have become apparent. In particular, it has become apparent to the
Fijians that the Indians are now established as the majority race in the Colony and
that their economic power far exceeds that of the Fijians. We are now being
confronted with the consequences arising from the fact that, since Cession, two
policies have been pursued which, basically and in the peculiar circumstances of
Fiji, have always been inconsistent; namely, recognition in theory, by
pronouncements and by implication, that the Deed of Cession conferred a moral
obligation on the British Government to regard Fijian interests as paramount, and
the preference given in fact to the promotion of economic development. I am not
implying that economic development per se need be inconsistent with Fijian
interests, but it depends on the manner in which it is undertaken. Aspects of the
form which economic development took before 1946 are: firstly, it has led to the
Indians becoming established in a dominant position; secondly, because the Fijian
was not then interested in such development and preferred to retain their
traditional form of life, it took place largely independently of the Fijians. The
Fijians, in fact, have been left a long way behind, not only in the population race
but also in the economic race, and there seems very little prospect of their being
able to catch up. These disadvantages have been accentuated by the emphasis
placed in the past on communalism and Fijian tradition, and by their having been
largely isolated, geographically, from the centres of economic growth. Both these
factors have retarded the development of the Fijians as individuals and have
prevented any advanced form of integration between them and the other races of
the Colony. These historical and geographical factors require describing in greater
detail.
6. Historically, it has been the policy, since it was first proposed by Sir Arthur
Gordon (later Lord Stanmore) until the last few years, to preserve the traditional
customs and social organisation of the Fijians, and to promote their development
through what has been described as ‘The Fijian Way of Life’.1 The measures taken to
effect this policy were the institution and preservation of the Fijian Administration,
the enactment of Fijian Affairs Regulations which recognise the liability of Fijians to
community work and provide sanctions for its enforcement, and by confirming,
within reason, the power of Chiefs with the Governor, as representing the British
Crown, accepting the role accorded to his position by the Deed of Cession as that of
the highest Chief. Not only, therefore, has the preservation of the Fijian Way of Life
been fostered consistently by successive Governors since 1874 in accordance with a
considered policy, but the traditional relationship between the Governor, as
representative of the Crown, and the Fijian people has been one of peculiar intimacy
and trust.
7. Geographically, circumstances have been favourable to the Fijians living
much unto themselves. Europeans live chiefly in the urban areas, the Indians chiefly
in the urban areas and in the cane areas. In consequence, there are large tracts of Fiji
which have remained almost entirely Fijian. This applies to most of the Eastern
Division, to the hinterland of Viti Levu, and to the greater part of Vanua Levu. The
1 G K Roth, Fijian way of life (Melbourne, 1953).
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distribution of the Fijian population, in fact, is far less densely concentrated than
that of the Indian. With the increase in the Indian population, Indians are beginning
to obtain access of these predominantly Fijian areas but this does not affect the
argument that, in the past, the majority of Fijians have been able to live in an
atmosphere insulated from the impact of Indians.
8. It is possible that had greater mingling occurred in the early formative years,
integration between the two races would have resulted. Indians were then very much
in a minority, they would not have been regarded as a threat, and the shortage of
Indian wives would have encouraged miscegenation. This prospect of integration
between the two races, if it ever existed, has now been removed. It is sometimes
supposed that time alone is required to develop a feeling of common citizenship and
community of interest between the races but I fear that this is wishful thinking, at
any rate if time is estimated in decades rather than centuries. Time, if anything, is
placing the two races further apart because, as the Indians increase in numbers,
status, influence and wealth, the Fijians become more conscious of their own
inadequacies in competition with the Indians, and of the threat which the Indians
present to the position of the Fijians in their own country.
9. In this view, the Fijians are encouraged by the Europeans, who are suspicious
of the increase in Indian numbers and influence, and tend to use the principle of the
paramountcy of Fijian interests as a counter to Indian aspirations. They therefore
favour maintenance of the status quo which gives the Europeans a degree of political
influence disproportionate to their numbers, the justification for this disparity being
that it is necessary to protect the Fijians. This view is reflected in the following note
made by Mr. K.H. Henderson when commenting in 1953 on the prospects of the
Rural Councils Bill which he was then preparing.
‘The framework of local government may be established but the co-operation
and goodwill essential to success will be lacking. Unfortunately many of the
Europeans most interested in rural affairs are employees of the Colonial
Sugar Refining Company and the views of the Company are bound to
influence many other Europeans.
The attitude of the Colonial Sugar Refining Company is that there is no need
for an expansion of local government and no real demand for it among the
Indians. The Company really fears that future local authorities will be the
playground of existing Farmers Unions such as the Kisan Sangh and the Maha
Sangh who have frequently been in opposition to its policies. Big European
landlords are opposed to paying further taxation in the form of rates and fail to
see any ultimate benefit in co-operation with Indians and in guiding them
towards more responsibility. Certain Europeans expressed a genuine fear that
anything good for the Indian must be detrimental to Fijian interests.
It is extremely hard to convince the majority of the European community
by argument. Fear of being swamped by the Indian is very real and has led to
lack of goodwill. The Australian background of many of the most influential
Europeans may well be another reason for their inability to get upon any but
the most formal terms with people of a different colour, and to forget the
commanding position which they held in the early days of indentured labour.
This is enforced, in many cases, by a somewhat narrow and parochial outlook
on what has happened or is happening in any country but Fiji.’
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The investigations by Mr. Seller2 confirm that this view towards rural local
government still prevails amongst Europeans.
10. There are also the facts that the Indians are mostly Hindus while the Fijians
are Christians; and that their respective culture, standards and outlook are widely
divergent in certain fundamental respects. The differences between the two races are
similar to those which divide the Arabs from the Jews in Palestine and the Turks and
the Greeks in Cyprus, a conclusion reached by Mr. Amery during his visit to Fiji in
1960 when he described the Fijians and Indians as like ‘oil and water’.3 At a
superficial level there are, of course, numerous examples of Indians and Fijians
getting on well together. They mix freely in committees and on public bodies. They
are to be found together in amity on social occasions, and both in the rural and
urban areas a considerable degree of inter-mingling, co-operation and congenial
concourse takes place. But these superficial signs should not be regarded as evidence
that any deeper reconciliation is occurring between the two races. At base, they
remain distinct and this fact is revealed whenever a matter of importance arises
involving racial rather than personal issues, or whenever the Fijians feel themselves
being manoeuvred into a position where they will be dominated by the Indians.
11. The position is well stated by the following extract from a minute written by
Ratu Sir Lala Sukuna4 in 1946 when commenting on Mr. Cooper’s proposals for rural
local government.
‘To quote from the minutes of the Administrative Officers’ Conference 1944,
“as it must be evident that in the long run harmony cannot be secured in a
Colony of this size by political development on collateral communal lines, the
ultimate aim should be the merging of the two as soon as circumstances
permit in order that the three principal races of the Colony should play their
full part in wider Fijian Local Government Institutions, the term ‘Fijian’
being used in its broadest sense.” Fine moral sentiments, but as propaganda
seeds they fall on barren ground that has needed fertilisers for over 60 years.
There are three principal languages, three cultures that have nothing in
common, three water-tight societies. Between the European and Indian
communities there are very few real personal friendships, suspicion abounds,
and there is a marked clash of political aspirations. Because for historical
reasons the Fijian looks up to the European as his mentor, leader, and
protector, relations between them are good; but they rarely mix and, on the
European side, there is a lack of appreciation; and on the part of the Fijians
there has been apprehension regarding the system of native administration
followed. As for Indians and Fijians there are undoubtedly more personal
friendships; but that is to be expected in two large communities living cheek
by jowl. Generally speaking, however, they despise each other, for there is no
understanding and no common ground—except among the small number of
educated people, and then only on ideas and topics alien to both. Further
there is an increasing clash of interests—land hunger on the one side and a
growing determination on the other to preserve their heritage. Politically the
2 See 19, note 3. 3 See 13. 4 Sukuna was then secretary for Fijian affairs.
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Indian aspires to a foreign form of government which even his betters in the
homeland cannot run and looks down on the Fijian for accepting his own
form of government which he can run. Surely a survey of this ground must
make it abundantly clear that, before we begin sowing in it the seeds of
common political development, we must first diligently prepare it—have we?’
12. Sixteen years have intervened since Ratu Sir Lala expressed these views, and
they have been years during which circumstances have been favourable in many
respects for closer understanding between Fijians and Indians. The experiences of
many Fijians of conditions overseas during the Second World War and the campaign
in Malaya; the great improvement which has occurred in education; the more liberal
attitude adopted by the Fijian Administration towards freedom amongst the Fijians;
the emphasis there has been in recent years on their economic development; the
greater mingling of the races, particularly in urban areas; and the much closer
relationship which Fiji has now with other parts of the world through improved
communications and opportunities both for travel abroad, and for persons overseas
to visit Fiji, have all been factors which might have been expected to contribute to
Indian and Fijian relationships in the manner considered by Ratu Sir Lala to be
necessary before greater co-operation between the two races could take place.
However, although at the superficial level relations are good, it is clear that the
Fijians remain adamantly opposed to co-operating with Indians in ways which they
feel threaten their fundamental interests, and that the position to-day remains
similar to that described by Ratu Sir Lala in 1946. In fact, it is probable that it has
deteriorated because the Fijians are now more conscious of the significance to their
race of the Indian penetration in Fiji. This significance has been emphasised during
the past three years by the disturbances in Suva in December, 1959, by the
outspoken criticism of Fijian institutions in the report of the Burns Commission,
and by the unrest in the sugar industry during 1960, which they interpreted as a bid
by the Indians to dominate the Colony’s economy.
13. There are numerous reasons why Fijian apprehension of the Indians should
increase. Each year, when the population figures are published, Indian numbers
creep up. The dissolution of the Colonial Empire is causing Fijians to question how
long the United Kingdom will be able, or be prepared, to protect their interests. The
Indians are strongly entrenched in commerce in which the Fijians play little part.
Indians are rapidly obtaining professional qualifications and are becoming
established in the better jobs outside the Civil Service. Within the Civil Service,
Indian influence is increasing and would be increasing much more rapidly were it
not for the policy of maintaining a balance between the two races. In agriculture, the
Indians already dominate sugar cane production and, with their increasing numbers
and greater industry, are favourably placed to take advantage of the opportunities
which the Land Development Authority will provide to become established in other
forms of agriculture. This process of Indian penetration has, of course, been going on
for a number of years but it has only recently become conspicuous, particularly to
the Fijians who hitherto have been largely insulated from the impact of Indians for
the reasons which I have described. This abrupt realisation by the Fijians of how
matters really stand, and their concern that the Indian advance should be halted
before they are overwhelmed, explains why the Fijian attitude towards the Indians in
future, and particularly towards measures which involve inter-racial co-operation,
will be one of increasing opposition.
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14. The fact that racial relations, as they affect major issues, have not improved
since 1946 is supported by the following comments of Mr. Seller which he made in a
report on his investigations into the present reactions of the three major races to the
proposal that a scheme for rural local government should be introduced. Thus, he
writes:—
‘It was surprising to note how uniform and unanimous was the reaction of
the various groups to what I had to say. Unless I had been aware of the general
lack of interest in local government on the part of the vast majority I would
have suspected collusion. But this was clearly not the case. My experiences
with the main racial groups were as follows.
INDIANS. Most of my contacts with Indians were with the several Indian
Advisory Committees at the different headquarters visited. Generally speaking
all appreciated the need for and benefits of local government. All without
exception expressed in most positive terms that local government if it is to be
of any use, must be multi-racial although all agreed that equal representation
on a local government body for Indians, Fijians and others was probably
essential if local government was ever to be accepted by the Fijians and others.
The Ba, Lautoka and Nadi committees went so far as to state that they would
prefer to carry on as at present rather than go it alone without the other races.
As I expected all the advisory committees laid great stress on the method of
rating. After I had explained several alternative methods i.e. the land rate, poll-
tax, house-tax, graduated poll-tax, all committees came out strongly for a land
rate which they believed to be the most equitable system of apportioning the
cost of government. The Lautoka committee believed that a land-rate should
be supplemented by a poll-tax to catch the landless citizen. All committees
unanimously stated that the land-rate should be extended to all Fijian land
whether in or outside reserves. Indeed when I referred to the difficulty of rating
Fijian land I was told at Nadi that ‘A way must be found’. All the Indian Advisory
Committees and individual Indians to whom I spoke favoured an elected
majority on the local government body. I should point out that the Labasa
committee while endorsing the land-rate considered that it should not be
imposed until adequate security of tenure was provided for Indian farmers. They
referred to the fact that reserves can be re-opened at any time.
FIJIANS. I need not describe at any length what Fijians had to say. They had
nothing constructive to offer. I held meetings with representative groups at all
centres visited except at Nadi where I interviewed individuals. I must confess
that I found the going very heavy. It was not generally possible to get down to
any detailed discussion of the merits of local government since Fijians were
invariably opposed to the inclusion of others (particularly Indians) in any body
which might be devised. As you know I consider that the working together of
the races in local government institutions to be essential and that the setting
up of a system without full-scale Fijian participation would be worse than a
continuance of the present position. Furthermore there was no inclination on
the part of Fijians to discard the essentials of their present provincial
administration although many admitted that it could be usefully reformed.
The position in brief is one of deadlock. Unless and until the Fijians can
forget their anti-Indian animus and also discard many features of the Fijian
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administration it is exceedingly difficult to say how multi-racial local
government can be born.
EUROPEANS. I did not get in touch with many non-official Europeans during
my tour. I did speak with the Company Managers at Labasa and Penang. Both
expressed the view that the time for local government is not yet and also drew
attention to the unfavourable condition of race relationships. Mr. Gibson at
Labasa was extremely dubious of either the need or practicability of local
government. While admitting that it might provide training in self-government
he considered that the present was not the right time to attempt the experiment.’
15. Mr. Seller’s view on Fijian opinion is supported by the Secretary for Fijian
Affairs who, at a meeting convened to discuss local government, is recorded as saying:—
‘The Secretary for Fijian Affairs thought that the views of Ratu Penaia on
matters affecting the Fijians accurately reflected Fijian opinion as a whole.
Ratu Penaia considered that before the Fijians and Indians came together in
any form of local government, it was necessary that they should come closer
together socially. There required, in fact, to be more harmony between the
two races before a measure of this kind could be introduced successfully. It
followed that the adoption of inter-racial local government at the present
time was premature.’
16. One would have thought that a reasonable measure for Government to take
in the process of ‘fertilization’ referred to by Ratu Sir Lala would be to promote inter-
racial education but, as you know, even the moderate recommendation in this
direction proposed by the Burns Commission was opposed by the Fijian people. I am
afraid that such reasons as this for postponing the introduction of local government
amount to little more than a polite way of saying that the Fijians are not prepared,
and do not visualise themselves as being prepared, to co-operate with Indians in a
measure of this kind, the consequences of which will have a far-reaching effect on
the Fijian way of life and would involve Fijians being subject to the authority of
Indians, i.e., Indian local government officials, and the decisions of Rural Councils
on which Indians would be much in evidence, in matters which the Fijians regard as
their particular preserve and which, hitherto, have been dealt with either by the
Fijian Administration, or by the District Administration with Europeans and not
Indians in control. In this respect, the issue of rural local government is different
from that of urban local government because urban local government is not regarded
by the Fijians as being concerned with matters which are traditionally Fijian and for
that reason the Fijians are either prepared to co-operate in urban local government
on a basis of equality with other races, such as has occurred in Suva as the result of
the passing of the Local Government (Towns) Ordinance, No. 27 of 1961, or to ignore
it, which is their usual attitude towards Township Boards.
17. The basis of this attitude is summarised in the following resolution which
was passed by the Council of Chiefs in November, 1932, and which is probably as
valid to-day as representing Fijian opinion as it was then:—
‘That this Council records its strong and unanimous opinion that Fiji, having
been ceded to Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain and Ireland, Her Heirs
and Successors, the immigrant Indian population should neither directly nor
indirectly have any part in the control or direction of matters affecting the
interests of the Fijian race.’
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This resolution was cited in the Fijian Affairs Board as a reason against the recent
appointment of Mr. R.N. Nair as the first Indian Administrative Officer and it has
been necessary to station a European District Officer at Nausori at the same time and
to stipulate, informally, that Mr. Nair should be mainly concerned with Indian
affairs. Fijian objections are based on principle and not on the personality of Mr. Nair
whom they generally like.
18. In face of this evidence, there can be no doubt that if an attempt was made now
to introduce a system of inter-racial rural local government it would fail because of
Fijian opposition. This is the third occasion during the past sixteen years when this
attempt has been considered, and has had to be abandoned primarily for the same
reason. The same fate, I feel, awaits any other proposal designed to bring the Fijians
and Indians closer together on an inter-racial basis in any matter which has important
administrative or political implications. From this I fear that it must be concluded that
the belief that in the course of time racialism would be submerged by the development
of a common social conscience cannot be regarded as a likely development for a great
number of years unless changes occur at the centre of Government which provide
sufficient assurances for the Fijians about their future status for them to be prepared
to abandon their increasingly rigid attitude towards racial co-operation. In other
words, it seems that further constitutional advance of a nature acceptable to the Fijians
must precede the introduction of inter-racial rural local government, or measures of
a similar nature. A guide to the way in which the Fijians are thinking was given by
Ratu P.K. Ganilau and Ratu G.K. Cakobau during the Budget session of Legislative
Council in December, 1961. Ratu P.K. Ganilau said:—
‘When the time comes—and I hope the time will not come soon for some new
form of Government to replace the present system—then I would like to say
here that the Fijians would like the composition of the Legislative Council to
be reviewed, and I would also like to have it recorded here that the running of
this Colony must be handed over to the Fijians.’
and Ratu G.K. Cakobau said:—
‘Turning to constitution, Sir, the ultimate aim of this chosen constitution is,
let us put it bluntly, independence. I have nothing against independence, Sir;
let independence come. But when that independence comes—I should like
this recorded in this House—let the British Government return Fiji to the
Fijians in the state and in the same spirit with which the Fijians gave Fiji to
Great Britain.’
19. These remarks indicate that the Fijians regard the British Government as
being committed to remaining in control of Fiji indefinitely to protect Fijian
interests, or to handing over control in accordance with a constitution which will
ensure the paramountcy of their interests. I do not propose to comment in detail on
the merits of these alternatives because they are outside the scope of this despatch
although, as I have attempted to show, the introduction of rural local government
raises issues which are fundamental to the future of this Colony, and it has therefore
been necessary to refer to these issues in explanation of this third failure over rural
local government.
20. All I would say about these alternatives now is that they are both
unattractive. For Fiji to continue indefinitely under British control is a disturbing
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prospect. The present constitution is suitable for conditions within Fiji only to the
extent that it provides a modus vivendi between conflicting racial interests. The
modifications which are to be introduced next year, which include a greatly extended
franchise and the increase in the number of members are designed to permit the
introduction at an early date of a ‘member’ system but until this is accepted the
official majority is to be retained. Outside Fiji the constitution is likely to be
increasingly subject to attack as being archaic. In its present form it leads to a
racialistic and irresponsible approach by certain elected members of the Legislature,
and makes it difficult to get controversial but necessary measures adopted. This
latter defect impedes constructive government which is a serious disadvantage at a
time when the problems here require forceful action if they are to be resolved. The
alternative of handing the government of the country back to the Fijians sounds well
as a rhetorical statement but appears somewhat unrealistic on examination. The
Fijians show little sign of being able to accept the responsibility and it would lead to
the peculiar position of the industrious and economically powerful majority being
governed by the economically weak Fijians, most of whom live simply and under
primitive conditions in the country. It is unlikely that the Indians would be prepared
to accept this state of affairs.
21. I would mention, however, that the principle of Fijian paramountcy is
supported by a number of senior Administrative Officers who have spent most of
their service in Fiji and I feel that you should be aware of their views. They do not go
so far as to say that Fiji should be ‘handed back’ to the Fijians but they do maintain
that to concede ‘paramountcy’ to the Fijians is the only way in which the present
deadlock can be broken without antagonising the Fijians to an extent which might
be disastrous. They think, also, that there is a fair chance of the Indians accepting the
principle, providing their own political status is improved in relation to that of the
Europeans. What is visualised, in brief, is internal self-government on the basis of a
Fijian racial majority on the Legislative and Executive Councils, with the Indians
next in numbers, and the Europeans, combined with the other racial groups, coming
last. The proposal is really a device to introduce greater flexibility into local affairs by
forcing the local leaders to accept responsibility for government and, by doing so,
overcome their racial prejudices. Although racial in conception, therefore, it might
prove to be the best way of achieving inter-racialism. The proposal merits serious
consideration, especially as more orthodox approaches appear unacceptable to the
Fijians. My present view is that while the majority of the Indian community would be
ready to accept it, Indian politicians and leaders of opinion would regard it as
political suicide to do so. And I fear that even this solution would not make the
Fijians any more enthusiastic about multi-racial local government.
22. Before concluding this despatch, I should like to refer to two factors which
are likely to accelerate the need to consider what the future of Fiji is to be and, if
possible, to reach a decision on what that future is to be, and the conditions on which
the United Kingdom Government will be prepared to accept responsibility for Fiji.
You will recall that Lord Selkirk5 raised these questions in a demi-official letter to
you No. Q11953/111/61 of the 30th November, 1961.
23. The first factor is the increasingly precarious condition of the Fijian
Administration. Financially, there is a marked resistance amongst the Fijians to
5 UK commissioner for Singapore and commissioner-general, South-East Asia, 1959–1963.
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paying their Provincial rates. For the Provinces of Ra, Ba, and Nadroga in the
Western Division, a total of £4,214 has been collected in Provincial rates by the end
of May this year out of an estimated £51,643. There has been a steady decline in the
payment of these rates during recent years, a fact to which I drew attention in my
despatch No. 18 of the 18th January, 1962, when commenting on the annual report
for 1960 of the Secretary for Fijian Affairs. In addition, many of the Fijian Affairs
Regulations which gave authority to the Fijian Administration, and provided the
basis on which Fijian society was organised, are now being repealed; my despatch No.
339 of the 24th May, 1962 on International Labour Organisation Convention No. 105
refers. The Fijian Administration, for all its defects, has provided a stabilising
influence in Fijian affairs and it seems that this influence is going to be much less
significant in future. Accompanying this decline in the influence of the Fijian
Administration, is the decline in the authority of the Chiefs. This process has still
some way to go, but it is occurring. In consequence, the Fijians face a vacuum in
leadership unless acceptable political leaders soon emerge.
24. The second factor is related to the first. The new electoral regulations will
give Fijian adults the right to vote for the first time. At the first elections they are
expected to exercise this right responsibly, and the majority of Fijian members
returned will probably be those leaders who are already familiar. But the ballot box
provides opportunities for the demagogue and, looking to the future, the possibility
cannot be discounted that, with their economic difficulties and their apprehension of
the Indians, the Fijians may transfer their support from their present moderate
leaders to extremists on a platform of Fijian nationalism. Since the majority of the
security forces are Fijian, this prospect should be provided against by considering
now, while the political atmosphere remains comparatively calm, what the future of
the country is to be. In some respects, Fiji contains the ingredients of another
Palestine or Cyprus, a comparison which is beginning to be made more frequently.
In my opinion, some years remain for political manoeuvre, but I think it would be
inadvisable to suppose that the passage of time will make the solution of the racial
issue any easier.
49 CO 1036/654 3–13 July 1962
[Future of Fiji]: minutes by J E Marnham, A R Thomas and 
Sir H Poynton on future policy in the context of talks with 
other powers about colonial territories in the Pacific
Mr. Thomas (through Mr. Jerrom)
As you know, we are due shortly to have talks in Washington on the future of the
Pacific territories with the U.S., Australia, New Zealand and (it now seems definite)
France.
2. I submit draft briefs1 on the British territories, together with a general
introductory brief and further drafts on U.N., Communist and Asian interests in our
territories. They will need clearance with other departments, but I submit them first
1 Not printed.
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in order to be sure that higher authority in the Colonial Office approves what we say
in Whitehall.
3. The Joint Planners are preparing a brief on strategic interests for
consideration by the Chiefs of Staff. Other drafts are being prepared on the South
Pacific Commission, communications, and arrangements for future discussions with
the other metropolitan powers. These further briefs may affect marginally what is
said in the batch now submitted, but I think not enough to warrant further delay in
submitting these.
4. Of this present batch, I think that all except that on Fiji2 are fairly
straightforward, and I hope that higher authority will be able to approve them, for
their limited purpose as guidance for the coming talks, without undue difficulty.
5. The Fiji draft is more controversial, since it tries to set out the makings of a
policy for resolving the Colony’s internal problems which frankly we have not yet
got. It should be read together with the despatch from the Governor, and the draft
reply, submitted on PAC 93/1/02 attached.3 I think higher authority will want to read
both drafts together, but I would suggest that thereafter they be separated and that
the draft brief, which is non-committal and (like its fellows) needed quickly, be
approved or amended without awaiting the more deliberate thought which I think is
called for by the draft despatch.
Both drafts between them represent an approach which is designedly provocative;
which the Governor will not like; which may be based on wishful thinking in the
department; and which may if followed through lead to trouble in Fiji. Apart from
these disadvantages it seems to me to have much to commend it! Mr. Wheatley’s and
my reason for thus stirring up trouble is our feeling that Fiji can’t afford to drift
much longer (or that if it can, this should at least be a conscious decision); that to
resign ourselves to communalism is a counsel of despair; and that to entrench Fijian
paramountcy is not a durable answer. Our justification is the support lent to this
view by Sir Alan Burns and the general, if intangible, impression I have gained
during the past six months that with really determined leadership a non-racial
community might yet be achieved (though it probably needs someone of the calibre
of a Foot or a Cohen to drive it through).
I am putting a copy of this minute on PAC 93/1/02 so that Fiji policy may be
considered without rush. Meanwhile I submit for more urgent consideration the
draft briefs for the coming talks, subject to inter-departmental clearance which Mr.
Wheatley will arrange.
J.E.M.
3.7.62
2 The Fiji draft argued, ‘The economic value [of the colony] to Britain is nil’. The UK made available to Fiji
£1 million p.a. in CD&W grants and Exchequer loans, and about £200,000 p.a under the Overseas Aid
Scheme to maintain 360 officers expatriate officers. The UK took about 45 per cent of Fiji’s exports, Canada
14 per cent, but Australia and New Zealand only 9 per cent each. On the communal problem, the draft
suggested that some chiefs already spoke privately about wanting to ‘kick the Indians into the sea’. The UN
was likely to become interested within a year and to press for decolonisation. Some good might come of
this because it would concentrate minds in Fiji. The draft envisaged one of three solutions. The
abandonment of attempts to foster integration, recognition of Fijian paramountcy, or an attempt to bring
the communities together. The UK had yet to decide which to adopt. A later (1963) version of the Fiji paper
is reproduced as document 66.
3 For the despatch from Maddocks, see 48; for the reply as sent, see 52.
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Sir H. Poynton
I submit a number of briefs in preparation for Mr. Marnham’s forthcoming talks in
Washington with representatives of the U.S., Australia, N.Z. and France.
I am afraid that both the number and contents of the briefs are formidable. My
excuse for troubling you is that the Washington discussions may be the first of a
series of international discussions about the Pacific and it seems advisable to ensure
that the basic and initial briefs are approved by higher authority. Nor do I suggest
that you need read the briefs in full. I think that it should be sufficient if you could
concentrate on the section coming at the end of each brief entitled ‘Points for Talks’.
The brief on Fiji is, as Mr. Marnham states in para. 5 of his minute of 3.7.62, more
controversial than the others and I refer in this context to (8), minutes from 27.6 and
the draft despatch on PAC 93/1/02. It would be convenient to approve the draft on
that file at the same time as the briefs on this file are considered but if it is desired to
defer the former, this could be done. For the rest, it seems to me that the department
is to be complimented on the thoroughness and quality of the briefs. They are still for
clearance with other departments, including the C.R.O.
I think that Mr. Fraser will want to see.
A.R.T.
9.7.62
Mr. Fisher
I think you should see this sheaf of briefs which have been prepared for the
forthcoming talks in Washington with the United States, Australia, New Zealand and
France.
I have no comment on the briefs dealing with the particular territories though I
think you should read the one on Fiji, which is the most controversial, rather
carefully. It seems to me to put the problems very clearly and in a very well balanced
form.
The one brief about which I do find considerable difficulty is the general
background one which I have put on top. To my mind this draft as originally
prepared reflects a state of mind which seems to be becoming increasingly prevalent
in Whitehall and which I myself find extremely distasteful, namely that our policy
should now be to get rid of territories as fast as we can and in any possible way in
which we can manage to do so simply because we appear to be tired of our
responsibilities. This place is of no strategic value, get rid of it. This place is of no
economic value and indeed is a financial liability. Pass the burden over to someone
else. The United Nations does not like us having any Colonies. Our continued
possession of them is an embarrassment to us in dealing with the United Nations.
Get rid of them. The idea that we still have a continuing responsibility to create
conditions of stable government before we depart or even that we may have to
preserve indefinitely some colonial or quasi-colonial relationship in order to
complete our mission seems to be becoming increasingly brushed aside. The fashion
is now to talk about ‘de-colonisation’ as if this were an objective in itself. It is
symptomatic of the negative and defeatist attitude which I so much dislike.
Obviously the ultimate objective is to grant self government or wherever possible
independence, but this should be the culmination of our preparatory work in fitting
territories for self government and not a device to enable us to rid ourselves of
responsibilities before our task is completed. Perhaps in the past our publicity about
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colonialism has been too altruistic and we may have been a little nervous about
bringing up the fact that the colonial relationship is of mutual benefit to Great
Britain and the Colonies and as such is perfectly respectable. But I can imagine
nothing more cynically irresponsible than to say, when we have made countries like
Malaya, Ghana, Nigeria and so on, independent, that we cannot be bothered to carry
the burden of the rest of them any longer because they are a liability. I have therefore
redrafted this brief pretty considerably in the hope of giving a more positive approach
to the problem. The conclusions in the brief are more or less all right but they seem
to me to be arrived at for the wrong reasons.
A.H.P.
13.7.62
50 CO 1036/998, no 28 4 July 1962
[Carpenters’ monopoly]: letter from J E Marnham to Sir K Maddocks
reporting a meeting with R B Carpenter
I have sent you a telegram reporting R. B. Carpenter’s categorical denial that his firm
has the slightest intention of making a take-over bid for Burns Philp (South Sea).
Here is the fuller account of our talk which I promised.
2. When your telegram No. 93 arrived we discovered that Carpenter had only one
more day in England. We were a little hesitant at asking an unknown tycoon to come
and be lectured at such short notice, but we did, and Ambler1 and I saw him on the
29th June.
3. Ambler came straight to the point and said that you had told us of rumours
afloat in Fiji that Carpenters might be contemplating a take-over. His immediate
response was a shout of what seemed to both of us (unless he is a consummate actor
and we are mugs) perfectly genuine astonishment. He said he couldn’t imagine
where or how such rumours could have originated, that they certainly had not the
slightest foundation and that he had no intention of doing anything of the sort.
4. Having apologised for asking him to call under what we readily accepted
were false premises, Ambler nevertheless went on to say that, had there been
anything in the rumours, we should have felt it right to let Carpenter know of the
concern you had expressed at the possibility. Your concern, he said, was based on
two grounds: first, the economic effect which a monopoly could be expected to have
on the country’s economy; and secondly, the political ammunition which a take-
over would present to anti-European agitators (on the lines of paragraph 5 of your
letter). Ambler stopped here and did not go on to use the argument in your
paragraph 6.
5. Carpenter took this in very good part (indeed the whole talk was very friendly
and I must say we both liked and were impressed by him). For his part, he said he was
very conscious of the unpopularity which the size of his firm was liable to engender.
Indeed he claimed that Carpenters had in the past decided against undertaking
1 Ambler Thomas.
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certain pieces of development which they thought would benefit the economy,
because they had sensed that further activity on their part would be resented by the
people and discouraged—or at least not encouraged—by Government. He felt they
were in a difficult position in such cases: they could see things to do which ought to
help the economy and which they had the capital, the organization and the know-
how to do better than anyone else; but if they embarked on them they were liable to
be criticised for increasing their ‘stranglehold’. As an earnest of his desire to help
solve this problem, he said his firm were thinking seriously of forming a subsidiary
company to take over all their Fiji interests, in which local shareholding would be
welcomed even to the extent of a majority of say 60%. Indeed, but for the ‘troubles’
this would have been tried last year.
6. They had tried, in other ways, he said, to shoulder responsibilities
commensurate with their influence, particularly in the field of vocational training
and employing locals up to the limit of their abilities. He thought it fair to say that in
these fields his firm was in some respects ahead of both Government and the banks,
though he took the point that Government has to go relatively slowly in order to
keep the balance between Fijians and Indians. He doubted whether many locals
would ever rise right to the top—Fijians were ‘too provincial’ to cope with world-
wide financial problems, and Indians were too unreliable and self-seeking. But he
was ready to take as many as he could get in any jobs for which they were fitted, if
only because imported labour was so expensive.
7. Carpenter expanded quite a bit about the need for technical education, using
as a peg Ambler’s remarks about anti-business and anti-white propaganda based on
paragraph 5 of your letter. After volunteering (perhaps a bit cavalierly!) that he
thought we all let ourselves get over-worried by the oratory of ‘a few larrikins’, he
said he thought demagogues were the inevitable product of an educational system
which turned out more half-educated youths than there were jobs for; the real
answer—since one clearly couldn’t deny them education—was to make a proper
job of it by providing more and better technical colleges and so on. (This will
scarcely strike you, after West Africa, as a blindingly original thought, but I
mention it as evidence of the friendly and commonsense nature of much that
Carpenter said.)
8. Conversation finally ranged over more general Fiji problems. I don’t think I
need burden you with it, save that Carpenter strongly advocated making as much
land as possible available to Indians (and suitable Fijians) in individual 20-acre or so
plots for mixed farming. He said he was constantly urging C.S.R. to do this, and that
if they didn’t it would be well worthwhile for Government to buy the land—they
ought to be able to resell quickly enough to have no difficulty in finding the money
for the short time needed (easier said than done, as we know from our talks with
Ritchie2 early this year!).
9. This letter has ranged well beyond its original purpose of recording
Carpenter’s disclaimer of designs on Burns Philp. I have recorded the talk at length,
partly for its intrinsic interest and partly, since Carpenters seem to be rather ogres in
Fiji eyes, to explain why we ourselves rather took to him. He eartainly struck us as
able, sincere, and genuinely anxious to help Fiji. But if you think we have been had
for simpletons, please don’t hesitate to disullusion us.
2 H P Ritchie was then deputy financial secretary, Fiji.
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51 CO 1036/613, no 121 19 July 1962
[Human rights]: letter from J E Marnham to Sir K Maddocks on the
introduction of human rights provisions in the constitution
I am writing this letter, perhaps prematurely, to ask whether you have given any
thought to the timing of the introduction of human rights provisions into the Fiji
Constitution. We realise, of course, that it may seem early days to be thinking along
these lines, but the view has been expressed by a former Minister of State that such
provisions should be contained in the body of the constitution (rather than the
preamble) and that they should be inserted in any new constitution being drafted
for Colonial territories generally which are at an earlier stage than independence
since it would then be easier to secure their retention in the independence
constitution.
2. So far as Commonwealth countries are concerned, the constitution of the
Republic of India (promulgated 1949) contains elaborate provisions safeguarding
fundamental rights of individuals and of minorities and that for Malaya (1957) also
has provisions safeguarding ‘Fundamental Liberties’ derived partly from the 1950
European Convention. The first example of full-scale constitutional provision based
on that Convention was that inserted in the Nigeria constitution (October 1959) a
year before independence.1 You may remember that the 1957 Nigeria Conference
agreed that draft provisions should be prepared for consideration at the Resumed
Conference the following year. The Minorities Commission, set up after the 1957
Conference, prefaced its recommendstions in 1958 with the following words which
are a good summary of the case for fundamental rights provisions:—
‘One group (of witnesses appearing before the Commission) asked only for
provisions in the Constitution guaranteeing certain fundamental rights.
These were the Christian bodies who appeared before us both in Lages, on
behalf of their organisations throughout Nigeria, and again in the Northern
Region. Some other witnesses said they would welcome such provisions in
the Constitution but were afraid that they would not be sufficient.
Provisions of this kind in the Constitution are difficult to enforce and
sometimes difficult to interpret. Nevertheless, we think they should be
inserted. Their presence defines beliefs widespread among democratic
countries and provides a standard to which appeal may be made by those
whose rights are infringed. A Government determined to abandon
democratic courses will find ways of violating them but they are of great
value in preventing a steady deterioration in standards of freedom and the
unobtrusive encroachment of a Government on individual rights. We have
therefore considered what provision might suitably be inserted in the
Constitution and have given particular attention to the Convention on
Human Rights to which, we understand, Her Majesty’s Government has
adhered on behalf of the Nigerian Government. Where the matter which we
1 On the issue of safeguards for human rights in the Nigerian constitution, see Ronald Hyam and Wm
Roger Louis, eds, The Conservative government and the end of empire 1957–1964 (BDEEP, 2000) part I,
pp lxvii-lxviii and documents 103–105, and Martin Lynn, ed, Nigeria (BDEEP, 2001) part II, 432 and 454.
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think needs expression has already been provided for in the Convention of
Human rights, we aimply place below the relevant provisions in that
Convention but we do not necessarily recommend the exact wording of the
Convention and it may be that constitutional lawyers will wish to draft in
different terms.’
3. The Nigeria provisions have been used as a model, adapted as necessary, in the
following constitutions:—
(a) Sierra Leene (1961)—independence constitution as agreed at Constitutional
Conference 1960;
(b) British Guiana (1961)—internal self-government constitution, as agreed at
1960 Conference;
(c) Malta (1961)—constitution representing a similar form of internal self-
government to that of Singapore, as recommended by the 1960 Commission;
(d) Kenya (Nevember 1960)—amended constitution, short of full internal self-
government but with majority of unofficial Ministers, following the Secretary of
State’s proposals to Constitutional Conference in January/February 1960.
(e) Southern Rhodesia (1961)—advanoed state of internal self-government,
following certain recommendations of the Monckton Commission.
In addition, the Cyprus constitution contains provisions safeguarding ‘Fundamental
Rights & Liberties’ based on the European Human Rights Convention but not
deriving directly from the Nigerian model.
4. In May 1960 a motion was passed in the Basutoland National Council
favouring legislation against colour discrimination. During subsequent Executive
Council proceedings the limited motion was converted into a major proposal for a
comprehensive statement of human rights and fundamental freedoms. A draft Bill
was prepared, despite the territory’s comparatively early state of constitutional
development, and since that a Constitutional Commission has been set up to review
the working of the 1959 Constitution. The Commission is still in session and will, no
doubt, consider inter alia the merits of the draft Bill.
5. The position varies in other Colonial territories but the general view here is
that, unless there are overriding local objections, it is desirable that an independence
constitution should include human rights provisions and that this object is likely to
be achieved more easily it inclusion can be secured initially at the internal self-
government stage or perhaps even earlier if there are particular minority interests to
be safeguarded. On the other hand, since Britain is a party to the European
Convention and is bound to secure its observance in the territories to which it has
been extended, it may be unnecessary or inappropriate to introduce the provisions
into the constitution at an early stage because up to independence H.M.G. has the
means to secure such observance. It is however likely that constitutional provisions
enforceable in the courts may in practice afford a better protection to the individual
than H.M.G.’s intervention, which might be very difficult when a territory has
reached an advanced stage of self-government.
6. We should be grateful for your views on this matter.
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52 CO 1036/775, no 10 31 July 1962
[Future of Fiji]: despatch (reply) from Mr Sandys to Sir K Maddocks
arguing that indefinite recognition of Fijian paramountcy is
impracticable
I have the honour to acknowledge your despatch No. 388 of the 19th June.1 I am
grateful to you for setting out so fully your reasons for concluding that it would be
unwise politically to pursue for the time being the introduction of interacial local
government.
2. You give as the main reason the fear of the Fijians for the Indians. You go on
to point out that this fear is such that the Fijians are now unlikely to agree to any
progress of this or a similar nature within a reasonable time ahead unless they are
given assurances about their future status through changes at the centre of
government. This in turn raises the whole question of the future of Fiji and of
Britain’s part there in. You conclude with reasons why it is important to reach an
early decision on these last points.
3. I accept that, as shown in your despatch, a serious situation may soon
confront us in Fiji, and I agree that it is desirable to consider and take a decision as
soon as possible on how best to deal with it or avoid it. I agree also that it is an
exceedingly intractable problem for which there is no easy and attractive solution
There is bound to be mounting international pressure against the indefinite
continuation of British colonial rule (and may be mounting pressure from within
from the Indian community as their numbers continue to increase both absolutely
and relatively to the minority communities); and, although I would certainly hope to
resist suggestions for withdrawal so premature as to leave chaos behind us, I see little
prospect that it will be practicable for us to stay in control in Fiji for anything like as
long as the majority of Fijians seem to envisage. Prophecy is rash, but it must be
doubtful whether Britain can still expect to be in control in Fiji ten years hence, and
the tempo of events elsewhere suggest that it is questionable whether the era of
British control can be prolonged for as long as that.
4. The alternative to it is which you mention, namely the recognition of Fijian
paramountcy in some form, seems to me impracticable. I do not see that we could
possibly persuade, and it would be wrong and impossible politically to try to compel,
the Indians to accept a constitution which recognised Fijian paramountcy. Even
were we to do so and however such a provision was entrenched, I find it unrealistic to
think that they, with a growing majority of the population, their economic
dominance and well known propensity for self-advancement, would accept it after
our departure, and I should expect them to receive considerable outside support in
revolting against what would surely seem to the world at large to be the negation of
democracy. However innocent the Fijians may be of the historical developments
which have brought the Indians to the position of the largest community, that is the
position today. The Indians are there to stay and their position must inevitably
become increasingly important. It seems to me that any solution which does not
recognise these facts is doomed to fail.
1 See 48.
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5. I am forced to the conclusion that we should consider very seriously a third
approach with you do not mention, namely a forthright statement to the effect that
the privileged position of the Fijians is not one which the modern world can be
expected to find acceptable or Britain to continue indefinitely to enforce. Such a
statement would stress that, in the view of Her Majesty’s Government, the only
future for Fiji worthy of her past and suitable for her position in the modern world is
as a multiracial state in which citizens of all races have full opportunity to play their
part according to their abilities; that this, whilst it cannot be achieved overnight, is
the goal at which Britain and Fiji must unite in aiming; and that it is not too soon to
begin considering how to adjust the institutions of government, both central and
local, to this end. I realise that action on these lines would amount to shock tactics
and that the precise content, timing and presentation of such a declaration of policy
would need careful thought. Its subsequent implementation, moreover, would call
for a sustained effort throughout all ranks of Government under the inspiration of a
strong lead from you and your senior advisers. But I am reluctant to believe that the
goal is unattainable, for I believe that to fall back either on entrenched separation or
on the indefinite continuation of the status quo is a counsel of despair. Unless early,
steady progress is made in this direction, there must surely be a risk of a major
explosion later when the Indian community realises its strength and decides to
exercise it.
6. I do not of course seek your immediate acceptance of this proposition on the
strength of the admittedly sketchy outline in this despatch. I should however be
grateful for your own considered views on the future of the Colony, including your
positive recommendations on the policy by which you suggest we should direct our
actions for, say, the next five years. This policy cannot of course be considered in
isolation from the crucial problem of the use of land. I should be grateful if I could
have at least your provisional views in time for them to be considered here and then
discussed with you during the visit which I hope that a member of my staff and
possibly the Parliamentary Under Secretary of State will be able to make to Fiji
during the coming autumn. I have in mind that following that discussion I should
formulate more detailed but still tentative proposals for future policy and arrange a
suitable opportunity to discuss them further with you before reaching final
conclusions.
53 CO 1036/775, No 21 10 Oct 1962
[Future of Fiji]: depatch (reply) from Sir K Maddocks to Mr Sandys
arguing in favour of gradual change and opposing a statement about a
multi-racial state. Appendix A: Proposed statement on constitutional
advance; Appendix B: Note on land use
[This despatch was Maddocks’s response to document 52 in which Sandys argued that
indefinite recognition of Fijian paramountcy was impractical. Document 52 was
described by Marnham as ‘designedly provocative’ in that it deliberately ‘shot down’ two
solutions to the Fiji problem, namely indefinite continuance of UK rule and recognition
of Fijian paramountcy. Instead it suggested as a third solution the goal of Fiji as a multi-
racial state (cf 49, note 2). This was intended as ‘shock treatment’ for the Fijians. It was
also designed, as A R Thomas put it, to ‘goad’ Maddocks and his advisers into more
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constructive thought than they had so far evinced. To this extent, according to Marnham,
it served its purpose because the despatch from Maddocks reproduced below was a
‘thoughtful and well argued counterblast’ which demonstrated that the governor
recognised the need to make progress. His despatch provided ‘admirable food for thought
and discussion’ for a forthcoming visit to Fiji by Fisher, the parliamentary under-
secretary of state (CO 1036/775, minute by Marnham, 16 Nov 1962). Poynton thought the
statement proposed by Maddocks in Appendix A to his despatch ‘pretty harmless, and
indeed rather platitudinous’. The permanent secretary disliked the reference in the last
sentence of para 6 of the statement about ‘the right of the Fijians to be adequately
represented in the Civil Service’. This might become an ‘embarrassing hostage to fortune’
and therefore damaging to the ultimate goal of a civil service selected on merit without
regard to race. Poynton suggested instead ‘adequate representation of the Fijians in the
Civil Service’. He also wondered whether there was any need at all ‘for a long rigmarole of
this kind’. He preferred a shorter statement of a handful of sentences only emphasisng
the need for local thinking ahead of Fisher’s visit (ibid, minute by Poynton, 16 Nov 1962).
For CO amendments to Appendix A, see notes 4–7 below.]
I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your secret despatch No. 417 of the
31st July, 1962, on the subject of the future of Fiji. I have given the contents of this
despatch the most careful consideration in consultation with my closest official
advisers, and I have endeavoured in private discussions with a few leading members
of the community to assess current feelings about the timing of further
constitutional advance.
2. While I fully appreciate that there is mounting international pressure against
an indefinite continuation of British colonial rule, it must be made clear that the
demand for self-government in this territory is, at present, negligible. It will
certainly grow but is at present confined to a handful of Indian politicians. If the pace
of constitutional advance were governed solely by the wishes of the people of Fiji,
(including the great majority of the Indian community), it would be slow and
gradual.
3. It is true that recent events in other parts of the world have brought home to a
few of the more thoughtful members of the community that a move towards internal
self-government or even independence may be forced upon them before long, but
leading Fijians and Europeans alike view the prospect with apprehension. Their
natural reaction is to resist change rather than to welcome it and to demand to know
what lies at the end of the road before taking the first step along it. Recently, for
instance, the Hon. Ravuama Vunivalu declined to participate in the proceedings of a
committee appointed to consider the future organisation of the Fijian
Administration on the grounds that, since the meeting of the Council of Chiefs
which had appointed the committee, a number of things had happened to worry the
Fijian people. He is reported to have said:—
‘that the Colonial Office was now under the Secretary of State for
Commonwealth Relations1 and that the British appeared to be entering
E.E.C. and turning away from the Commonwealth. What would be the effect
on the Deed of Cession? Nearer home, events in West New Guinea had caused
alarm. There had been the complete sell-out of the Papuans and none of the
big powers seemed to be thinking of them.2 He referred to the United Nations
1 The CO and the CRO were under the same secretary of state from July 1962 but the CO was still a
separate department with its own staff and departmental functions. The two departments merged to form a
Commonwealth Office in August 1966.
2 The reference here is to West Papua or Iriyan Jaya and the Indonesian occupation.
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demand for immediate independence of colonial territories and to a recent
statement by a well-known Australian preacher that Fiji should be moving
more rapidly to independence. Even Government officials were now talking
about changes. Government should make its position clear on the future of
Fiji before changes in the Fijian Administration were considered.’
4. The doubts expressed in paragraph 3 of your despatch, whether the era of
British control can be prolonged for as much as ten years, indicate that public
discussion about the form of government which will be best suited to local
conditions must now be actively stimulated and that a decision on the speed and
direction of further constitutional change must be made as soon as possible. The
matter will, however, have to be handled with great care and shock tactics as
suggested in paragraph 5 of your despatch would be fatal.
5. I am strongly opposed to any announcement that Fiji should become a multi-
racial state in which citizens of all races are to have full opportunity to play their part
according to their abilities, and that the privileged position of the Fijians cannot be
continued indefinitely. I am quite sure than any expression of views on these lines
would be disastrous. The immediate reaction would be one of anger and amazement,
not only amongst the Fijians, but also amongst the Europeans. It would be contrary
to all the pledges which have been made to the Fijians since Cession, the most recent
of which was made by me, with your approval, on the 10th October, 1961, the
relevant part of which reads:—
‘I speak particularly to the Fijian people because some of them are, I know,
worried by the changes that have been taking place in recent years. The
growing population and talk of constitutional advance have led to questions
by some Fijians about the intentions of the British Government and to some
expressions of fear about the safety of their land.
I have been able during my visit to England to explain these doubts and
fears to the Secretary of State and I can assure you that the British
Government stands firmly by the Deed of Cession and the subsequent
promises that were made regarding the ownership of Fijian land.
As for constitutional changes, the British Government has no intention of
forcing the pace of constitutional advance in Fiji. The extent and timing of
such changes will continue to take into account the need to safeguard
legitimate to Fijian interests; and Her Majesty’s Government will only decide
on any major changes after full consultation with representatives of the
various communities in the Colony. They believe, however, that it is in the
general interest that some measure of increased responsibility should be
given to unofficial members as soon as they are ready to accept it.’
The statement which you contemplate would therefore undermine the confidence of
the Fijians in the intentions of the United Kingdom Government. They would regard
themselves as being abandoned to suit the United Kingdom’s interests, and in
response to pressure from the United Nations, based on principles which take no
account of local conditions, of past pledges, and of the fact that, unless the Fijians are
to receive the treatment necessary for the reasonable protection of their interests
they will be dominated by the Indians. It would destroy the balance between the races
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which rests on the Fijians being accorded protection for which, in return, they have
given their full cooperation to Government, and have adopted a tolerant attitude
towards the Indians. If the Fijians lose their confidence in the British it is possible
that they, united as a race, would embark on a policy of passive resistance and non-
cooperation which would seriously prejudice the success of any move towards self-
government, and would inevitably lead to violence.
6. I think, with respect, that your proposed statement is based on two incorrect
assumptions. First, it under-estimates the strength of Fijian opposition to proposals
of this kind. Secondly, it assumes that a majority of the Indian population are
determined to achieve multi-racial self-government on a basis of complete equality
without delay. I do not think that this is so. With the exception of a small minority,
the Indians are anxious to avoid antagonizing the Fijians. They recognize that it is in
Indian interests to go along with the Fijians, and to put up with the discrimination
which this involves until time and nature gradually achieve greater equality. To
alienate Fijian opinion abruptly would make the Indian position in Fiji very difficult,
and might well lead to bloodshed and chaos. No sensible Indian wants that to occur.
On the other hand it must be accepted that Indians are easy victims to mass hysteria,
and are sheep-like in the following of their leaders. Determined political leadership
by rabble-rousers of the calibre of A.D. Patel could therefore have unpredictable
results. Nevertheless the present Indian view is that a reasonable measure of
protection for the Fijian is acceptable and justified. It is the privileged position of the
European to which the Indians object, largely because it stands in the way of Indian
aspirations (commercial, industrial and political), and it is an adjustment in this
respect which they will expect before self-government is introduced rather than any
substantial interference with the Fijian position, which they believe will in any case
be eroded in course of time.
7. Oh the face of it, of course, I agree that your proposed statement is true
enough, i.e. that Britain cannot continue indefinitely to enforce the privileged
position of the Fijians but I believe that such pronouncements are best left unsaid at
this juncture. It is to be hoped that, ultimately, some form of multi-racialism and
equality will come to Fiji but it is far too soon for public pronouncements to this
effect. We should therefore put aside the ultimate aim and concentrate on the
intermediate aim of introducing internal self-government smoothly which means
that it must be in roduced in a manner acceptable to the local population as a whole.
I am sure that the only way in which this can be done is to acknowledge that the
Fijians are entitled to protection, to entrench such protection in the constitution and
to maintain the United Kingdom connexion for as long as possible, perhaps
eventually in the form of a Treaty of Friendship similar to that between the United
Kingdom and the Kingdom of Tonga.
8. As a first step in the stimulation of the public discussion to which I referred in
paragraph 4, I included the following passage in the broadcast which I made on the
8th October, in connexion with the Cession Day celebrations:—
‘The Colony has reached a stage in its development when its leaders should be
playing a greater part than they are playing now in the management of their
country’s affairs. Some of the unofficial members who will be chosen at the
next election may well be asked to shoulder real responsibility. I hope that
you who will choose them will remember this, for in the days that lie ahead
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Fiji will need as leaders honest and good men who will work not for
themselves or for sectional benefit but for the good of everyone in Fiji—
Fijians, Indians, Europeans and others—so that Fiji may prosper and may be
a good and happy place for all who live within these shores.’
9. I propose, subject to your agreement, to follow this up in my Address to
Legislative Council at the opening of the Budget Session on the 23rd November with
a statement to the effect that it is desirable that member of the public as well as of
the Legislature should think seriously about the future so that exploratory
discussions may be held with the Under Secretary of State when he visits Fiji early in
1963. A draft statement on the lines I have in mind is attached as Appendix A and is
submitted for your approval.
10. In considering the timing of local discussions about constitutional advance it
must be remembered that general elections are to be held at the end of March, 1963.
In January or February, when the Minister is expected to visit Fiji, electioneering will
be at its height and it must be expected that politicians will adopt attitudes that will
be more extreme and uncompromising than would normally be the case. One
European member has told me that at such a time he would have to speak strongly
against constitutional advance because his electorate would wish this and that he
might have to take up a position in public from which it would be difficult to
extricate himself after the elections. It would therefore be preferable if the visit of the
Under Secretary of State could be made after the elections, say in May, if that were
possible. However, if this cannot be arranged I certainly would not suggest any
greater deferment of his visit.
11. Turning now to the question of the Colony’s future, while I am very
conscious of the tremendous differences, cultural, historical and psychological that
divide the Fijians from the Indians, I do not believe that it is impossible to devise a
form of government which for a period will be acceptable to both though the task
will certainly be one of great difficulty and demanding great patience. The Fijian is
tolerant and reasonable so long as he feels that his vital interests are being protected;
and the vast majority of the Indians, who are realists, have no wish to antagonize the
Fijians. The Indian community is, in fact, so divided that to many of them a Fijian
leader is much more acceptable than an Indian of a different faction. I believe that
once it were announced that Her Majesty’s Government felt that Fiji was now ready
to move towards self-government, it should not be impossible to work out some
acceptable compromise between the Fijian view that their interests should be
paramount and the Indian view that there should be equality for all. The settled
Europeans and part-Europeans would unfortunately complicate the situation for
they would inevitably sow suspicion of Indian motives among the Fijians.
Nevertheless I believe that with good luck and careful management an acceptable
constitution providing for internal self-government could be devised within the next
few years. I have no doubt, however, that any such compromise will have to be
proposed by us. To bring the Fijian and Indian leaders together in the hope that they
would be able to negotiate a settlement without any firm guidance from the British
Government could have the most harmful results. The Indians, with centuries of
bargaining behind them, would inevitably make claims which would so anger the
Fijians as to cause an immediate breakdown. The Fijians would have to be given clear
assurances from the start.
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12. It should be noted here that the leading Fijians feel very strongly that if
Britain really thinks that Fiji is ready for internal self-government it should say so on
its own initiative and not give the impression that it is giving way to pressure by the
United Nations Organization. They are prepared to listen to the United Kingdom but
greatly resent what they regard as interference by other countries.
13. The type of compromise solution that I have in mind, and to which the
Indians might well agree, is that when, ultimately, Fiji reaches the stage at which it
is appropriate to appoint a chief minister, the chief minister should be a Fijian; that
legislation effecting rights over Fijian land should require a majority of two-thirds or
three-quarters of those present and voting; and that a balance in the Civil Service
should be preserved. This would be a departure from the usual practice but no more
so than was approved in the constitution of Malaya; but if anything is certain it is that
the normal democratic practices of the western world will not, in the foreseeable
future, work here.
14. In the first place there are no genuine political parties in Fiji amongst either
Fijians or Indians and there is no indication at present that such parties will develop
except on racial lines. Although there has recently been rather closer association
between a few left wing Fijian and Indian politicians, the land tenure situation
effectively prevents any lasting alliance between important numbers of the two races.
In the absence of a party system there is no representative body to whom the
Government of Fiji could be handed over and no obvious machinery for forming a
Government. If this situation persists it may in due course be necessary to adopt a
device whereby the Legislature elects its chief minister who in turn would choose his
Cabinet with due regard to the need to include an agreed minimum number of
ministers from each of the main racial groups.
15. One of the main reasons why both Fijians and Europeans dislike the idea of a
ministerial system is the extremely poor quality of the present Indian elected
members, not one of whom is worthy of trust or respect. It is a regrettable fact that
in recent years few Indians of any calibre have offered themselves for election. This
may change when the constitution provides greater opportunities and prospects for
ambitious politicians.
16. A point which has been made to me is that European members of calibre will
be reluctant to accept responsibility under either a member system or a ministerial
system. The reason is that they have remunerative careers in their private capacity,
and will not wish to jeoparize their prospects by accepting member or ministerial
responsibility which will only offer them limited security. The introduction of the
member or ministerial systems, therefore, is likely to be accompanied by a decline in
the influence of European representatives, at any rate those of the better type.
17. The future of the franchise presents a special problem. In the first place there
is the question of the Rotumans, Chinese and other Pacific Islanders who at present
have no vote. These, I believe, should be included with the Europeans in a ‘general’
roll. But much more important is the question of the retention of communal rolls or
of the introduction of a common roll. There is at present the most bitter and
unanimous opposition amongst both Europeans and Fijians to any suggestion of
even a single common roll constituency; but looking to the future, I myself can see
no hope of a breakdown of the deep differences between Fijian and Indian members
while the present system persists. So long as Fijian members look solely to the Fijian
electorate they will be uncompromising in their stand on all things Fijian. The
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Indian members will be equally intransigent so long as they owe their seats solely to
Indian voters. I believe that a common roll on the Tanganyika model,3 with an agreed
number of Fijian, Indian and other members, would have the most salutary results.
This, I believe, should be our aim, though its attainment is certain to be difficult. The
number of seats to be given to each of the racial benches will be a matter for
negotiation and agreement and need not necessarily bear close relation to population
figures.
18. Although efforts to introduce inter-racial local government in the rural areas
has [sic] failed, it is developing (though not without difficulties) in the urban areas
and is being fostered in the rural areas by the appointment of multi-racial district
committees. The purpose of these committees is to provide an opportunity for the
various races, particularly the Fijians and Indians, to meet together and discuss
matters of common concern such as feeder roads, relief for destitutes, rural water
supplies, recreation areas and school building grants
19. In regard to the use of land, the determination of Fijian reserves has almost
been completed and native land outside reserves is now freely available for leasing to
all races, subject to proper subdivisions being prepared. The preparation of
subdivisions, and the manner in which the staff of the Native Land Trust Board has
handled applications for leases, has been subject to a good deal of criticism recently
based on allegations of inefficiency and dilatoriness, but I have appointed a
committee to examine the position which should result in improved performance. A
more extensive note on the land situation is enclosed as Appendix B.
20. I consider that the position of the Fijians in the Civil Service must continue
to be protected, and that the Fijians will attach great weight to provision for this
being made. Since this principle has already been accepted in Malaya, I presume that
there will be no objection to similar protection being provided in Fiji.
21. I have a few comments to make on the localisation of the Civil Service. A
planning exercise has recently been undertaken for the localisation of the Civil
Service over a period of ten years. This exercise was started before your despatch No.
417 was received and its object was to draw up a man-power budget for the training
of local persons so that they can progressively fill posts at present occupied by
expatriate officers, as they become vacant through the retirement or the termination
of the contracts of these officers. The total establishment of the Civil Service is at
present 4,798, of which 4,329 posts are already filled by local officers leaving only 469
filled by officers from overseas. Thus, 90% of the posts in the Civil Service are already
held by local people and, of the remaining 10% which are held by expatriates, it is
estimated that half will be available for filling by local persons within from five to
seven years. It is also relevant that there are now from four to five hundred students
receiving further training abroad. It is true that the great majority of these students
are Indians, and that the posts at present occupied by expatriates are key posts, but
this information does show that a considerably degree of localisation has already
taken place and that, from now onwards, there should be an increasing supply of
local persons with suitable qualifications to fill the remaining posts at present filled
by expatriates. Compared to many other territories which have recently received
independence, Fiji should be reasonably well equipped to govern itself with aid from
3 See 8.
09-Fiji-48-cpp  10/5/06  6:56 AM  Page 158
[53] OCT 1962 159
overseas, chiefly in the form of technical assistance, which I presume the United
Kingdom will be willing to provide.
22. I believe that, bearing in mind the climate of world opinion, the time has
now come for Fiji to move forward along the path towards internal self-government
and that our actions during the next few years should be consciously directed to
reaching that target, stage by stage, without undue delay. The timetable might be as
follows:—
(i) Cession Day statement already made (paragraph 8 above).
(ii) Statement to be made in my Budget Address next month (Appendix A).
(iii) During the visit of the Under Secretary of State next year private discussions
should be held on the means, timing and form of future constitutional progress.
(iv) The ‘member’ system should be introduced as soon as possible after the
forthcoming elections. This could be done without further amendment of the
existing constitution. The broadcast referred to in paragraph 8 above, and the
statement in Appendix A, will make it clear before the elections that elected
members may be required to take over some ministerial responsibilities. As you
know, when this proposal was made in the Legislature in 1961, it was strangly
opposed by four out of five Fijian members, and also by European members. I
believe that this opposition is less strong than it was and that, providing the
Fijians are given assurances about their future, they will be more willing to
cooperate over this and similar measures. I think it advisable, therefore, to await
the outcome of the statement in November and of the discussions with the
Minister before deciding the timing of an announcement of the intention to adopt
the ‘member’ system in 1963.
(v) An announcement might be made in mid-1963 that you welcome the
introduction of the ‘member’ system and hope that it will lead on in due course to
a full ministerial system and pave the way towards internal self-government, for
which you believe Fiji to be ready.
(vi) Provided that the ‘member’ system works smoothly, full discussion on a new
constitution might be held early in 1964.
(vii) A ministerial system might be introduced in January, 1965, with the Governor
(who would have reserve powers) still presiding over Executive Council and with
the Colonial Secretary, Attorney-General and Financial Secretary as ministers.
(viii) Full internal self-government would follow a few years later.
23. I am aware that this timetable provides for a relatively rapid advance towards
internal self-government but I am sure that it is in the interests of the Fijian people
that Fiji should have responsible government while men of the experience and
calibre of Ratu Penaia Ganilau and Ratu K.K.T. Mara are available for appointment as
ministers; and my experience is that once the first step towards self-government has
been taken, the tempo accelerates and that it is rarely that any one stage can be held
back for more then, say, two years. Much will depend on Fijian reactions, but once an
acceptable constitution has been agreed on locally, there would seem to be no reason
to delay its adoption.
24. In conclusion I must again stress the fact that this is certain to be a difficult
and delicate operation which could very easily go badly wrong. If Indian politicians
are too demanding or if the Fijian people are pressed too hard to accept a
constitution that would provide inadequate sufeguards, race relations may so
09-Fiji-48-cpp  10/5/06  6:56 AM  Page 159
160 FIJIAN ASPIRATIONS [53]
deteriorate as to make impossible any progress towards a multi-racial solution. I
believe nevertheless that the operation must be attempted.
25. I shall be grateful for an early indication of any amendments that you would
wish me to make in the proposed statement to the Legislative Council.
Appendix A to 53
It is apparent that the speed with which other dependent territories, particularly
those within the British Empire, have obtained independence in recent years, is
causing speculation amongst members of the public about the future of Fiji.
We live in an era of great and rapid political change, the predominant feature of
which is the emergence of formerly dependent territories to independent status. As
this change affects the British, it is taking the form of the transformation of an
Empire into a Commonwealth, and there is naturally speculation on how Fiji is to fit
into this process [in view of the commitments of Her Majesty’s Government to
safeguard legitimate Fijian interests.]4
Although it is undesirable that this uncertainty should persist, as I said in my
Cession Day Address last year ‘Her Majesty’s Government will only decide on any
major changes after full consultation with the representatives of the various
communities in the Colony.’ Full consultation, therefore, must take place before the
form and the timing of further constitutional advance can be known, and to this
extent the present uncertainty must remain.
But it should be recognized now that it is the long-standing policy of Her Majesty’s
Government to help dependent territories to attain self-government as soon as they
are ready for it. Self-government can take various forms and it does not require any
severance of association with Great Britain.
I also wish to emphasize that Her Majesty’s Government recognizes its obligations
to this country, including the need to safeguard legitimate Fijian interests, and will
continue to give help and protection as long as they are needed.5
Because of the happy relationship which has existed between Fiji and the United
Kingdom in the past, and which continues to exist now, there is a reluctance on the
part of many to accept change. In particular, I am aware that the Fijians are
apprehensive that any major change in the status quo will be detrimental to their
interests. I can give the assurance, however, that any change which is made will
make proper provision for the protection of legitimate Fijian interests, and in saying
this I am thinking in particular of the ownership of Fijian land and of [the right of
the Fijians to be adequately represented]6 in the Civil Service.
Subject to such provision being made, it is unrealistic to suppose that the status
quo can be maintained indefinitely, and neither do I believe that it is in the interests
of the Fijians or Fiji that it should be. Countries and races, like individuals, must be
encouraged to grow and mature by accepting responsibility for the running of their
own affairs, and to retard this natural process by unduly prolonging the state of
4 The section in square brackets was amended by the CO to read, ‘and there is naturally a desire to know
how Fiji is to fit into this process’.
5 The CO deleted this paragraph.
6 The section is square brackets was amended by the CO to read, ‘adequate representation of Fijians’.
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dependence frustrates the development of the potential for accepting responsibility
which exists both in nations and individuals.
This reluctance to accept change means also that the constitution of Fiji continues
to be based on a system which was not devised for modern conditions. Fiji has
become an important centre in the Pacific. The opportunities for education are
steadily improving, and increasing numbers of people from Fiji are obtaining higher
education overseas. The economic development of the Colony is also progressing
rapidly, and bringing with it new standards, wider horizons, and more numerous
problems. With these changing conditions, both within Fiji and in the outside world,
the time is approaching for the people of Fiji to accept greater responsibility for the
government of the country.
I am glad to be able to inform you that the Under Secretary of State hopes to visit
the Pacific early in 1963. [I therefore consider it desirable that members of the public
as well as of the Legislature should think seriously about the future so that
exploratory discussions on this subject may be held with him when he visits Fiji.]7
Appendix B to 53
The Fijian attitude to land is that, providing their rights of ownership are respected
and such land as they require for their own use is made available, chiefly by being
set aside in reserves, Indians or anyone else can lease the remainder. The Indians
do not dispute Fijian rights of ownership over native land, which forms 83% of the
land in the Colony, providing they can lease, with reasonable security, land which
the Fijians are not using productively. If land is not being used productively within
reserves, the Indians feel strongly that it should be taken out of reserve. Much of
the better land is in reserves and the Fijians will be vulnerable to severe criticism if
this land is locked up indefinitely and denied to those who need it. But for some
years at least this criticism should be confined to the cane growing areas where the
Indian population is greatest and good land is in short supply. Outside the cane
areas, not only is the population predominantly Fijian but there is an abundance of
unoccupied land, a great deal of it outside reserves. In fact, the Director of Lands
has estimated that there is sufficient to satisfy demand for at least the next ten
years.
2. In the past, the Fijians have been at a disadvantage as agriculturalists, because
the communal system has made systematic and efficient farming difficult. They
have also suffered from lack of capital and training, a confused system of land
tenure, and insufficient individual incentives due to their social organization. It is
not surprising, therefore, that land occupied by Fijians has seldom been used
properly. These disadvantages, however, are being overcome. The Land
Development Authority will provide guidance and financial assistance, better
opportunities for training are available, and the Fijians are slowly moving from a
7 The section in square brackets was amended by the CO to read, ‘I know that he will want to take this
opportunity to learn the views of all sections of the community on the future of the Colony. I therefore
think it is desirable that members of the public as well as of the Legislature should think seriously about
this question so that they may make their considered views known to him when he visits Fiji. Honourable
Members, I pray that God’s blessing may rest upon your deliberations.’
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communal towards an individual approach to farming. An example of this change
has been the acceptance in principle by the Fijians in some areas that the greater
part of reserves should be subdivided for leasing to individual Fijians as
independent farmers. Although pressure is already evident from Fijians in some
areas for the extension of reserves, or for the resumption of leased land outside
reserves on the expiry of leases, the Native Land Trust Board has recently
announced the following policy decision:—
‘The Board does not propose to undertake a comprehensive review of
decisions already made on the extent of reserves but it would investigate
individual applications from native owners for the return of expired leases for
their use, taking into account the state of cultivation of lands available to the
native owners within twelve months of the date of expiry of the lease, the
population trend of the native owners, and their capability to use adequately
the lands requested as evidenced by their existing cultivation. The return of
such lands will be conditional on their continued cultivation.’
This policy is a reasonable compromise between the rights of the Fijians, as owners,
to regain possession of land which they require for their own use when a lease over it
expires, and the claims of Indian lessees for their leases to be renewed on expiry,
because the Fijians will not be given priority if they have other land at their disposal
which they are not farming efficiently.
3. Because of the prospect that the Fijians will improve as agriculturalists, the
reasonable attitude adopted by the Native Land Trust Board towards the leasing of
native land outside reserves, and the large areas of such land which remain
undeveloped, a modus vivendi may be achieved over land, in which event, it should
be possible to avoid land becoming a crucial issue for at least some years. This
assumes that the Native Land Trust Board will continue to adopt a liberal attitude
towards leasing land outside reserves, and will give preferential treatment to the
Fijians only to the extent that they are given reasonable areas to occupy which they
farm efficiently. Although friction will arise, particularly in the cane areas, I think it
reasonable to accept this assumption, providing Fijian rights of ownership are
respected and the present method of administering Fijian land is retained until the
Fijians themselves agree that it should be changed. By leasing their land, the Fijians
benefit from rents, and they realize that if they, and the rest of the community, are to
have the improved social services which they require, the land must be used
productively. As Ratu Sir Lala Sukuna said in a speech to the Council of Chiefs in
September, 1936:—
‘It is thoroughly understood that the control of our lands is in our hands,
but the owner of property has an important duty to perform . . . It is the
bounden duty of land owners to utilise what they possess for the benefit of
all. An idle land owner neglects his duty to his State. Should his holding be
more than he can utilise, he should lease the surplus to those that can make
use of it . . . This is why I insist that as leaders of the Fijian people, it is our
duty to use our influence, our power, to open up waste Mataqali lands for
agricultural purposes, whether they be taken up by Europeans, Indians or
Fijians.’
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54 CO 1036/703, no 16 18 Oct 1962
[Fijian Pact]: letter from P D Macdonald to J E Marnham about an
alleged secret pact between the Fijians and the UK
This morning I received the following secret report from our Special Branch:—
‘Ratu K.K.T. Mara
A source has reported that after the welcome ceremony at the Wharf for Ratu
Mara on 2nd September, 1962, Ratu Mara, Ratu Penaia and Ratu George
Cakobau1 went to Ratu Mara’s house at Lami where another ceremony of
welcome was accorded to him by people from Lau.
2. After the second ceremony the Lauans left the house and only a few Fijian
V.I.Ps remained. Amongst those who remained were Ratus Penaia and George
Cakobau.
3. Ratu Mara is alleged to have told them that Ratu Sir Lala Sukuna had
come to an agreement with the British Government on the future of the
Fijian race and that while he, Ratu Mara, was in the United Kingdom, he saw a
document purporting to be this agreement between Sukuna and the
Government. He went on to say that the Fijian people, whose future had been
arranged by this agreement, have now only to ask the Vunivalu to implement
the agreement: when such a request is made the Vunivalu would pursue it
with the British Government. The impression obtained was that the
agreement may not be upheld by the British Government now and Ratu Mara
is alleged to have said:—
“Me satini vakavinaka mada na nomu masi”—which means—
“Be prepared to go to war or be prepared to accept whatever is given to you”.’
2. Mulligan, the head of our Special Branch, is desirous that a demi-official letter
should be written to someone in the Colonial Office enquiring that such a document
exists and, whether it does or not, what discussions occurred at the Colonial Office,
with Ratu Mara in attendance which might conceivably impinge on this point.
3. Mulligan has been told that we are quite unaware of any such document and
that its purported existence probably originates from some remark made by the
late Ratu Sukuna about a despatch or letter to the Secretary of State with which
he had been associated and that the story had grown in the telling until it has
reached its present proportions. Mulligan said that his source of information was
present at the meeting when Ratu Mara made these disclosures, and that, in his
opinion, that source was reliable and competent. He added that apparently the
rumour about the existence of this document has been circulating amongst Fijians
since 1953.
4. I cannot believe that there is such a document in existence but, in view of
Mulligan’s insistence, and for his peace of mind, I feel that I must write to you if only
so that you can deny the existence of the document and set his mind at rest.
1 All high chiefs with influence across Fijian society. Cakobau was the Vunivalu, warlord of Fiji.
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55 CO 1036/703, no 13 12 Nov 1962
[Fijian Pact]: letter from J E Marnham to Sir R Garvey requesting
information from the former governor1
I enclose a copy of a secret and personal letter to me from Paddy Macdonald which
explains itself.2 I add as background that Mara, having preached to all of us while he
was here the need for Fijians to emerge into the modern world, has since his return
been playing the arch-traditionalist guardian of every jot and tittle of Fijian rights.
None of us here, including Philip Rogers whose memory I have tapped, knows of
any document or conversation which could conceivably have given rise to all this.
But before I say so to Paddy, it would be a great comfort to know whether you agree.
Can you think of any document, or anything else, which might bear on Mara’s claim?
If so, can you give us a clue where to look for it? And if not, may we quote you to
Macdonald as sharing our ignorance?
I am sorry to bother you, but proving a negative is always difficult and any light
you can shed will be a great help.
I am due to go off to the Pacific immediately after Christmas with Nigel Fisher. We
arrive in Honiara on New Year’s Day (hoping to find at least one Sassenach around),
and reach Fiji about 12th January. I am looking forward enormously to seeing it at
last.
1 Marnham’s letter was sent to Douglas, Isle of Man, where Garvey was now lieutenant-governor.
2 See 54.
56 CO 1036/703, no 3 14 Nov 1962
[Fijian Pact]: letter (reply) from Sir R Garvey to J E Marnham
denying the existence of a pact
Thank you for your Secret letter of the 12th November enclosing a copy of a Secret
and Personal letter to you from Paddy MacDonald with reference to the alleged
existence of an agreement between the late Ratu Sir Lala Sakuna and
H.M.Government on the future of the Fijian Race.1
I can say with absolute certainty, so far as I am concerned, that no such document
exists. As you may probably know Joe Sakuna2 and I were not only firm friends but
came much into contact with each other on official matters during the course of my
six years as Governor of Fiji, and I feel sure that during that relatively long period Joe
would have made some reference to this document had it, indeed, been in existence.
Since we can be pretty sure that this document is purely mythical we should I
think try to sort out what was in Ratu Mara’s mind when he made reference to it, if
indeed he did. There is just the possibility that the Fijian phrase he used was mis-
translated and I cannot myself see any way of ascertaining what Mara really meant
except by confronting him with his statement and asking him to explain it.
1 See 54 & 55. 2 Ratu Sir Lala Sukuna.
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I think I ought to say here that I know a little bit about Mara’s present background
of discontent. It so happens that Bishop Foley, the Roman Catholic Bishop of Fiji,
paid me a visit a month or so ago and Mara, a prominent Roman Catholic, naturally
formed the subject of conversation since he is very well known to us both. It appears
that since Mara’s return to Fiji he has been placed in charge of the Eastern District
with Headquarters at—I think—Levuka. Whilst this is a perfectly logical thing to do
for Mara is a Lauan and Lau forms part of this Division, I know that he feels
disgruntled about this posting for his feeling is that better use should have been
made of the recent course and training which he underwent in the United Kingdom.3
Unfortunately I did not manage to make a contact with Ratu Mara whilst he was
here as he has been one of my mildly troublesome but lovable Fijian friends. As you
know he is of high chiefly rank, very intelligent with a weird dose of immaturity
mixed up with it and extremely ambitious both for himself and his people. In
ordinary circumstances I myself should have felt that it would be worth while taking
the risk of putting him in charge of Fijian Affairs and making him Secretary for
Fijian Affairs, perhaps a little ahead of his readiness for that post. I made strenuous
efforts to train a Fijian to succeed Ratu Sukuna in that post but failed to do so, but I
did put Ratu M4 in as Assistant Secretary with a view to training him up over a period
of years so that he could ultimately take the post.
There is now, I assume, the difficulty of disposing of Archie Reid who I understand
is now Secretary for Fijian Affairs, but it is of absolute importance to the orderly
development of the Fijian Race that Mara should be kept on the rails. Nothing could
be worse than for him to become a sort of mid-twentieth century Apolosi.5 This, with
Mara’s strong leftish tendencies, could happen if he is not carefully handled which I
admit I tried to do. I am sticking my neck out in making these comments to you
because they are now not my concern and I hope that you would not pass them on to
my successor for I am under the impression that he is critical of my administration
of Fiji during my term of Governorship.
I see that you are off to the Pacific immediately after Christmas and I should be,
naturally, delighted to have a talk with you as you suggested some time ago if you
could manage to visit the Isle of Man for a day or so.
3 Mara was attending the London School of Economics for a Diploma in Economics and Social
Development, 1961–62
4 Mara. 5 Apolisi Nawai, Fiji rebel of the early 20th century.
57 CO 1036/618 4 Dec 1962
[Comparison with Malaya]: minute by I S Wheatley to C S Roberts1
asking whether the position of the Indians in Fiji is similar to that of
the Chinese in Malaya
In the context of the Fiji situation, the essential features of the Malayan constitution
are:—
1 Principal, Far East Dept, CO.
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(i) The state is clearly a Malay state, by religion, language, the powers of the
Council of Rulers, qualifications for acquisition of citizenship, and so on. No
concessions seem to have been made in favour of the separate existence of the
Chinese section of the population, but fundamental rights have of course been
preserved.
(ii) Special privileges are given to the Malays (who are defined in Article 160) in
regard to
(a) their land (Articles 89 and 90);
(b) the civil service, scholarships and permits for trade or business (Article
153).
Please see the attached paper2 prepared recently by the Malayan government for the
Malaysian talks for details of these privileges.
It may be added that dereservation of Malay land under Article 89 requires a two-
thirds majority of those voting both in the State Legislative Assembly and in each of
the houses of the Federal Parliament, and a majority of the total membership of
each. Again, under Article 159, to amend Article 89 or 153 (like any other Article in
the Constitution) requires a two-thirds majority of the total membership of each
house in the Federal Parliament. Article 153 is additionally safeguarded in that the
consent of the Council of Rulers (who will always be Malays) is required for its
amendment.
2. I have not been able to detect any privileges in regard to elections; but it may
be that the constituencies have been drawn in such a way as to favour the Malay
electorate, for example, if the Malays predominate in the rural areas, by making
rural constituencies with smaller populations than urban constituencies. The
electorate is of course determined by the citizenship provisions, which appear to
favour the Malays, or at least to make it very difficult for the Chinese to become
citizens.
3. It is difficult to say whether all this could be made to apply to Fiji without
knowing more of the facts in the Malayan situation. The essential question is, I think,
how like the position of the Chinese in Malaya is to that of the Indians in Fiji? Some
relevant facts about the Indians are:—
(i) iithey are almost all citizens of the U.K. and colonies;
(ii) ithey are almost all born in Fiji, in turn very largely of parents born in Fiji;
(iii) they have outnumbered the Fijians since 1945 and are steadily increasing
their lead. (There are now almost 207,000 Indians (50.5%); over 171,000 Fijians
(41.5%); and 35,000 others (Europeans, Fijian-Europeans, Chinese and Other
Pacific Islanders (8%).
Can you please tell me how the Chinese compared with this in 1957 (the date of the
Constitution) and how the Constitution was made acceptable to the Chinese and to
international opinion?
2 Not printed.
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58 CO 1036/618 6 Dec 1962
[Comparison with Malaya]: minute (reply) from C R Roberts to 
I S Wheatley
Your minute overleaf.1 I do not know how deeply you may wish to go into this. If very
much so, then it would no doubt be worth your while to put the questions to which
you require answers to the Far Eastern Dept. of the C.R.O., who have assured me that
they would be glad to do any necessary research. (The Principal dealing with Malaya
there is Mr. D. G. R. Bentliff.)
2. The Chinese have always been in a minority in Malaya (excluding Singapore).
In 1957 the ratio of Malays to Chinese and other races was about 30 : 23 : 1. The
distribution of the races is uneven, however, and the Chinese predominate in some of
the south-western states and in Penang, the commercial and industrial area.
3. There is a long history of Chinese immigration. It begun in 1786 and
continued up to the beginning of the last war. It can be inferred from figures
published in 1957 that at that time about half of the Chinese population consisted of
persons who were both UK citizens and born in the Federation. It would seem
therefore that at any rate a majority, and I would have thought most, of the Chinese
population had UK citizenship, even though many of them may have been of alien
birth. I have not, however, been able to put my hand on any reliable figures which
would substantiate this.
4. As for the reasons why the present Malayan Constitution was accepted by the
Chinese, I would suggest the following:—
(i) There was a long unbroken tradition of Malay rule and of legislative
discrimination in favour of the Malays.
(ii) The Chinese were in a minority.
(iii) The Malays were united and knew what they wanted. The Chinese, on the
other hand, were divided culturally and ideologically—some ‘English-educated’
others not; some sympathising with the CPR, others with the Nationalists, others
politically neutral.
(iv) Like most overseas Chinese, those in Malaya were more interested in trade
and industry than in local politics. Those interests were best served by having the
strong central government for which the new Constitution provided. The still
continuing ‘Emergency’ emphasised the need for protection.
(v) The leading Chinese political party—the Malayan Chinese Association—was
cultivated by the dominant Malay party and assured of representation in the new
Government (the present Finance Minister, among others, is a Chinese).
(vi) Though the new Constitution recognised the special position of the Malays, it
was not by any means unduly oppressive to minorities. There is freedom of religion,
for instance, and the other fundamental liberties are also fully safeguarded. (It is
interesting to note, in this connection, that even the Constitution of Singapore,
which has of course a predominantly Chinese population, provides that ‘it shall be
the deliberate and conscious policy of the Government of Singapore at all times to
recognise the special position of the Malays, who are the indigenous people of the
island and are in most need of assistance . . .’.)
1 See 57.
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5. I do not know that any need was felt to ensure that the new Constitution was
acceptable internationally. It certainly did not cause any controversy in the UN or
elsewhere.
59 CO 1036/775, no 33 18 Dec 1962
[Future of Fiji]: minute by J E Marnham on Mr Fisher’s brief for his
visit to Fiji
Sir Hilton Poynton
Mr. Fisher
The brief on the Fiji constitution for Mr. Fisher’s visit is still in draft. Its lines were
agreed with Mr. Thomas before he left and he thought it not necessary to trouble Sir
Hilton with it since it is intended that policy decisions shall await Mr. Fisher’s
return. Its general line will be to advise that Mr. Fisher should start by assuring the
Governor (subject always to whatever view is eventually taken by the Secretary of
State himself) that we readily agree to drop any idea of ‘shock tactics’ on the lines we
canvassed last summer; the brief will suggest that Mr. Fisher should go out with an
open mind but thinking it likely that, after discussion with the Governor and all
concerned, he will find himself agreeing to recommend to the Secretary of State a
programme broadly on the lines suggested in para 22 of the Governor’s despatch No.
676 (Flag A).1
2. I received yesterday three accounts of varying length and completeness of a
recent debate in the Fiji Legislative Council which followed the Governor’s
statement at Appendix A of despatch No. 676.
3. If Mr. Fisher can possibly spare the time to read the full Hansard over
Christmas, I think he will find it extremely useful background. Before then, I would
only suggest that if you have time you look at paras 8–13 of Mr. Macdonald’s letter of
14th December (Flag B); the Governor’s short letter (Flag C) but not the enclosure;
and the short summary of the main points made by speakers which I made myself
(Flag D). (The Governor’s letter covers a much fuller summary by the Public
Relations, Office, but if anyone is going to read that it is probably more profitable and
not much longer to read the full Hansard in the stiff cover below.)
4. The interesting points to my mind are the high standard of the debate; the
accuracy with which it bears out the assessment of public opinion given two months
earlier in the Governor’s despatch No. 676; the predictable fact that Fijians and
Europeans supported the motion; and perhaps most interesting of all, the fact that
the Indians said pretty categorically that if only the motion had referred to ‘all the
people of Fiji’ instead of merely the Fijians, they too would have accepted it, with its
implication that constitutional change was only to come about when everyone in Fiji
wanted it and was on no account to be wished on them from outside—least of all by
the United Nations—on which body strictures were passed that will delight Sir
Hilton if he has time to read them. Finally there is the brave speech of Ratu Mara: a
Fijian chief publicly advocating change.
5. Apart from its value as background for Mr. Fisher and myself to take with us,
there is in all this, I think, one point oh which Mr. Fisher will be glad to have Sir
1 See 53.
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Hilton’s advice. Mr. Fisher is going out to listen, to confirm a view, and to advise the
Secretary of State on his return. Nevertheless, he is clearly going to have one or two
awkward questions shot at him which it will be impossible to duck entirely. The main
one, I suggest, is: ‘Will you assure us that Britain is not going to abandon us or force
constitutional change upon us unless and until we ask for it?’ The second is ‘Will you
promise us that nothing will be done to weaken our links with the Crown?’.
6. To give a considered answer to the first question would go very near
prejudging the whole question raised in Sir Hilton’s recent letter to Governors about
the future of the smaller territories.2 It would be very nice to give a categorical
answer that H.M.G. will certainly not force changes on Fiji before all concerned want
it; but I have an uneasy feeling (which may be accounted defeatist!) that we may at
some stage during the next 5 or 10 years find ourselves under orders to put at least
pretty strong pressure on Fiji to move faster than at least some sections of the
community would like. It seems to me therefore that Mr. Fisher ought at this stage
carefully to avoid saying anything which might be interpreted as a pledge not to
introduce change until all sections of the community wanted it. On the other hand,
he will want to avoid spreading alarm and despondency by suggesting that we may be
about to force change upon them. I take it that all we can do is use our combined
verbal ingenuity within these limits.
7. There are however two things on which I think Mr. Fisher could usefully be
categorical. One is, to clear up the confusion in some local minds between self-
government and independence; without declaring in favour of any particular
solution, Mr. Fisher could I think point to the existence of possible alternatives to
separate sovereign independence which would nevertheless give Fiji as full a measure
of internal self-government as she wants and is ready for. If we need to elaborate on
this theme, the Governor will have a copy of the big memorandum enclosed with Sir
Hilton’s recent letter.
8. The second point is that even independence within the Commonwealth in no
way damages the link with the Crown. The Queen would be just as much Queen of an
independent Fiji as she is today Queen of Great Britain and Queen of Australia.
9. This minute is too long and probably superfluous, but it would certainly help
me to know whether these broad operating instructions are on the right lines.
10. I am sending a copy of this minute with copies of the short summary and a
copy of the full Hansard to Mr. Wheatley. I should be grateful if he will consider with
IRD and perhaps Information Dept. whether any use can be made of it in the U.N. or
elsewhere (it is of course the record of a public debate). Not all of it is suitable: I
doubt whether it would be productive to tell members of the United Nations that
they have been described as an anatomical monstrosity with the backbone of a
jellyfish, no teeth and a lack of intestinal arrangements, and one or two of the Indian
members remarks might boomerang. But the fact that the Indian members would
have been prepared to go along with the motion amended to imply that nobody in
Fiji wants constitutional change forced by outsiders may perhaps be usable.
2 Dated 12 Sept 1962. This circular letter was not a statement of policy but rather an indication of
provisional thinking about whether smaller territories might be capable of sustaining independence or
whether instead they should either be ‘freely associated’ with an independent country or ‘integrated’ with
an independent country (Ronald Hyam & Wm R Louis, eds, The Conservative government and the end of
empire 1957–1964 (BDEEP, 2000) part II, 566).
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60 CO 1036/392, no 40 Jan 1963
‘Political future of Fiji’: memorandum presented to Mr Fisher by the
Fijian Western Democratic Party
Introduction
Since the 1959 mass riots in Suva, followed by the 1960 unrest in the sugar industry,
Fiji seems to have settled down a little. But this is probably because the people have
partially realized the futility of destruction rather than because they are any more
satisfied. Thus, a friend recently told us:—
‘I have a small shop in the Lautoka market selling fruits and lots of other
things . . . The position is very bad with the people who have no job . . .
Sometimes I think that in this country life is not worth while living. Fiji is a
place where they should test nuclear bombs and not in Johnson Island.
Sometimes I feel very bad. I am trying to get away from this place . . .’
We do not see any simple solution for the human unhapiness which exists beneath
Fiji’s smiling and tropical surface. We do not see any easy solution in terms of any
ideology of any sort. The question of political independence, discussed in this
memorandum, must be viewed in terms of pros and cons, and not as a simple
solution for anything. This said, we will proceed:—
1. (a) In spite of optimistic reports in conventional newspapers, there has been
little improvement in the condition of the ordinary people of Fiji in the last ten
years. The Colony’s economic growth is simply not keeping with its very rapid
population growth. Thus sugar production over the last six years, 1957 to 1962, has
been 196,100 tons, 198,300 tons, 283,00 tons, 147,100 tons, 143,000 tons, 250,000
tons (approx). Production and sales of subsidiary crops has been similarly erratic.
And in this period the population has increased by about 20%. (Slightly more if
anything.)
The problems of Fiji, have of course not been caused by the Colonial
Administration. Nevertheless, this administration has not tackled such problems as
vigorously as it might have.
The main defect of Colonial Administration springs from the difficulty of getting
first-rate men to go to some outpost of semi-civilization in order to do well jobs
which are unlikely to win them any fame. Men who think they have some chance of
doing something notable or original usually like to stay close to what they regard as
the centre and forefront of things. Those who do go to Colonies are often sincere and
well-intentioned, but they also often lack the initiative, energy and ingenuity which
is needed to fully solve the problems they encounter.
On the other hand, from what we know of the distribution of intelligence, the first-
rate minds which there is difficulty in importing ought to be potentially available
locally.
This we regard as the main argument against indefinite continuation of colonial
rule, in Fiji or anywhere else.
1 Signed by Apisai Mohammed Tora on behalf of the Fijian Western Democratic Party.
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(b) Against this argument it may be objected that a well-trained second-rate brain
may be better than a relatively untrained first-rate brain. This is indeed true, but one
of Fiji’s most competent popular leaders has by now almost completed a degree in
economics, administration, etc., on a United States scholarship and there other such
well-educated local leaders in Fiji. If these people do not get a chance to run things in
about 3 years, there is likely to be trouble. The suggestion that they and many other
people in Fiji do not want an increase in political independence is quite false and is
based on the statement of privileged people who are not likely to count decisively in
Fiji in the near future.
2. (a) It cannot be denied that Fiji’s balance of payments deficit seems to be chronic
and is unlikely to decrease in the immediate future. Nor can it be denied that if, at
any time in the immediate future, Britain should cease her financial assistance, the
economic plight of Fiji would be very serious. The fact that Fiji is dependent on
Britain economically may be regarded as a reason why Britain should continue to
have political control over Fijian policy.
(b) In reply to this argument, it need only be pointed out that nations who have to
borrow money to keep going can never be completely ‘independent’. Fulfilment of
the desire for greater political independence might lead to a more effective drive
towards economic independence and self-sufficiency. This would reduce the cost of
Fiji to Britain whereas under the present political set-up this ‘cost’ has steadily
increased.
3. (a) The present administration has shown itself to be not very receptive to
qualified advice.
As one instance among a number, there is a great need in Fiji to utilize
unemployed or under-employed labour in worthwhile government projects, e.g., the
replacement of grossly overcrowded slum housing in the towns, the building of halls
in country areas for showing movie pictures and for other purposes, and so on. Such
building projects could use local labour, timber and cement, and could be paid for by
deficit financing. Properly handled, such a deficit-financed government development
programme need have no unpleasant economic side-effects. Recently a very
competent New Zealand economist prepared a statement to this effect into which he
had obviously put some time and thought, and it was sent to the Financial Secretary
in Fiji. The nett result, however, was a so-called ‘stand-still’ budget, no sign of a
government plan ti utilise under-employed labour, and a series of economically
elliterate warnings in the local paper about the dangers of deficit financing.
(b) In reply to the above, it may be maintained that local political leaders would be
equally unwilling to listen to qualified advice. This may prove to be so. Yet most local
leaders are more deeply concerned about local problems than are people who have
never suffered personally from material poverty. They should, therefore, be slightly
more receptive to advice likely to help in raising living standards.
4. (a) Good leadership requires adequate communication with the feelings and
aspirations of those who are led and with men of initiative in the community whose
co-operation is needed to efficiently handle the details of changes and projects. In
spite of differences of language, culture and standard of living, the best Colonial
Administrators doubtless try hard to achieve the ‘communication’. However, in this
effort, junior personnel are hampered by European groups who socially snub and
otherwise discourage those who Praternize too much with ordinary local people and
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requirements of authority and ‘dignity’ hamper senior personnel who are immune to
such efforts of the racially snobbish. And, as a matter of practical fact, lack of
complete communication except with better-off civil-service-type local people has led
in Fiji to a complacency among some government officials which has to be
experienced to be believed. Such officials mouth platitudes about ‘these people’
needing ‘little’, being ‘happy in a simple life’, etc., which are often farcially unrelated
to the actual facts. This was shown by the 1959 riots when the force of popular
feeling was, as the government itself admitted, much greater than was allowed for,
and was not altogether unpredictable. And, in the sugar industry, inept failure to
judge dissatisfaction and do something to forestall its destructive effects cost the
Colony millions of pounds.
Such miscalculations would be less likely to occur if local men, fully in touch with
local feeling, had a majority influence in the government. (By ‘local men fully in
touch with local feeling’ we do not mean unelected Fijian Chiefs, for they can also get
out of touch with ordinary Fijians, as they often do.)
(b) It might be asked: ‘If local people were more aware of the urgency for
government action, why didn’t more of them say so publicly?’ The answer to this is
that as long as Europeans hold a majority of the positions of power criticism of them
can have unpleasant effects on the criticizers, and many keep silent who would
otherwise speak. Given an elected majority in the Legislative Council, all this would
tend to vanish and a less ill-informed European minority would probably play a more
effective part in guiding progressive change than the present European majority.
Moreover, the bad effects of the racially minded minority, those few Europeans in Fiji
who would make good citizens of South Africa if they got the chance, would be
substantially reduced.
5. (a) It is argued by some that the presence of the British in Fiji is necessary to
prevent potential conflict between the Fijians and the Indians from becoming
destructive.
We do not doubt than when the British Colonial Government can no longer be
blamed for the troubles of the people, some of them will take to blaming each other,
probably on a racial basis. The Fijians will resent Indian landlords and Indian control
of commerce, and the Indians will resent Fijian control of land. However, there is a
good deal of friendly fraternization and co-operation between Fijians and Indians,
particularly in Labour Unions, and we do not personally believe that this
fraternization and co-operation would ever entirely break down. Moreover both sides
are fairly evenly matched in numbers and resources. It is not a question of a helpless
minority being left at the mercy of an unprincipled majority.
On the whole, we believe the danger-of-racial-conflict argument has been
exaggerated.
(b) At the same time, in the remaining period left to British rule, every effort
should be made to reduce this possible danger to the welfare of Fiji, viz: Multi-racial
government high school should be fostered. Uncontrolled population growth, which
is the main source of the conflict over land, should be energetically grappled with. As
the Governor himself has maintained, every effort should be made to achieve
‘adequate representation of Fijians in the Civil Service’.
On this latter point we note: This threat (i.e. the Indian threat) is heightened in
the Fijians’s eyes by the appearance that the Indians are being given rapid promotion
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and rising to great heights in the Civil Service. Although this is not seen as a long
term plan to place the Indians in control of the government (which it is by a few
isolated individuals), it has given them reason to think that the principle of the
‘paramountcy of Fijian interests’ on which much of their loyalty to Britain rests, may
legitimately be doubted. If we may be permitted but one personal observation, we
may remark that it seems disturbing that after 88 years of British Colonial rule in
Fiji, the Fijians have been able to rise to the highest ranks of the government service
only in the Fijian Administration and in the Army.
6. (a) On the subject of the Fijian Chiefs, we say: The chiefs are fighting to retain
their position, and the sad part about it is that they know they are fighting against
time. Fighting against time is fighting history. Fighting history is fighting Nature,
and fighting Nature is fighting God. It is, of course, stupid to even entertain an idea
that a mortal can ever fight, let alone win a fight against God.
The chiefs have been soundly thrashed by the Burns Commission. They (the
chiefs) get fat on the milk and honey of the land through that primitive, out-dated
and chaotic organisation called the Fijian Affairs Board.
It is not known whether they are actually our leaders (therefore we must listen to
them), or our representatives (therefore they must listen to us). Although the
members of the FA.B. have their own opinions, they are precluded from ‘imposing’
these on Provincial Councils by their position, for they are merely ‘representatives’ of
the Fijian people at Legco; they have no party organisation, no constituencies, and
there is no clear formal mandate for them to lead Fijian public opinion, such as
would be possible through election campaigns.
Now it is a Fijian Chief, Ravuama Vunivalu, who recently brought a motion before
the Legislative Council that there should be no change in the present constitution.
There is some chance that this same chief may be standing against an ordinary Fijian
at the coming election, and some evidence of his wishing to back down or change his
choice of a constituency rather than face the possibility of defeat at the hands of a
popular commoner. All this must be acutely embarrassing to a proud and feudalistic
mind. In these circumstances, can his opposition to constitutional change, and that
of other Fijians who have been given power without having to earn it, be regarded as
very significant. We do not think it can afford to be taken very seriously.
There is a good deal of evidence that if we exclude the Chiefs and their satellites,
the majority of town and village Fijians want political independence almost as much
as the Indians, although we cannot, perhaps, speak with much certainity about the
Fijians in the villages. The freedom of these villagers—to assemble, to work for
themselves, to move from the village, etc., is, however, considerably restricted, a fact
which does create resentment against the present system. The government, we
believe, should conduct a gallop poll to ascertain what percentage of ordinary Fijians
are, like their chiefs, opposed to constitutional change. Fear of opposing the chief’s
would doubtless partially invalidate the result. Nevertheless, we believe such a survey
of popular Fijian opinion should be made, and it should me made without delay.
Conclusion
What the people themselves want must be regarded as very important, so that in the
absence of fuller knowledge of what the ordinary Fijians want, an unqualified
conclusion can not be arrived at. It is possible to say with some certainty, however:—
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1. That the present constitution does not provide Fiji with a government with
enough energy and concern to solve Fiji’s problems.
2. That competent and reasonably well-educated local leaders exist who, if given a
chance to rule, might tackle the difficulties of government more vigorously than
the present type of government.
3. That unless they are given a chance to try (i.e. a majority in the Legislative
Council) within about 3 years, a combination of popular discontent with their
discontent is likely to cause serious social unrest.
4. That, therefore, unless Fijian opposition to change proves to be very strong,
elected Fijian representatives should be given a majority over both local
Europeans and ‘Officials’ or other appointed members by 1966 at the latest.
61 CO 1036/1392, no 5 10 Jan 1963
‘Future development of Fiji’: memorandum by H G Nicholls, chief
inspector, Fiji, of the Colonial Sugar Refining Company
During recent years there has been a growing awareness amongst some people close
to the scene that the affairs of Fiji should be of increasing interest to the
neighbouring countries of Australia and New Zealand.
The Chairman of Directors of The Colonial Sugar Refining Company Limited, in
his address, delivered at the Annual General Meeting of that company held in Sydney
on 18th July 1962, had this to say in connection with Fiji:—
‘There is something more that should be said about the Fiji Islands.
Compared with the land masses of the world they are small; nevertheless they
are large in their South Pacific context. They are indeed located at the cross-
roads of the South Pacific. They have a rapidly increasing population. They
are strategically important and of political significance for the future. It is our
considered opinion that Australia and New Zealand and the United Kingdom
(whose Crown Colony the islands are), and the United States of America,
should keep Fiji in mind when forming broad policies in respect of the South
Pacific. Fiji needs considerate and constructive treatment from its stronger
and more developed neighbours and friends, if it is to gain needed access to
markets and to mature economically and politically.’
C.S.R. has been in Fiji for a long time and is considered to have acted responsibly in
that territory. It has a comparatively large investment there, but apart from this it is
genuinely interested in the future economic and political development of Fiji. The
Company hopes to stay in Fiji and in thinking generally about future progress and
development of Fiji, it would appear most desirable that Government’s policies
should indlude seeking the opinions and co-operation of the larger business firms
such as C.S.R. in Australia and New Zealand, who make a point of being fairly closely
in touch with overseas affairs and can contribute some expertise when the problems
of Fiji are being studied.
It is fully appreciated by C.S.R. with its long experience in Fiji alone, that the
future policies for this territory involve consideration of many sided and quite
complex matters. One thing that does seem evident is that it would not be beneficial
09-Fiji-48-cpp  10/5/06  6:56 AM  Page 174
[62] JAN 1963 175
to the people of Fiji to turn Fiji loose as a self governing territory without ensuring
that it can depend in many essential ways on the neighbouring and friendly countries
who are more advanced and economically stronger.
We believe that Fiji should seek to explore points of view with the neighbouring
countries concerned in the expectation that the outcome would lead to the
development of some firm links or even some forms of treaties between these
countries and Fiji. The initial step would seem to be for the United Kingdom
Government and the Fiji Government to get Australian and New Zealand
Governments genuinely interested in the vital problems confronting Fiji, and to do
this with the knowledge that some larger business firms such as C.S.R. are in a
position to provide some of the thinking for the future economic advancement of
Fiji.
62 CO 1036/1392, no 12 Jan 1963
‘Fijian Cane Growers’ Industrial Congress’: memorandum presented
to Mr Fisher by Ratu Latianara (president) and Tomasi Vunisina
(general secretary)1
On behalf of the Fijian Cane Growers’ Industrial Congress we the representatives of
the Various affiliated Associations extend to you our most sincere and cordial
welcome.
It is visits such as yours that give us the opportunity to appreciate the speeches
made by leading Stateman that we are in the age of great scientific advancement and
the world has shrunk in regard to time and space. Even so, we wish to welcome more
of those Ministers in whose hands and wisdom rests the destiny of the Colonial
peoples of the British Empire. At the outset we beg to request you to convey through
the Secretary of State for the Colonies our deep loyalty to the Throne of Her Majesty
the Queen. All of us were born under the British flag and are proud to regard it as a
symbol of citizenship shared with people in the British Commonwealth itself.
The British Government of whatever party have always expressed a sincere and
living desire to promote the general progress and welfare of the Fijian people. In your
tour of this Colony we beg to request you to note the undermentioned with a view to
finding solution for these problems which face us at the present time.
2. Constitutional changes
We the Fijian Cane Growers’ Industrial Congress, BA, RA and NADROGA, supported
the motion passed in the Legislative Council recently which was moved by Hon. Ratu
Ravuama Vunivalu about the Constitutional changes.
‘WE FIJIAN WILL NOT GIVE UP OUR RIGHTS’. We would like to state that there
should be no changes in the present constitution of the Colony until our Council of
Chiefs and we Fijian people to [sic] express our desire for further Constitutional
changes.
We Fijian people had not been fully informed what the future of the Colony was
going to be. We interested to see the views and ideas to give some guidance to the
1 The Congress was based in the sugar belt of western Viti Levu.
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kind of future, our children would see. We very much like to know whether our bond
with Crown still the same as when our Fijian Chiefs ceded our land and people to
Queen Victoria. ‘OUR LOYALTY TO THE BRITISH CROWN WILL ALWAYS REMAIN’.
We are apprehensive that any major change in the status quo will be detrimental to
our interests.
3. Population
Our most urgent needs is a reduction in the rate of population increase that
proposals for accelerating family planning will work rapidly. We Fijian people are
very much worring of the rapid population growth of Indians in this Colony.
4. Indian people
It is evident that Indians are the only troublesome people in this Colony. We the
above mentioned affiliated Associations (Congress) had handed the attached COPY2
of a Petition to His Excellency the Governor, dated 6th March, 1962 during his visit
to the Western Division, stating how much trouble Indians done in the Colony’s
main export—Sugar Industry. This was also mentioned in the report of the Sugar
Inquiry Commission on page 9 particularly by their two leaders, A.D. Patel and
S.M.Koya.
In 1943, 1960–1961 these two leaders deliberate intention to cause disruption to
the largest Industry of this Colony in the hope of gaining advantages for themselves
and their people of trying to drive the millers out of Fiji. This was cooking and will
remain in the hearts of their people (Indian). We hated to see it happened again as it
was disrupting the whole economic of this Colony. If they still of the same opinions
to drive the millers out of the Colony, it is far better and we Fijian people would be
very much please to see them to quit the Colony.
We appeal that this matter to be considered.
5. In conclusion we express our heartfelt thanks for giving us the opportunity of
placeing our views before you and we trust that your sojourn in this Colony will be a
pleasant one and beneficial to its people.
2 Not printed.
63 CO 1036/1392, no 38 16 Jan 1963
‘Suva Indian Chamber of Commerce’: memorandum presented to 
Mr Fisher by M M Narsey (president) and K J Patel (secretary)
We extend cordial welcome to you and the members of your staff. We hope that you
will have an enjoyable stay in this Colony and that your mission would be successful.
We take this opportunity to present our views with regards to the future of this
colony, as follows:—
1. Most of the members of our Chamber belong to a class of immigrants (and
their descendants) who came to this colony otherwise than under the indenture
system. They are all domiciled in this colony and possess substantial financial
interests.
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2. We rightly claim to be loyal and law-abiding citizens who have made considerable
contribution in the development of this colony mainly in the commercial field. There
should be no doubt that we shall continue to play our part in various fields in this
country and will continue to discharge our duties as citizens in whichever capacity
we shall be reasonably required to do so in the general welfare of the people. We should
like to assure Her Majesty’s Government and its administration in this Colony of our
continued loyalty and support as British subjects.
3. We are deeply concerned regarding the future of this Colony and particularly
our place therein. Statements recently made by certain responsible people in the
press as well as in the Legislative Council and before various commissions have
made us very apprehensive about our economic interest and our ordinary rights as
citizens of this country. There is a growing fear that if the British administration
in this Colony ceases, our rights as free citizens of a democratic state may be
seriously affected. There is a grave feeling of insecurity amongst our members.
4. We have made this Colony our permanent home. We therefore respectfully
urge Her Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom to give us an unequivocal
assurance that in the event of constitutional changes in this country, adequate
provisions shall be made to safeguard our economic interests and citizenship
rights so that we may be able to do our duty as equal citizens for the general good
of this country.
5. It is our candid opinion that by and large, the British administration in this
Colony has been fair and just in accordance with British traditions. If the present
system of administration be classified as ‘dependency’ it is benevolent to the
people of Fiji rather than detrimental and any hasty step towards ‘liberation’ would
do more harm than good to them.
6. We believe in the principles of democracy. We are in general accord with the
present policy of training local people to take charge of various administrative
functions. There should be a gradual expansion and encouragement of this policy
in various spheres of activities in this country.
We support the opinion that appears to exist that people of this country should be
required to take more and more responsibilities of general administration with an
ultimate aim towards a sort of guided independence which would be in accordance
with democratic principles of equal rights for all citizens and at the same time
would not be in any way detrimental to the economy of this Country. To achieve
this the Colonial administration should make haste slowly.
7. It is also our opinion that local government could be a very useful ground to
train local people to shoulder responsibilities of administration. It is abundantly
clear that the expansion of local government is over-due. The local Government
(Towns) Ordinance was enacted in 1947. It has been over 15 years since this
legislation was passed, yet only two areas, city of Suva and town of Lautoka, have
elected councils. We do not see any reason why townships of Nausori, Tavua, Ba,
Lautoka, Nadi, Sigatoka, Levuka and Labasa should not have their elected
representatives to govern their own, areas in the same manner as in Suva and and
Lautoka. Further, it is our opinion that time is not yet opportune for local
government in rural areas.
8. We are mindful of the fact as to what extend this Colony is economically
dependent on the United Kingdom. We are appreciative and grateful to U.K. for all
her economic aids. In return, we have nothing but our unalloyed loyalty to offer.
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9. It is regretable that while talking about political independence, some people
tend to ignore our economic dependence. Economic independence is just as (if not
more) important as political indenpendence. We therefore feel that economic
development should go side by side with political development.
We need more secondary industries in this country to help our balance of payment
and to assist us to check the evergrowing unemployment problem. We sincerely
hope that the United Kingdom Government will in future do more to assist us in
this direction.
We are fully aware of many problems that face us in establishing local industries
due to the smallness of our market. We seek technical assistance and advise and
financial help in establishing small industries. We also realise that some
established industries are facing difficulties. Some of the difficulties could be
attributed to faults in operation and others to lack of active interest and
cooperation from the Government and the people in general. We are, however,
convinced that some more industries could be advantageously established and
operated if there is a concerted effort from all concerned and assistance is
forthcoming from the United Kingdom.
10. We should in the end express our appreciation to Her Majesty’s Government
for its genuine interest in colonial welfare and for sending representatives such as
yourselves to obtain views of the people and to gain first-hand information of
various matters affecting the colony and its people.
64 CO 1036/107, no 8 17 Jan 1963
[Fijian Affairs Board]: memorandum on Fijian rights presented to 
Mr Fisher1
1. We desire to place before you the following representations.
2. We consider that the Act of Cession had, for the Fijian people, a special
implication. It was this. They envisaged their country as attached to the Crown—an
integral part of the United Kingdom. Her Majesty’s title, decided by the Chiefs after
Cession, is ‘Queen of Fiji and Britain’ (Radi ni Viti kei Peritania) and the Council of
Chiefs have from the beginning jealously maintained their right of directly
addressing the Soverign on the occasion of their meetings. It is the Fijian view that
the possibility of severance of this link with the Crown—a link forged in a spirit of
mutual trust and goodwill—should never be contemplated.
3. This special relationship would appear to have its closest parallel in the
constitutional links between the Channel Islands or the Isle of Man and the United
Kingdom. It is submitted that before any further constitutional change is considered
and certainly before there is any move towards internal self government, the terms of
the special relationship between Fiji and the United Kingdom should be clarified and
1 This became known as the ‘Wakaya Letter’ because it was written on the island of Wakaya. It was signed
by Ratu Mara, Ratu Penaia Ganilau, Semesa Sikivou, Ravuama Vunivala, Ratu George Cakobau, A C Reid, J
N Falvey, R M Major (financial adviser).
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codified along the lines of the relationship between the United Kingdom and the
Channel Islands or the Isle of Man.
4. We propose a new constitutional instrument which Would embody this
understanding of the relationship and would make provision for the safeguarding of
Fijian interests, building on and strengthening the spirit and substance of the Deed
of Cession.
5. There would have to be a precise restatement of the guarantees on Fijian land
ownership. We visualise that the Native Land Trust legislation should not be changed
or added to without the prior consent of the Sovereign and the agreement of the
Council of Chiefs. We also stand by the expressed desire of the High Chiefs in the
preamble to the Deed of Cession that Fiji should be a Christian State and that
therefore no constitutional or administrative changes should take place that would
deviate from that intention. The provision in the Fijian Affairs Ordinance that all
legislation affecting Fijian rights and interests should be referred to the Fijian Affairs
Board or, on the recommendation of the Board, to the Council of Chiefs, should be
retained, and likewise the Governor’s direction to the Public Service Commission to
work towards a balance of the races in the Civil Service.
6. Subject to a satisfactory solution of the issues we have raised in the foregoing
memorial, we would be prepared to initiate, in co-operation with the other principal
races, further moves towards internal self government. In this regard we wish to
remind you of the terms of the resolution passed at the last session of the Legislative
Council which records the insistence of the Fijian people that the initiative for any
constitutional change should come from them.
65 CAB 134/2403, PFP(63)1 18 Jan 1963
‘Strategic importance and security of the Pacific Islands Region’: 
CO note for Cabinet (Official) Committee on Future Policy in the
Pacific on a note by the US State Department. Annex: Islands of
strategic importance
[The Committee on Future Policy in the Pacific (the CO, CRO, FO, MoD, Treasury and
Home Office were represented) was set up in 1962 to consider (i) policy on the
constitutional and economic future of UK territories in the Pacific, where possible taking
into account the plans of other powers with Pacific territories, (ii) means of exchanging
information; (iii) the future scope of the South Pacific Commission, (iv) the possibility of
establishing a Melanesian Federation. By Apr 1963, a year on, decisions had been reached
that a Melanesian Federation was impractical and that solutions short of independence
had to be found for most Pacific territories. The alternatives to independence, and when
to involve ministers in the deliberations, were next for consideration (CAB 134/2403,
PFP(63)5, 25 Apr 1963) but the committee was wound up in November 1963 and its
functions transferred to the Colonial Policy Committee. Running in parallel with the
Pacific Committee was a Washington Study Group of officials from the US, UK, Australia
and New Zealand. It was set up at New Zealand initiative. France declined to participate.
The paper reproduced here emerged from discussion in the Washington Study Group.]
1. Free World Security arrangements in the Pacific are primarily based on the
SEATO and ANZUS Treaties and on a series of bilateral arrangements between the
United States and certain countries north of the SEATO region. The security aspects
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of all these arrangements are implicitly based on the ability of the United States on
the eastern rim of the Pacific and its partners whose forces are stationed on the
western rim to communicate with each other quickly and effectively without serious
enemy interference in time of war.
2. Owing to the size of the Pacific Ocean, ability to communicate effectively
requires not only an absence of strong enemy forces in the area but a network of
weather stations, air bases, communication sites and other installations. In
addition to these, it is essential that the United States and its allies have the
necessary forces based in the area to exclude or eliminate the enemy submarine
and other forces which can be expected to attempt to cut communications in the
event of hostilities.
3. Development of military techniques and of complicated weapons systems in
recent years has imposed requirements for bases or sites for a variety of technical
activities such as tracking and monitoring stations, partly for defense of the Pacific
Islands area and partly for the effective application of these Weapons systems to
potential enemy powers in Asia. Owing to the speed of development of new weapons
and techniques, the precise base requirements will vary from time to time. As an
example only, there is attached a list of installations currently in use by the United
States in the Pacific for operations mentioned in the preceding paragraphs. The
security of the Free World demands in addition not only that the United States and
its allies have access to base sites as above, but that such sites be denied to any
unfriendly powers. For security purposes the Pacific Islands area must be considered
as an entity. The greatest weakness, for a defense viewpoint, is the tremendous size of
the area and its greatest vulnerability is to submarine warfare.
4. In the event of hostilities, an enemy with the access to the Pacific would
undoubtedly attempt to penetrate the area for the purpose of rupturing
communications. To the extent that such attempts at penetration originate outside
the Pacific Islands area, the enemy would be operating at great distances from his
bases, and his activities could be substantially controlled by forces based within the
area. The problem would be greatly intensified, however, if the enemy had succeeded
in securing bases at any point within the area in peace time, or had succeeded in
locating sites under the control of states which would be receptive to requests for
support.
5. To summarize the foregoing, the maintenance of allied security in the Pacific
area requires the use of a large number of base staging, and other areas, the exact
description of which necessarily changes as weapons techniques change, as well as
assurance that enemy forces would be unable to make use of land in the islands area
for support purposes of any sort.
6. So long as all land in the Pacific Islands area remains in effective allied control,
the danger of enemy penetration in peace time is minimized, with the corollary that
enemy action in war time would be more readily controlled. From the point of view
of military security, it is essential that no land areas in the Pacific be alienated from
effective control by the allies. The creation of new independent states should be
undertaken only if adequate arrangements for the security of the area involved can be
assured.
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Annex to 65: ISLANDS OF STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE
ISLAND ISLAND GROUP PRESENT USE
Angaur Palau NAF/LS
Arakabesan Palau SPF/AISRS/LS
Bikini Marshall ATS
Christmas Northern Line ATSS
Eniwetok Marshall PMR/ICBM
Guam Guam HF/AFB/NAF/ASB/CC/WS/APB+S
Kwajalein Marshall PMR/NIKI-ZUES
Kapingamarangi Eastern Carolines LS
Kusaie Carolines ATSS
Melakal Palau HF/PA
Ponape Carolines AISRS
Roi Marshall SSS
Saipan Marianas LS/NAF/Port
Tinian Marianas AFAAS
Tutuila American Samoa HF
Ulithi Carolines LS
Viti Levu Fiji HF
Key to Abbreviations used in the List
AFB Air Force Base
AFAAS Air Force Auxiliary Air Station
PMR Pacific Missile Range
PA Protected Anchorage
NAF Naval Air Facility
AISRS Army Ionospheric Scatter Relay Station
ASB Air Staging Base
APB+S Air Patrol a Surveillance Base
ATS Atomic Test Site
ATSS Atomic Test Support Site
LS Loran Station1
FS Fixed Surveillance Station
SSS Space Support Site
STF Satellite Tracking Station
SPF Sea Plane Facility
HF Harbor Facility
CC Communication Center
WS Weather Station
1 The function of a Loran Station was to transmit a signal on a fixed line so that aircraft and ships having
suitable equipment could determine their exact position from the direction of several Loran signals
66 CAB 134/2403, PFP(63)3 9 Apr 1963
‘Future policy in Fiji’: CO note for Cabinet (Official) Committee on
Future Policy in the Pacific. Annex D: Estimated voting strengths
based on universal adult suffrage
I. Introduction
The background to Fiji’s problem was summarised in the paper on Fiji circulated
with P.F.P. (62)15. It was implied that until some lasting solution to the racial
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problem is achieved Britain must continue to hold the ring if the country is not to
relapse into chaos.
II. The dangers of a constitutional standstill
2. Until recently there has been little local pressure for constitutional advance.
The Fijians fear that any advance towards internal self-government will lead to
British withdrawal and consequent Indian domination. The Indians have been torn
between a desire to play a bigger part in government, and the realisation that British
withdrawal might lead the Fijians to take violent measures to entrench their own
position.
3. It is therefore tempting to leave the constitution as it is and hope that time
will soften racial antagonisms. There are two objections to this.
4. First, the internal situation if left to itself will get worse rather than better.
The Indian leaders are beginning to press for constitutional advance, and this
pressure will increase if nothing is done to meet it. Once a few of them lose patience,
they are likely to say things which will drive the Fijians even more on to the
defensive and spark off communal violence.
5. Secondly, outside intervention will make this worse. Fiji is likely to be
discussed in the Committee of Twenty-Four in May or June. The Fijians dislike and
distrust the United Nations. Discussion of ‘decolonisation’ in New York will make the
Indians more impatient and the Fijians more reluctant to move at all.
6. Even if this U.N. interference were less imminent, it would have been bound
to come. Both for this reason and because of the internal situation described in
paragraph 4, it is in our interest to bring about at least the first steps towards
internal self-government. How far and how fast it is practicable to go (unless we are
prepared to impose a decision by force or abdicate and leave chaos behind us)
depends on devising measures which will for the time being at least be acceptable to
the Fijians and content the Indians.
III. State of opinion among the main communities
The Fijians
7. The Fijian leaders handed to Mr. Fisher in January, and later published, the
statement at Annex A.1 They are determined not to be swamped by the Indians. They
insist on their ownership of land, their right to at least an equal share of posts in the
public service, and the continued reference to the Fijian Affairs Board of legislation
affecting Fijian rights and interests. They also desire the continuance of Fiji ‘as a
Christian State’. All these things, they insist, must be guaranteed, and they demand
the assurance of a continuing link with Britain strong enough for us to ensure this.
They will press for this link to be permanent, though they recognise reluctantly that
Britain may find it impossible to go this far and they would probably accept a formula
which assured them of a ‘continuing link’ provided no term were set to it, Only when
such an assurance is given will they agree to any steps towards internal self-
government. This Fijian insistence on a prior assurance of the continuing link with
Britain is crucial.
1 Only Annex D is reproduced here. For Annex A, see 64.
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The Indians
8. The Indian leaders were at pains to stress to Mr. Fisher their willingness to
meet the main conditions expressed to him by the Fijians, and their wish to live and
work amicably together with the Fijians. But they pressed for constitutional advance
leading to full internal self-government. Probably most of them are sincere to this
extent, that they do not want a head-on clash with the Fijians; they think that time is
on their side and they judge it tactically wise to display moderation and gain the
confidence of the Fijians during at least the next few years.
The Europeans
9. With one or two exceptions, they take a fairly extreme ‘Fijian conservative’
line and oppose change.
IV. Outline of possible policies
10. We have the following choices:—
(a) Carry on as at present
The objections to this are described above.
(b) Impose change regardless of the wishes of the people
Whether or not we prescribed independence as the ultimate goal, the first steps
would presumably be to introduce the ‘Member system’ which is the normal
preliminary to a full ministerial system. This is unsatisfactory except for a fairly
short ‘running-in’ period, and we should have to introduce a ministerial system
shortly afterwards whether or not it was generally acceptable. The Fijians would
oppose both steps. They would presumably decline to take office. They would be
intensely resentful and it is likely that a threat to security would arise.
(c) Try to secure constitutional advance acceptable to, or at least acquiesced in,
by all communities
This is clearly the right course if we can do it. It involves carrying the Fijians with
us without arousing Indian opposition of the sort that would lead to continuing
instability. Proposals to this end are discussed below.
V. Proposed policy
Recognition of the need for a continuing link with Britain
11. We have seen that in Fijian eyes the essential preliminary to any
constitutional advance is that H.M.G. should give a prior guarantee of a continuing
link with Britain. We are convinced that if stagnation is to be avoided H.M.G. will
have to do this.
12. We realise that this entails acceptance of a continued responsibility for what
(however we dress it up) will look like colonial rule, at the instance of a minority, in a
territory which in size and economic potential we could otherwise, by modern
standards, reasonably expect to see independent before too long. It also entails
continuing internal security and financial commitments.
The international difficulty: the United Nations
13. Our only obligation to the United Nations is the transmission of information
(Art. 73(e)), and our objective vis-à-vis them would be to produce a status which
enables us to discontinue this. But the immediate question is how to mitigate the
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likely repercussions in Fiji: and if we can also damp down argument in the United
Nations that is helpful too. The crux of the problem is consultation with the people.
We should expect most member governments of the United Nations to be tolerably
well-disposed to any solution (even continuing association with Britain) which was
based on full consultation of the people and was not opposed by the Government of
India (see paragraph 18 below). The ideal would be a plebiscite, or a vote in a
legislature elected on a common roll by universal adult suffrage. Failing this, we
shall have to base our case on our responsibilities to the Fijian people and on such
consultation as has taken place with the representatives of other races.
14. The only complete safeguard of our position would be a plebiscite in which
an overall majority of the people of Fiji voted for a continuing link with the Crown.
The vote need not be a choice between continuing association and independence: the
question might e.g. be ‘are you in favour of continuing association with Britain and
development of self-government within that association’, so that a negative vote did
not support any particular alternative policy.
15. This would be risky. Despite what their leaders said to Mr. Fisher, the Indians
in a secret ballot would probably vote solidly against continuing association. The
calculations in Annex D indicate that the outcome of a vote on racial lines is
unpredictable. The mere act of holding one would heighten racial tension. It would
probably be necessary to have the votes of the different races recorded separately,
because (a) the Fijians would object to a ‘common roll’ vote and (b) we should have
to be free not to accept an overall majority vote but to pay regard to the balance of
opinion within each community. And since adult Indian numbers are increasing,
there would be continued pressure for further plebiscites over the years, creating the
instability which we want to avoid. We could not commit ourselves to hold a
plebiscite without consultation with the Governor and careful preparation of Fijian
opinion. This could not be done in time for a May or June debate in New York, and
the mere act of sounding the Fijians would probably harden their reluctance to
accept our main proposals. We therefore hope we can avoid a plebiscite.
16. Similar objections apply to arranging a visit by one or more Independent
Commissioners. A visit by the sort of Commission that would find favour at the United
Nations would tempt the Indians to be much less moderate than they were to Mr.
Fisher, since the prospect of gaining the United Nations’ ear would be hard to resist.
17. We might secure a vote in the Legislature which would show a majority of
unofficials, including at least some Indians, in favour of a continuing link. We cannot
be sure of full Indian support, and time will again be needed to prepare Fijian opinion
if we are to avoid an extreme ‘Fijian conservative’ vote which will lessen our chance
of a constructive solution
18. If we cannot show widespread support among the Indians for our proposals it
will be difficult to meet United Nations criticism on this point. This would be
mitigated if we could gain support from the Government of India, and if our
proposals are approved we could consider with the C.R.O. how this might be
achieved. We should also wish to keep the Australians, Americans and New
Zealanders informed and seek their co-operation in the United Nations.
The internal security difficulty
19. Short of risking chaos, we cannot in any case withdraw from Fiji for some
time, and meanwhile we are faced with a difficult internal security commitment.
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Despite our efforts to interest Australia and New Zealand there is no immediate hope
of their relieving us of it. Our best course is therefore to avoid provoking local
discontent. This means trying to make progress constitutionally, and the guarantee
of a ‘continuing link’ is the necessary price of such progress.
The financial difficulty
20. Continued presence implies continued aid. But experience with newly-
independent countries does not suggest that in practice independence brings much
slackening of the demand for aid. It would be difficult to deny a measure of aid to an
independent Fiji which at best can only barely be viable.
Counter-attraction
21. There is advantage in not littering the Pacific with tiny independent
countries. Australia, New Zealand and the United States are anxious that we should
avoid this and they may be able to help us in the United Nations. We are ourselves not
anxious to swell the numbers of independent members of the Commonwealth. The
disadvantage of doing so would be particularly strong if we left behind us communal
tension and possibly civil war.
Balance of advantage
22. We conclude that despite the United Nations problem the balance of
advantage is strongly in favour of giving the Fijians a public assurance in the
minimum terms which they will accept as the necessary price of securing
constitutional advance by consent. We therefore wish to propose to Ministers that
(whilst they should avoid saying anything which would explicitly commit Britain for
ever) they should give a public assurance to Fiji that H.M.G. do not envisage
separate, sovereign independence for the territory in the foreseeable future but will
be prepared to work out, in consultation with the people of Fiji (i.e. all communities,
not just the Fijians) a status designed to preserve for the territory a continuing link
with Britain.
The nature of the continuing link
23. To be acceptable to the Fijians the link in paragraph 7 must enable us to protect
their essential interests as defined above. This entails continued reserve powers held
by a Governor appointed by the Crown, coupled with a power of disallowance (or similar
device) wielded by some authority in Britain. It also entails power to ensure the
continued employment of expatriates in at any rate the key top posts.
24. These conditions could be met by continuing the present system, with the
addition of a guarantee that it would continue indefinitely. But this would be open to
attack both by the Indians in Fiji and internationally; the Fijians would recognise
this and distrust our ability to maintain it.
25. The Fijians, as will be seen from Annex A, are much attracted by the analogy
of the Isle of Man and the Channel Islands. Many details of the constitutional
arrangements of these islands would be unsuitable for adoption by Fiji, but the
essential features are these: link with the Crown; separate legislatures, fiscal systems
and courts of law and generally a wide measure of internal self-government;
appointment to some key posts by the Crown; local laws not valid without the
concurrence of a British body (in their case the Privy Council). The Colonial Office
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are studying the details in consultation with the Home Office, but we think that,
provided we avoid talking of the ‘Channel Islands arrangement’ as something which
can be taken over holus-bolus by Fiji, we can devise a constitution which will
preserve essential Fijian interests whilst looking sufficiently different from the
indefinite continuance of ‘Colonial rule’ to command at least a fair degree of
international acquiescence. It might not command the Fiji Indians’ acquience
indefinitely; but they will probably go along with it for a few years at least, which is as
much as we can hope for.
VI. Implications for other colonial territories
26. Apart from a proposal made for Malta 10 years ago, this would be the first offer
of continuing association made by H.M.G. to any colonial territory. A summary of the
discussions on this subject since 1949 is at Annex C. An offer to Fiji of continuing
association might attract attention in Mauritius, Barbados or the eleven territories
mentioned in Annex C. But (a) these eleven are all small places, most of them with
populations of less than 100,000, and whatever is done in Fiji most of them are likely
to be candidates for some sort of continuing link with this country; and (b) an offer to
Fiji would be based on the unique conditions there and need not necessarily be
interpreted as setting a pattern for adoption elsewhere. Policy for Fiji need not therefore
be inhibited by its possible implications for other colonial territories.
VII. Timing
27. It is not at this stage necessary to decide exactly what form a ‘continuing
link’ should take. It is necessary, however, if we are to avoid a worsening internal
situation, for H.M.G. to say publicly at an early date that they are prepared to
introduce such an arrangement when the time comes. The timing of such a
statement would have to be considered in relation to United Nations tactics, but we
should prefer it to come before a debate rather than afterwards. We should therefore
like to recommend to Ministers that, as soon as possible after the Fiji elections which
are due this month (April), and in any case not later than May or June, H.M.G. should
send to Fiji a despatch for publication locally, of which the key paragraphs would be
on the lines of Annex B to this paper.
28. In its present form the draft stops short of a firm guarantee: it simply records
that ‘H.M.G. have no wish to see the link severed’ and commits H.M.G. only to
‘examining’ the idea of arrangements analogous to those in the Channel Islands and
to introducing it ‘if an arrangement . . . can be devised which will command general
acceptance’. To that extent we could make it clear in New York that its implementation
would depend on its reception in Fiji. But (a) it will have to be cleared in draft with
the Governor, who may well advise that it does not go far enough (he will probably
think it essential to consult the Fijian leaders confidentially before it issues); and (b)
anything we say in New York calculated to appease the anti-colonials will automatically
infuriate the Fijians and tempt the Indians to demand more.
29. We think the best way of making progress is to submit the draft at Annex B to
Ministers in its present form (suitably ‘topped and tailed’) and, subject to their
instructions, try it on the Governor and consult our Mission in New York. The final
decision, including precise wording, timing in relation to United Nations debates, and
instructions to New York, would be decided in the light of the Governor’s comments
and the United Nations situation at the time the despatch was ready for issue.
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The attitude of the American, Indian, Australian and New Zealand Governments
will be important and we should welcome the advice of the F.O. and C.R.O. on how
and when to present our policy to them (cf. paragraph 18 above).
30. The views of the Committee are invited on the proposal in paragraph 29.
Annex D to 66
The total estimated population at the end of 1961 was 414,000, of whom 176,500
were over 21. The figure of 176,500 may be subject to an error as high as ±10,000. We
have no racial breakdown of the 1961 total, but at the end of 1960 the Indians
outnumbered the Fijians by 30,000 and the disparity was increasing.
2. Present electoral qualifications include a literacy test. The electorate is
therefore loss than the figure of 176,500 by the number of illiterates (mainly Indian
women) and of Chinese and ‘Other Pacific races’ who have no vote. It was estimated
in mid-1961 as 76,000 Fijians, 48,000 Indians and 8,000 ‘Europeans’, a total of
132,000, which is 44,500 short of the estimated adult population.
3. We can assume that all ‘Europeans’ are literate. There are slightly fewer
Chinese and ‘Other Pacific races’ than there are ‘Europeans’ and so we can guess
their over-21 population at 7,000. This gives a total of 8,000 + 7,000, or 15,000 for
the over-21 non-Fijian, non-Indian population.
4. This leaves a total of 176,500–15,000, or 161,500 for the Fijian + Indian over-
21 population. How to break this down depends on a guess as to how many in each
race are illiterate: the total of illiterates is 161,500–76,000 Fijians − 48,000 Indians,
or 37,500. As a pure guess there are probably 3 or 4 times as many Indian illiterates
as Fijian. This gives say 9,000 Fijian illiterates and 28,500 Indian. On this basis the
total Fijian over-21 population is 76,000 + 9,000, or 85,000; the Indian 48,000 +
28,500, or 76,500; the ‘Europeans’ 8,000, and the ‘Other Pacific races’ 7,000.
5. The result, that there are more Fijians than Indians over 21, although in
terms of total population the Indians are more numerous, may be explained by the
fact that there are many more Indians than Fijians under 21. We may also have
underestimated the number of Indian illiterates. The figures are of course also
subject to the overall doubts about their accuracy.
6. It may therefore be that at present the Fijian and other votes, if everyone voted,
would outnumber the Indians. But this is far from certain, and every year the margin
will rapidly narrow as the Indian under-21’s grow up. It will have narrowed already,
boaring in mind that our figures, such as they are, are already over a year old.
67 CAB 134/2403, PFP 1(63)2 8 May 1963
‘Future policy in Fiji’: minutes of Cabinet (Official) Committee on
Future Policy in the Pacific
The Committee considered a memorandum by the Colonial Office (P.F.P.)(63) 3) on
future policy in Fiji.1
1 See 66.
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Mr. Marnham said that the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the
Colonies (Mr. Nigel Fisher) had, in the light of his recent visit to Fiji, reached certain
provisional conclusions about the political future of the territory on which he had
instructed the Colonial Office to seek the views of the Committee before he
formulated his advice to the Colonial Secretary. There was racial friction in Fiji
between the native Fijians who were of a traditional and hierarchical temperament
and were strongly attached to their links with the British Crown, and the Indian
immigrants, who out-numbered the Fijians and who sought, though not yet openly,
political advance towards independence. The situation could be expected to get worse
rather than better since internal friction was increasing and outside intervention by
the United Nations, whose Committee of Twenty-four was shortly to discuss the
territory, would be likely to increase it further. The Colonial Office therefore
considered that the first step should be taken towards internal self-government by
the introduction of a ‘member system’; but the Fijians had indicated to Mr. Fisher
that they would not be prepared even to consider this unless they had assurances
that the Fijian link with the Crown would be continued together with safeguards for
their existing position on the ownership of land and the filling of posts in the Civil
Service and for the continuance of Fiji as a Christian state. The Colonial Office
therefore wished to propose to Ministers that, whilst they should avoid saying
anything which would explicitly commit Britain forever, they should give a public
assurance to Fiji that the British Government did not envisage separate sovereign
independence for the territory in the foreseeable future but would be prepared to
work out in consultation with the people of Fiji a status designed to preserve for the
territory a continuing link with Britain.
In discussion other members of the Committee considered that their Ministers
would wish in due course to have the opportunity of discussing the wider
implications of continued British involvement in Fiji; it would be helpful if when the
matter were brought before Ministers these could be more fully brought out. The
political and military burden of continuance of British sovereignty with the
associated responsibility for internal security, possibly against opposition in the
United Nations, appeared likely to increase when British burdens in the area were
also increasing because of the opposition to Malaysia and because of SEATO
commitments. Defence interests regarded more narrowly on the other hand weighed
in favour of maintenance of British sovereignty over Fiji to safeguard the use of the
civil air-field and telecommunications facilities.
In further discussion the following main points were made:—
(a) The situation in Fiji could be expected to alter with time and an assurance
about the continuance of the link with Britain should therefore be the minimum
necessary to persuade the Fijians to agree to constitutional advance.
(b) The memorandum suggested that the support of the Indian Government
should be sought for the proposals as a means of mitigating United Nations
criticism. It was important, however, to avoid any implication that the Indian
Government was thought to have influence over Indians in Fiji; and there were
wider objections to seeking help from the Indian Government whilst the
difficulties with them over independent finances continued.
(c) The draft notes for a possible constitution despatch (Annex B to P.F.P. (63) 3)
stated that there was not any desire on the part of any section of the community
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for sovereign independence for Fiji in the foreseeable future. It would be wiser to
omit this statement since it might well be challenged at the United Nations with
the request that it should be substantiated by the holding of a plebiscite.
(d) The draft notes also referred to the possibility of retention in constitutional
arrangements for Fiji of Crown appointment of certain key senior officials. Such a
reference should be drafted so as not to prejudge by implication the question
whether expatriate officers would be given the right to retire with compensation.
The Committee:—
(1) Invited the Colonial Office:—
(i) when pursuing their proposals for future policy in Fiji to take account of the
points made in the Committee’s discussion.
(ii) in consultation with the Treasury and the Home Office to give further
thought to the terms of the draft constitution dispatch annexed to P.F.P. (63) 3.
(2) Invited the Ministry of Defence to provide the Colonial Office with a statement
of British defence interests in relation to Fiji for conclusion in a paper for
Ministers.
68 CO 1036/1067, no 93 15 Aug 1963
[Constitution]: despatch from Mr Sandys to Sir K Maddocks on a
proposal to convene a constitutional conference
I have the honour to refer to the discussions about the constitutional future of Fiji
which the Parliamentary Under Secretary of State, Mr. Nigel Fisher, held with
representatives of all communities during his visit to the Colony last January. Mr.
Fisher gave me a full account of those discussions, and I have studied carefully the
letter dated 17th January, 1963,1 which was addressed to him by the members of the
Fijian Affairs Board and which was subsequently published.
2. The British Government accept that the time is approaching when the future
relationship between Fiji and Britain should be clarified and codified, and will be
glad, in consultation with representatives of the people of Fiji, to work out a
constitutional framework which will preserve a continuing link with Britain and
within which further progress can be made in the direction of internal self-
government.
3. The precise nature of this framework will require further study and
consultation between the British Government and the Government and people of
Fiji. I therefore have it in mind to convene a conference at an appropriate time at
which the British Government and the leaders of representetive opinion in Fiji would
try together to agree upon concrete proposals. This conference might take place in
London during 1964 or early in 1965.
4. I note that it has been suggested that a form of constitutional relationship
with Britain comparable with that of the Isle of Man or the Channel Islands might
provide the basis for an enduring constitutional framework. The circumstances of
those islands are of course in many respects different from those of Fiji, and their
1 See 64.
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constitutional arrangements could hardly be adopted in their entirety. Nevertheless,
the experience afforded by the working of their constitutions may be useful in
deciding upon suitable arrangements for Fiji, and at the conference we should
examine, among other questions, which features of them can be adapted to suit
conditions in Fiji.
5. Although the precise nature of the future relationship between Britain and Fiji
requires further study and discussion, I hope it will be agreed, in the light of the
assurance which I have given in paragraph 2 above, that this need not prevent some
advance meanwhile towards a greater degree of internal self-government than exists
at present. I believe that Fiji has leaders well qualified to bear added responsibilities,
and that a suitable step would be the introduction of the ‘Member system’ on the
lines described as ‘Stage 1’ in Legislative Council Paper No. 8 of 1961, modified to
accord with the constitutional changes introduced last February, This will not
involve any amendment of the existing constitutional instruments.
6. I shall be glad if you will lay this despatch before your Executive and
Legislative Councils and seek their agreement to the introduction of a ‘Member
system’ at a convenient date, perhaps early in 1964.
69 CO 1036/1263, no 11 15 Oct 1963
[Executive Council]: letter from P D Macdonald to J E Marnham on
the emergence of Ratu Mara as the leading Fijian political figure
1. Many thanks for your in confidence letter No. PAC/A. 137 of the 6th October,
1963, on the subject of the activities of Penaia1 and his family in England. He has
indeed left, because Mara received a postcard from Laisa from Gibraltar.
2. I am glad that Nigel Fisher, Trafford Smith and yourself were able to discuss
the constitution despatch with him, and I was particularly interested in his views as
recorded by you. But, I should perhaps issue a word of warning here; unfortunately,
the Fijian leaders have one marked failing; in conversation with them individually
they will often express a particular—and usually a sensible—view but, alas, if one
meets them together at a meeting of the Fijian Affairs Board or some other similar
body, they will only too often express a contrary—and often, I fear, cautious and
reactionary—view. Too often, alas, each is looking over his shoulder at the one next
to him, either seeking a lead, or being somewhat fearful of expressing an opinion
which may not be acceptable to the others. This may be particularly so in discussions
concerning proposals for constitutional advance, since opinions amongst the Fijian
leaders range from the liberal and progressive (indeed somewhat radical) views of
Mara, to the conservative and somewhat reactionary views of Edward and George
Cakobau.
3. I have addressed you in a separate letter about my conversations with
representatives of different races regarding constitutional advancement. In this
connexion, I regret to say that it is proving in many ways a great pity that my original
proposal (not Maddocks’s) that one European should be dropped from the Executive
Council and be replaced by a Fijian (Mara) was not accepted by the Colonial Office.
1 Ratu Penaia Ganilau.
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Unfortunately, I had gone on leave when the reply was received from the Colonial
Office to our initial telegram, otherwise I would have advised against acceptance of
your view without a stern struggle! I say this because Ratu Edward is, I fear, very
much of a roi fainéant,2 apart from his conservative and slightly reactionary views. It
is of little or no use consulting him about matters such as constitutional advance,
first, because I do not think he fully represents Fijian opinion; secondly, because of
his cautious and conservative nature; and, thirdly, because the undisputed leader of
the Fijians at the present time appears to be Mara. But one simply cannot, of course,
omit to consult the Fijian member of Executive Council; on the other hand, one
must consult Mara who, as I have said, at present appears to be the undisputed Fijian
leader and who is certainly more seized than the others of the need to make use of
the short time which is left at our disposal.
4. I have never believed, and I do not now believe, that the non-appointment of a
second European on Executive Council and his replacement by a Fijian, would have
elicited any protests from the Indians, who are at present ‘leaning over backwards’ to
cooperate with both Government and the Fijians. In this connexion you will recall
that Patel’s line (and that of other Indians) during some of the troubles in recent
years, has been rather one of evicting Europeans from the higher seats of
Government and the commanding heights of the economy, than taking action to
hold back, or stop, the advance of the Fijians.
5. There are other reasons, besides those which I have given in paragraph 3, as to
why it is desirable that Mara should be frequently consulted and should have been on
the Executive Council. If you have read my annual confidential reports upon him,
you will know that he is a mass of complexes and contradictions, with a load of chips
on his shoulders. But I am happy to say that at last he and I now work in very close
harmony indeed and can be entirely frank with each other; indeed, I venture to think
that I am probably one of the very few officers, if not the only officer, in Government
who can deal with him on a basis of complete frankness. Be that as it may, I have
always warned that he will be liable to explode from time to time over this or that.
Thus, a case in point has recently arisen in connexion with the forthcoming salaries
review and I attach a copy of his letter to the Secretary to the Salaries Review
Commissioners.3 I have not had time to examine his letter in detail and see whether
the history he has given of this matter is factually correct—although I rather doubt
it. But I am appalled at the bitterness which this scheme still causes within him; I
had very much hoped that he had accepted the necessity for this scheme even though
he might not entirely agree with it.
6. But it is because of such explosions, coupled with his great potential for
political leadership, that he must be treated with the greatest care and given his
due—and more—wherever possible. I am convinced that it is a bitter
disappointment to him that he is not on the Executive Council (though we can
probably remedy this when the ‘member system’ is introduced) and certainly the fact
that he is not will make our work in various fields that much more difficult unless, as
I am sure we must do, he is taken into our confidence as a sort of extra-Executive
Council member. We need his support so much for progress in so many fields and we
cannot afford to fritter away his influence and powers of leadership.
2 Ineffective king. 3 Not printed.
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7. Although this letter commenced as a reply to your letter concerning Penaia, I
now seem to have got far distant from that subject! However, I hope that the above
thoughts which I have dictated this morning at 7.30 a.m. just before leaving on tour
of the Western Division, will be of interest and value to you.
70 CO 1036/1067, no 6E Dec 1963
[Constitution]: confidential note by J N Falvey on Fiji’s future
relationship with the UK and the member system
[This note was enclosed with a letter from Trafford Smith to P D Macdonald on 23 Dec.
Discussions with a European delegation from Fiji took place at the CO on 6 Dec, and
Trafford Smith saw them again on 10 Dec when Falvey handed over the note reproduced
here. The note revealed the close liaison between Europeans and Fijians in Fiji. Falvey
asked that it should be treated in confidence, especially in view of the final sentence of
para 9.]
The Fijian Affairs Board’s letter of the 17th January, 1963,1 to Mr. Nigel Fisher
proposed, (para. 3), as a pre-requisite to any constitutional change that a new
constitutional instrument should be drawn up to clarify and codify the special
relationship between Fiji and the United Kingdom. The relationship envisaged is on
the lines of that subsisting between the United Kingdom and the Isle of Man or the
Channel Islands. It is envisaged that the relationship should be permanent, not
transitional.
2. It followed from this proposition that a membership system, even on a trial
basis, would necessarily follow the making of the constitutional instrument, which
would incidentally involve an Order-in-Council or possibly, according to Mr. Fisher,
an Act of Parliament.
3. The response from London contains an acceptance of the codification proposal
and in general terms an acceptance of the Isle of Man/Channel Islands conception.
London points out, and we must agree, that certain features of this conception would
be inapplicable to the Fiji/United Kingdom relationship.2
4. Pressure already being exerted by the ‘Committee of 24’ and the likelihood of
further pressure from the General Assembly of the United Nations seem now to
dictate a revision of the timing of change.
5. The United Kingdom delegation at the United Nations will be saved much
embarrassment, if not vilification, if it is able to announce that Fiji has of its own
initiative proposed a membership system, on a limited scale, as a first step towards
the evolution of a system of internal self-government.
6. The proposals which follow are suggestions for the reconstitution of Executive
Council. It is suggested that at the same time as these proposals are being discussed
the United Kingdom Government should be urged to formulate draft material which
might form the basis of the constitutional instrument.
7. The reasons for this are two-fold:—
(a) the authors of the letter of the 17th January, 1963 are entitled to stronger
assurances than have been received that the ‘special relationship’ is acceptable to
1 See 64. 2 See 68.
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the United Kingdom Government and that the necessary enactments will present
no insuperable difficulties;
(b) unless there is some broad measure of agreement amongst the Fiji delegation
before the London conference the outcome of the conference may be an enforced
compromise which is unpalatable to Fijian and European members and those they
represent.
8. As to the unofficial composition of Executive Council the Fijian members
would like to have a majority representation on the basis of 2–1–1. The European
members take the view that while they do not regard the present composition (2
Europeans, 1 Fijian, 1 Indian) as conferring entrenched rights, and while they fully
understand the motives of the Fijian members, they feel that the switch could entail
unfortunate consequences.
9. Indian members might as a matter of expediency agree to the 2 Fijian, 1
European, 1 Indian set-up. But in no time they would raise a demand that the
Indians have parity with the Fijians. On a population basis this would be virtually
irresistible. The result would be to weaken, irreversibly, the Fijian/European
alignment, which we regard as essential to the political survival of both races.
10. The membership system involves collective responsibility and therefore a
change which would create an unofficial majority in Executive Council would have
no great significance. Under the membership system the Governor continues to act
on the advice of Executive Council and is not necessarily bound to accept the
majority opinion.
11. We therefore propose that Executive Council should be constituted as
follows:—
Official Unofficial
Colonial Secretary 2 European
Attorney-General 2 Fijian
Financial Secretary
ex officio
2 Indian
Secretary for Fijian Affairs

Development Commissioner
12. So long as the post of Secretary for Fijian Affairs exists the holder should
have the portfolio of Fijian Affairs, including native land. It should be understood as a
constitutional instrument, that either the Secretary for Fijian Affairs or a Fijian
Member of Executive Council should always hold the native land portfolio.
13. A typical order-in-council providing for a membership system speaks of the
Governor’s assigning to ‘two or three’ appointed (i.e. unofficial) members certain
‘responsibility’. The sphere of responsibility can be enlarged or contracted as time
goes by. Such a system would therefore permit of the part-time functioning of a
Member and could also permit of the interchange of areas of responsibility.
14. In Fiji there would clearly need to be three Members—one of each race. On
the principle of collective responsibility the other three members of Executive
Council who are not for the time being changed with responsibility would
presumably be expected to support any decisions emerging from Executive Council.
The enlarged unofficial membership of Executive Council would minimise the
embarrassment which might otherwise be encountered if a measure were brought
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into Legislative Council and met solid opposition from unofficial members who are
not members of Executive Council.
15. There is room for further discussion of the points mentioned in the last
paragraph. The purpose of this note is to record the opinions unanimously reached at
the meeting held today, viz:—
(i) a membership system should be put on trial in advance of the constitutional
conference in London;
(ii) membership of Executive Council should be enlarged to include 2 European, 2
Fijian and 2 Indian Members, the Secretary for Fijian Affairs being an ex-officio
member and charged with responsibility for Fijian affairs including matters
pertaining to native land;
(iii) every effort should be made to form a consensus regarding the terms of the
constitutional instrument by which Fiji’s link with Britain is to be permanently
codified, well in advance of the conference. Inter-governmental discussion of this
point should be got under way immediately.
71 CO 1036/1067, no 24 19 Mar 1964
[Reflections from Fiji]: letter from Ratu Mara to J E Marnham on
relations between Fijians and Indians
Dear John,
By the time you receive this letter you will probably have met Henry Hall who left
Nadi early this morning and will be arriving in London 9 pm tonight. The Halls spent
a few days with us on their way home from Sarawak and I took them to Wakaya for a
couple of days. We had lovely weather out there and they enjoyed themselves
swimming & fishing. We did think about England & its cold and foggy March days.
Henry mentioned to me that in 1959 he came across some papers on the background
of the Indian immigration to Fiji. He sent copies of these papers to Sir Kenneth
Maddocks. I have never heard of these papers but I think they can be very useful in my
collection of facts in preparation for the London Constitutional Conference. I shall be
most grateful if you will be able to let me have a copy of these papers.
No further progress has been made since the January Leg. Co. in which we
approved the adoption of the Member System. H.E. is touring the islands and I shall
be accompanying him to Lau tomorrow.
A.D. Patel and Koya have been very mischievous in their speeches lately. They have
been very provocative about land matters and have aroused strong feelings amongst
our own people. While we Fijian members (with the exception of Ravuama) have
strictly followed Nigel Fisher’s advice not to say anything that will exacerbate racial
relations, A.D. & Koya have gone out of their way to provoke us. Our people are
getting restive as they interpret our reticence as a sign of weakness and are
beginning to listen to Fijian demagogues who are very critical of our so-called tame
and unwarrior-like attitude on the eve of the Conference.
I am inclined to think that A.D. & his confederates do not really want the
Conference to succeed and would much prefer intervention by the United Nations.
He has of course been feeding the United Nations Indian & other Afro–Asian
delegates with his version of information on Fiji. His right-hand man Krishna Murti,
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librarian at Nadi & editor of the Jagaiti, collapsed & died while actually asking a
question at Cecil King’s1 press conference. Fijians now want Cecil King to come here
more often!
Yours sincerely
Kamisese Mara
1 Chairman in the UK of the Daily Mirror group of newspapers.
72 CO 1036/1067, no 25 9 Apr 1964
[Reflections from Fiji]: letter (reply) from J E Marnham to Ratu Mara
My dear Kamese,
Many thanks for your interesting letter of 19th March.1
I will see whether I can track down the papers you mention, but it may not be easy
to identify them and may take a little time. You might be able to get on to them more
quickly if you were to ask Sir Derek,2 since if copies were sent to Sir Kenneth
Maddocks they are presumably on record somewhere in Fiji.
You may find what you want, in enough detail for your purpose, in a couple of
books which I have just seen. One is ‘Indians in Fiji’ or some such title by Adrian
Mayer, published by the Institute of Race Relations.3 I have read this, & it is short,
simple and clear. The other, which is on my desk but which I haven’t yet read, is
‘Fiji’s Indian Migrants’ by K. L. Gillion, published by the OUP in Melbourne in 1962.
It looks to be a good deal more solid and detailed. You may of course have seen these
already, but if you haven’t you may find them useful.
This is a sad morning: I am writing under the shadow of Ravuama’s death and am
just going down to the funeral. For all his enigmatic and sometimes difficult
character, he will be a sad loss and it is tragic that his end should have come the way
it has. It is particularly hard on Adi Davila and the children but I am sure everyone
will do all they can to comfort her when she gets home.
All good wishes to you and Lala and the family. I hope we shall see you again before
too long. I am delighted that Brian Pearce is going to see something of Kero & hope
the turtles answer the call! That was a good trip that you gave me.
Yours ever
(signed) John
1 See 71. 2 Jakeway, the incoming governor.
3 OUP for Institute of Race Relations, 1963.
73 CO 1036/1458, no 64 31 Aug 1964
[Land tenure]: letter from Trafford Smith to Sir D Jakeway.
Enclosure: CO brief
When John Marnham wrote to you on 29th June he promised that we would let you
have a paper on the land problem prepared during Lloyd’s1 visit to Britain. Here it is.
1 D T Lloyd, director of land, mines and surveys, Fiji.
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After we had cleared it with him and with Simpson, Brian Pearce2 and I ran through
the general ideas in it with Mr. Fisher and it has his blessing too. We hope that you
feel that the paper meets the criteria set out in paragraph 4 of your letter of 9th June.
We should be most grateful if you would let us have in due course your reactions to it
with any suggestions you may have on how it should be modified.
2. I do not think I need take up in detail the points made in the enclosures to
your letter of 9th June, which were a great help to us in clearing our minds on the
problems involved. (In any case we are now I think sufficiently in agreement on this
problem for us not to need to be deliberately controversial!) I should, however, make
a comment on paragraph 6 of your letter where you refer to a possible extension of
the length of leases recommended by the Landlord and Tenant Committee. We did
examine this possibility with Lloyd, but our agreed view was that to a large extent,
with the protection offered by the proposed legislation, the length of lease becomes
somewhat academic. The guarantee of security of tenure rests not so much in the
actual length of the lease as in the stipulation that the tenant may only be evicted on
limited and justifiable grounds. (Indeed under the proposals in the enclosed paper
one is close to tenancies on the English pattern which are, of course, annual. We
have provided for new leases to be heritable. This goes further even than English
law. We think it desirable but would not think it should be a sticking point.) It could
in fact be argued that a longer tenancy might militate against the interests of the
tenant as the tribunal would be more disposed to consider that greater hardship
would be caused to the landlord in the event of renewal for 30 years than it would in
the case of a renewal for 10 years. But we have suggested retaining the 10 year lease
primarily for the reason that it is recommended in the Landlord and Tenant
Committee report, and thus has already gained a measure of acceptance. There
seemed to us to be little to be gained from getting too embroiled in arguments on
the length of the lease.
3. You will note that we have recommended that the new provisions should apply
to all existing tenancies including those of lands within reserve. To exclude the latter
would be detrimental to the increasing number of Fijians taking out individual
tenancies of reserved land, and Lloyd considers that such a measure is not as drastic
as it might first appear. His view is that by the time the new act is introduced the
Native Land Trust Board under its present policy will have dealt with most of the
tenancies affected by reserve which have already been announced. However, we have
suggested in the memorandum that the Governor should have discretionary power
to prescribe the areas of Fijian reserve land where the legislation shall apply and this
would provide room for manoeuvre in cases of particular difficulty or where the new
provisions are not strictly necessary—because most of the land is owner occupied—
(though in the latter case it might be better to bring these areas within the scope of
the new legislation for the sake of conformity).
4. There is one additional point which I should specifically mention and that
refers to the recommendation about compensation for tenants in respect of
improvements made before the new legislation takes effect. We did look at the
possibility of including some provision for a fund to meet this problem (which will of
course gradually disappear) but did not feel justified in proposing one. We give our
reasons in the paper. It might be that there is residual injustice here but we cannot
2 J B Pearce, principal, Pacific and Indian Ocean Dept, CO.
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hope to provide a complete panacea for all ills in this legislation. We think the best
approach to the problem is by Government action to provide a safety net through
resettlement schemes and other help, rather than through the erection of a statutory
one.
5. In preparing the paper we have made the basic assumptions that the policy of
setting aside reserves cannot be undone, and also that no major changes can be
initiated by legislation (at this juncture at least) to amend the present customary
system of Fijian tenure through mataqali ownership or the management
organisation of the N.L.T.B. (which will, however, be reduced in effect under the
proposals in our paper to the status of an estate manager). Changes in these respects,
we imagine, are more likely to come about through pressure from among the
progressive Fijians themselves who will find the protective shackles on their
economic initiative increasingly frustrating. We should however be very interested to
have your views on how far Government can or should encourage this process.
6. In conclusion I should say that we all recognise that it will be a considerable
political feat if you are able to ‘sell’ the package contained in the enclosed paper. In
our view it would in fact achieve a revolutionary improvement in the situation. We
are however encouraged by Lloyd’s opinion that there is more than a 50% possibility
of getting it accepted. Above all, please do not think that we fail to appreciate how
much harder it is to solve the land problem on the ground in Fiji as opposed to
sitting in an office in London!
Enclosure to 73
1. This paper attempts to set out the basis of a new approach to present problems
of land tenure in Fiji without depriving existing owners of their fee simple. It is clear
that the policy of setting aside reserves of land which may be used only by Fijian
farmers has contributed to these problems (as was pointed out by the Burns
Commission Report of 1959). The Fijian owners are deprived of the rents which they
might otherwise be receiving and they cannot freely dispose of their land in order to
acquire land outside reserves which might be more suited to their requirements. The
policy has also distorted the pattern of land holding outside reserves as a result. The
traditional communal system of Fijian land-holding places additional obstacles in the
way of Fijian economic advancement. (This is being increasingly recognised with the
granting of individual holdings on Fijian land.) Also, the high management costs of
the Native Land Trust Board result from having to operate within this complicated
framework and lead to a reduction in the amount of rents available for distribution to
the owning mataqalis. However, these are matters on which the Fijian owners
themselves must judge where their best interests lie in a developing economy. The
Native Land Trust Board in its statement of 10th August, 1962, affirmed that there
would be no review of decisions already announced by it on the extent of reserves of
native land. It is recommended that the proclamation of reserves in areas where this
work has not yet been completed should take place as rapidly as possible and the
N.L.T.B’s declared policy should be given statutory effect by removing the legal
power to extend these reserves.
2. The remainder of this paper is based on the conviction that many of the
problems of land tenure spring from the absence of an adequate statutory framework
09-Fiji-48-cpp  10/5/06  6:56 AM  Page 197
198 FIJIAN ASPIRATIONS [73]
for the conduct of relations between landlord and tenant; (a shortcoming which will
assume increasing importance to Fijians themselves as more and more of them take
out individual leases inside reserves). The succeeding paragraphs summarise
proposals for legislation to remedy this. To a large extent the paper follows the
recommendations of the Agricultural Landlord and Tenant Committee of 1961
(published as Legislative Council Paper No. 30 of 1962). It does however modify these
recommendations in certain respects (which are specified) and in particular it
proposes that the legislation should apply to all leasehold agricultural land outside
reserves (including land in reserves and land outside reserves leased by the Native
Land Trust Board), where the area of the land on lease exceeds 21⁄2 acres. (In the case
of reserved land only the Governor may prescribe from time to time the areas to
which the ordinance would apply.) One of the principal effects of this would be that
the N.L.T.B. would have to justify its claim to the resumption of leasehold land
before an independent tribunal if such a claim were challenged by the tenant. (In the
case of any tenancy of land in reserve the tenant could, of course, only be a Fijian).
Those factors which the tribunal will be required to consider are already taken into
account by the N.L.T.B. in arriving at its own current decisions. The suspicion that
this is not the case because the Board is at present ‘judge in its own case’ will
however be seen no longer to have any possible foundation and this will help to free
the N.L.T.B. from criticism of its actions.
3. Under the new legislation, all tenancies falling within the application of the
legislation as set out in paragraph 2 (whether on the basis of written or unwritten
agreements) should be converted with effect from the enactment of the legislation to
statutory tenancies which should carry the following conditions. (This widens the
scope of the legislation to affect all existing leases whereas these were only affected to
a limited extent by the recommendations of the Committee).
4. As set out in the Committee’s report, tenancies should run for the remainder
of their current term and on expiry should be renewable unless notice of termination
has been given by the landlord at least one year prior to the expiry of the tenancy.
The landlord should only be permitted to give such notice on one of the five grounds
set out in paragraph 27 of the Committee’s report. The tenant should have right of
appeal to a Lands Tribunal against notice of termination by the landlord and the aim
should be for such an appeal and any further appeal therefrom to be settled during
the twelve month period of the notice. In any event the tenant should not be evicted
until his appeal has been heard. Some transitional provision will be necessary to deal
with current leases due to expire within less than twelve months from the enactment
of the legislation. It could be provided for notice given by a landlord under such a
lease to be deemed to take effect on the expiry of the lease but that a tenant who
lodged an appeal with the Tribunal could not be evicted until after the appeal had
been heard.
5. New leases should, in accordance with the recommendation of the
Committee, be granted for a minimum period of ten years and should be heritable.
Tenancies should be terminable during the period of the lease by agreement between
the landlord and tenant or on one of the grounds set out in paragraph 32 of the
Committee’s report, with protective rights of appeal to the Lands Tribunal as there
described. (Paragraph 32(b) (i) of the report should however be amended for
clarification by the addition after the words ‘previously obtained in writing’ of the
words ‘(but the consent of the landlord shall not be unreasonably withheld)’).
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6. The recommendations of the Committee for the review of rents by a Lands
Tribunal should be adopted and extended. Rents of all leases (including current leases)
should be liable to revision by the Lands Tribunal on appeal by either tenant or landlord.
It is recommended that such appeals may be made at any time but thereafter at intervals
of not less than five years. The maximum permissible rent for statutory leases should
be 5% of the fair market value of the land (assuming that it were held in fee simple)
not taking into account any improvements on the land. The Committee’s view was that
the initial rent on the granting of a tenancy should not be controlled. It was feared by
the Committee that this might lead to an overloading of the Tribunal. Under this
recommendation, however, there is a danger that tenants might be subjected to rack
renting for a period of five years because of the shortage of land and it is suggested
that this recommendation should not be adopted. Special provision will, however, be
needed to avoid an over-loading of the Tribunal in the period immediately after
enactment of the legislation now that all existing leases are to come within the
legislative provision for rent revision. This might be achieved in so far as arbitration
on rent is concerned by bringing existing leases within the scope of the law gradually
e.g. by extending these provisions of the act to leases with ten years or more to run
during the first year of the act’s operation and to the remainder of existing leases as
the work-load on the Tribunals permitted. In addition, the possibility of providing for
a measure of retrospection in the decisions of the Tribunal might be considered as a
transitional measure only, while not accepting this as a general principle.
7. The recommendations of the Committee on the liability of the landlord to
payment of compensation for improvements made (on the basis set out in paragraphs
53/55 of its report) and the provisions in paragraphs 57/58 of the report on
dilapidations similarly should apply to all leases and not simply to new leases.
However, compensation should only be payable for improvements made after the
date of enactment of the new legislation. Otherwise, in equity, retrospective
adjustment of rents would also be required and this is clearly out of the question
here. It is recognised that some hardship may be felt by tenants whose tenancies are
not renewed and who receive no compensation for considerable improvements made
during their tenancies but prior to the new legislation. However, moveable
improvements can be removed and the tenant has at least had the benefit of the
other improvements he has made for the period of the lease. Also he has had the
benefit of lower rents than might otherwise have been the case if the landlord had
known that he was to be liable for compensation for improvements made. At the
same time it is suggested that Government should accept the obligation to provide
the maximum help with the resettlement of displaced tenants to prevent hardship
wherever possible. (The new proposals recently announced which will enable cane
farmers whose leases expire and are not renewed to withdraw their contributions to
the Sugar Stabilisation Fund should help here).
8. The procedure for the creation of a system of Lands Tribunals should in
general follow the proposals in paragraphs 59/64 of the Committee’s report subject
to any modification found necessary. If a number of Area Tribunals have to be
established, as seems likely, consideration might be given to the establishment of a
Central Lands Tribunal to which appeals from the Area Tribunals could be made. The
Chairman of such a Tribunal would need to be a person of considerable ability who
was able to secure and retain the trust and confidence of all sections of the
community in Fiji.
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9. The recommendations of the Committee in relation to share farming,
premiums, sub-letting, licences, distress, documentation, offences, prohibited
conditions, implied covenants and other subjects in paragraph 41/50 and paragraphs
64/76 of the report should also be drawn upon in drafting the new legislation. One
amendment, however, is recommended to paragraph 66 of the report. Paragraph 65
refers to the case of a tenant who falls ill during a tenancy and wishes to sub-let until
his health has recovered. In such a case the tenant might well wish to sub-let the
holding as a whole. It is recommended therefore that there should be no statutory
bar on sub-letting the whole though such a course would still be subject to the
provision in paragraph 66(ii) for control by the Tribunal. Additionally provision will
have to be made in the legislation to cover the position of existing sublettings now
that it is proposed that existing leases should be brought within the scope of the
legislation.
74 CO 1036/1215, no 71 18 Jan 1965
‘Fijian Association’: Fiji Special Branch report of a meeting on 
16 January. Annex: Translation of presidential address by Ratu Mara1
A special general meeting of the FIJIAN ASSOCIATION was held at the Ratu Sir Lala
Sukuna Memorial School on Saturday, 16th January, 1965. It was attended by
approximately 300 Fijian men and women. Ratu K.K.T. MARA chaired the meeting.
2. Ratu PENAIA GANILAU, in presenting the report of the Committee, said they
were fully aware that the Association was undergoing a period of financial difficulty.
Some success had been noted in the recovery of outstanding debts however and it
was hoped that the Association would now go forward on a sounder footing. He
appealed for support with a view to achieving a strong Fijian front which would
withstand any challenge from other communities in Fiji.
3. Ratu K.K.T. MARA prescribed his Presidential Address (Translation attached).
4. The meeting then discussed the proposed constitution—particularly that
clause which permitted membership to all races. This issue was discussed at length
and resulted in the proposal being defeated. The Association therefore will remain
mono-racial. URAIA KATISAWANI KOROI voiced his objection to the proposed
clause stating that it clashed with the objects of the Association ‘To promote the
rights, liberties, privileges and freedoms of the Fijian people.’
5. SEMESA SIKIVOU expressed concern as to what should be released to the
Press and Radio as a result of the meeting. His suggestion was that nothing should be
released since other political organisations had not publicised any of their proposals
for the London Conference. He further suggested that copies of the Presidential
address circulated to the meeting should be withdrawn.
HUNT SILA (Manager of the Nausori Fijian Secondary School and Member of the
Rewa Provincial Council) spoke against the suggestion of SEMESA. He said that
Fijians had nothing to fear. They claim ownership to the land and no one could
dispute the claim. Provided they were making genuine demands then they should
broadcast it to the world for all interested parties to note.
1 Forwarded to CO for background information by Macdonald, 22 Jan.
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RUSIATE NAYACAKALOU suggested that the decision for releases should rest with
the Committee. This was agreed to.
6. Elections were then held, resulting in the following:—
President — Ratu K.K.T. MARA.
Vice-Presidents — Ratu G.K. CAKOBAU.
Ratu P.K. GANILAU.
Hon. JOSUA RABUKAWAQA.
Secretary — Ratu N.N. NAWALOWALO.
Treasurer — WILLIAM KENI NAULUMATUA 
(Clerk to Central Fijian Treasury)
Committee — DAVID TOGANIVALU
EMOSI VUAKATAGANE
TOMASI VAKATORA
PENIAME NAQASIMA
HUNT SILA
ISIRELI NABORISI
7. URAIA KATISAWANI KOROI stated that Fijians had not been informed the
basis of the London Conference. He said that members of the Legislative Council had
no doubt been informed by His Excellency the Governor as to the views of the British
Government for future political changes in Fiji. He added that such information
should be made known to Fijians to enable them to express their views. URAIA
appealed to Fijian leaders to keep their own people fully informed of any proposed
change. URAIA was supported by MANASA BUTADROKA (Ex-Secretary, FIJIAN
GOVERNMENT WORKERS’ UNION) who appealed to Fijian leaders to tell the British
Government to transfer the trust given to them by the Fijian Chiefs in 1874, back to
Fijians. He added that Fijians were determined to achieve this claim of right at the
cost of their lives. Bloodshed would mean nothing if their demands were not
acceptable to other races in the Colony.
Numerous other speakers appealed to Fijian leaders to ask the British Government
to honour the Deed of Cession.
Ratu NOA NAWALOWALO said the Deed could be interpreted in many different
ways and advised those present not to rely too deeply on it. He said that at the time of
Cession it was impossible for the Chiefs to foresee present racial problems. Any talks
should be between the signatories to the Cession only. Ratu NOA advocated the
setting up of a Royal Commission or Magisterial Enquiry to determine the present
validity of the Deed. This suggestion was challenged, however, by a member of the
audience who said the Deed of Cession was quite clear and that any challenge over its
validity would not be acceptable to Fijians.
8. URAIA KOROI enquired of Ratu MARA whether or not leaders of all races in
Fiji had met to discuss the basis of the London Conference. Ratu MARA said that
discussions were currently underway and that the Council of Chiefs would be
notified of results. He further added that an official of the Colonial Office would be
visiting Fiji about the middle of this year to seek the views of all people in Fiji
pertaining to the Conference.
9. The meeting, generally, was disjointed with little regard for procedure. Many
people aired views which are not worthy of comment. There was a distinct anti-
Indian feeling which is perhaps best expressed in the President’s Address, attached.
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Annex to 74
Review of activities from the time the Committee was elected on 27th August, 1964,
to this meeting.
The Executive Committee met eleven times during this period while sub-
committees met six times.
At these meetings were discussed:—
(1) The preparation of a new constitution for the Association copies of which you
now have. You will notice that in the new constitution, subbranches of the
Association may be formed in other parts of Fiji. It was not possible to do this
under the old constitution.
(2) Also discussed were action to be taken to bring the financial position of the
Association up to date. Efforts were made to refund loans from the Association, pay
off its debt and to have all receipt books circulated to other parts of Fiji, returned.
(3) Also discussed were important matters which are thought necessary to be
clear to us in view of the coming Constitutional Conference.
These are the headings of the important matters discussed by the Committee and
which I should make known to you:—
(1) Ownership of Native land.
(2) Native Lands Ordinance and Native Reserve Ordinance.
(3) Reference to Council of Chiefs and Fijian Affairs Board of Bills affecting the
Fijians.
(4) The constitution to be in line with Christian principles.
(5) The confirmation of equal distribution of Fijians, Indians and Europeans in
Government service.
(6) Policy of granting citizenship of Fiji to individuals.
(7) The Legislative Council.
1. Ownership of native lands
This subject was not discussed at length for it is clear as daylight, and in existing
Government ordinance is definitely stated that native lands are owned by natives. It
is also clear that ownership by natives of native lands is on ‘mataquali’ basis as was
resolved by the Council of Chiefs at Mualevu in 1881, and which was confirmed in
1958 when the Council of Chiefs rejected a motion by Mr. J.S. THOMSON, the
Commissioner of Native Lands that the land-owning unit should revert from the
‘mataqali’ to the ‘yavusa’. Many honourable statements have been made by former
Governors and these were confirmed by His Excellency the Governor Sir DEREK
JAKEWAY’s speech to the Legislative Council on 27th November, 1964, that
ownership of land in this Colony is clear, and not to be debated.
2. Native Lands Ordinance and Native Reserve Ordinance
The foundation of the ownership of native lands is embodied in the Native Lands
Ordinance which originated from the Deed of Cession.
The Native Reserve Ordinance defines the policy of usage of native lands, especially
so to lands outside the native reserve.
As ownership of native lands is secure it is believed unlikely that these two
Ordinances would be threatened by major changes. But in view of development
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projects it is necessary to alter some clauses of the Native Reserve Ordinance to
facilitate assistance on present land development methods to owners. Firstly, the
Ordinance does not permit the use of Native Reserve fund to open up and prepare a
piece of land for development. Secondly, the deduction of 1⁄4 of all leases for the use of
the Native Land Trust Board. As there has been an increase in the number of leases,
there has also been a corresponding increase in the number of 1⁄4s. But the work
undertaken by the Board is limited. It is therefore necessary to consider a reduction
of the fraction of a lease to be used by the Native Land Trust Board.
It is clear from development plans that our lands in, and outside the reserve are
not sufficient if we were to be equally provided with a piece capable of providing
economic stability. A large number of us are not suited or are not desirous of
becoming farmers. They want or are suited to take up other professions. The only
means by which we can be equally provided with the products of the land we own is
the distribution of the money obtained from the lease to the owners of the land who
are farming it and those who are only owners though not using it. It is also necessary
to hasten the leasing of our own land within the Native Reserve, to us and other races
of people outside the Native Reserve. But the lease should accordingly be increased to
suit the distribution of the money obtained from the land being leased.
3. Reference to Council of Chiefs and Fijian Affairs Board of Bills affecting the
Fijians
As the Council of Chiefs will remain, it is necessary that its important function must
also be maintained and that is to consider and advise Government before any Bill
affecting the Fijians is passed.
4. The constitution to be in line with Christian principles
The desire to ensure that Christian principles are followed in the Administration of
Government did not only originate from the success of this kind of leadership in Fiji.
From its emergence as a Colony up to this day, or in the world as a whole, it
originated from the desire of the Chiefs who ceded Fiji as it can be seen from the
Deed of Cession. The clause reads:—
‘And whereas the Fijian Chief Cakobau styled Tui Viti and Vunivala and the
other high native chiefs of the said islands are desirous of securing the
promotion of civilisation and Christianity and of increasing trade and
industry within the said islands, . . .’
This is one of the important clauses of the Deed of Cession which appears to be
neglected when considering constitutional reforms. The Chiefs who ceded Fiji were
desirous of securing the promotion of civilisation and Christianity, and of increasing
prosperity. Christianity is founded on the creation of man to be like the Almighty,
and the foundation of our life be compassion, tolerance and obedience to law and
Government.
5. Confirmation of equal distribution of Fijians, Indians and Europeans in
government service
This system of Government Administration is intended to avoid an excessive number
of only one race compared with the other two in Government service. What is meant
here is the number, and does not concern the equal distribution of posts in
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Government service. This system of administration was meant to protect us natives
as higher education was lacking to us. This is by no means a sound protection device
as numbers can be equally distributed but not the posts.
6. Policy of granting citizenship of Fiji to individuals
At present there is an accepted policy recognising a person to be a citizen of the
Colony and Great Britain. When the time comes to give Fiji some of the major
powers of control now vested with Britain, a new legislature should be enacted to
determine individual claim of right as a citizen of Fiji. The present policy is to
recognise all Fiji-born as citizens of Fiji. It only remains to determine the policy of
granting citizenship to non-Fiji born.
7. Legislative Council
Before reviewing the structure of the Legislative Council, we think the following
create the bond between Fiji and Britain:—
(a) The Queen in Council retains the power to amend or repeal the Constitution,
and to enact legislature which promotes and guarantees social, economic and
political welfare.
(b) Appointment of the Governor will continue to be vested with the Queen.
(c) The Queen is to appoint Chief Justice and Judges.
(d) Defence and Foreign Relations should be the responsibility of Great Britain
with the exception of other branches of such responsibility which may be
delegated by Britain to Fiji.
(e) Citizens of Fiji, should be British subjects but the policy of determining
citizens of Fiji is to be reviewed. We believe with continued observance of
Christian ethics within Government Administration similar to our present policy
of offering prayers in important Assemblies.
We wish to insist and support the present racial composition of elected members of
Legislative Council but we believe that the two nominated members from the
Council of Chiefs should be excluded from this composition. They should be
additional members to Fijian elected members since they represent the oldest
Council in Fiji. Such Council looks after the interest of the Fijians.
We support the election of a Representative for Rotumans, Chinese and people of
the Pacific Island Territories resident in Fiji.
When branches of our Association are formed and extended to other parts of Fiji, it
will broadcast the news of placing upon the shoulders of the present generations, the
responsibilities to lead and to govern which were carried by the High Chiefs of Fiji
when they negotiated with the British Government over the Deed of Cession.
One indication of the changing of time is the privilege extended to Fijians and
other races in Fiji to discuss and decide major issues about Fiji. It is hoped with the
formation of branches of the Association it will make it possible to invite the general
views of the Fijians from all parts of Fiji.
The responsibilities now placed upon us are to consider, resolve and draft a new
constitution to suit the transfer back to the people of this Colony of the power to
administer with the acceptance of the bonds which I have already mentioned in the
report of the Committee whereby our bond with the British Government under the
British Crown should continue to be honoured.
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One thing that is creating apprehension amongst Fijians at the present time is the
demand by other races for land. It is our wish to retain for ever the ownership of our
land. We know that it is controlled by legislation and statements made to this effect
by past Governors. The present Governor Sir Derek Jakeway said in his address at the
opening of the Legislative Council on the 27th November, 1964, ‘The ownership of
land in this Colony is clear and cannot be disputed.’ Considering the statements
made by Governors which have had wide publicity, it is surprising to us that a certain
class of people in the Colony are ignorant, or refuse to understand our right of
ownership and believe that this should be discussed at the forthcoming Conference.
It has been published in the newspapers that some organisations (not Native) have
demanded the abolition of the Native Land Reserve. This is unwarranted interference
in our affairs. We do not have to look for the answers, e.g.
1. New Zealand — Native lands for the natives—Maoris.
2. Australia — Native lands for the natives—Aborigines.
3. Canada and the — Native lands for the natives—Red Indians.
United States 
of America
4. Malaya — Native lands for the natives—Dyaks.
5. India — Native lands for the natives—Nagalands and N.E.F.T.
6. South Africa — Native lands for the natives—Kaffirs and Zulus.
Parts of the land not in the possession of the natives of these countries were forced
from them through wars. This system did not happen in Fiji.
It is clear that the system of land ownership is accepted throughout the world and
is based on Christian principles. The right to possess property or land necessitates
their protection and preservation if the people are to carry out their various
commitments and retain their self respect and it is essential that they do so if we are
to have a prosperous Government.
From these contentions which maintain our rights to continue to own our lands,
we are able to see the path to stability and prosperity of our government in times to
come. On the question of daily economic means, it is plainly clear that the natives
are the poorest. If the constitution of this Colony is changed to enable the removal of
native lands from our hands it is possible for us in future to be floating about like
rubbish and our race will become extinct to be forever forgotten from this world.
It is now clear that it is unthinkable for we natives to allow any discussion or
debate on the ownership of native hands to come up in the Conference to be held
here or in London. I believe it proper for our representatives to walk out and leave
the conference if ownership of land is to be debated.
The procedure used by Government to facilitate the use of our native lands by
other races is no secret. Before the Native Land Trust Board was founded, it was the
duty of the District Commissioner to send applications for leases to the Tikina
Council before sending them to the Lands Department for approval. This authority to
grant leases was transferred to the Native Land Trust Board when it came into being.
Let us ask to whom does this Board grant leases to? We see today that the Indians
grow 80% of the cane. On whose land? Why be too greedy and why want to claim
other peoples property? If we rent a house I do not know of any law which enables us
to own that house through the length of tenancy. It is the same concerning land. I do
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not know of any law which gives the right to the leasee to own the land he leases
through the period he has held the lease.
When our main cause of anxiety is known it is very hard for us to consider
common roll. We fear this type of election as it is possible that we will be in the
minority and the other races in the majority. If the other races are elected in
majority to the Legislative Council, it would enable them to amend the Ordinance
which governs our ownership of land.
We natives should be united in the two matters I have mentioned, and I impart to
the other branches which will be formed to discuss and submit in the utmost
urgency their decisions.
75 CO 1036/1551, no 1 Mar 1965
‘Interviews with political leaders in Fiji’: note by Trafford Smith after
his recent visit1
What follows is summarised from notes of a number of meetings I had with the
various leaders. I have chosen the material primarily to illustrate the personalities
and general point of view. As regards the actual state of play, some of what follows
has been overtaken by events—notably the meeting with the representatives of other
races in the Legislative Council recently organised by Ratu Mara and reported in the
Governor’s latest letter.
Ratu Mara
(For his career, see the entry in the separate personalities note).2
As you can see by looking at him, Mara is not a pure Fijian. His mother was
Tongan. He is not typically Fijian in temperament either—much less open and gay:
much more thoughtful and reserved. Not quick to react to a situation. Likes to take
his time and think it over. For a Fijian, almost donnish in outlook.
But he has much more foresight and a shrewder political instinct than other Fijian
leaders, and suffers consequently from the necessity to look back over over his
shoulder continually to make sure they are keeping up. The main burden of
leadership and negotiation on the Fijian side falls on him.
At a Native Lands Trust Board meeting on March 10th
The land problem generally was discussed. Mara thought there was a good chance of
settling the issue before the London Conference. A settlement was essential, he said
but beyond the proper organisation of leases, renewals, compensation, etc. the
Fijians had much to learn in the economic use of land.
At the same meeting another member, Mr. Lloyd, expressed the view that there
was too much concentration on land and that some of the political pressure on the
land problem would be relieved if there was more diversification into light industry.
There may be something in this.
1 Trafford Smith visited Fiji in Mar 1965 ahead of Mrs White’s visit in Apr.
2 Personality notes not printed.
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At a Fijian Affairs Board meeting on the same day
Mara put forward the view that local government was the best training ground for
Legislative Council representatives and Ministers. He sees the need to broaden the
Fijian Administration into a more general local government system.
At a personal interview on March 11th
Mara began by saying that the initiative for the Conference had come mainly from
London, but the more forward looking Fijians had already realised the necessity for
change. As regards the land, he thought he could persuade the Fijian Affairs Board to
accept the new landlord and tenant proposals, and if they did, the Indians should be
pacified and ought to be willing to make some concession from their side in return.
He will be producing a paper for the Conference setting cut the Fijian view. He
thought the Conference should move towards a Ministerial system, but not try to go
too far in one step. The Fijians like living with the devil they know, hence there
should be a continuous series of steps, little by little, each step as short as reasonably
possible to maintain the confidence of the Fijians, but made with the next step in
view.
The present system of 3 Members should be expanded to a Ministerial system with
6 Portfolios, the officials (Chief Secretary, Financial Secretary and Attorney-General)
remaining as they are at present. The next move after a short time could be to give
the officials Portfolios (the Chief Secretary—Defence and Foreign Affairs, the
Financial Secretary—Finance).
For the next stage it would be essential to keep the Governor in the Chairmanship
of the Council of Ministers. It was much too early to consider the thorny problem of
a Prime Minister.
As regards Communal Rolls, any step away from them at the present stage would
be looked upon by the Fijians as a defeat. Progress towards a Common Roll (he
seemed to regard this as something to which the Fijians must become resigned in
the long run) should come later. He was not particularly impressed by Mr. Falvey’s
idea of a trial balloon of 3 Common Roll seats at the next election. The Fijians would
regard this as the thin end of the wedge, and it certainly should not be tried until the
land settlement was firmly established. The great Fijian fear was that a Common Roll
Legislature would change the law on land and deprive them of their security of
ownership, and the Fijians are not convinced that written safeguards against such
action would be adequate.
Referring to the Fijian Association, with its demand for ‘Fijian paramountcy’,
Mara said that he had revived it to try to contain the Fijian extremists. As regards
their demand that the Prime Minister must always be a Fijian, coming from a Fijian
majority produced by having one extra Fijian seat for the Vunivalu (= something like
‘Paramount Chief’—the present Vunivalu is Ratu George Thakombau)3 he thought
that there might be a certain amount of latitude in this for negotiation.
Reverting to the local government question in our private talk, Mara said that he
thought 3 years would be sufficient to make enough good results visible to attract
the Fijians. The Lomaivuna scheme (the new banana development project with many
Fijian peasant farmers) was an example, and what was happening in the Singatoka4
3 Cakobau. 4 Sigatoka.
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Valley (a similar development project, mostly rice and passion fruit) was
revolutionary. The Fijians established there as individual peasant farmers were
saying ‘Why didn’t we do this before?’
Mr. A.D. Patel
(For his career see the separate personalities note).
A charming man to meet, not the bogey-man the Fiji Times makes him out to be.
Very pro-British in some practical ways—he is spending what must be a small
fortune in having 3 of his children educated at boarding schools in England. But not
without some chips on his shoulder and a certain tendency to look for sinister
motives in British actions which are in fact either completely innocent or
unthinking—e.g. the Governor’s speech in Australia.5 In the course of a superficially
cordial conversation it is noteworthy how many points emerge on which he feels or
professes to feel a grievance. Checking up on some of these afterwards, the grievance
is not always well founded.
At a private meeting on March 11th
Mr. Patel said that he and his colleagues in the Federation Party were working on a
considered constitutional scheme which would be ready before your visit. Consonant
with his line in the Executive Council at that time, he would not show his hand in
more detail.
The main stumbling blocks at the Conference would be (he said) the method of
election and representation in the Legislature (meaning common roll versus
communal rolls) and the composition of the Executive.
With relief he slid off into more general remarks. What Fiji most needed was for all
races to work towards common nationhood. With this in mind he had been
considering the ultimate possibility of a coalition between the Federation Party (his
own) and the Fijian Association (the group Mara revitalised to contain the Fijian
extremists). One of the present troubles with the Fijians was that their European
advisers (he meant primarily Mr. Falvey) play on their fears because they (the
Europeans) want to prolong the status quo as long as they can. He went into a long
narration of attempts to bring about talks between Ratu Mara, Mr. Falvey and himself
and suggested they had broken down because of Mara’s unwillingness (which is not
true). He would himself try to start direct talks with Mara—except that if he did Mara
would be considered by the Fijians as selling them down the river: while on his side
the Indian extremists would consider him to be doing the same. Hence the bringing
of the two sides together must be the main task of the Conference.
There followed a long passage directed primarily at the Fiji Times, about the
Europeans whipping up feeling and playing on the fears of the Fijians (there is a good
deal in this, at least where the Fiji Times is concerned). Then came a diatribe on the
iniquities of the local broadcasting system,—broadcasting having originally been
offered to Mr. Patel as part of his social services portfolio and then withdrawn on
threats of European resignations. The cracks were finally papered over by an
arrangement by which Mr. Macdonald, the Colonial Secretary, consults Mr. Patel in
5 In which Jakeway said the UK government would not allow the indigenous population to come under the
heels of an immigrant community.
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his ministerial capacity on broadcasting matters. The Europeans were continually
trying to get Indian stooges appointed on broadcasting and other statutory boards in
order that they might have the appearance without the reality of multiracial control.
These boards were, indeed, ‘islands of autocracy’, and could not be criticised in the
Council. ‘In this way self-government is an empty shell. The Native Lands Trust
Board, the sugar, broadcasting, price stabilisation and housing authority boards are
all immune from question in the Legislative Council.’ (The Governor says this is
considerably overdone.)
After dinner at Government House on March 12th
Getting him on his own, I asked him point blank: ‘Would you be prepared to move
away from common roll to some kind of compromise if necessary?’ He answered: ‘I
would try to find a form of common roll having safeguards which would make it
acceptable to the Fijians.’
At a meeting with the Indian members of Legislative Council, March 10th
(Mr. Patel, Mr. Deoki, Mr. Shah, Mr. Madhavan, Mr. C.P. Singh—see separate
personalities note).
Here the tables were thoroughly turned. Most of the meeting was spent in my
answering their questions, not the other way round.
They were mainly interested in the procedure of the Conference, how long it
would last, whether papers should be put in and so on. One question asked was
whether ‘agreement had to be reached beforehand’. I gave the obvious answer about
the need to secure the widest area of agreement beforehand so that the Conference
could get straight down to the crucial issues. Asked how long it would take, I said—
emphasising the wide variations and different circumstances of different
conferences—that it might take a week or ten days to get to the point when it could
be seen what the outcome might be, and there might then be an adjournment for
consultations, seeking instructions, etc. then a further period of a few days to clinch
the agreement.
Mr. Patel expressed great interest in Professor de Smith’s book6 and asked me to
arrange for a meeting with him in London.
There was much talk about a supposed Australian and New Zealand interest in the
outcome of the Conference. Was the Colonial Sugar Refining Company (the
Australian parent of the Fiji Company)7 pulling wires? Were the Australians anxious
that Fiji should go slowly to prevent the heat being turned on New Guinea and
Nauru? Why was the Australian Commissioner in Fiji (Mr. Hamilton) always trying
to ferret out people’s constitutional position? Had he been instructed by his
Government to do so? Had the date of the Fiji Conference been postponed so that it
could be after the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ meeting? (The thought here
being that at the Prime Minister’s meeting the British, Australian and New Zealand
Governments would togather decide the outcome of the Conference before it
opened.)
6 Stanley A Smith, The new Commonwealth and its constitutions (London, 1964). De Smith was a
constitutional expert who reported on electoral systems in post-colonial constitutions.
7 South Pacific Sugar Mills Ltd.
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Mr. Deoki showed interest in the Mauritius example. Were there formal steps laid
down on the road to full internal self-government? How long does each take? Why
cannot Fiji go forward to full self-government in one?
Mr. Patel then launched out into one of his favourite grievances, that the balance
between Fijians, Indians and Europeans in the Civil Service, police and Fiji Military
Forces is weighted against the Indians. (There are for various reasons appearances of
this but it is not a policy, and the Government goes out of its way to try to bring
Indians in.) If H.M.G. had wanted to bring the people of Fiji forward towards self-
government they would themselves have insisted on a balance. There was not one
Indian in the Colonial Secretary’s office.
The races had been kept in watertight compartments too long. Common roll
would mean that many Indians would vote for Fijian candidates and vice versa, by
sectional interests and not by race.
The only spokesmen I have noted were Messrs. Patel and Deoki. The former let slip
‘common roll’ once in a context making it look like his objective: similarly the latter
referred once to ‘full internal self-government’ as an objective.
Mr. Falvey
(For his career see the separate personalities note).
Reputed the best brain among the Europeans, and likely to be their main
spokesman at the Conference. He made no very great impression at our few
meetings, but still less did the others. Perhaps his eminence may be due to some
extent to the features of the surrounding country. It is rumoured that he may be
giving up politics after the Conference to return to his legal practice.
In a private interview on March 11th
(Remember that Mr. Falvey is the Fijians’ main adviser in constitutional and land
matters.)
He started off by referring to the land problem as capable of solution. The Indians’
basic need is to get the land problem settled, and if and when that happens, Patel
would be able to come off common roll. The land is the Fijians’ trump card and they
know it. They do not want to make the concession too soon as they would lose the
card. The Fijians would also see in any whittling down of European representation
the beginning of a move towards Indian domination.
The reason for the alignment of the Europeans with the Fijians (Mr. Falvey
continued) is that they see no future in any kind of relationship with the Indians,
some of whom have declared their objective of getting the Europeans out. This is the
purpose of the Indians attempt to get together with the Fijians. Apart from the land
question, there are no anti-Fijians among the Indians, who would like the Fijians to
align with them against the Europeans. But hardly any Fijians want to line up with
the Indians—perhaps only some very young and disgruntled ones.
The Fijians are shifting more and more away from any acceptance of common roll,
even in the future. They would not favour such compromises as multi-member
constituencies with block voting, as the result would simply be that unrepresentative
stooges would be elected.
The Fijians attach great importance to ‘Fijian paramountcy’ as a token recognition
of the Fijian status as the landowners and indigenous inhabitants. The Europeans
would be happy to give up a seat to make this possible, but they could not propose to
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do this—the suggestion must come from outside. He then made the trial balloon
suggestion of 3 general seats, one of each race elected on a common roll, but gave his
view that of differing candidates, the communal man would get elected, at least at
first.
Up to six months ago the Fijians might have been ready to accept the Rotumans on
their roll, but not now because this looks like a form of common roll. Their thinking
has hardened.
The advanced Fijians cannot go beyond the point to which they can bring the
main body of Fijians. Nevertheless there are signs of movement—e.g. Semesa
Sikivou (see personalities note) got in, to everybody’s surprise, at the last election,
against a Fijian candidate supported by the Vunivalu, Ratu George. In fact, the
influence of the Chiefs is waning and, looking back, it seems that the British have
maintained it for too long.
Meeting with the Fijian Association on March 10th
(Particulars in the separate notes on political and similar organisations in Fiji.)
This is the Association that Ratu Mara said he had revived in an attempt to contain
the more extreme Fijians. Its attitude was however fairly typical of most of the
ordinary run-of-the-mill Fijians I spoke to in various parts of the country.
Though Ratu Mara is President, and Ratu Penaia Treasurer, they deliberately did
not attend this meeting in order that the others could speak without inhibition.
The Fijians began by underlining the fact that they were a political party. They
then launched into the only set-piece constitutional lay-out presented to me during
my visit. I record it in detail primarily as an indication how far the main body of the
Fijians still have to go.
They want full internal self-government, NOT independence.
The Governor should continue to be appointed by Her Majesty.
Defence and External Affairs should continue to be the responsibility of Britain.
The Legislature should be elected on a communal roll, and this system should be
retained to ensure political stability and economic growth. They were firmly against
any form of common roll.
The Fijians should have an absolute majority in the Legislature—more than half
the total number of members, the non-Fijian seats being allocated in ratio to
populations. ‘Fijian paramountcy’ should be entrenched. Controversial changes
should be made only by a three-quarters majority of the whole confirmed by a three-
quarters majority referendum of each communal roll. This might seem rigid and a
bar to progress: but the majority of Fijians desired it. ‘Put the situation back where it
should be, that is what we are demanding—our rights must be given legislative
recognition’.
The Indians would be provided for by minority safeguards—e.g. as regards land.
The salaries of members would be £1,500 a year.
The Chief Minister should be a Fijian derived from the Fijian majority in the
Legislature. At first, the Council of Ministers, which should also contain a Fijian
majority should be under the Chairmanship of the Governor, and there should be a
gradual transfer of powers to the Fijian Chief Minister.
The Constitution should be written, but British Parliamentary conventions should
apply. There should be a Bill of Rights defining basic human rights, and government
should be ‘according to Christian principles’.
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Citizenship: Aliens should be disqualified from voting: British subjects not born in
Fiji should qualify after 7 years residence.
Immigration: This is at present under the police, but should be brought under
political control with more stringent legislation.
The literacy qualification should be retained.
The Civil Service should maintain a balance between races. More scholarships
should be given to Fijians to enable them to catch up. Civil servants should resign on
election to the Legislature.
Local Government: The Fijian Administration should continue, but in urban areas
there should be racial representation on Municipal Councils.
76 CO 1036/1263, no 20 27 Apr 1965
[Federation Party attack on Public Relations Office and Fiji
Broadcasting Commission]: inward telegram no 51 from 
Sir D Jakeway to Trafford Smith1
Press release issued by Federation Party after Annual General Meeting 25th April
contains serious attack on integrity of Public Relations Office and Fiji Broadcasting
Commission (as well as Fiji Times) alleging inter alia that they have ‘deliberately
published distorted news concerning proposed constitutional changes for Fiji,
concerning inter-racial harmony in Fiji and concerning political rights and views of
the Indian Fijian’ and that ‘they have transmitted such distorted news overseas with
the sole objective of creating animosity, misunderstanding and disharmony between
the different racial communities living in Fiji.’
2. At this meeting two Executive Councillors Patel and Madhavan,2 were elected
President and Vice President respectively. I am satisfied that these attacks are
without foundation. I am also advised that statements relating to the Public
Relations Office are libellous (Fiji Broadcasting Commission is independent statutory
organisation). Whatever legal action may be taken I cannot let these attacks go
unchallenged and I am issuing a statement in tomorrow morning’s press and radio
reaffirming my confidence in the impartiality of the Public Relations Office and Fiji
Broadcasting Commission. I am also addressing letters to Patel and Madhavan
pointing out that unless they dissociate themselves from the attack on the Public
Relations Office their continued membership of the Executive Council must come
into question. I have taken this action with the concurrence of Mrs. White.
3. Whether I shall have to recommend the removal of persons named from the
Executive Council will depend on their answers to my letters.
4. The Federation Party General Committee resolution went on to say that
because of distortion mentioned (? it had omitted) directed the four party Legislative
Councillors to have no more discussion on constitutional matters with other
Legislative Councillors before the London Conference. It also gave full authority and
discretion to the four members to present the Indian community case at the
Conference. On the strength of this Patel at his meeting with the Legislative
1 cf Trafford Smith’s report on his meeting with Mr Patel in 75. 2 James Madhavan.
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Councillors yesterday merely read a short paper arguing in general terms the merits
of the common role and declined to enter into any discussion (this was the meeting
the Indians undertook to convene—see my letter of 8th April).
5. The meeting then broke up, but the Legislative Councillors (including Deoki
and C.P. Singh) continued it in another place and issued a statement afterwards
saying that they had had a full and frank discussion and proposed to have further
meeting amongst themselves.
6. This is wretched turn of events and one is left to guess at motive. But whatever
the consequence I cannot condone such flagrant violation of the principle of
collective responsibility. Patel’s good trust is now particularly questionable in that
the previous evening I saw him and urged on him the need for a forthcoming
attitude at his meeting in view of the recent encouraging indications of Fijian
willingness to meet Indian anxiety on land occupation. He made no mention of the
party resolution passed earlier that day and gave no indication that he was not
prepared to enter into full discussions with other Legislative Councillors before the
London Conference. Fuller report follows by savingram but I may have to ask for very
early action in relation to Patel and Madhavan’s continued membership of the
Executive Council. Next meeting is due on 30th April.3
3 Greenwood minuted: ‘I shall like a note on this please. Are the two members of Ex. Co. also members of
the executive body of the Federation Party?’
77 CO 1036/1263, no 19 27 Apr 1965
[Federation Party attack]: outward telegram (reply) no 55 from
Trafford Smith to Sir D Jakeway
Your telegram Personal No. 51.1
Following from Trafford Smith.
This is indeed a disturbing development. Since you have Mrs. White and
Galsworthy with you I hesitate to intervene but I thought that in view of my recent
visit to Fiji,2 you might like to have my own reactions.
2. I naturally agree that Federation Party’s attack cannot be allowed to go
unchallenged, but inclination would be to play it cool. I wonder whether statement
you propose to issue coupled with letters to Patel and Madhavan would not be
sufficient, particularly if anything like an apology is offered in reply.
3. Removal of Patel and Madhavan from Executive Council could have serious
and far reaching consequencies. Would this not wreck prospects of a successful
conference and lead Indians to adopting more extreme positions than they have in
the past and than we had hoped that they would at the conference? This in turn
might:—
(i) make it difficult for a long time to re-establish any trust between the races;
(ii) affect security (it is perhaps not fanciful to bear in mind the situation in
British Guiana);
(iii) render satisfactory government of Fiji difficult to ensure.
1 See 76. 2 See 75.
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78 CO 1036/1263, no 24 27 Apr 1965
[Federation Party attack]: letter from Sir D Jakeway to Mr Patel and
Mr Madhavan. Annex: Press release
The press release of the Federation Party on its Annual General Meeting held on April
25th, signed by the Secretary-General (Mr. C.A. Patel), contains the following
statements:—
‘(a) that certain vested interests and organisations in Fiji particularly the Fiji
Times, Public Relations Office and the Fiji Broadcasting Commission have in the
past deliberately published distorted news concerning the proposed constitutional
changes for Fiji and concerning the political rights and views of the Indians in Fiji.
(b) That they have transmitted such distorted news overseas with the sole
objective of creating animosity, misunderstanding and disharmony between the
different racial communities living in Fiji, and
(c) that they have created an atmosphere of mistrust and misunderstanding
among the people of Fiji on matters aforementioned at a time when Fiji is going
through its critical stage of political development . . .’
and
‘That this Annual General Meeting of the Federation Party declares (and)
deplores the action of the staff of the Public Relations Office, Suva, when they
intentionally and deliberately translated the “Jagriti” version of the address
given by the Party’s President, the Hon. A.D. Patel, at a meeting of the Party
held on Sunday, April 4th, 1965, at the Century Theatre, Suva, which said
translation has been published in Fiji and abroad and declares that it has no
confidence in the staff of the said office.’
I must ask you to say, explicitly and immediately, whether you associate yourself with
these statements in so far as they affect the Public Relations Office, which is a
Government Department.
You will realise that anything other than a public disassociation from these attacks
on the Public Relations Office must bring into question your continued membership
of Executive Council.
I attach for your information a copy of a press release which I am issuing.
Annex to 78
For issue to press and radio on the morning of Wednesday, 28th April.
A press release issued by the Federation Party after its Annual General Meeting
on April 25th, and signed by the Secretary-General (Mr. C.A. Patel), contains
attacks on the integrity of the Public Relations Office and the Fiji Broadcasting
Commission.
The Governor wishes it to be known that he repudiates any suggestion of bias in
the Public Relations Office, and has no reason to doubt the impartiality of the
Broadcasting Commission.
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79 CO 1036/1263, no 21 28 Apr 1965
[Federation Party attack]: CO minute for Mr Greenwood1
In telegram No.51 of the 27th April2 the Governor of Fiji reported that the Federation
Party in a press release issued after its annual general meeting on the 25th April
made a serious attack on the integrity of the Government’s Public Relations Office
and the Fiji Broadcasting Commission on alleging that they deliberately published
distorted news with the object of creating unrest between the different racial
communities in the island. The Governor is satisfied that the attacks are without
foundation.
2. Two Executive Councillors, Mr. Patel and Mr. Madhavan (who are both
Indians) were elected President and Vice-President of the Federation Party at the
meeting of the 25th April. Before these elections Mr. Patel was already President of
the Party; Mr. Madhavan was a member of the Working Committee of the Party. The
constitution of the party is not known sufficiently well in the Office to answer your
enquiry as to whether Mr. Patel and Mr. Madhavan are members of ‘the executive
body of the Federation Party’. But the party is Mr. Patel’s creation and Mr. Madhavan
is ‘a Patel man’. It is inconceivable that the attack on the Public Relations Office and
the Broadcasting Commission could have been made except on Mr. Patel’s authority.
3. The Governor has written to them pointing out that unless they dissociate
themselves from the attack on the Public Relations Offices their continued
membership of the Executive Council must come into question.3 Mrs. White has
concurred in this action. The Governor states that whether he will have to
recommend the removal of the two members from the Executive Council will depend
on their answers to his letter.
4. In a personal telegram4 to the Governor Mr. Trafford Smith, while agreeing
that the Federation Party’s attack cannot be allowed to go unchallenged, has
suggested that the Governor’s statement of confidence in the Public Relations Office
and his letters to Messrs. Patel and Madhavan may be sufficient, particularly if
anything like an apology is offered in reply. He has suggested that dismissal of these
two members from Executive Council could well wreck the prospects of a successful
conference in July and lead the Indians to adopt more extreme positions. It might
also make it difficult for a long time to re-establish any trust between the races, affect
security on the British Guiana pattern, and render satisfactory Government of Fiji
difficult to ensure.
5. In considering what if any further action to take the Governor will of course
be able to discuss the situation with Mrs. White and Mr. Galsworthy. The formal
position is that appointments to the Fiji Executive Council are made by the Governor
in pursuance of instructions given to him by Her Majesty through a Secretary of
State. Office is held during Her Majesty’s Pleasure. There is no detailed provision for
dismissing an Executive Councillor for misconduct but there is provision in section
16 of the Fiji (Constitution) Order in Council 1963 for suspension, by the Governor,
1 See 76, note 3. 2 See 76. 3 See 78. 4 See 77.
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in his discretion. Every such suspension must be reported forthwith and remains in
force until removed by the Governor or by Her Majesty through a Secretary of State,
or the persons suspended ceases to be a member of Executive Council.
6. At this stage the situation is reported for information only.
80 CO 1036/1551 Apr 1965
‘General economic and constitutional background’]: CO brief A for
Mrs White’s visit to Fiji [Extract]
. . .
Background
14. During discussions in December 1964 between the Governor and unofficial
members of the Legislative Council, a request was made for a visit to Fiji by the
Secretary of State prior to the Conference. It was suggested that if representation at
the Conference was to be limited to members of Legislative Council, such a visit, in
addition to enabling him to see something of Fiji, would provide representative
bodies outside the Legislative Council with an opportunity to express their views to
him in person.
15. It was subsequently agreed that Mrs. White should visit Fiji shortly after
Easter. This would acknowledge the desirability of enabling representative bodies
outside the Legislative Council to express their views before the Conference to a
British Minister, but would avoid the obvious danger of a visit by the Secretary of
State developing into a kind of pre-conference at which it would be difficult to
avoid commitments. It was agreed that Mrs. White should make it plain on all
issues of substance which might be raised with her that she could not anticipate
the decisions of the Secretary of State at the Conference. She would emphasise that
the purpose of her visit was to listen to representations and report them to the
Secretary of State.
Issues likely to arise at the conference and during Mrs. White’s visit
16. (a) The continuing link with Britain
The Fijians will press for a closer definition and firmer assurances on the
continuing link in the future. There has been discussion in the past of using the Isle
of Man or the Channel Islands examples as a basis for a new constitution in Fiji. We
have made efforts to resist this. As Mr. Sandys’ Despatch of 15th August, 1963 said,
‘the circumstances of these islands are, of course, in many respects different from
those of Fiji and their constitutional arrangements could hardly be adopted in their
entirety’.1 However, the Despatch did promise that the Conference could examine
features which might be adapted to suit the conditions in Fiji. To some extent the
Fijians mis-understand the whole question of the continuing link. All those points on
which they have sought safeguards, (e.g. appointment of the Governor by the Crown,
appointment of judges by the Crown, U.K. responsibility for defence and the need for
1 See 68.
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the assent of the Crown to legislation), would be preserved in any ministerial system
likely to be worked out at the coming Conference. We are likely however to be faced
by a demand for a further assurance that there will be a permanent continuing link
with Britain, and this might involve us in some discussion of ultimate constitutional
solutions for Fiji. It would be preferable if at all possible, to avoid this by pointing out
that there is no question of these ties being dissolved as a result of the Conference;
that it has been agreed and publicly stated by all the unofficial members of the
Legislative Council (including the Indians) that independence should not be
discussed at the coming conference; and that it would be better to postpone
consideration of ultimate solutions until the new constitution has been in operation
for some time. The people of Fiji are then more likely to have clearer ideas of their
needs in the way of a permanent solution.
In discussion of this point during her visit, Mrs. White is advised to avoid any
appearance of favouring any particular ultimate solution. She might urge on all
concerned the importance of full discussion locally at the appropriate time of such
matters, but could stress her understanding that it is generally agreed in Fiji that
independence should not be discussed at the Conference, and say that she presumes
therefore that there will likewise be no need to discuss alternative ultimate
solutions. Finally she might usefully emphasise the fact that, whilst we have in the
past always made it clear that we have no wish to withhold independence from Fiji
should this be the desire of the people of Fiji, it is just as truly the case we are
prepared to retain our links with Fiji if this should be their wish. The most
important thing is for all the inhabitants of Fiji to agree on their constitutional
objectives. Our minds are entirely open on the subject and we are quite prepared to
try to work out in consultation with their representatives arrangements designed to
give constitutional expression to their wishes, both at the Conference and in the
more distant future. (Faced with this problem Mr. Trafford Smith took the line
during his visit2 that H.M.G. have no desire to lay down a pre-determined pattern
for the development of Fiji. Their desire is to bring the people of Fiji forward to a
state of full internal self-government in which the people themselves will be able to
make a choice as to their ultimate destiny—whether independence, or some form
of continuing association with Britain. The time for such a choice is not yet).
(b) Land ownership (see separate brief on land problem).3
The Fijians will insist on the sanctity of the Fijian ownership of land. The Indians will
probably not resist this. They will however seek assurances of improvements in the
conditions of tenure of Indian farmers. We hope that the proposals now under review
in Fiji and discussed in the brief on land problems will gain acceptance and go far to
satisfy the Indian demands.
It will be useful to discuss the general line to be taken on land problems with the
Governor, but it is suggested that Mrs. White need not become involved in details on
the subject. When it arises she might say that, so far as she is aware, no one
challenges the Fijian ownership of their land. It is, however, important to agree on a
2 See 75.
3 The only other brief included in this volume is that on the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man (see 81).
On the land problem, cf 73.
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satisfactory system of land user, i.e. on the provision of an adequate statutory
framework for the conduct of relations between all landlords and all tenants which
will prove satisfactory to all concerned; and she has been glad to learn that progress
on this matter is being made.
(c) The Christian state
The Fijians have demanded that Fiji should remain a Christian state. We do not know
how firmly the Fijians will insist on provision for this in the new constitution; nor
are we quite sure what they mean by it. It is to be hoped that we may be able to
convince them that the acceptance of the principle of non-discrimination in the
context of a code of human rights, on the usual lines, will be sufficient. Ratu Mara
made clear to Mr. Trafford Smith that the Fijians are not contemplating Fiji
becoming constitutionally a Christian State with Christianity a state religion in the
way that e.g. Pakistan is a Muslim state. They want to be sure that Fiji will continue
to be governed according to generally accepted Christian principles. Mr. Trafford
Smith pointed to the difficulty of securing Indian agreement to a formal statement of
this, not because Indians had any objection to Christian principles, but because they
would feel that their religions deserved equal mention. Ratu Mara came some way
towards agreeing that something on the lines of chapters on Human Rights in some
recent constitutions might in fact serve to meet this point.
(d) Racial balance in the Civil Service
This is a common demand on the part of the Fijians who are worried that the more
able Indians will become entrenched in the more senior posts in the Public Service.
(Conversely, the Indians demand a racial balance with armed forces and the Police,
now predominantly Fijian.) The need to preserve a balance between the races in the
Civil Service is widely recognised in Fiji. In 1961 the Governor issued a directive to
the Public Service Commission ‘that entry to the Civil Service should be controlled
in such a way as to secure as far as possible a balance between the number of Fijians
and Indians within the service’. This instruction has since been written into the
Public Service Commission Regulations. A balance in numbers is not of course
entirely satisfactory to the Fijians, as their concern is that there should be an
equitable distribution of the senior posts. Mrs. White might refer in discussion of this
issue to the present policy of the Public Service Commission; she could add that the
question of whether this principle might be affirmed in some way in the constitution
is a matter which would no doubt belooked into at the Conference. (It might be
possible to insert a provision on the lines of that in the Malayan Constitution—a
copy of the relevant provision is attached.)4 It is of course most probable that, in the
new constitution, which we hope will be evolved at the Conference, the Public
Service Commission will still remain advisory; this should serve to set Fijian fears at
rest and also to avoid the need for a compensation scheme for expatriate staff who are
still needed in considerable numbers in Fiji. Normally Public Service Commissions
do not become executive until full internal self-government is reached and a
compensation scheme for expatriate staff is then introduced at the same time. It is
most unlikely that the Conference will decide on a move as far as this.
4 Not printed.
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(e) The Fijian administration (see separate brief)
The future of the Fijian Administration may be raised by some Indians but we hope
that this will not be an issue at the Conference. If this question is raised Mrs. White
might simply say that the need to make changes in the Fijian Administration has
been widely recognised by the Fijians themselves, whose prime concern this is; that
she welcomes the steady development of multi-racial local government in Fiji,
particularly in urban areas; and that it is important for the people of all races to work
together in Fiji on a local, as well as on a national level.
(f) The new constitution
(i) This franchise, and the related questions of the composition of the Legislative
Council and the makeup of the Executive Council, are the major constitutional
issues on which acceptable compromise will have to be found at Marlborough House.
On the franchise the Indians may well demand the introduction of common roll
voting. This would result in the Fijians being swamped electorally and both the
Fijians and Europeans are insistent on the need to maintain communal rolls. In our
view it is impossible to envisage the introduction in Fiji now of a common roll in the
simplest form. It might, however, be possible to devise an electoral system which
introduces elements of the common roll principle while maintaining the principle of
communal rolls as the basis to a greater or lesser extent. This will require careful
consideration and will need detailed study and discussion. (Mrs. White is aware of the
possibility, which is still under consideration, of Professor de Smith (who is a
constitutional expert with specialist knowledge of franchise arrangements) being
asked to be available to be called in, if necessary, at the Conference.)
It is, however, generally agreed that provisions should be made in any new
franchise arrangements for the vote to be given to the Chinese, the Rotumans, other
Pacific Islanders and part Europeans who are at present without the vote (now
limited to Fijians, Indians and Europeans). Some solution for this will have to be
devised; possibly there should be a ‘general’ roll on which all other than Fijians and
Indians would be registered; it would be of interest to test European reaction to this
proposal. The Europeans may insist on the preservation of a separate European roll:
as they number only about 10,000 against over 25,000 ‘others’ their case for this is,
however, weak.
It is suggested that on the franchise question Mrs. White should limit herself to
saying that the aim of the Conference must be to work cut provisions which will be
fair and reasonable to all concerned and which will not place the interests of any one
community in jeopardy; there are many methods of voting which could achieve this
and which might be examined, both beforehand and at the Conference. There would
be no objection to Mrs. White expressing herself as being in favour of extending the
franchise, whatever the precise method eventually adopted to those groups at present
excluded from it completely.
(ii) Legislative Council
The composition of the Legislative Council is, of course, closely related to the
franchise; the basic divisions in the Council remain, and are likely to remain, racial
ones. It is unlikely that we shall be able to escape from a strict parity of numbers
between Fijian and Indian members. However, in equity the European
representation should no longer enjoy similar parity. If there were a ‘general’ roll on
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which all voters not registered as Fijians or Indians were included, this could provide
a third group in the Council. The number of seats in this category should, however,
be less than that in either the Fijian or Indian category. The Indians may protest
that, as the ‘general’ group is likely to side with the Fijians on all major issues, they
will, as now, be placed at a disadvantage unless they have greater representation than
the Fijians in proportion to their preponderance in the population. This objection
will probably have to be overruled if a settlement is to be reached and the Indians
themselves may not press it too strongly. There may have to be safeguards such as
provision for, say, a majority of each community’s representatives, or a 75% majority
of the whole house, for legislation dealing with certain claims of subjects.
There is also the question of nominated seats. At present there are six nominated
members of the Council: two Europeans and two Indians (one of whom is in practice
normally a Muslim) all nominated by the Governor, and two Fijians chosen by the
Council of Chiefs. It may be that a small number of nominated seats should be
retained to provide seats for minority groups unable to secure representation
through elected seats for one reason or another e.g. a Muslim Indian, a Chinese, a
Rotuman, a part-European. It would, however, be preferable to get away from
nomination altogether, if possible.
In any case, the number of seats in the Legislative Council can usefully be
increased to provide for wider representation. It might be possible to think in terms
of a council of between 30 and 40 members e.g. a House with 40 members (15
Indians, 15 Fijian, 6 ‘General’ and 4 nominated) or with 35 Members (15 Fijian, 15
Indian, 5 ‘General’ and no nominated). There might in addition be a number of ex-
officio official members: this point also requires consideration.
Mrs. White is advised not to commit herself in any way on the composition of the
Legislative Council; she should restrict herself to noting and undertaking to consider
any suggestions that may be put forward. Here again she could usefully stress the
importance of attempts being made locally to reach agreement on this matter.
(iii) Executive Council and chief minister
We hope that at the Conference it will be possible to secure agreement to the
introduction of a Ministerial system. The same considerations will apply to racial
balance in the Executive Council as in the Legislative Council. It is likely that we
shall have to attempt to maintain the multi-racial coalition government which exists
in embryo under the Membership system. However, the question of the appointment
of a Chief Minister, if it arises, will be a difficult one. The Fijians would probably
insist that the position should be reserved for a Fijian: on the other hand Mr. A.D.
Patel (the leading Indian politician) has referred publicly to his ambitions to take this
post for himself. It is certainly important to avoid making any commitment on this
point. Perhaps the most likely outcome at this stage will be to leave the Governor as
Chairman of the Council of Ministers—the Fijians may well insist upon this. If they
do, the whole Chief Minister problem can be relegated to a subsequent constitutional
conference.
The question of the retention of officials on Executive Council will also have to be
considered; this involves consideration of e.g. whether an unofficial should take over
the portfolio of finance and the future of the post of Colonial (i.e. Chief) Secretary.
Under the type of constitution which is likely to emerge from the Conference we may
well have to allow finance to go to an unofficial Minister; it is practically certain,
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however, that the Chief Secretary would continue to exercise Ministerial
responsibility for such matters as defence, external affairs, internal security and the
public service.
(iv) Second chamber
It may be suggested that a second chamber should be established in Fiji. It is to be
hoped that this can be avoided, not only on grounds of expense, but also because if
the Legislative Council is to be expanded in size all the abler politicians should be
able to find a place in it. It would be better to establish proper constitutional checks
and balances within the Legislative Council rather than to seek to achieve this by
establishing a second chamber.
(v) Legislative safeguards
It is likely that there will be requests from the Fijian side for entrenched safeguards
on legislation which might affect their interests adversely. We should probably have
to concede some provisions on these lines; the Indians would probably accept this. As
pointed out above, possibilities would be to make provision whereby certain
categories of legislation needed to secure either a 75% majority in the Legislative
Council or secure the assent of a simple majority of each racial group in the Council.
This is, however, a matter which has not yet been thought out in detail; it will no
doubt have to be considered by the Conference.
(vi) Qualifications for candidates
At the moment Fijians in the Public Service are allowed to stand for election and to
sit as elected members of the Legislative Council. This is because of the dearth of
suitable Fijian candidates outside the Public Service (which includes the Fijian
Administration). It would be preferable to move away from this in future, but there is
likely to be strong Fijian pressure to preserve this position for the present. It might,
however, be pointed out in discussion with Fijians that this is a most unusual
arrangement which might cause their representatives and the Government some
embarrassment. A possible compromise might be to allow Fijian civil servants to
contest elections without having to resign their posts but to provide that they should
do so if elected.
81 CO 1036/1551 Apr 1965
‘The Channel Islands and the Isle of Man’: CO brief N for Mrs White’s
visit to Fiji
The Channel Islands and the Isle of Man
The Channel Islands and the Isle of Man are dependencies of the Crown, outside the
United Kingdom, and are distinguished from the overseas dependencies by their
proximity to Great Britain and by the antiquity of their connection with the Crown.
The Channel Islands came under the English Crown in 1066, being then part of the
Duchy of Normandy; the claim of the English Crown to the Isle of Man was
established about the end of the fourteenth century. Because of the proximity of
these Islands to Great Britain they are included by the Interpretation Act within the
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‘British Islands’; in the Merchant Shipping Acts trade with the Islands is classed as
‘Home Trade’; and in the Post Office Acts postage to and from the Islands is classed as
‘Inland’ postage.
2. The distinction between these ancient dependencies and the overseas
dependencies was recognised by the provision of the British Nationality Act 1948, by
which a Channel Islander or a Manxman is authorised to call himself a ‘citizen of the
United Kingdom, Islands and Colonies’. Recognition of their distinctive position may
have contributed to the decision taken in 1801 that business connected with the
Colonies should be transferred from the Home Secretary to another Secretary of
State while business connected with the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man should
remain (as it still remains) with the Home Secretary.
3. The Channel Islands and the Isle of Man have their own legislative assemblies,
systems of local administration, fiscal systems and courts of law. Subject to the
prerogative powers mentioned in paragraph 4 below, the islanders have general
responsibility for the regulation of their local affairs. Most of the laws by which they
are governed emanate from their own legislative assemblies, and most of their public
services are provided by these assemblies and administered by committees of these
assemblies, in much the same way as local government services are provided and
administered in Great Britain.
4. Appointment to some of the chief posts in the local administrations rests with
the Crown; and legislative measures passed by the Island assemblies depend for their
validity on ratification by Orders made by Her Majesty in Council. Occasions for
asking for such measures to be reconsidered seldom arise, but it is the Home
Secretary’s duty to see that each measure is scrutinised before submission to the
Council. It is the Privy Council which the Islanders recognise as the authority for
decisions concerning their affairs, and there is a Committee of the Privy Council to
entertain petitions from the Islands.
5. Acts of the United Kingdom Parliament do not apply to the Islands unless,
exceptionally, they are so applied by express provision or necessaary implication. The
more usual procedure is to enact that the provisions of United Kingdom Acts may be
extended to the Islands by Order in Council ‘with such exceptions, modifications and
adaptations as may be specified in the Order’. This procedure is preferred by the
Islanders because it gives them the opportunity to ask to argue their case before a
Committee of the Privy Council if they take exception to some provision; and some
modifications are often required in any case. The United Kingdom Government are
responsible for the international relations of the Islands; but the Island authorities
must be consulted before any international agreement is concluded which binds the
Islands.
6. The Channel Islands are divided into two Bailiwicks, one comprising Jersey,
the other comprising Guernsey and the adjacent islets of Hern and Jethou,
together with Alderney and Sark. For each Bailiwick there is a Lieutenant
Governor representing the Crown, who has certain executive functions in
connection with immigration, naturalisation, and passports. In each Bailiwick
there is also a Bailiff appointed by the Crown, who presides over the local Court
and over the representative assembly (the States of Jersey and the States of
Guernsey). All members of the States who have the right to vote are elected
directly or indirectly by an electorate which includes all British subjects over 21
resident in the Islands.
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7. The Islanders are immune from taxation for Crown purposes. Proposals by
the States for raising revenue by local taxation are petitions to the Crown for
permission to impose a tax and require authorisation by Order in Council; but the
responsibility for deciding how the revenue shall be raised and spent is in practice
left to the States.
8. The Isle of Man has a Lieutenant Governor appointed by the Crown who is the
executive authority for certain ‘reserved services’ including police and prisons. The
local legislature or Tynwald comprises two bodies, the Keys (24 men elected by an
electorate comprising all men and women over 21 who have resided in the Island for
six months) and the Legislative Council (which comprises the Lieutenant Governor
as President, the Bishop of Sodor and Man, the two Deemsters or local Judges, the
Attorney-General, two persons nominated by the Lieutenant Governor and four
persons elected by the Keys). All Acts of Tynwald require the consent of both the
Legislative Council and the Keys, and depend for their validity on confirmation by
Order in Council. The public services, other than ‘reserved services’, are provided by
Tynwald and administered by Boards of Tynwald.
9. The Lieutenant Governor is responsible for initiating proposals for raising
and disbursing revenue: all such proposals require the assent of Tynwald except
proposals for expenditure on the ‘reserved services’, about which Tynwald is
nevertheless consulted. There is a standing body of members of Tynwald, known as
the Executive Council, with whom the Lieutenant Governer confers before making
proposals for raising or spending money. In practice the major share of
responsibility for the financial affairs, as for the other public affiars, of the Island
rests on Tynwald. A percentage of the revenue is paid to the United Kingdom
Exchequer.
82 CO 1036/1263, no 24 30 Apr 1965
[Federation Party attack]: letter from Mr Patel to Sir D Jakeway
arguing he is not in breach of collective responsibility in his criticism
of the Fiji Broadcasting Commission
I beg to acknowledge receipt of your letter dated the 27th April, 1965.1 In reply I wish
to draw your attention to the statement of the previous Governor in the Legislative
Council in 1961 on the proposed membership system. In which he stated that:—
‘On appointment members would be required to give an undertaking to
accept collective responsibility; that means that when policy matters are
considered in Executive Council all members both official and unofficial
would as at present be free to advise and express their views according to
their conscience. Once a decision has been taken in Executive Council,
however then all would be bound by it. Whether it represents their personal
views or not, or must resign.
1 See 78.
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This was the extent of collective responsibility when the Portfolio of Social Services
was offered to me and I agreed and accepted it.
When you informed me by letter dated the 29th June, 1964 that I shall be
designated the Member for Social Services from 1st July, 1964 you sent me notes for
the guidance of the members for Executive Council under the membership system
with the said letter.
Under the heading ‘FUNCTIONS OF THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL AND ITS
MEMBERS’ the notes say:—
‘Executive Council will continue to be advisory to his Excellency the
Governor as at present and all important matters or matters of policy will
continue to be decided by the Governor-in-Council. There will be, however,
one very important change in that there will in future be collective
responsibility of members of the Executive Council in the formulation and
implementation of Government Policy. If any unofficial member disagrees
with any policy decided in Executive Council to the extent that he is not
prepared to bear his share of collective responsibility for that decision then
the proper course for him is to resign.’
In paragraph 7 under the same heading reads as follows:—
In view of the doctrine of collective responsibility all unofficial members of
the Executive Council will be required ‘fully to support and defend
Government policy in Legislative Council and in public.’
I have supported the decisions taken in the Executive Council and shared
responsibility both in the Legislative Council and in public. When I accepted the
office I accepted responsibility only to the extent mentioned in the notes and no
further.
Considering that under the Membership System I am supposed to undertake
collective responsibility as stated above without any power or authority whatsoever I
am not prepared to agree to the extension of the responsibility to defend the actions
of civil servants or to defend them against public criticism.
I found it difficult to carry on as a Member when all that I can do is to persuade the
Heads of the Department on the one hand and you on the other. Sometimes I have
succeeded, at other times I have failed. But I have continued, in the face of
difficulties, to give such a one-sided system a fair trial and you must admit that I have
faithfully carried out responsibilities in the formulation and implementation of
government policies.
I do not consider myself responsible to defend the wrongful acts of civil servants or
defend them against public criticism.
Sometime ago Mr. S.N. Koya, Mr. J. Madhavan, Mr. C.A. Shah and myself
complained to you about the Fiji Broadcasting Commission calling the members of
the Federation Party ‘Badmash’ in its Hindi broadcast, which term is grossly
abusive, insulting and provocative. Your reply was that you did not know the
meaning of the word and Government had no control over the Fiji Broadcasting
Commission as it was a self-financing body. You can hardly expect me to say that
the Fiji Broadcasting Commission was impartial in applying that epithet to me and
my colleagues.
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As regards the Public Relations Office; if it wants to translate what appears in
Hindi periodicals and disseminate translations in English within the Colony and
abroad, it is the duty of the office to ensure that the translations are correct and
accurate.
Any translation of a Hindi article into English must of necessity be a deliberate and
intentional act on the part of the translator. How can it be said that the translation of
the ‘Jagriti’ version of my speech by the Public Relations Office was not deliberate
and intentional? I know Hindi and English languages very well and therefore I
personally know that the translation is wrong, misleading and mischievous. While
you and Mr. Hackett,2 neither of whom possess any knowledge of Hindi Language
and who have therefore to depend upon hearsay opinions, wish me to uphold the
action of the Public Relations Office on its translation!
I assert that my view of the translation is correct and I am entitled to ask you, what
steps you have taken against the person who translated that article?
In the end I wish to emphasize that I have joined the Government to serve my
people—not to forsake them; and I am not prepared to sell my soul for a mess of
potage.
I am prepared to resign if you or the Secretary of State so wish.
2 E J F Hackett, public relations officer, Fiji.
83 CO 1036/1554 1 May 1965
[London conference]: press release by the Public Relations Office,
Suva, on Mrs White’s comments about arrangements and issues 
at the forthcoming conference
Mrs. Eirene White, Under Secretary or State for the Colonies, gave an interview to 14
Press and radio representatives in the Executive Council Chamber at Government
Buildings on Saturday. Mrs. White said that since coming to Fiji she and Mr.
Galsworthy had received excellent co-operation from His Excellency downwards both
from the officials and unofficials.
She explained that no statements were being issued about details of the talks with
individuals and organisations. If the organisations themselves wished to publish the
statements they had made that was up to them. The purpose of the visit was to get as
far as she could in a short time some sort of picture of the various opinions which
she could put before the Secretary of State.
Mr. Usher of the Fiji Times asked about the procedure to be adopted at the London
Conference. Would there be for instance a fixed agenda?
Mrs. White replied that they had not really got quite that far. It was still one of the
things to be discussed with His Excellency and the Administration in Fiji. The
representation from Fiji had been fixed as the members of the Legislative Council.
There had been one or two requests from various organisations representing
different interests that there should some additions. She had said definitely that was
out. The delegation was fixed. If one were to go wider then there would be so many
people present that the thing would become impossible. She had also been asked
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whether official observers could be sent. This was a subject which could be discussed
in London but she thought not for the same sort of reason.
If observer status was given to one then it would have to be given to another and
instead of having a real negotiating table, you would have a gallery to which some
people might wish to speak and that might make the negotiations difficult.
Asked by Mr. Usher if there would be Press arrangements, Mrs. White replied that
Press arrangements would be made as they always were. The general pattern was a
plenary open session and then very often a delegation split into groups, not always,
and then there were private sessions and at the and a full public session. It rather
depended on the nature of the conference as to how Press statements were issued in
between. Everything would be done to make things as easy an possible for the Press
to be able to carry satisfactory reports of the conference.
Mr. Carter of the Fiji Times suggested that if there were long gaps between the
issue of official statements about the conference then rumours in Fiji would became
rife.
Mrs. White said that they would have to do the best they could for the Press. One
wanted to give the general public as good a service as they could and they would be
entitled to it. On the other hand during negotiations the point might arise where you
did not know the outcome and any statement would be premature and could cause
damage.
Alipate Sikivou representing Volagauna asked Mrs. White’s views on the refusal of
certain people to continue preliminary discussions in Fiji and Mrs. White replied that
it would not be right for her to comment on it.
Mr. Shankar Pratap representing Kisan Mitra asked Mrs. White if she thought that
the delegates should sit down in Fiji and come to some decision.
Mrs. White said it was obviously sensible if people were making a long expensive
journey to London for a conference that there must be some preparation.
In reply to another question by Mr. Pratap, Mrs. White said that it was not for her
to comment on what method of preparation seemed to be the most suitable. Some
preparation was obviously necessary but how it was organised was a matter for the
delegation and not Her Majesty’s Government.
Asked if she had received any representations from the Federation Party, Mrs.
White said that she had not received any representations from them as a party.
Mr. Usher pointed out that Mrs. White had come to Fiji mainly to hear the views of
individuals and organisations who would not be directly represented at the London
Conference.
Asked by Mr. Pratap if she thought it possible that more thought could be given to
observers being invited to the conference, Mrs. White said it was something which
could be discussed in London with the Secretary of State but she pointed out that
once permission was given to one observer then the door would be opened wide to
any other organisation that could say it represented any substantial interest of any
kind.
Mr. Carter asked if Mrs. White would say who had the right to decide what Fiji
wanted, Were the elected and nominated representatives on Legislative Council the
ones?
Mrs. White replied that this was a partnership. The Conference was not intended to
be an independent conference and therefore the partnership remained. Her Majesty’s
Government also had some concern with what was done.
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Mr. Usher commented: ‘That is a statue that was incorporated in the Deed of
Cession’. And Mrs. White observed: ‘Quite, a mutual agreement’.
Mr. Usher said that in statements about Gibraltar he had gained the impression
that the policy of Her Majesty’s Government was that it was the people of the country
who were paramount. Did that apply to Fiji?
Mrs. White replied that the position of Gibraltar was still a partnership. Britain
had declared that they believed they were in Gibraltar completely legally and they
did not think that was a matter of dispute. However, if the overwhelming feeling of
the people was that they wanted to bring the British connection to an end then
they would have to consider it. However, that was not the case and the people
wanted to stay British and both Government and opposition in Gibraltar had made
this clear.
Mr. Usher asked if she thought that the delegation chosen to go to London was
capable of representing the views of Fiji and if measures had been taken to ascertain
whether these views could be adequately presented. Mrs. White replied: ‘Were the
measures adequate? I don’t know. I should have thought the members of Legislative
Council are pretty broadly based and there is, of course, official advice.’
In reply to another question Mrs. White said that the partnership was between the
United Kingdom and Fiji Governments and the Fiji Government included people of
all races. Mr. Pratap asked if Mrs. White was aware that all Indians did not want a
common roll.
She replied that she was aware of the diversity of opinion on almost every matter
presented to them.
Mr. Pratap asked what would be the outcome if there was deadlock at the London
Conference.
With a smile, Mrs. White replied: ‘Now, I will turn into a Parliamentarian. In
Parliament a Minister can refuse to reply to a hypothetical question. I regard that as
very hypothetical.’
Mr. Andrew Joseph of Pacific Review asked if there were pressure from Fiji was it
likely that there would be wider representation at the London Conference.
Mrs. White replied that frankly she did not think so for this conference. If this was
to be a conference for independence when things would be really ultimately settled
one would have to be very careful indeed to make sure you had the widest possible
consensus. This was not intended to be anything as definitive. Eighteen members of
Legislative Council of all shapes and sizes, plus the official advice, plus such
impressions as she had obtained and the various written documents sent in would,
she thought, be fairly representative.
In reply to Mr. Shankar Pratap, Mrs. White said they had not received any
representations from the Part-European community as such.
Mr. Usher asked: ‘What do you expect the end product of the conference to be. A
fully fledged scheme or just ideas?
Mrs. White replied: ‘If I knew what the end product would be we needn’t have a
conference.’
Mr. Usher said he thought this point was very important because if something cut
and dried was brought back and imposed then it could of cause resentment.
Mrs. White said she hoped that they would get a little further than ideas. Ideas had
to be translated into proposals for action. She did not think you could expect the
conference to confine itself to general ideas.
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Alipate Sikivou said they anticipated that there would deadlock at the conference
and Mrs. White commented: ‘You are a pessimist’.
Alipate asked for her opinions on certain people who he said were trying to disrupt
‘our society and way of life.’
To this Mrs. White replied: ‘You are not going to draw me on that brother. I don’t
think that is my business. I have come here for a particular purpose and that does not
include commenting on Fiji’s politics’.
Mr. Gandhi of Fiji Samachur asked: ‘Do you think Fiji is ready for self-
government?’
Mrs. White replied: ‘I think it is ready for a step forward’.
Mr. Usher asked: ‘Have you any evidence of a desire for radical change?’
Mrs. White replied: ‘In some quarters yes but in others a desire to stay put or even
put the clock back.’
Luke Vaidreketi of Volagauna said that it had been agreed that the question of land
ownership was not going to be brought up at the London Conference. If one or two
members raised this question, would it be allowed?
Mrs. White said she would hope that perhaps some agreement might be reached
here . . . not on land ownership because she did not think that was under discussion
. . . but on land tenure, the leasehold position. She did not think that the conference
would deal directly with land although they realised how important land was. She
said another important matter was education. Trying to get people of different
communities to live together, they should at least consider how they were brought
up but it was not a matter for constitutional discussions.
Mr. Usher said the 18 members had agreed that land ownership was not a proper
subject for the agenda of the Conference and Mrs. White said that at the moment
they were not expecting it to come up.
Mr. Usher; Would you agree that any proposal for constitutional change in Fiji
should be judged by its effect on the economy of Fiji—as to whether it encouraged or
discouraged investors and production and provided more jobs?
Mrs. White: That is one of the factors people would expect to be in people’s minds.
Mr. Gandhi: Would the British Government encourage a party political system in
Fiji?
Mrs. White: We would be very much interested if it developed in Fiji.
In reply to Mr. Pratap, Mrs. White said that the information which she had
gathered in Fiji and the opinions which had been expressed to her would be available
to the Secretary of State and other senior officials in London. There were certain
organisations which would not be directly represented in London, such as the
Rotumans and the Chinese, and it was part of her duty to make sure that their
representations were included on the Agenda for the Conference.
Replying to another question by Mr. Pratap, she said that the Muslim League had
asked that the Muslim point of view should be represented at the London
Conference.
Alipati Sikivou asked: After listening to the Muslim case, would you consider
representations from Catholics and Methodists?
Mrs. White explained: There has been previous correspondence with a Minister of
the British Government on this and our attention has been drawn by the Muslim
League to that correspondence. At least the attention of the London Conference will
be drawn to that correspondence.
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Mr. Pratap: Do Muslims in other Colonies have representation?
Mrs. White: That is not necessarily relevant at all but there has been some
official correspondence with the British Government about Muslim representation
in Fiji.
Mr. Gandhi: What sort of Government should there be to foster peace and
harmony in Fiji?
Crisply, Mrs. White answered: That is the purpose of the London Conference.
Mr. Usher: Would you expect the Agenda to be published in advance so that the
people of Fiji would know specifically what was being discussed at the Conference?
Mrs. White replied: ‘I would suppose not’. A draft Agenda is first prepared and then
it is put to the delegates for items to be added if they think necessary’.
Mr. Usher: So the people of Fiji will not know what is going to be discussed at the
Conference?
Mrs. White: They may or may not agree to publish the Agenda in broad outline in
advance.
Mr. Usher: That is at a very late stage and we are halfway round the world.
Mrs. White: There is the telegraph.
Mr. Galsworthy explained that at previous constitutional conferences, a brief
communiqué was issued at the end of each day’s discussions saying what points had
been discussed. Because of the difficulty of operating at different times, the Press
Section of the Colonial Office always telegraphed the information which was usually
available a little while after the Reuter cable arrived.
Mr. Usher: Or a newspaper might have a direct representative there.
Mrs. White exclaimed: Oh, these rich newspapers!
Alipati Sikivou remarked: The Indians here can always go back to India; the
Chinese can always go back to China; and the Rotumans and other people can also go
back to their own places but the Fijians will always be here. Some birds of passage
come here and create trouble and then go again.
Mrs. White: That is not something for me to comment on.
Mr. Niranjan Singh (Public Relations Office): Indians who have land in India and
property there can go back to India but the Fiji-born Indian has nowhere else to go.
The Indians are here to stay.
Mrs. White, who was once a journalist herself on the Manchester Evening News,
sister paper of the Manchester Guardian, thanked the journalists for their
attendance.
84 CO 1036/1263, no 26 6 May 1965
[Federation Party attack]: letter (reply) from Sir D Jakeway to 
Mr Patel
Thank you for your letter of 30th April.1 The Governor in Council is the supreme
executive authority in this Colony. The Civil Service is its agent for the execution of
1 See 82.
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policy. Members of Executive Council, whether with or without portfolio, are by
convention expected to refrain from public criticism of the organisation which serves
them. No one is called upon to ‘defend the wrong acts of Civil Servants or defend
them from criticism’.
If members of Executive Council have cause to be dissatisfied with the actions of a
Government department of officers thereof, the correct procedure is to report to the
Colonial Secretary. In this particular instance, I am quite sure that the Colonial
Secretary will carefully investigate any complaints made to him. If a prima facie case
of negligence or misconduct is established, disciplinary proceedings as prescribed in
Colonial Regulations will be instituted.
As regards the Fiji Broadcasting Commission, it is correct to any that I have no
administrative control over the organisation. Nevertheless, the Commission is by
statute required to maintain a broadcasting service ‘as a means of information,
education, and entertainment and to develop its service to the best advantage and
interests of the Colony’. By virtue of my power of appointment to the Commission I
have a responsibility for ensuring that the statutory duties of the Commission are
faithfully carried out. The offensive reference which you quote in your letter was
mentioned to me in the course of a discussion with you and other members of the
Federation Party but I did not construe it to be in the nature of a complaint that I
should take up. The correct procedure, if you wish to pursue this, or any other
instance of bias on the part of the Fiji Broadcasting Commission, should be to make
representations direct to the Fiji Broadcasting Commission or to the Colonial
Secretary.
Membership of Executive Council involves participation in the Government. It
does not stifle criticism of Government, its officers or statutory bodies but it does
imply direction of such criticism through different channels. A member cannot enjoy
the advantage of operating from the inside and retain all the freedom of being on the
outside. He cannot have it both ways.
I value your membership of Executive Council and believe it to be in the national
interest that you should continue to be a member and to retain your portfolio. I
realise that this from time to time presents you with a conflict of loyalties, and I have
hitherto much admired the way in which you have reconciled that conflict. At this
juncture, in particular, it would be a setback to the ideal of national unity for which
we are both striving if the leader of the majority Indian party withdrew from the
Government. If you share this view I hope you will refrain from active association
with words or deeds which make it impossible to reconcile your continuation in the
Government with the principle of collective responsibility and the conventions which
surround that principle.2
2 Jakeway forwarded his letter to the CO on 7 May and received a reply from Trafford Smith on 17 May: ‘I
feel sure that your decision that the balance of advantage lies in giving Patel the opportunity of remaining
in the Government is the wise and right one. Let us hope that he does so and that the whole incident has
not so seriously undermined the confidence of the other communities in the Indians as to make progress
between now and the conference impossible’ (CO 1036/1263, no 27).
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85 CO 1036/1127, no 3 July 1965
[London conference]: CO note on the views of the Fiji delegates on
the Legislative Council [Extract]
. . .
B. Attitude of Fiji delegates
(1) Fijians
11. The Great Council of Chiefs recently laid down guide lines for the Fijian
representatives at the Constitutional Conference. The Council also agreed however,
‘that members going to London should not be tied to the points agreed by the
Council as a mandate beyond which they could not go. They should be free to go
beyond what had been agreed to, lest the keeping to a mandate should bring
discussions to a full stop.’
12. The Council agreed that:—
(i) the Legislative Council should in future consist of eight Europeans, eight
Fijians, eight Indians, one Rotuman, one Chinese, one other Pacific Islander, all to
be elected, plus two Fijians from the Council of Chiefs, plus the Colonial Secretary,
Financial Secretary, Attorney-General and Secretary for Fijian Affairs. (One Chief
thought it undemocratic to have eight Europeans but Ratu Edward Cakobau
thought it better to keep racial parity in spite of democratic principles. Ratu
Edward’s view was generally accepted);
(ii) except possibly for four persons there should be no more nominated members.
(This may refer to the ex-officio members; or it could be that the Council has in
mind that nomination might be the most appropriate way of providing for the
representation of the Chinese, Rotumans and other minorities);
(iii) existing Fijian members who were civil servants should be permitted, but
apparently not required, to retire from the Civil Service on pension and with
compensation for the loss of further pensionable service. At the next election
Fijian civil servants should be allowed to offer themselves as candidates but if
elected would be required to retire with pension and compensation. At any stage
Fijian civil servants seeking election would be required to resign before
nomination. As a corollary to these provisions it was considered that all unofficial
members should be paid salaries;
(iv) property and income qualifications should be discarded;
(v) candidates should pay a deposit of £50;
(vi) candidates should be British subjects, 21 by the date of nomination, and able
to speak and read English with sufficient ability to take an active part in the
proceedings of Legislative Council;
(vii) candidates should have not less than two years residence and possess
unlimited immigration permits (if not exempt);
(viii) a candidate must be registered as an elector in some constituency but can
stand for any constituency, irrespective of where he lives;
(ix) the Speaker should be chosen by members of Legislative Council either from
among themselves or from outside;
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(x) the present system of communal electoral rolls should be retained;
(xi) there was no need for two Houses (Upper and Lower). Legislative Council and
The Queen in Council were quite sufficient;
(xii) the present reserved powers in respect of legislation should be retained.
13. The Governor has commented that Ratu Mara, Ratu Penaia and Ratu Edward
Cakobau were to thank for the Fijian representatives being given a free hand at the
Conference. He says that some gentle selling of the attractions of a limited common
roll element in the next constitutional stage has been done with all three and it does
not appear to have fallen on entirely unreceptive ground. It is true that the Council
of Chiefs has come out in favour of a communal roll but there was really no
discussion on this point and the Governor thinks that this was deliberate on the part
of Mara and Penaia. He thinks the position is that they are prepared to listen to
proposals from the British side and to give them a fair hearing. He has made the
point that their confidence in British integrity is complete and that we have good
reason to be grateful for this and must do nothing to damage it.
(2) Indians
14. The Indian members of the Legislative Council are split into two groups. Mr.
Deoki and Mr. Singh are generally in line with the Fijian and European members,
and although they have advocated the introduction of a common roll they would
undoubtedly be prepared to accept communal elections.
15. The Federation Party, which is the strongest political party (it claims to have
21,000 members) and is led by Mr. A.D. Patel, favours the immediate introduction of
a common roll for all seats. The constitution of the party says that its objectives
include:—
(a) ‘To . . . promote . . . national consciousness among the citizens of Fiji
irrespective of . . . race’;
(b) ‘To promote the political, economic and social rights of the citizens of Fiji
irrespective of . . . race’; and
(c) ‘To obtain self-government for Fiji by all legitimate and peaceful means’.
16. In preliminary discussions with the Fijian and European members of
Legislative Council the party agreed that full independence was not an immediate
issue and that:—
(a) Fiji should remain a British territory, and the link with the Crown should be
maintained;
(b) Great Britain should continue to be responsible for defence and external
affairs;
(c) the Governor, the Chief Justice, and the Judges of the Supreme Court should
continue to be appointed by The Queen; and
(d) land ownership would not be discussed at the London Conference.
At subsequent meetings the party members were unwilling to discuss such issues as
the future composition of Legislative Council and the method of elections. In April
they arranged for a special general meeting of the party at which a resolution was
passed authorising them to take no further part in local discussions on constitutional
issues. At a meeting with other Members of Legislative Council Mr. Patel read a
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prepared paper on the reasons why the party supported a common roll. In brief these
are to develop national consciousness and avoid racial attitudes. The meeting broke
up when the Federation Party leaders said they had been instructed to hold no further
local discussions on constitutional issues and they have since declined to attend all
further meetings between the unofficial members of Legislative Council.
17. The National Congress of Fiji which bitterly apposes the Federation Party
(and is not represented at the Conference) recently reiterated their already
announced opposition to a common roll. The Governor has commented, however,
that in spite of this support for the Fijian/European platform the party has recently
been markedly anti-European and he can only regard the support for communal rolls
as a piece of political opportunism.
18. The Governor advises that at the Conference Mr. Patel will advocate a
common roll, even though he knows that it is unacceptable to the Fijian and
European leaders. However, if he sees no alternative, he will probably accept a
limited number of common roll seats in a Legislative Council which is otherwise
elected on communal rolls. He will also press for a reduction in the number of
European seats in Legislative Council. Whether he will also oppose the Fijian
demand for two additional seats for representatives of the Council of Chiefs will
probably depend on whether the Fijians agree to a limited number of common roll
seats and/or whether they agree to definite concessions on the question of land
tenancy.
(3) Europeans
19. The European view regarding the future composition of the Legislative
Council is identical with that of the Fijians and does not require separate discussion.
(A number of leaders of the Methodist Church in Fiji have, however, recently issued a
statement advocating ‘that some positive step’ should now be taken towards
democracy, ‘e.g. some members now elected on the common roll, while the majority
of members are elected communally’. This led to an angry demonstration by Fijians
in favour of communal rolls.)
C. Departmental recommendations
20. The question of the composition of Legislative Council (in particular the
elected element) will be the crux of the Conference and our objective must be to try
to find as large a measure of agreement as possible between the views of the Fijians
and Europeans on the one hand and of the Indians on the other on this particular
topic. A considerable amount of probing will no doubt be necessary in order to
discover exactly how much common ground there is and the Governor has warned
us that it would be most dangerous to give the Fijians the idea that the Secretary of
State’s mind was already made up on the question of introducing even a limited
common roll.
21. The theoretical possibilities as regards the elected members range from the
retention of the present system under which all elected members are elected on
communal rolls, as advocated by the Fijians and Europeans, to one under which they
are all elected on a common roll. It is recommended that we should aim at some
limited introduction of a few common roll seats into a mainly communally elected
chamber as being the most to which we can have any hope of obtaining general
agreement.
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22. It will almost certainly be necessary to preserve at least parity between the
Fijians and Indians and to allow each of them some increase in their representation.
The Fijian/European suggestion of eight members for each major race is not
unreasonable for these two races. It would, however, still leave the Europeans very
much over-represented. A more equitable basis, which would also introduce a
common roll element, was canvassed during discussions between Mrs. White and the
Governor. This would give the Fijians and Indians 12 seats each (of which 3 from
each race would be common roll seats) and the Europeans 9 seats (of which 3 would
be common roll seats).
23. It will almost certainly be necessary to have separate discussions with the
delegates from each community to find out to what extent they are prepared to
compromise on the issue of the common roll. It would, therefore, probably be
desirable to avoid allowing this issue to be raised in full conference at an early stage
as to do so might well lead to the striking of attitudes and deadlock. If agreement is
reached in principle that some common roll seats should be introduced it will then
be necessary to decide how many such seats to create and what should be the
electoral basis.
24. It is difficult for us to improve on the electoral proposals contained in a
memorandum prepared by Mr. Macdonald after the discussions with Mrs. White at
which it was tentatively agreed that a solution should be sought by endeavouring to
create three common roll constituencies, each of which would return one Indian,
one Fijian and one European. It was suggested that Administrative Divisions should
be used as the basis for constituencies. A copy of Mr. Macdonald’s paper is attached.
Briefly, his conclusion is that the most appropriate basis would be three
constituencies composed of the Western Division (population 183,000), the Northern
and Eastern Divisions (124,000) and the Central Division (147,000). These results are
not unsatisfactory from the point of view of the 2 main races since the Western
Division would be predominantly Indian and the Eastern predominantly Fijian. In
the Central district the electorate would have a slight preponderance of Indians. It is,
however, considered likely that the majority of the others (Europeans, Chinese,
Pacific Islanders, Part-Europeans) in this division would tend to vote for the Fijian
candidates and redress the imbalance between the two main races.
25. If proposals discussed in paragraph 24 were accepted this would leave
constituencies based on communal rolls for 9 Fijians, 9 Indians and 6 Europeans. Mr.
Macdonald’s paper discusses the methods by which such constituencies could be
superimposed on the divisional common roll ones (a number of communal
constituencies being grouped in each division). The results, though not entirely
satisfactory in that there would be considerable disposition of members between
different constituencies in each racial group, are at least feasible and could be used
for purposes of illustration. There is, of course, no reason why, if the communal roll
constituencies cannot be grouped into divisions the common roll constituencies
should not be based on areas other than divisions. Those are, in any case, details
which can be worked out by an expert or by a Constituency Delimitation
Commission if the major issues of policy, viz. whether to have a common roll at all
and how many seats to cater for on each roll, have been settled. It will be appreciated
that the more the Conference reaches detailed and specific decisions on the
allocation of Constituencies the less scope there is for an independent Boundaries
Commission to operate. If the major outlines of the constituency arrangement are
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settled the Conference and it is intended that this arrangement should endure at
least for the lifetime of this Constitution the determination of constituencies would
be best left to local law, preferably Governor’s Regulations and we should drop the
proposal for a Constituency Delimitation Commission. (See also Brief No.11.) As
against this however there is, looking to the future, a good deal to be said for
introducing such a Commission (which would have to be introduced at some stage)
now so that Fiji becomes used to the idea.
26. It is also necessary to consider how to deal with the Chinese, the Rotumans
and the Other Pacific Islanders none of whom are at present represented in the
Legislative Council. If there are to be common roll elections they will presumably
take part in these and this may be sufficient difficult if not one possibility might be
for them together to constitute a fourth group for the purposes of the common roll
elements, thus making the three constituencies into four-member constituencies,
each elected one Fijian, one Indian, one European and one Chinese/Rotuman/Pacific
Islander. Alternatively the constituencies could remain 3-member constituencies
and they could vote with the Europeans, electing in each constituency one
European/Chinese/Rotuman/Pacific Islander. In any case it will be necessary to
consider whether they should be brought into the communal roll system. Whether
this is necessary will depend in past on the manner in which they are included on the
common roll. The Fijians have suggested that each of these groups should be given a
separate communal seat. It would be retrograde to introduce yet more communal
rolls at this stage and this suggestion should accordingly be strongly resisted.
Alternative suggestions if anything at all is needed might be:—
(1) they should be grouped with the Europeans;
(2) they should be allowed to choose their own communal roll;
(3) the Rotumans and other Pacific Islanders might be grouped with the Fijians
and the Chinese with the Indians or Europeans. This seems the best of these
possibilities.
27. If this major question of the composition of Legislative Council is settled on
the lines recommended above, the other questions that have to be settled should not
give rise to great difficulty. The Department’s recommendations on them are as
follows:—
(a) Official members of the Council
The ex officio members should be the Colonial Secretary, the Attorney-General,
the Financial Secretary (probably) and the Secretary for Fijian Affairs (possibly). If
there is pressure for finance to become the responsibility of an unofficial Minister,
at any rate at a later stage, and if this is accepted (see Brief No.4), the Financial
Secretary’s office will disappear. This also applies to the Secretary for Fijian Affairs.
An alternative way of dealing with the position of the Secretary for Fijian Affairs
(who is not at present a member ex-officio of either Legislative or Executive
Council) would be to give the Governor a discretion to appoint 2 member of
nominated official members of the Council of whom the Secretary for Fijian
Affairs could be one. Subject to such an arrangement being adopted, we should
endeavour to get away from nominated official members altogether. (See in this
connection Brief No.4—paragraph 14.)
(b) Nominated members
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Except perhaps as a means of giving representation to the minority communities if
they cannot be satisfactorily fitted into the elected-member system, there should
be no nominated members. (The two Fijian members elected by the Great Council
should also not be retained.) These are obviously necessary changes in the
direction of ‘one man, one vote’ type democracy.
(c) Franchise for elected members
Apart from the racial qualifications for members elected on the communal rolls,
the franchise should be based on universal adult suffrage. This differs from the
present franchise only in that it would mean abandoning the present residence
qualification and the present simple literacy test. If there is a general desire to
retain either of these, we need not resist very strongly. The basic principles of the
franchise should be spelled out in the Constitution itself but the details should be
left to local law.
(d) Electoral system
We should stick to the ‘first-past-the-post’ system in all cases, i.e. we should make
no attempt to introduce proportional representation. We should also not press for
any system of communal primaries in the common roll elections; in theory of
course these make a good deal of sense but the Governor is against them. . . .
86 CO 1036/1287, no 30 July 1965
[London conference]: CO note on Fijian Affairs
(This brief is provided primarily for background.) The problem of the future of the
Fijian Administration, which is closely related to the development of local
government in Fiji, is for various reasons unlikely to be raised directly. The main
reason is that everybody in Fiji (including the Indians) knows that any attempt by
non-Fijians to interfere in this matter at this stage would instantly cause the Fijians
to stop in their tracks and refuse to make any constitutional progress at all for the
present. Hence it is to everybody’s interest to keep them sweet by letting them go on
at their own pace, especially as Ratu Mara had made it clear that he is pressing on as
fast as the Fijians will let him.
The problem is, however, continually there in the background, and it could come
to the fore when the future of the present arrangements under which two members
of Legislative Council are elected by the Great Council of Chiefs is discussed.
The Governor (whose view it is that this will not come up at the Conference)
recently summarised his attitude in the course of his Budget address to the
Legislative Council, as follows:—
‘Several attempts have been made in the past to devise a comprehensive
pattern of local government covering the whole country. There was the
Cooper Report in 1947 and the Henderson Report in 1952. Neither achieved
translation into action. The fact remains that the establishment of vigorous
and viable local authorities is an important object of policy. I do not propose
that we should have yet another investigation but that we should build
pragmatically on the organisations which exist. We have two effective
municipalities. Other towns may become ripe for municipal status in due
course. We shall promote the election principle in township boards. The
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Fijian Provincial Councils already have many of the characteristics of rural
district councils. I believe they can be developed on these lines.’
The Fijian Administration is a local government system with jurisdction over all
Fijians in the Colony. It was established in 1876, and the current statutory authority
for the system is the Fijian Affairs Ordinance of 1944. For the purposes of the
Administration, the Colony is divided into 14 Provinces based on the old tribal
boundaries, each of which consists of a number of Tikina which comprise groups of
villages. Each Province and Tikina has its council which has power to make orders in
the case of the latter. At the apex of the structure, is the Council of Chiefs presided
over by the Secretary for Fijian Affairs. (With the introduction of the membership
system the Governor has redesignated this post as ‘Secretary for Fijian Affairs and
Member for Local Government’ retaining the seat on Executive Council with a local
government ‘portfolio’.)
2. The Fijian Affairs Board is established under the provisions of the Fijian Affairs
Ordinance. Its main duties are to make appointments, and regulations, to control
provincial revenue and expenditure and to submit to the Governor such
recommendations and proposals as it may think fit for the benefit of the Fijian
people. Any new legislation proposed by the Government involving the rights and
interests of Fijians is first referred to the Board for its consideration.
3. In 1962, the increasingly precarious condition of the Fijian Administration
was recognised by the appointment by the Council of Chiefs, of a Special Committee
to examine and report on the remaining Fijian Affairs Regulations and the
Administration. Financially, there was a marked resistance among the Fijians to
paying their provincial rates, which resulted in serious economic difficulties.
Secondly, many of the Fijian Affairs Regulations which gave authority to the Fijian
Administration and provided the basis on which Fijian society was organised were
out of date. Thirdly, the new electoral regulations which gave Fijian adults the right
to vote for the first time had led to an increased Fijian interest in politics.
4. The Committee reported that it did not feel any further minor amendments to
the existing Fijian Affairs Regulations could usefully be made in the absence of a
decision on the future structure of the Fijian Administration itself. It proposed
instead, in very broad terms, a number of changes in the overall structure of the
Fijian Administration, the general effect of which was to widen the composition of
Provincial Councils and to give them much more responsibility. In August 1963, the
Council of Chiefs generally accepted the report and recommendations of the
Committee and resolved to appoint Dr. R.R. Nayacakalou ‘to explain and assist in the
detailed implementation of the various stages’ of the proposed changes Dr.
Nayacakalou (a Fijian Ph.D—probably the only one—who holds a lectureship at
Sydney University) was to work under the Fijian Affairs Board, seconded for a period
from his academic work.
5. Dr. Nayacakalou’s report has now been received. The bulk of his
recommendations are concerned with reforming the existing system with particular
reference to the structure of Provincial Councils, methods of election, including
franchise, and finance. The proposals have been generally welcomed by the local
government advisers in the O.D.M.
6. The proposals have recently been discussed and generally welcomed by the
Council of Chiefs. There was, however, a reservation regarding a suggestion
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contained in the final section of Dr. Nayacakalou’s report that the reorganised Fijian
Administration might be used as a basis for inter-racial local government. Council
resolved to postpone discussion of this until a future session. This was almost
inevitable immediately before the Conference; it suggests, however, that the Fijians
are not entirely opposed to the proposal and is to that extent a hopeful sign.
7. Two matters related to the Fijian Administration will come before the
Conference, viz:—
(i) the position of the two Fijian members at present elected by the Council of
Chiefs; and
(ii) the position of the Secretary for Fijian Affairs.
8. As regards (i) the Council of Chiefs has recommended that it should continue
to elect 2 Fijians in addition to 8 communally elected members, thus giving a total of
10 Fijians as against 8 Indians and 8 Europeans in Legislative Council. At present the
2 Council of Chiefs’ members correspond to the Indian and European nominated
members. It is generally agreed that the nominated members should disappear. In
the circumstances the retention of the Council of Chiefs’ members would be illogical
and it is considered that this proposal should be resisted.
9. The Council of Chief’s has recommended that the Secretary for Fijian Affairs
and Local Government should continue to be (a) a civil servant and (b) a Fijian. It
envisages that when a Ministerial system is introduced it should consider further
whether the Secretary should continue as a civil servant and that the aim should be
for him be become an unofficial. He should, however, always be a Fijian. The
department recommends that these proposals should be generally accepted if that is
what the conference wants but that whilst the office is held by an official he should
be a nominated rather than an ex-officio member of Executive Council.
10. The question of Fijian courts is dealt with in the brief on the Judicature
(Brief No. 8).
87 CO 1036/1128, no 1 26 July 1965
[London conference]: opening addresses by Mr Greenwood, 
Ratu Mara, Mr Patel and Mr Falvey1
The Secretary of State for the Colonies said:— 
‘Your Excellency and Delegates: It is a very great pleasure for me to come
here today to open this historic conference on the future constitution of Fiji.
In order to do so I have flown through the night from Aden, because of the
1 The conference was held at Marlborough House. Greenwood chaired the opening session. The British
delegation consisted of Mrs White, Sir H Poynton, Trafford Smith, A J Fairclough, K W S MacKenzie, H
Steel, P R Noakes, Sir Charles Hartwell and Professor Stanley de Smith. The Fiji delegation consisted of
Ratu Mara, A D Patel, J N Falvey, R G Kermode, Ratu P K Ganilau, S M Koya, J Madhavan, Ratu E T T
Cakobau, J A Moore, Semesa Sikivou, Ratu George Cakobau, R A Kearsley, F G Archibald, C A Shah, Josua
Rabukawaqa, A I N Deoki. Jakeway and Justin Lewis (attorney-general in the Fiji government) were
designated separately.
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importance I attach to being here to welcome you today on behalf of Her
Majesty’s Government, and to extend a welcome to the Governor, Sir Derek
Jakeway and to all the unofficial members of the Fiji Legislative Council who
comprise the Fiji delegation.
I said a moment ago that it is a historic conference, and it is historic
because I believe it is the first conference on the constitutional arrangements
for Fiji ever to be held in London. And if I may speak personally for a moment,
this is the first constitutional conference for any territory at which either
Mrs. White or I have presided; so for all of us it is a new experience.
Fiji is of course an exceptional Colony in many respects. First and foremost
because it became a British Colony not by conquest or occupation, but by a
free act where under the leadership of the illustrious ancestor of Ratu George
Cakobau the Chiefs of Fiji ceded the territory to the British Crown. And this
fact of sovereignty freely transferred in a spirit of mutual trust and goodwill
has I think affected the subsequent relations between this country and the
people of Fiji. Certainly trust and goodwill have always been in evidence and
today Fiji has an enviable reputation for friendliness to the stranger,
particularly to those who come from Britain; for tolerance and understanding
between different races; for orderly and peaceful progress; and for great
loyalty to Her Majesty The Queen, which we in this country greatly
appreciate.
It is a little over 90 years since the Deed of Cession was signed in Levuka
between Queen Victoria’s representative and the Chiefs of Fiji. Many things
have changed since then. People of other races have made their homes in
Fiji—Europeans, Indians, Chinese and people from other Pacific islands.
Meanwhile, Fiji has prospered and developed; disease has been eradicated;
agriculture and education have made giant strides; mining has been
introduced. And all the time constitutional progress has gone forward steadily
and peacefully in a way that many other places might well envy.
Today Fiji is moving rapidly towards economic independence; she enjoys
high standards of living and she is forging ahead with development. Her
political and constitutional system works well and is understood by the
people: but it is not as advanced as one might expect from the facts of her
healthy economy and the political maturity of her people.
It was against this background that my predecessor, Mr. Duncan Sandys,
issued his despatch of August 19632 suggesting that a conference should be
convened to work out a constitutional framework within which, whilst
retaining her link with Britain, Fiji could make further progress in the
direction of self-government. Since that despatch was issued the Membership
system has been introduced just a year ago. There has been a great deal of
discussion of all aspects of constitutional change, and serious thought has
been given to the further steps that should now be made on the road to self-
government. The Governor has kept me fully informed of these discussions;
and Mrs. White has also reported on the discussions she had with a wide
range of people when she visited Fiji recently, and which she so greatly
2 See 68.
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enjoyed. This has all been most helpful to me and I am confident that at this
Conference, building on all this preparatory work, we shall be able to reach
agreement on new Constitutional arrangements which will command the
support of all the people of Fiji.
At the wish of all races in Fiji this Conference will of course not be
concerned with Independence. But I hope that we shall nonetheless be able at
the end of our deliberations to register considerable progress. The world is
changing, and changing very rapidly. I am convinced that it is in the long-
term interests of a territory with a future as bright as Fiji’s and with her
degree of political maturity, to accept a considerable further measure of
responsibility for running her own affairs. And it is I think clear that there is a
good deal of room for the development of political institutions in this
direction, within the framework of a continuing link with Britain.
That, as you know, is the purpose of this Conference. Let me say at once
that you will encounter no disposition on the part of the British Government
to press particular solutions upon you. Our main aim will be, whilst
remembering also British interests, to assist you so far as we can, in the light
of the experience of many constitutional Conferences in the past, many of
them held in this very room and attended by Sir Hilton Poynton and Mr.
Galsworthy on those occasions, and also to determine some general
principles which seem to us important if we are to reach agreement on the
next steps in Fiji.
There will no doubt be differences of view and difficulties during the
Conference before we can reach agreement. But with goodwill and mutual
trust and a spirit of compromise I know that we shall be able to resolve these
difficulties and arrive at solutions acceptable to all; the interests of Fiji as a
whole and those of all the different communities that make up her people
demand that we should succeed in this task.
Let us ensure by our efforts during this Conference that our labours lead us
to success.
I will now ask Ratu Mara to address the Conference.’
The Hon. Ratu Mara said:—
‘Mr. Chairman, Mrs. White, Your Excellency, gentlemen, on behalf of the
Fijian Delegation may I say: Greetings to you, and may you enjoy good health,
may good fortune bless your leadership, and thank you very much.
We thank you, sir, for the invitation of the United Kingdom Government
which has brought us here. We thank you also for the events which your
invitation has initiated, and which culminated in the series of joint meetings
of representatives of all the races in Fiji held prior to our departure for
London. These meetings have a profound significance in the history of our
Colony, because they were held without any rigid constitutional framework—
they did in fact break through the racial barrier for the first time. They were
motivated by a sincere and common desire to secure the peace and prosperity
of our future.
We are all of one accord that racial harmony is the key to our future well-
being. We also believe that no constitution on earth will work without the will
of the people to make it work. It is therefore absolutely essential that in the
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preparation for any constitutional change all the peoples who compose our
multi-racial society must be consulted about the change, so that they will be
ready to accept that change, and furthermore that they will see to it that the
change will be carried out.
When the representatives of all the races come together of their own accord
and consult each other on the prospects of the change in our Constitution,
the conclusions of our deliberations here are likely to receive at least a fair if
not an enthusiastic and sympathetic hearing at home.
We have declared that independence is not our goal, because we have never
found any sound or valid reason to attenuate, let alone abandon, our
historical and happy association with the United Kingdom. It is true that we
want a greater measure of self-government, but we fail to see why the full
measure of self-government should sever the link forged by our forefathers in
1874. This link was forged in a spirit of mutual trust and abiding loyalty. That
trust on our part has bred an enduring faith and loyalty in the British Crown
and in British institutions. We sincerely hope that the Constitution we are
about to place on the anvil of this conference will re-echo the same spirit of
mutual trust and abiding loyalty, so that our future generations will look as
kindly on us as we do on those who wrote the Deed of Cession in 1874.
We pray that God will bless our deliberations, so that the outcome will
secure our future prosperity and happiness, and that the United Kingdom will
share with us our prosperous future, as she has always willingly and
unstintingly shared our past and present.
May I, Mr. Chairman, conclude by saying once again: Vanaka sake
vakalevu.’3
The Secretary of State said:—
‘Thank you, Ratu Mara, very much indeed. I wonder if I may ask Mr. Patel to
speak.’
The Hon. A.D. Patel said:—
‘Mr. Chairman, Mrs. White and Gentlemen: I thank you, Sir, and the United
Kingdom Government for the kind invitation and welcome extended us to
this historic conference which is called to smelt the existing system of
government in the Colony of Fiji and to forge and mould a new constitution
which I hope will lead our country ultimately to complete independence in
the not too distant future.
Political liberty, equality and fraternity rank foremost among the good
things of life and mankind all over the world cherishes and holds these ideals
close to its heart. The people of Fiji are no exception. Without political
freedom no country can be economically, socially or spiritually free.
We in Fiji, as in many other under-developed countries of the world are
faced with the three most formidable enemies of mankind, namely poverty,
ignorance, and disease. We need political freedom to confront these enemies
and free our minds, bodies and souls from their clutches.
3 Thank you very much indeed.
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Needless to say that when I refer to political freedom I mean democracy
under the rule of law, the sort of freedom which the British people and the
people of the United States enjoy.
We need freedom which will politically, economically and socially integrate
the various communities living in Fiji and make out of them one nation
deeply conscious of the responsibilities and tasks which lie ahead.
I call this Conference important and historic because it is the first
conference of its kind in the history of Fiji and it may very well prove the
beginning of the end of a form of government which stands universally
condemned in the modern world.
I have come to this Conference with faith and trust in the British people
and the United Kingdom Government which has set peoples of other
colonies free and has led them on the path of economic and cultural
development. After all, Fiji’s problems are not as difficult or formidable as
those which some of the colonies which are now independent have had to
face and solve.
We from our side promise you full co-operation and serious consideration
in the deliberations which lie ahead in this Conference. We have all got to
guard ourselves against avoiding right decisions because they are unpleasant
or run counter to our ingrained habits of preconditioned thought, or wrong
decisions because they appear advantageous in the short run.
We must appreciate the fact that we owe great responsibility, not only to
the people of the present generation but also of generations to come. We have
to resist the temptation of driving the boat on the shallow waters because of
the fear that it will rock heavily if we steered it on the right course. Bearing
all this in mind let us bend to the tasks before us.
In the end I pray to Almighty God who led the Crown Colonies like
Australia and New Zealand to full independence, may He also lead us and our
country to the same destination safely and in good heart.
Again I most sincerely thank you, Sir, for your kind welcome.’
The Secretary of State said:—
‘I shall be very grateful if Mr. Falvey will speak.
The Hon. J.N. Falvey said:—
‘Mr. Chairman, Mrs. White, members of the United Kingdom Delegation,
gentlemen; I speak, Sir, for the European Delegation; I speak also with the
Fijian Delegation. May I first thank you, Sir, for your kind words of welcome
to the whole of our Delegation this morning. We are very glad to be here at
your Government’s invitation to discuss our country’s constitutional
structure.
You will not take it amiss, Sir, if I remind you that this conference is a
response to that invitation and is not the result of any general demand from
us or from the people we represent. There are in fact many people of all races
in Fiji who are well content with our present and relatively new constitution,
and you will find few in our country who are seriously critical of the
Government and the administration of our country since 1874 when
sovereignty was ceded to Her late Majesty, Queen Victoria.
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We have moved along the path of constitutional development over these
last ninety years in a quite way but in a way which has enabled us to preserve
racial harmony in a multi-racial community to a degree which you may
consider remarkable, if not unique.
It may, in fact I am sure it will, come as a surprise to many people in this
country that not one member of our delegation is here to demand
independence. We might rather be said to be in the forefront of the smaller
British territories which, not unnaturally, aspire towards a system of internal
self-government, but which insist upon a continuing link with the Crown.
We believe that this form of association with the United Kingdom is both
sensible and realistic. We may perhaps emerge from this conference with a
new name for that form of association, which I think will be new in
constitutional terms.
You will not, Sir, find us a cantankerous delegation. You will find, in fact
you may already have detected, some differences of opinion amongst us.
Without being presumptuous, however, to the other members of the
delegation, I think you may find that our differences are differences in timing
rather than in relation to principle.
We do most certainly have this in common, Sir, that we appreciate very
much the frequently stated attitude of your Government that the
constitutional development of our country is something to be worked out by
its people and their representatives. We expect to be able to tell you in
unmistakable terms how we think our constitution should develop in the
foreseeable future.
Finally, Sir, may I say how very grateful we all are that it was possible for
your deputy, Mrs. White, to pay a visit to Fiji a few months ago. We are glad to
meet her again at this table in the company of other members of the United
Kingdom Delegation, many of whom are well-known to us.’
The Secretary of State said:—
‘I should like to say how very much we appreciate the content and the spirit of
the speeches that we have just listened to. Mr. Falvey talked about differences
of opinion; I had thought of referring to differences of emphasis that made
themselves apparent in the three contributions. It is quite clear that there is a
good deal of food for discussion, and I envy Mrs. White the task of presiding
over all the working sessions of the conference.
It is my intention to be here today, and to come at any time when Mrs.
White or members of the conference think it will be useful for me to be here,
but that generally speaking the working sessions shall be presided over by
Mrs. White. As Mr. Falvey said, you did have a visit from Mrs. White earlier
this year, and I think you will feel as I do that with her wisdom, her
experience, her friendliness and warmth and a desire to reach the right
solutions at this conference, the conference will be in good hands. I know
that you will share the confidence that I myself feel.
It is suggested, and I hope this will be generally agreed, that there should
be no further formal business this morning, but that we should adjourn now
and that the first working session of the conference should take place at 3
o’clock this afternoon; would that be acceptable to the delegates generally?
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In that case may I thank you very much indeed for your presence here
this morning and for the spirit in which we have started the conference,
and may I express the hope that on the occasions during the conference
when I meet you that I shall find abundant proof that this spirit of
friendliness, understanding and tolerance is continuing. Thank you very
much. I look forward to seeing you again, first of all at the reception in
your honour.
88 CO 1036/1129, ff 56–61 July 1965
[Franchise]: note by the Indian (Federation) group of the Fiji
delegation at the constitutional conference on the arguments in
favour of a common roll
We believe that the time has come that the different communities living in Fiji
should become a nation. We suggest that the future Constitution should make
provisions for free elections based on universal adult suffrage, on the principle of one
man, one vote, one value, to create true representative political institutions to
govern Fiji.
We also believe that every effort should be made to ensure that the peoples of Fiji
are actively encouraged to form and organize political parties along national lines, so
that in due course the different communities living in Fiji are politically integrated.
In our view, the establishment of national political institutions are a prerequisite to
any plan for a rapid economic development of the country.
We also believe that at this stage Fiji is justified in asking for the introduction of
full internal self-government.
Case against communal roll
Our case against Communal Roll is as follows:—
(a) Communal Roll stands for divided loyalties, it inhibits national consciousness
among the people; it is generally identified with religious fanaticism or racial
separatism or economic or social privilege.
(b) Communal Roll can be a serious obstacle to the successful operation of
parliamentary democracy. The elected representatives of a racial or religious sub-
community cannot afford to subordinate the interests and prejudices of their
people to those of a larger community.
(c) Communal Roll tends to magnify communal differences and new communities
discover themselves as further claims to separate representatives are lodged.
(d) Communal Roll, to the best of our knowledge, has been abandoned (with a few
exceptions) by all the countries of the world.
(e) The Communal Roll has been universally condemned as a system of election in
all democratic countries.
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United Kingdom Delegation’s proposals for communal roll with plural votes and a
multi-member constituency in three cases
These proposals may be divided into two parts:—
(a) Plural votes on communal roll in a multi-member constituency
This proposal, in our view, carries the proposition that each race, regardless of its
population strength in the country, or regardless of the strength of the voting
population in the country, would be entitled as of right to an equal number of seats
with other races in the future legislature. This is a grossly unjust proposition and
should have no place in Fiji politics.
This proposal does not take away the element of communalism in the electoral
system but, on the contrary, it perpetuates the existing communal system of voting.
It would not make way for, but obstruct, the introduction or the implementation of
common roll in the future. It will magnify communal differences and inevitably
harden the attitude of all races (including the majority race) along communal lines.
Under this system, political parties will not be able to obtain the candidature of a true
representative of any particular race, let alone obtain a majority of seats in the
legislature to form a workable government.
In any event, under this system, it is our view that because of lack of common
ideology or common interest or common programme, the formation of executive (be
it Executive Council, Council of Ministers or Cabinet) on a party line would be
rendered impracticable, if not impossible.
In our view, under this system a minority party (whether composed of a single race
or otherwise) will hold the balance of power in the Legislature.
Lastly, we say that the arguments we have put forward against Communal Roll
above equally apply to this proposal.
(b) Proposal for single member constituencies with one vote based on communal
roll
We repeat our earlier arguments against Communal Roll, and in so doing we wish to
point out that nearly all economic experts, political advisers and scholars who have
visited Fiji and have conducted a research, have condemned racial segregation in the
field of politics in Fiji.
It is pertinent to note that Mr. Cyril Shirley Belshaw, who is a Professor of
Anthropology in the University of British Columbia, a trained economist and a
former administrator in the Pacific, and who visited Fiji some time in 1959 and who
wrote ‘Under the Ivi Tree’, criticised communal system of voting. In dealing with
economic problems facing Fiji, he said (at page 282):—
‘The role of government is thus of crucial importance, and in Fiji we have
noted it to be seriously defective in its responsibility for economic growth. We
have seen that the system of Fijian administration imposes disturbing and
onerous obligations on the villagers, and that it has failed to organize or
stimulate the supply of productive capital, of commercial experience, and of
communications, and that its system of administration and of land
registration has inhibited the adjustment patterns of the people. This list of
defects is not a long one, and in many respects is counterbalanced by vigorous
and significant government action in such matters as education and health
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services. But from the point of view of economic growth, the list could hardly
be more significant, and it is impossible to see how significant economic
growth can take place without incisive remedial action.
‘In asking why government has not taken appropriate action, we cannot be
content with the reply, it cannot afford to. Obviously, remedial action will
involve an outlay of resources of some order of magnitude. But there are
serious questions as to whether the resources already collected from the
Fijian people are being effectively used, as to whether money now used can be
used more productively, and whether the most determined attempts are
being made to make it possible for the Fijian people to use more financial
resources than at present through new forms of revenue collection and the
mobilization of private funds. To raise the financial question merely puts the
problem a little further back so that we must ask why does the government
not manipulate finances to give priority to the crucial omissions in the
adjustive system?
‘The answers to these questions are to be found in the system of political
administration, and thus political institutions under these circumstances
become central to the analysis of the economic system. Two primary aspects
require emphasis: the political institutions themselves, and the methods of
analysis used by the institutions to guide development and create the
articulated economic system.
‘The political system of the colony as a whole is based on premises of racial
segregation. Not only is there a separate Fijian administration, but members
are appointed to the Legislative Council as representatives of the racial
communities, and the electoral system which is being introduced is based
upon separate racial electorates. The school system is mainly, though not
wholly, separate.
‘When I was in Fiji in 1958–9 there were signs of rapprochement and
understanding between the leaders of the Fijian and Indian politics, and there
was certainly considerable understanding and friendship between Indians and
Fijians in rural farming areas, which even survived the potential friction
caused by the failure of the Native Land Trust Board to resettle Indians whose
leases had expired in areas of Fijian land shortage. There were considerable
points of common interest between Fijian and Indian, in educational and
health problems, in levels of living, in agricultural methods, in the demand
for roads and communications. Except for the fact that the Indian had
potentially less land than the Fijian, and for the fact that his rapidly
increasing families placed a greater strain on his resources than it did for the
Fijian, the two groups, in the rural areas, faced much the same problems and
need much the same help. The Fijian villager has learned much more from
his Indian neighbour than from his European neighbour, and mixes with his
Indian neighbour socially, but not with the European. On the other hand,
Fijian political leaders of standing and education mix freely with some
Europeans.
‘My point is that at this time there was much to build on by way of good-
will and common interest, and it would have been politically feasible to have
introduced quickly common political institutions which would have assisted
with economic growth, and which, though common, would have safeguarded
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the legitimate interests of the separate groups. At the present time, this will
be more difficult, for with the beginning of a deliberate move towards
responsible government in Fiji (necessary and overdue), Fijian leaders have
shown a more specific fear of being over-run by the Indians should the
paternal colonial administration withdraw, and have thrown in their lot more
with conservative European elements. Yet responsible government not only
cannot be avoided, but is an indispensable prerequisite to economic
advancement. Lack of such government will reduce the possibilities of
meeting the requirements of the people, of solving the rapidly increasing
land-population problem, and will help create the grave national distress
which looms on the horizon as population outstrips resources. Responsible
government on a racial basis will fail to provide solutions, will be expensive,
frictional, conservative; will separate the Fijian leadership from the Fijian
villager even more than at present; will encourage demagoguery and breed
upon fear and insecurity. In either case there are very distinct possibilities of
serious violence, both internal to the ethnic groups as struggles for power
take place (this has already begun among the Indians), and between them as
Fijians threaten the growing power of the Indians or create incidents in an
endeavour to have the colonial government remain to protect them.
‘To overcome the difficulties inherent in creating a national electoral
system which avoids racial antagonisms while protecting the rights of
minorities is surely not beyond the legislative genius of the governing power.’
It is our view, therefore, that in the interest of economic advancement of Fiji, if
nothing else, the communal system of voting must be abolished.
This system of voting has never been proved successful, and we need only give one
example to substantiate our argument. In the report of the Commission of Enquiry
which led to the Ceylonese constitutional reform of 1931, we are told that Lord
Donoughmore,1 the chairman of the commission, wrote:—
‘In surveying the position in Ceylon, we have come unhesitatingly to the
conclusion that communal representation is, as it were, a canker on the body
politic, eating deeper and deeper into the vital energies of the people,
breeding self-interest, suspicion and animosity, poisoning the new growth of
political consciousness and effectively preventing the development of a
national or corporate spirit.’
(See book entitled ‘The Protection of Minorities’ by J. A. Laponce published by the
University of California Press pages 114–115.)
In this connection may we also quote Professor S.A. de Smith in his book ‘The New
Commonwealth and its Constitutions’ pages 117–118.
‘The idea that minority communities should be guaranteed special
representation as such in the legislature is seldom acceptable in African and
1 On the Donoughmore Commission in Ceylon, see K M de Silva, ed, Sri Lanka (BDEEP, 1997) part I, pp
xxxvi–xxxix. The commission recommended that the franchise be extended to the immigrant minority in
the island—in the main plantation workers—on the same terms as the indigenous population, that is after
five years’ residence in the country.
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Asia today. Communalism stands for divided loyalties; it inhibits the
development of a national consciousness; it is identified with religious
fanaticism or tribal separatism or economic and social privilege. In the United
Kingdom, Jews, Roman Catholics and West Indians may suffer unofficial
discrimination in various ways, but it is not thought necessary or desirable to
give them distinct representation in the House of Commons. Why, then,
should it be thought necessary to single out communal groups in new states
for this form of preferential treatment? The outside observer who detects the
accents of special pleading must remind himself that communal
representation, in so far as it entails the reservation of seats for communal
members elected only by members of their own communities, has a poor
record. It tends to magnify existing communal differences, inasmuch as
communities are stirred to fuller self-consciousness and electoral campaigns
are dominated by appeals to communal prejudices; and new communities
discover themselves as further claims to separate representation are lodged.
Indians (but not Pakistanis) still look back in anger at the consequences of
the Morley–Minto reforms of 1909.2 The Report of the Donoughmore
Commission in 1928 was a damning indictment of the results of communal
representation in Ceylon. The fact that communal representation survived in
Kenya till 1960 in order to guarantee Europeans, Asians and Arabs a
disproportionate number of seats in comparison with African representation
did nothing to improve its public image. Today it survives only in New
Zealand, Fiji and Cyprus.’
Does common roll mean Indian domination?
In our view the answer to this question must be in the negative. To support our view
we do invite the United Kingdom Delegation to look at the composition of the
population in different constituencies of Fiji, and give particular attention to the
number of eligible voters of each race in different constituencies.
It is inevitable that one political group or another must, of necessity, govern a
country if a parliamentary system of government is in operation. In our view, the fear
of racial domination is not a reality, but purely psychological in the minds of our
colleagues. We fail to see how a particular race in Fiji could ever dominate one or
other race to the intent that their basic fundamental rights and privileges in the
Constitution are taken away. These rights no doubt will be protected in the future
Constitution and clarified.
Assuming there is an abuse of power by a majority group in the legislature, what
are the safeguards to protect the minorities? The answer to this question is that the
constitution itself will provide the following safeguards:—
(a) the right of the Sovereign to emend, suspend or revoke the Constitution;
(b) the right of the Sovereign to disallow bills;
(c) the right of the Governor to reserve bills for the signification of the
Sovereign’s pleasure;
2 The Indian Councils Act of 1909, enacted at the initiative of Lord Morley, the secretary of state for Indian,
and the viceroy, Lord Minto, introduced, inter alia, the principle of separate electorates for Muslim voters
in India.
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(d) the right of the Governor to refuse to assent to some bills;
(e) formation of neutral zones in the field of government such as the
establishment of Judicial and Legal Service Commission, Public Service
Commission and Police Service Commission.
In our view, the safeguards enumerated above are sufficient to allay the fears of all
reasonable citizens living in Fiji, but we would be happy if the following additional
safeguards are embodied in the Constitution:—
(a) provision to the effect that the ownership of land would not be taken away or
challenged except with the concurrence of the Secretary of State for the Colonies;
(b) any other safeguards which would not be incompatible or infringe the
principle that each citizen is one vote, one value in a single member constituency
under the future Constitution.
In this connection we would welcome any proposal from the United Kingdom
Delegation or from the other members of the Fiji Delegation so that a compromise
may be reached.
It is our belief that the views expressed in this Note are shared by many members
of all communities living in Fiji.
89 CO 1036/1128, no 16 9 Aug 1965
[Constitutional conference]: closing addresses by Mr Greenwood and
Sir D Jakeway
The Secretary of State for the Colonies said:—
‘We have the report before us. I understand that it is agreed that it is a correct
and accurate report of what has taken place during the discussions in the
Constitutional Conference. May I take it it is agreed that I sign this as a
correct record?
Thank you very much. Mrs. White and gentlemen, I should like if I may to
begin on a purely personal note, by saying how glad I am that this final
session is taking place at a time when it has been possible for me to be
present. As you will have realised from the newspapers, I have been
preoccupied with other problems during the last few days,1 and I am glad that
this happy concurrence of events has happened so that I can be here on what
is I think an important occasion this afternoon.
I realise fully that in order to complete your proceedings by this time, it has
involved a great deal of very strenuous and very hard work and great
concentration upon your part, and I would like to thank you for the
forbearance and for the industry and the concentration that you have shown.
And I think it would be your wish that I should thank Mrs. White for having
presided so skilfully over discussions that I know must have been very
exacting and very tiring at times.
1 This is a reference to Greenwood’s visit to Aden and to the breakdown of preparatory talks for an Aden
conference in London.
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Speaking purely for myself, I should have been very sorry indeed if we had
broken up at a time when it had not been possible for me to come and see you
again and to hear the results of your labours. I am naturally disappointed that
the Conference has not reached complete agreement, but on the other hand I
am certainly strongly of the opinion that, thanks to the hard work which you
have put in, Fiji has made a definite stop forward along the road to
democratic self-government. I know that there are different views on the
subject among the various groups, but it is certainly our strong view that the
introduction of an element of voting across the communal and racial
boundaries is a useful stop towards the long-term objective that we all of us
have in mind, and that is the breakdown of barriers between the different
elements in the population. There is a responsibility upon all of us to create a
homogeneous Fijian population, a homogeneous society in which all the
inhabitants of the territory, whatever their background, feel able to work in
the interests of their homeland, and to put these interests before any
considerations of community or race or creed. And basically when we think of
the things which are really important, there is so little difference between the
different races of the world, and when it comes to love of beauty and love of
our follow men, and a demand for justice and a sense of fair play, there is so
little that divides the races.
Those surely are the things which we must bear in mind when we set out to
serve our country, to realise that it is the interests of the country and not the
interests of races which really matter.
It is one of the sadnesses of my situation that I have not been able to visit
Fiji myself, but everybody whom I know who has been there, Mrs. White
among them, has come back quite clearly in love with Fiji. And it is not only I
think that they are in love with the beauty of the island, which everybody tells
me about, but what I think really impresses them even more deeply is the
mutual confidence and the good relations which exist in ordinary daily life,
whether it is in towns or villages throughout the country, the good relations
and the confidence which exist between the people of all races. Perhaps you
will forgive me if I say that that is perhaps the most precious asset which any
country can have, and once that asset is squandered, and if that confidence is
destroyed and if that mutual respect were to disappear, it would take not just
a matter of months, not just a matter of years to restore it, it would take
generations to undo the damage which had been done and to enable us to
build again on foundations of mutual respect and mutual confidence.
I would therefore urge you strongly to remember that consideration, and
to realise how fortunate you are in contrast with some of the countries in the
world at the present time. And so I would say that, whatever may be the
defects of the Constitution that we have been discussing during the last few
days—and I do not think that anybody would claim that it was a perfect
Constitution—whatever may be the defects of it, I think there is
responsibility upon all of us to give it a fair run, to strive to make it work with
the maximum of officiency for the benefit of all the people of your country.
We have got I think to use it as a base from which further constitutional
progress can be made, as the political experience of the people grows and
racial harmony is consolidated. And you know, this really means I think
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sinking differences which there may exist at the present time, differences
about the immediate effects of the Constitution, differences between the
outlook of the various communities. Nobody has got to give up his principles
or to give up the things which he believes to be right. But what all of us have
got to do, I think, is to remember that above all things it is the interests of Fiji
which really count, not the interests of any community or any race, that we
have got to start thinking in terms of country rather than of community or of
race.
That, gentlemen, is the main thought which I would like to leave in your
minds on this occasion. And in concluding may I say that I pray God that you
will have a safe journey home; I express to you my good wishes and the good
wishes of Her Majesty’s Government for the future of your country, and I
would ask you to take back with you our good wishes to the people of Fiji,
whose long, loyal and voluntary association with the people of this country is
one of the treasures which we prize above all valuation.
Thank you, and good luck to you all.’
Sir Derek Jakeway said:—
‘Right Honorable Sir, Mrs. White, Fellow Delegates: On behalf of the Fiji
delegation I would like to express to you, Sir, and through you to Her
Majesty’s Government, our very sincere appreciation of the arrangements
which have been made for this Conference. For all of us in the Fiji delegation
it has been our first experience of a conference of this nature. Indeed, I doubt
whether there has been any comparable gathering to consider the
constitutional future of Fiji since the Deed of Cession was signed 91 years
ago.
That it should have taken place in the historic setting of Marlborough
House will be for all of us especially memorable. Here we have been able to
draw on the inspiration of a gracious and spacious past while enjoying all the
facilities of the present. Our comfort, both mental and physical, has been
amply provided for.
It has been a strenuous fortnight, filled with a most enjoyable social
programme as well as the regular working sessions of the conference. But
however hard some of us may think we have worked, none will gainsay that
the palm for sheer devotion to duty should be awarded to the Secretary-
General, Mr. Nixon, and his staff. For them there was no respite, and the
rapid and accurate rendition of minutes, papers and the report—achieved
only by literally all night labour—deserves and receives our unstinted
admiration.
We appreciate also that Her Majesty’s Government should have made
available to all sides of the Conference the wide knowledge and experience in
matters constitutional of Professor de Smith. Whether he, for his part, may
have added to the sum of his knowledge of the complexities of constitutional
machinery in a plural society, it is not for me to say.
Although Mr. Steel, as legal adviser to the United Kingdom delegation, had
no obligations to the Fiji delegation, he has in fact been a constitutional
guide, philosopher and friend to all. This has notably assisted the Conference
in its deliberations and we are correspondingly grateful for it.
10-Fiji-85-cpp  10/5/06  6:57 AM  Page 251
252 LONDON CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE [90]
In your unavoidable absence, Sir, from the working sessions of the
Conference, Mrs. White has presided with, if I may say so, grace and skill. It
was beneficial to us all that she was able to pay a preliminary visit to Fiji and
to gain a first hand acquaintance with our problems on the spot.
Of the outcome of the Conference I will say no more than respectfully
endorse your view that the right thing now is for everyone, whatever his
private opinion on any particular conclusion, to co-operate in making the
operation of the new Constitution, when it comes into being, a success. As Sir
Hilton Poynton has so rightly pointed out, a constitution is but a framework
within which human relationships can develop. The best constitution that the
human intellect can devise will be of no avail if there is lacking the will to
promote those human relationships on a basis of justice, tolerance and
friendship. The other side of the coin is that even a bad constitution cannot
frustrate that objective if the will is there. I pray God that it is there and will
remain there.’
The Secretary of State for the Colonies said:—
‘I think, gentlemen, that concludes the business. I would thank the Governor
for the kind words that he says, and I know that I am speaking on behalf of
Mrs. White in thanking him for the remarks he has just made. I think this has
been a happy Conference and that it has been a useful Conference, and I hope
that you will enjoy the rest of your time in London and have, as I said earlier,
a safe journey to your own homes. Thank you very much indeed.’
90 CO 1036/1129, no 18 9 Aug 1965
[Constitutional conference]: report (FCC(65)15(Final)) by the
secretary-general (C B Nixon)
Introduction
1. The Fiji Constitutional Conference, 1965, was held at Marlborough House,
London, S. W. 1., from the 26th July to the 9th August, 1965. The Rt. Hon. Anthony
Greenwood, M.P., Secretary of State for the Colonies, presided at the opening and
closing sessions and Mrs. Eirene White, M.P., Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State
for the Colonies, presided at the other sessions. Sixteen sessions were held in all. A
list of those present is in the Appendix.1
2. The purpose of the Conference was to work out a constitutional framework for
Fiji which would preserve a continuing link with Britain and within which further
progress could be made in the direction of internal self-government.
3. The Conference agreed that for the first time the Constitution would provide
for a majority of elected members in the Legislative Council. The nomination of
unofficial members would be discontinued entirely and the number of nominated
1 Not printed, see 87, note 1.
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officials would be reduced to a maximum of four. It was also agreed that the
members of all minority groups, who have hitherto had no vote, would be
enfranchised and eligible to stand for election. Fiji will thus attain universal adult
suffrage. Agreement was also reached on provision for the introduction of a
Ministerial system and for a Bill of Rights to be incorporated in the Constitution.
4. There were, however, strongly opposed views within the Fiji delegation on the
method of election to the Legislative Council and the representation therein of the
different communities. The Indian group contended that the proper course was to
proceed at once, with appropriate safeguards, to the replacement of the existing
system of elections on communal rolls by a system under which all the elected
members of the Legislative Council would be returned, by single member
constituencies, on a straight common roll, that is to say, with neither communal
qualifications for electors nor communal reservation of seats for candidates. The
Fijian and European groups, on the other hand, took their stand on the retention of a
fully communal system of elections as at present. While both these groups
recognised that election on a straight common roll basis was a desirable long-term
objective, they could not agree to its introduction at the present stage or in the
foreseeable future. Faced with this conflict of views the Conference did not succeed
in reaching agreement on when such a system should be introduced.
5. Her Majesty’s Government, for their part, recognised that election on a
straight common roll basis was not practicable for Fiji until a greater degree of
integration of the communities had been achieved. They made clear, however, the
importance they attached to introducing a system whereby some members would
be both elected by and responsible to voters drawn from all communities. To this
end they put forward certain proposals which were eventually accepted by the Fijian
and European groups and in part by one of the Indian delegates (see paragraph 30).
These form the basis of the recommendations set out in paragraphs 21 and 22
below. It was emphasised by the Fijian and European delegates that these proposals
would be brought before the communities in Fiji affected by them, through a
debate in the Legislative Council. These proposals, however, were not accepted by
the remainder of the Indian group. They proposed a system of full common roll
elections with appropriate safeguards. When it became clear that this was not
acceptable, they offered the alternative compromise proposal summarised in
paragraphs 24–27. This alternative proposal failed to secure acceptance by the
Fijian and European groups in the Fiji delegation. The Indian group indicated that
in these circumstances they would wish to take their stand on the proposals for full
common roll elections.
6. In the discussion on the provisions of the Constitution dealing with executive
powers, the Indian group, with one dissentient (see paragraph 41), made it clear that
they considered that the stage had been reached where full internal self-government
should be introduced forthwith. The remainder of the delegation considered that it
was still necessary for the Governor to retain a substantial measure of discretionary
power and preferred the recommendations which are set out in paragraph 40 below.
7. The Conference reached the following conclusions with reservations as noted
in the text.
The Crown
8. The position of the Crown would remain unchanged.
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The governor
9. The Governor would continue to be appointed by the Crown on the advice of
Her Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom.
The judicature
10. The Constitution would contain provisions expressly establishing the
Supreme Court, and the Court of Appeal and prescribing their composition. The
judges of those Courts would be appointed by the Governor on instructions from Her
Majesty. There would be a safeguard against the abolition of the office of any judge
during his tenure of office. Judges would be removable only for inability or
misconduct, and only upon the recommendation of the Judicial Committee of the
Privy Council after a local judicial tribunal had investigated the facts. The
Constitution would prescribe the qualifications for judges.
11. Appeals would continue to lie to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council.
12. There would be provision in the Constitution for a Judicial and Legal Service
Commission consisting of the Chief Justice as Chairman, the Attorney-General (see
paragraph 44), the Chairman of the Public Service Commission (see paragraph 15)
and one other member appointed by the Governor in his discretion. The Governor
would be required to consult the Commission on the appointment and discipline of
the subordinate judiciary and the holders of other public offices for which legal
qualifications are required but would not be bound by the advice of the Commission.
The provisions relating to the security of tenure of a member of the Public Service
Commission, and to the qualifications and disqualifications attaching to his office
(see paragraphs 15 and 16 below) would apply also in relation to the appointed
member of the Judicial and Legal Service Commission.
Public service
13. The Constitution would contain provisions establishing the Public Service
Commission and the Governor would be required to consult the Commission on the
appointment of persons to certain public service posts (including appointments on
promotion and on transfer from one public office to another) and their disciplinary
control but would not be bound by the advice of the Commission.
14. The Public Service Commission would be responsible for advising the
Governor on all posts in the public service except the following:—
(a) The Chief Justice and puisne judges and the judges of the Court of Appeal;
(b) posts dealt with by the Judicial and Legal Service Commission;
(c) posts dealt with by the Police Service Commission;
(d) Chief Secretary (at present known as Colonial Secretary);
(e) Attorney-General (see paragraph 44);
(f) Financial Secretary;
(g) Secretary for Fijian Affairs;
(h) Director of Audit;
(i) Commissioner of Police;
(j) Junior and subordinate officers of disciplined services such as the Police and
Prison Services.
The Commission would be empowered with the consent of the Governor, to delegate
its functions to one or more of its members or to other public authorities.
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15. The Public Service Commission would consist of a chairman and not more
than three members appointed by the Governor, in his discretion, for a fixed term of
three years. There would be transitional provisions permitting some of the initial
appointments to be for a shorter period in order to ensure continuity of experience.
During their term of office they would be irremovable except on grounds of inability
or misconduct established by a judicial tribunal. Members would be eligible for re-
appointment. The Constitution would direct the Public Service Commission that in
appointments to the public service, preference should be given to suitably qualified
local candidates. The Public Service Commission would also be directed to ensure
that as far as possible each of the communities in Fiji would receive fair treatment in
respect of appointment to the public service.
16. Sitting members of the Legislative Council and serving members of the
public service would be disqualified from membership of the Commission. Persons
who had stood as candidates for election to the Legislative Council and also former
unofficial members of the Legislative Council could not be members of the
Commission within three years of standing for election or of vacating their seats.
Members of the Commission would be disqualified for nomination for election to the
Legislative Council within a period of three years after ceasing to be members of the
Commission. Members of the Public Service Commission would not be eligible for
appointment to public office for three years after retirement. Retired civil servants
would be disqualified from membership of the Public Service Commission for a
period of two years after retirement.
17. The terms of service of public servants would continue to be one of the
special responsibilities of the Governor.
Police Service Commission
18. The Constitution would contain provisions establishing the Police Service
Commission and the Governor would be required to consult the Commission (but
not be bound by their advice) on the appointment of all officers of gazetted rank
except the Commissioner of Police. The Police Service Commission would consist of
a chairman and not more than two members, all of whom would be appointed by the
Governor in his discretion. The provisions relating to security of tenure of a member
of a Public Service Commission and to the qualifications and disqualifications
attaching to his office (see paragraphs 15 and 16 above) would apply also in relation
to a member of the Police Service Commission.
Bill of Rights
19. A Bill of Rights would be included in the Constitution. Subject to what is said
below, any law which is inconsistent with the Bill of Rights would be void.
Application would lie to the Supreme Court for redress in relation to infringement of
the provisions of the Bill of Rights. The Bill of Rights would protect the right to life,
personal liberty, freedom of movement and residence, freedom from inhuman
treatment, freedom from slavery and forced labour, freedom from arbitrary search
and entry, the right to a fair trial in criminal and civil cases, freedom of conscience,
freedom of expression, assembly and association, freedom from arbitrary seizure of
property and freedom from discrimination, subject to certain general qualifications
to permit restrictions that are reasonably justifiable in the public interest or to
protect the rights and freedoms of others, and for derogations in time of war or
public emergency.
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20. The right to freedom from discrimination would not invalidate existing laws,
but when the discriminatory effect of a particular law had been reduced or
eliminated, it could not be reintroduced. It was accepted that the aim should be to
eliminate conflict between existing laws and the right to freedom from
discrimination. The Indian group of the Fiji delegation wished to record their view
that there should be no saving for existing laws which were in conflict with the right
to freedom from discrimination and which could not be brought within one of the
specific exceptions set out by the Constitution; these laws should therefore become
void as from the introduction of the Constitution. If, however, this was not
practicable, they suggested that such laws should be saved only for a specified period,
without prejudice to their earlier repeal if possible.
Legislative Council Composition
21. The Legislative Council would comprise thirty-six members elected as
described below together with not more than four official members. The number of
Fijian members elected on the Fijian communal roll would be increased from the
present four to a total of nine. In addition, there would continue to be two Fijian
members elected by the Council of Chiefs. For the purpose of the election of these
nine members, Rotumans and other Pacific Islanders would be given the opportunity
of being grouped with the Fijians and would thus, for the first time, be enfranchised
and eligible to be elected to the Legislative Council. The number of Indian members
elected on the Indian communal roll would also be increased from the present four
to a total of nine. Instead of the present four European members elected on the
European communal roll there would be seven members elected on a roll, on which
people of the Chinese and other communities, not at present entitled to vote, would
also be eligible for registration. They would also be eligible for election to the
Legislative Council.
22. In addition to the twenty-seven members elected as described above, a
further nine members would be elected on a system of cross-voting under which,
though the seats would be reserved in equal proportions for members of the three
communities (the Rotumans and other Pacific Islanders being grouped with the
Fijians and the Chinese and others with the Europeans), each member would be
elected by persons of all communities. In this way each elector would take part in the
election of members of the other communities as well as of his own, and each
member of the Council elected under this system would be responsible to persons of
the other communities as well as his own. For the purpose of these elections the
colony would be divided into three constituencies, each returning one Fijian (or
Rotuman or other Pacific Islander), one Indian and one European (or Chinese). The
electoral rolls would be made up by amalgamating the three communal rolls for the
relevant areas.
23. As indicated in paragraph 5 above, the Indian group submitted a proposal for
the immediate introduction of elections on a common roll without any seats being
communally reserved. When it became clear that this was unacceptable to the two
other communities they put forward certain alternative compromise proposals under
which, to the extent that elections on a fully communal basis were to be retained,
there would continue to be parity between the Fijian and Indian communities. These
alternative proposals—involving communal rolls, cross-voting and common roll—
are summarized below.
24. The Legislative Council would contain 36 elected members. Twelve of these
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would be elected on communal rolls as at present, four members for each
community. A further 18 members would be elected by a system of cross-voting. For
this purpose Fiji would be divided into three constituencies, each returning six
members. In each constituency two seats would be reserved for Fijians, two would be
reserved for Indians, one would be reserved for a European and the remaining one
for a member of the other communities, e.g. Rotumans, other Pacific Islanders and
Chinese. The remaining six members would be returned by the same three
constituencies, each constituency returning two of them. The electorate would be
the same as for the 18 seats just described but there would be no racial qualification
for candidates.
25. It was explained that the Indian group expected that the members of the
minor communities (Rotumans, etc.) would participate in the above non-communal
elections.
26. Where one constituency was required to return more than one member in
each of the above elections (e.g. two Fijians for the racially-reserved seats on the
cross-voting system or two members for the non-reserved seats) the system used
would be the ‘first past the post’ system.
27. The Indian group explained that if these proposals, or if a scheme worked out
on similar lines, were acceptable to the delegates, they recognised that certain
safeguards might be considered necessary to avoid under-representation of particular
communities.
28. When these alternative proposals made by the Indian group failed to gain
acceptance by the Fijian and European groups, the Indian group again took their
stand on their original proposals for the immediate introduction of common roll
elections and made it clear that the proposals described in paragraphs 21 and 22
above were unacceptable to them.
29. The Indian group unanimously rejected, and recorded their strong protest
against, the proposal that there should be two more Fijian members of the
legislature than Indian members. They rejected the argument of the Fijian and
European groups that the additional representation was justified by the special
position occupied by the Fijian community in Fiji. They also rejected the argument
of the United Kingdom delegation that two extra Fijian seats were justified by the
inclusion of the Rotuman and other Pacific Island communities in the Fijian
electorate. They made it clear that, as the Indians constituted the majority of the
population, though not necessarily of the electorate at the next election, they were
entitled to at least parity of representation with the Fijian, the Rotuman and other
Pacific Island communities combined.
30. As mentioned in paragraph 5 above, one member of the Indian group (Mr.
Singh) indicated that he could accept only in part the proposals set out in paragraphs
21 and 22. While he would have preferred the adoption of elections on a common roll
basis, he was prepared to accept the proposals but only in so far as they related to the
method of election. So far as the number of members was concerned, he supported
the other members of the Indian group in contending that parity between the two
major communities should be retained.
Nominated official members
31. The only nominated members would be those persons who were, for the time
being, the official members of the Executive Council (see paragraph 39 below). The
Governor’s present power to nominate up to sixteen official members (in addition to
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the three ex-officio members provided for by the present Constitution) would
disappear. His power to nominate unofficial members of the Legislative Council to
represent the various communities would also be abolished.
Qualifications and disqualifications of candidates
32. The qualifications and disqualifications of candidates would be the same as at
present with the following exceptions:—
(a) the present requirement relating to property or income would be abolished
but local law should contain a provision related to candidates furnishing a deposit;
(b) for the purpose of establishing the community to which a candidate belonged,
he would be permitted to trace his descent through his mother if he could not
ascertain who his father was;
(c) British protected persons would be entitled to a vote on the same basis as
British subjects.
(d) At the first election under the Constitution, Fijian civil servants would not be
disqualified to stand for election to the Legislative Council but would, if elected,
vacate their seats as soon as the Legislative Council first met thereafter if they
had not by then retired from the public service. At all subsequent elections Fijian
civil servants would be disqualified to stand for election to the Legislative
Council and would therefore have to retire from the public service before
nomination.
(e) Members of the Commissions established by the Constitution would be
disqualified for nomination for election to the Legislative Council within a period
of three years after ceasing to be members of the Commissions.
Qualifications and disqualifications of electors
33. The qualifications and disqualifications of electors would be the same as at
present with the following exceptions:—
(a) the literacy test would be abolished;
(b) the same alteration would be made in the rules governing the method of
establishing the community to which an elector belonged as is to be made in the
case of candidates.
(c) British protected persons would be eligible to be elected on the same basis as
British subjects.
The speaker and the deputy speaker
34. The Legislative Council would elect a Speaker either from within the Council
or from persons outside who were qualified to be elected to the Legislative
Council. There would be no by-election in his constituency for a Speaker elected
from the Legislative Council. He would hold office until the Legislative Council’s
first meeting after the General Election following his appointment. A majority of
two-thirds of the Legislative Council would be required to remove a Speaker from
office. The Speaker would have no vote on motions before the Legislative Council.
Any motion upon which the votes were equally divided would be regarded as
withdrawn. The Speaker would be among the officers whose salary was a charge
upon the Consolidated Fund. The Legislative Council would be empowered to
appoint a Deputy Speaker from among its members. His powers and functions
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when presiding at the Legislative Council would be the same as those of the
Speaker.
Powers
35. Subject to the restrictions imposed by the Colonial Laws Validity Act 1865
(which invalidates a colonial law to the extent to which it is inconsistent with an
imperial enactment extending to the Colony) and by any provisions of the
Constitution itself such as a Bill of Rights, the Constitution would give the
Legislative Council full power to make laws on any subject. There would be a
provision to prevent Bills being introduced without the consent of the Governor if
their effect would be to impose taxes or to increase expenditure or to alter terms and
conditions of service of public officers. The Governor would have power to refuse
assent, to reserve legislation, and to ensure that Bills were passed by certification.
Certain subjects specified by reference to particular laws would be dealt with by
special procedure in the Legislative Council. Under this procedure Bills affecting the
laws concerned would require the support of more than two-thirds of all the elected
members of the Legislative Council. A similar requirement should apply to any
resolution the effect of which would be to recommend any change in the
Constitution. The Indian group of the Fiji delegation wished to record their dissent
from these proposals.
36. The Governor would be required to reserve certain kinds of Bills, e.g. Bills
which appear to him to conflict with international obligations or affect the Royal
Prerogative, or Bills which purport to amend the Constitution. The power of
disallowance would be retained by the Crown. Besides these restrictions on the
powers of the Legislative Council the Crown would retain the power to revise or
amend the Constitution by Order in Council and to make other laws for Fiji by Order
in Council.
Prorogation
37. The Governor’s power to prorogue the Legislative Council would be
exercised after consultation with the Executive Council, though he would not be
bound by such consultation.
Dissolution
38. The maximum life of the Legislative Council would be five years. The
Governor would be empowered to dissolve the Legislative Council in his
discretion.
Executive
39. The executive power would remain formally vested in the Governor at all
stages, although particular laws might confer certain functions on other officers and
authorities. The Governor would continue to appoint the unofficial members of the
Executive Council in his discretion but would provide for appropriate representation
of the various communities in the unofficial element of the Executive Council. This
would be regulated as at present by convention. These members would be drawn
from the elected members of the Legislative Council. In addition the Governor would
be empowered to appoint not more than four official members of the Executive
Council. The Constitution would provide that the Governor might at an appropriate
time appoint members of the Executive Council to be Ministers with executive
powers in certain fields of public business, and also Ministers without Portfolio. The
Executive Council would be described as a Council of Ministers when Ministers were
appointed.
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Executive Council: powers
40. The Governor would consult the Executive Council in the exercise of all his
functions (except on trivial or urgent matters or where the public interest made it
undesirable). He would not be required to consult in cases where he was specifically
authorised or required by the Constitution to act in his discretion or on the advice of,
or after consultation with, some other person or authority. He would in general act
in accordance with the advice of the Executive Council but could act against such
advice where he considered it necessary in the interests of public order, public faith
or good government; in such cases he would be required to seek approval of the
Secretary of State.
41. The Indian group of the Fiji delegation wished to record their view that the
Governor should be required to act in accordance with the advice of the Executive
Council, except where he considered that he should reject it in the interests of one of
his special responsibilities. As explained in paragraph 6 above, one member of the
Indian group (Mr. Singh) felt unable to support the other members of the group in
proposing the immediate introduction of full internal self-government. He agreed
with the other members of the Fiji delegation that it would still be necessary for the
Governor to retain substantial discretionary powers.
42. Certain subjects would be reserved to the Governor in his discretion as his
special responsibility. These would include defence, external affairs, internal security
and the public service.
Prerogative of mercy
43. To assist the Governor in his exercise of the prerogative of mercy, there
would be an advisory committee presided over by the Governor himself and
consisting of the Attorney-General (see paragraph 44), and between two and four
other persons appointed by the Governor, one of whom would be a member of the
Executive Council and another a medical practitioner. The Governor would be
required to refer to the committee all capital cases and might refer such other cases
as he thought fit. The advice of the committee would not be binding on the
Governor.
Attorney-general
44. The Constitution would make it clear that the Attorney-General was
ultimately responsible for the initiation, conduct or discontinuance of criminal
prosecutions. If the office of Attorney-General became that of an unofficial
Minister, the office of Director of Public Prosecutions would be established and the
provisions of the Constitution relating to the Attorney-General, as envisaged by
this Report, would then apply to the office of Director of Public Prosecutions. In
addition the office of Solicitor-General would then be excluded from the
jurisdiction of the Public Service Commission, and the Solicitor-General would
take the place of the Attorney-General on the Judicial and Legal Service
Commission (see paragraph 12) and also on the Advisory Committee on the
Prerogative of Merey (see paragraph 43).
Important public offices
45. The Constitution would provide for the security of tenure of office of the
Director of Audit and of the Judges of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeal and
would also safeguard (by charging on the Consolidated Fund) their emoluments as
well as the emoluments of the Governor, the Attorney-General (see paragraph 44),
the Chairman and members of the Public Service Commission and other
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Commissions established in the Constitution and the Speaker of the Legislative
Council.
Finance
46. The financial provisions in the Constitution would establish a Consolidated
Fund into which all public revenues would be paid and out of which all expenditure
would be met (except as provided specifically by local law). There would also be a
Contingencies Fund. The Constitution would prescribe the appropriate procedure for
scrutiny of expenditure by the Legislative Council.
91 CO 1036/1119, no 73 17 Aug 1965
[Constitutional conference]: letter from Trafford Smith to 
P D Macdonald criticising the performance of the Indian delegation
Now that the Conference is over, I am writing at more leisure with a few general
impressions to supplement the series of telegrams ending with our Secret and
Personal No. 88 of the 9th August.
2. First, in regard to that telegram, Mrs. White has asked me to amplify what is
said in the second paragraph about her talk with Mara and Falvey on the 9th August.
This was a personal talk with only the three of them present. Naturally, we were
worried about the situation into which the Indians had got themselves towards the
end of the Conference—had they played their cards better, they could certainly have
come out with a more acceptable result from their point of view—and Mrs. White
thought it might be useful to discuss frankly with Mara and Falvey on a purely
personal basis whether it would in the long term make sense to give the Indians one
more seat—whether the game would be worth the candle. There was a general
discussion of the balance of advantage and disadvantage in doing this. Obviously a
late concession of this sort might have shown that H.M.G.—and the Fijians and
Europeans, if they acquiesced—were trying to make some move towards placating
the Indians. But would it in fact have placated them to any material extent? The
conclusion finally reached, with which I think I agree, was that a gesture of this sort
would have been fruitless at that late stage. It would not really have removed the
Indian sense of grievance, and might indeed have gone some way to alienate
European and Fijian opinion.
3. This was the first conference of this kind I had taken part in (my previous
experience in this field being the Malta Integration Conference which was obviously
quite a different kind of exercise)—and a number of things impressed me. The thing
which struck everybody on H.M.G.’s side most was the quite extraordinarily bad
performance of the Indians. When Patel decided to go into purdah and not talk any
more during the last months before the Conference, we all thought he was preparing
some great Indian plan which he didn’t want to launch in Fiji, partly to avoid its
being watered down in discussion and partly because it would inevitably, whatever its
merits, have been torn to pieces and hopelessly prejudiced from the start by Usher1
and company. We thought that for these reasons this magnum opus was to be
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launched on an expectant conference at what Patel judged to be the right tactical
moment.
4. As it turned out, the Federation Party seemed to have come to London
having done no homework at all. Patel got off on the wrong foot during the formal
opening session by talking about independence as the ultimate objective and
holding up the colonial state of Fiji to condemnation: and then the party simply
made their case in a very general way for a straight common roll, with a few
subsidiary murmurs about safeguards, and when asked to put it down on paper,
took a couple of days to do so. No one seemed to have thought of the necessity,
given the circumstances on the ground in Fiji, to produce some kind of
compromise plan, short of the common roll ideal, which would stand some chance
of working without too much local friction. Whether they misjudged the situation
and thought that, on purely theoretical doctrinaire grounds, a British Labour
Government would automatically start from the straight common roll position, and
the discussion would simply be about safeguards, I don’t know: at all events, at no
point in the proceedings did Patel or his henchmen take any real grip of the
situation, and it was left to Deoki at the last moment to produce his Indian
compromise plan, which was the only statesmanlike move made from the Indian
side (discounting Singh’s efforts to dissociate himself from the Federation Party
line) during the whole conference. This was a perfectly viable and sensible proposal,
and had the Indians tabled it on the first day, it would have been impossible for
H.M.G. to avoid taking very great account of it, and indeed difficult for H.M.G. not
to have spent a considerable time—most of the conference even—trying to
persuade the Fijians and Europeans to accept it or some variant of it.
5. As it was, by the time Deoki produced his compromise, we had already spent
all our efforts on pushing the Fijians and Europeans down the road towards cross-
voting. Deoki’s intervention came only when this had been virtually tied up with
the Fijians and Europeans in the absence of any positive move from the Indians
beyond their purely theoretical general paper on a straight common roll. It would
have been difficult to draw back and start at Square 1 again without prejudicing
our bona fides with the Fijians and Europeans, and indeed the only way to have
made progress on the Deoki plan would have been to extend the conference by
another week, which was not possible because of other commitments on the
British side.
6. In short, rarely has a case been so mishandled by three competent lawyers.
If the Indians had not called in Gratien [sic]2 at the end—again too late to do more
than help them save what they could from the wreckage—their case would have
gone even more by default. I find it baffling to know what Patel and Koya really
thought was going to happen. Surely they cannot have come to the conference
with no detailed plan at all and simply vague views about common roll. In some
way which I do not understand, I think they must have wanted to court
martyrdom. Yet, at the end, perhaps due to Gratien’s persuasion, they did not stage
a walk-out or refuse to attend the final session or in any way depart from normal
standards of politeness.
1 L G Usher, editor, Fiji Times, and an active member of the Alliance Party (see also 83).
2 E F N Gratiaen, QC, a London barrister engaged by the Federation Party as legal adviser.
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7. The Fijians were surprising in a different way. Because of their seeming
unwillingness at the start to open their mouths and say anything at all, we had one or
two separate sessions with them. At these they were equally taciturn, and seemed to
be on the defensive all the time. So far as one could ascertain from talking to them
privately, they seemed to feel that H.M.G. had made up their mind what they wanted,
and were simply engaged in an exercise of pushing the Fijians into it willynilly. I
think that in general they felt that the British were very skilled and experienced in
negotiations of this sort while the Fijians were relatively naive, hence the safe Fijian
line was both to say and to concede as little as possible. At their own request later on
we had meetings of the Fijians and Europeans together, when the former were a
good deal more relaxed. Obviously they had great faith in Falvey, and though I don’t
think he is an intellectual giant, Kearsley made a number of sensible and helpful
interventions. The most sticky of the Europeans, round the table, was probably
Kermode. Archibald, whom I had expected to put on the somewhat alcoholic
performance he produced when I last attended a meeting with him at Savu Savu,
remained so far as I could judge cold sober and sensible the whole time. His presence
at the conference was certainly not a dead loss.
8. Where the Europeans made a had impression was in some of the asides to
members of the U.K. delegation at odd times in the bar, etc. Falvey was unwise
enough to say to Mrs. White à propos of Patel ‘Of course I know a rat when I see one’:
and Kearsley in the midst of a conversation threw out ‘Of course we all hate Indians’.
Though by and large the Europeans behaved sensibly and well, and did not overdo
their case, and accepted the reduction of their seats with a good grace, these
symptoms of anti-Indian prejudice did not enhance their standing in London.
9. In general, the atmosphere of the conference was relaxed and friendly, and
there were no impassioned outbursts from any quarter, though, as you would expect,
Koya expressed his frustration and disappointment in fairly forcible terms from time
to time. The best Indian performance was Deoki’s balanced and sensible exposition of
his compromise plan, and the very genuine plea he made for more time to consider
it. Patel scored few marks.
10. You will of course get a much fuller and more valuable commentary from the
Governor and Justin Lewis3 when they get back. So far as I personally can judge, it
was a good idea to have the Governor on the Fijian side of the table opposite Mrs.
White. He was able from time to time to make some important and very useful
interventions, and did so much more effectively than if he had been sitting among
Mrs. White’s U.K. advisers.
11. By now you will have no doubt been sent separately copies of the record of
the Press Conference given by Mrs. White immediately after the concluding session,
and of the one at the Strand Palance Hotel given by the Indians a day later. Koya
came in to see me the other day largely to talk about an immigration case. Patel
promised to come in but has not done so up to the present. Kenneth MacKenzie and
I took Mara and Penaia out to lunch the other day and tried to press home two main
themes—first that the landlord and tenant reforms must be got through as quickly
as possible so as to remove a possible sense of grievance from the Indians, and
second, that they should do everything possible to ‘sell’ the new arrangements to
3 Attorney-general, Fiji.
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their people so that we can have the new elections with minimum delay. I think they
now realise that, though it took some pushing to get them to accept crossvoting, the
net outcome of the Conference is extremely favourable to them.4
4 Official reaction in India to the Fiji conference was mooted. The Indian press, however, was not
sympathetic towards Britain’s role, and there were references to a policy of ‘divide and rule’, a familiar
theme, according to the UK High Commission, ‘in the mythology of the Indian Congress Party’ (DO
169/501, no 22, W L Allinson (New Delhi) to V C Martin (South Asia Dept, CRO), 21 Aug 1965).
92 CO 1036/1345, no 65 21 Sept 1965
[Future policy in the Pacific]: minute by Mr Greenwood to Mr Stewart
on the reorganisation of the South Pacific Commission and strategic
interests in the Pacific
In recent months officials in my Department and the Foreign Office and
Commonwealth Relations Office have been considering our future policy in the
South Pacific area. The territories there are almost all dependencies of Britain,
Australia, New Zealand, the United States and France; they are scattered throughout
an area of 12 million square miles of sea and range from Papua/New Guinea (an
Australian territory with a population of approximately 2 million) to minute coral
atolls only a few acres in extent. They are at widely different stages of political,
constitutional and economic development; there are differences of race and of
background arising from the trade and educational links which have grown up
between each territory and its metropolitan power.
2. At present the South Pacific Commission provides the only forum for
discussion and co-operation between the five administering powers and their
territories. The Commission is an advisory and consultative body set up in 1947:—
‘to encourage and strengthen international co-operation in promoting the
economic and social welfare and advancement of the peoples of the non-self-
governing territories of the South Pacific region administered by the
participating Governments’.
It is not concerned with political or constitutional matters. It consists of two
Commissioners from each metropolitan government (the territories are not directly
represented) and meets annually to determine a Work Programme. It is advised by a
Research Council and by the South Pacific Conference which meets at intervals of
not more than three years, is attended by representatives of all the territories within
the Commission’s area and can make recommendations to the Commission on
economic and social matters. It has a Secretariat responsible for carrying out its
programme and based in Noumea in New Caledonia.
3. The speed of constitutional development in the South Pacific has quickened in
recent years and the territories are increasingly taking an interest in political and
constitutional matters. It has been recognised for some time that the Commission as
at present constituted is no longer adequate to meet the needs and command the
support of the territories. There are a number of anomalies of which the most
striking are the fact that Tonga, although similar to the other territories, does not
come within the Commission’s scope, and the fact that Western Samoa although in
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every other way similar to the remaining non-metropolitan territories, has joined the
Commission as a full member since achieving independence. It is generally agreed by
British representatives in the area that if action is not taken soon to reactivate,
rationalise and extend the Commission’s activities it is likely to become moribund.
4. It is in my view most undesirable that the Commission, which within its
limited scope has done an extremely useful job in the last eighteen years, should be
allowed to collapse. This is certainly not the desire of the representatives of the
territories. At a meeting of the South Pacific Conference last month a strong demand
by representatives of the territories (and in particular by Ratu Mara, a member of the
Fiji Executive Council) was voiced for stepping up the Commission’s work and for
increasing participation by representatives of the territories; the suggestion was also
made that the territories might contribute financially to the work of the
Commission.
5. Against this background, consideration has recently been given in the
Colonial Office and other Departments to:—
(i) the reorganisation of the South Pacific Commission so as to ensure that it
better meets the needs of the area and provides for local participation;
(ii) the strategic implications of constitutional development of the territories in
the area.
As regards the second point, it is to be noted that the west-about air route to the Far
East, which may well become important to us, crosses the area; further, in the event
of a breakdown in the Moscow Test-Ban Treaty, some islands might be wanted for
nuclear testing either by ourselves or an ally. Apart, however, from these factors
Britain’s main strategic interest in the Pacific area is in its denial to unfriendly
powers. Apart from positive American defence requirements in certain of their
islands, it is thought that the strategic interest of Australia, New Zealand and the
United States is likewise largely negative. The position of the French is not clear;
their colonial policies are quite different from ours and the French attitude is
complicated by their intention to carry out nuclear tests on one of their islands in
the Central Pacific. A number of ideas have been considered as to how these strategic
interests should be secured; and at the Conference which I recently held in Oxford
further suggestions, directed to a neutralisation of the area rather on the lines of the
Austrian Treaty, were put forward.1 This aspect of the matter will be further
considered interdepartmentally. In this minute I shall concentrate on the first of the
two points noted above; early action on this is clearly necessary in view of the
increasing pressures from the island peoples, and can in my view be pursued without
prejudice to any proposals that may subsequently be put forward on the strategic
aspect.
1 The conference reference is to the conference held at Lady Margaret Hall, Oxford, in July 1965 to
consider the future of the smaller UK colonial territories. It was attended by CO ministers and officials,
officials from other departments, colonial administrators, academics, journalists and business
representatives. Those attending divided into three working groups to consider issues of government,
financial and economic problems, and international issues, including forms of continuing relationship
with the UK. CO 1032/407, 413–422 and CAB 21/5304, 5296/5 for papers. The treaty reference is to the
Austrian State Treaty of 1955 restoring sovereignty to the post-war Austrian government and confirming
Austria as a neutral country.
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6. Proposals have been worked out in the Colonial Office and agreed at official
level in the other Departments concerned as to a possible reorganisation of the
Commission which, whilst protecting the position of the metropolitan governments,
would be likely to meet the aspirations of the Pacific peoples. Briefly, the structure of
the Commission would be radically altered and it would be transformed into a ‘South
Pacific Organisation’ of which the structure and functions will be clear from the
outline proposals in the Annex.2 The effect of a reorganisation on these lines would
be that, whilst the Organisation would still in its formal terms of reference carefully
eschew political and constitutional matters, concentrating as in the case of the South
Pacific Commission on economic and social projects, a very much greater role than
hitherto would be accorded to representatives of the Pacific peoples themselves. This
is of course desirable in itself as political maturity grows. I think that we should look
forward to some form of free association as an ultimate status for most of our Pacific
territories. Given this target it simply will not be practical politics to maintain the
South Pacific Commission much longer on its present basis, with local
representatives having no direct voice.
7. Apart from these considerations, the increased participation of representatives
of the Pacific peoples must be achieved in order to foster the growing interest in
regional co-operation which in view of the small size and population of most of the
territories, and the fact that many of them are still economically dependent to a
considerable degree, is of particular importance if wasteful duplication of services is
to be avoided. The Organisation would also provide a forum in which, no doubt,
views would be exchanged between representatives of the territories themselves on
the future of the South Pacific area; this might well prompt the Pacific peoples to
consider possible future political associations which might provide a sensible means
of terminating their colonial status.
8. The Organisation would (unlike the South Pacific Commission which is
financed entirely by the metropolitan governments) be financed in part by the
territories themselves. This is clearly desirable in itself, and becomes essential if
representatives of the territories are to be given a greater role to play in the
Organisation than they have had in the Commission. Moreover a number of the
territories can well afford to contribute in this way.
9. Before any progress can be made on the ground towards a reorganisation of
the South Pacific Commission on these lines, we must reach agreement with our
partner metropolitan governments on the types of reform to be proposed. This will
be a difficult process (particularly with the French) and will take an appreciable time.
In view of the local pressures referred to above, we should start discussions with our
partners as soon as possible. Similar discussions on Pacific policy generally have
been held in Washington in an informal body known as the ‘Washington Study
Group’.3 It is not suggested that we should now try to reconvene this body (which
last met in December 1962)—though it may have a useful role to play later—but
rather that we should first inform our four partners of our ideas on reorganisation.
This should be done before the Budget Session of the South Pacific Commission
takes place in early October in Noumea in the hope that a useful exchange of views
2 Not printed. 3 See 65, note.
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on the matter could take place at Noumea4 (when the local representatives of the
metropolitan powers, though not representatives of the local peoples, would be
present in addition to representatives sent our direct from metropolitan capitals), in
consultation with the officials of the Commission. From such an exchange of views
more precise proposals might emerge.
10. The Foreign Office considers that the French are unlikely to be willing to co-
operate in such a reorganisation of the South Pacific Commission and that, as a
result, we may have to face the possibility of going ahead with a reorganisation in co-
operation with Australia, New Zealand and the United States alone. Despite this risk,
I am satisfied that an initiative on the lines suggested is now essential, to meet the
increasing local pressures. It would be regrettable if the French refuse to co-operate,
but arrangements made between ourselves and the other three partner Governments
would cover most of the South Pacific area; they would also fit in well with the joint
American–British–Australian-–New Zealand defence arrangements for the
Indo–Pacific area which I understand are now under consideration.
11. The South Pacific Commission’s 1965 budget is £267,071, financed by the
metropolitan governments on an agreed percentage basis of which the British share
is 17% (i.e. £45,402 in 1965). We have recently, with the agreement of the Treasury,
proposed to our partner governments that the 1966 budget should be raised to
£320,000 and the 1967 budget should be increased by 10% over that figure i.e.
£352,000. At the recent South Pacific Conference Ratu Mara, a Fijian, speaking on
behalf of delegates from many of the Pacific territories, proposed that the territories
themselves should in future contribute about the same amount as the metropolitan
governments. Whatever the method of financing the Organisation may be, if this
were generally accepted as giving a measure of the locally desired level of activity, it
would mean that, even without any additional direct contributions by the
metropolitan governments, a budget of some £700,000 would be available to the
Organisation.
12. There is little doubt that under the proposed reorganisation there would be
pressure for increased contributions by the metropolitan governments; and this is
probably desirable and justified in any case. I of course recognise that, in present
financial circumstances, it would be difficult to contemplate additional expenditure
by H.M.G. Nonetheless I hope that this consideration will not stand in the way of
pursuing proposals on the lines of those suggested in this minute because:—
(i) it is highly unlikely that a reorganisation on the lines suggested could take
effect for some considerable time—probably well over a year;
(ii) our contribution would be considered annually, as at present, on its merits;
(iii) the scale of finance involved is small;
(iv) even a budget of the order of £700,000 would in itself make a radical
difference to the range and extent of useful work that could be carried out. At
present a high proportion of the Commission’s budget is absorbed by
administrative expenses; if the proposed Organisation had a budget twice as large
it would make much more than a proportionate difference to the work that could
be done.
4 Capital of New Caledonia, former name Port de France.
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13. To sum up, I seek your agreement to:—
(i) informing in the near future our partner governments of proposals, on the
lines of the annex, for the conversion of the South Pacific Commission into a
South Pacific Organisation in the determination of the work Programme and in
the financing of which there would be considerable participation by the South
Pacific territories themselves;
(ii) pursuing discussions on these proposals further at the meeting in October of
the South Pacific Commission;
(iii) continuing interdepartmental discussions as a separate exercise on the
strategic considerations arising in the Pacific area and their political and
constitutional implications.
14. I am sending copies of this minute to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the
Commonwealth Secretary, the Defence Secretary and the Minister of Overseas
Development. As time is so short I would propose to assume their concurrence with
these proposals unless I hear to the contrary by midday on Friday 25th September.
93 CO 1036/1345, no 76 24 Sept 1965
[Future policy in the Pacific]: minute (reply) by Mr Stewart to 
Mr Greenwood on the strategic aspects
I have seen your Minute of 21 September1 about the proposed re-organisation of the
South Pacific Commission and am in general agreement with the proposals in
paragraph 13.
2. From the point of view of our foreign policy, one of the most important points
in all this is the strategic interest, actual or potential, which we or our allies may
have in the area. This is admirably set out, if I may say so, in paragraph 5 of your
Minute. In the light of this, I am inclined to sound a note of caution about the
statement in your paragraph 6 that we might look forward to some form of free
association as an ultimate status for most of our Pacific territories. I share your
underlying concern that the policy of decolonisation should be pursued energetically
and that every means should be sought for taking an account of the wishes and
interests of the inhabitants of our remaining dependent territories. But the trouble
about ‘free association’, as I understand it, is that it leaves the recipients in a position
to opt for full independence at a second stage whenever they wish—however little
they may be capable of sustaining it. This could have undesirable consequences for
our politico-strategic interests and those of our allies. Tiny independent states in the
Pacific might not always behave responsibly on the international scene and might
come to the conclusion that the easiest way of making ends meet would be to come
to terms with whichever Great Power was willing to pay most for the right to
construct, for example, a local submarine base. I do not think that these dangers
should inhibit us from pursuing the enlightened policies you have in mind. But we
must not forget that the dangers exist.
1 See 92.
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3. I am sending copies of this Minute to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the
Commonwealth Secretary, the Secretary of State for Defence and the Minister of
Overseas Development.2
2 Greenwood held discussions about the Pacific with State Dept officials at Washington on 20 Oct 1965. He
outlined UK proposals for a South Pacific Organisation to replace the South Pacific Commission, and
touched briefly on Fiji, commenting on the recent London conference, ‘With a bit of luck there should be
no trouble for the next few years, although the Indians were restless.’ US officials responded that the
administration had yet to evolve firm ideas about the Pacific although they agreed with Greenwood it was
important to avoid a ‘vacuum’ in the region (CO 1036/1346, no 123).
94 CO 1036/1510, no 3 15 Nov 1965
[Emigration]: letter from H P Hall to Sir D Jakeway on the problems
caused by emigration from Fiji to Commonwealth countries and 
the US
I am replying to your letter of 5th October to Trafford Smith (who is at present on
leave) about difficulties arising from the flow of emigrants from Fiji to other
Commonwealth countries and the United States.
2. While we sympathise with you over the problem arising from the loss of
technical and professional manpower, I am afraid that we cannot offer you any very
helpful advice in stopping the ‘brain drain’. The freedom to leave any country,
including one’s own, and to return is one of the fundamental human rights set out
in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and is embodied in the draft
Covenant intended to turn the Universal Declaration into binding obligations. It is
also set out in the Fourth Protocol to the European Human Rights Convention.
This provision has not yet been extended to colonial territories but this course of
action is under consideration and to go the other way would simply not be practical
politics.
3. Enquiries about extending the Declaration did not elicit any reports of
legislation to restrict emigration and this, I think, can be taken as sufficient evidence
that none of our territories has introduced restrictive measures to counter
emigration. Some of the West Indian islands control the emigration of workers
recruited by contracters for work in other areas of the Caribbean but this is designed
to prevent the exploitation of the workers themselves and not to prevent their leaving
the islands so as to retain the skilled people. Even this kind of restriction has been
held to contravene the Fourth Protocol. While therefore Fiji is not at present bound
by any international convention not to restrict the right to leave Fiji, to do so would
run contrary to the general policy which the free world has been following, in
bringing human rights under international protection. If, notwithstanding, you felt
obliged to introduce some such measures we should first need to consult the Foreign
Office who would almost certainly want to comment from the point of view of British
Human Rights policy. The possibility of our being subjected to criticism in United
Nations or elsewhere has to be reckoned with. Frankly we cannot regard restrictive
legislation as a starter.
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4. We were interested in the report on the new United States immigration
legislation and our International Relations Department are taking steps to follow its
progress as this substantial increase in colonial territory quotas will be of
considerable importance to some other territories. On the record of the past one
would hesitate to assume that Congress will necessarily give United States
Government the quotas sought but it would seem from the fact that the United
States Consul has raised the subject that the expected quotas will be achieved. We do
not think it would be of the slightest use to suggest to the Americans any different
basis for territorial quotas than that proposed, since it would involve them in
finding an equitable formula and lead to lobbying of individual Congressmen
interested in the affairs of particular places to secure special treatment. Indeed this
used to happen and numerous Bills were put before Congress to amend the quota
for particular countries which were invariably side-tracked; Malta is a particular case
in point. Furthermore, such an approach might not be in the best interests of all our
other territories, for example, in view of the desperate search for re-settlement
outlets for Gilbert and Ellice Islanders we would not expect the Resident
Commissioner to complain too bitterly that as many as 650 could be admitted
admitted to the U.S.A.—even at the expense of some slowing down of localisation.
From the general British point of view therefore the U.S. legislation is to be
welcomed since it will provide to some extent an alternative outlet for would-be
emigrants from our territories. I think it is also true to say that emigration is as
liable to cream off the more able section of the population in overcrowded territories
as in others with no population pressures.
5. With regard to your point about asking United States and Canada if they would
help in the technical and professional training of local personnel as replacements
from those drawn away from the Colony, we could of course approach both
Governments. The Ministry of Overseas Development (as the Department responsible
for bilateral aid) anticipate that they would get a more favourable reaction from the
later but point out that neither the U.S. nor Canada have any obligation to help in
this way. We cannot, I think, honestly say that a question of enticement is involved
and in any case training of those left behind will largely provide a further stream of
people tempted in their turn to leave, Fiji playing the role of an off-shore training
college. Before the O.D.M. made any approach to either Government they would need
to give a lot of thought to what Britain could or could not do before a case was made
for American or Canadian help.
6. I am sorry if all this sounds unhelpful but as you know the control of
migration is a very difficult subject and I think you have really hit the nail on the
head when you say (in paragraph 8 of your letter) that the only really long term
solution seems to be for wages and conditions of employment to improve to a
level which no longer makes it financially attractive. However, do please come
back to us if there are any further points you would like to make; we should in
any case be interested to have the comments of Foster, Andersen and Wilkie1 to
whom I am copying this letter. I am also enclosing a second copy for Tony
Fairclough.
1 Respectively, resident commissioner, Gilbert and Ellice Islands Colony; high commissioner, Western
Pacific; and resident commissioner, New Hebrides Condominium
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95 CO 1036/1510, no 2 15 Nov 1965
[Emigration]: letter from H P Hall to Sir D Jakeway on the issue of
Indian emigration
By the same mail I have replied1 to your letter of 5th October to Trafford Smith about
the difficulties arising in Fiji over the migration of professional and skilled people to
Commonwealth countries and the United States. A further point has occurred to us
which, for obvious reasons, we are putting in a Personal letter to you only.
2. We notice from the figures you quote that the preponderance of emigrants
from Fiji have been from the Indian community. Although a high proportion of these
are probably the skilled artisans that Fiji can ill-afford to lose, the long term effect
may not perhaps be wholly disastrous given the present imbalance between Fijians
and Indians. Furthermore, might there not be unfortunate reactions from the Fijians
if it became known that measures were being introduced that had the effect of
preventing people of the Indian community from leaving the country?
3. Admittedly you will be losing on the swings but there is quite a chance that
you may gain, eventually, on the roundabouts bearing in mind that there does not
seem much likelihood of a mass exodus from the Fijian community.
1 See 94.
96 CO 1036/1067, no 43 17 Nov 1965
[Racial co-operation]: letter from A J Fairclough to Trafford Smith on
discussions with Ratu Mara
Derek Jakeway, Paddy Macdonald and I had a very valuable discussion this morning
with Ratu Mara and John Falvey on action by way of follow up to the constitutional
conference.
We tried to thump home the theme that it is essential for the future happiness and
good government of Fiji that a vigorous attempt should now be made to make a
multi-racial appeal to the electorate not only in the cross-voting seats but also
generally. Mara and Falvey are planning to hold a meeting with certain other leaders
(including some Indian leaders) later this month and we stressed to them the
importance of getting on with this and working out a broad based appeal to the
electorate cutting right across racial boundaries, of getting some suitable political
organisation under way, and getting out into the country and putting across the
message of racial cooperation in the political field with a view to returning at the
next election a group of members drawn from all races who could work together to
form a strong government adequately representing all.
They very much seemed to see the point of all this and indeed their thoughts moved
in the same direction. But unfortunately at something approaching a snail’s pace. Both
Derek and I tried to stress the urgency of getting moving on this matter even though
the elections are almost a year away and of getting out into the country with a positive
appeal and getting people used to the idea of seeing politicians of all groups working
together. They seemed to take the point but how much urgency there really is in their
planning and how much awareness there is of the need for some fairly professional
political organisation to be put into it all is, I fear, a matter of some considerable doubt.
10-Fiji-85-cpp  10/5/06  6:57 AM  Page 271
272 LONDON CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE [97]
However, I think that the meeting was useful and Derek will be letting you have a full
assessment of the situation as he sees it after the proposed meeting towards the end
of this month between Fijians, Europeans and some Indian leaders.
One particular point we touched on at the meeting this morning at some length
was the 14/12 question and the very strong reaction there has been from many
Indians against this, a reaction which seems in some quarters to have been quite a
bitter one. I think Derek has already told you that he had been tentatively sounding
out Mara and Falvey as to the possibility of Fijians as a gesture offering to move back
to parity. This really does not seem to be on—it would lead to too many internal
difficulties for the Fijians themselves. Falvey had, however, at a talk I had with him
some days ago, thrown out the suggestion that perhaps a convention might be
adopted that the two Council of Chiefs members would not vote. Derek floated this as
a suggestion of his own this morning with the variation that the Council of Chief
members would only vote on matters of direct Fijian concern, and not on other
matters. The reception was not very positive and both Derek and I made it plain that
in talking about this we were not in any way putting forward a suggestion for altering
the proposals adopted at the constitutional conference but were merely thinking
aloud round points which could, in the context of trying to launch a multi-racial
appeal, become serious political problems. The difficulty that both Derek and I see is
that if the Fijians and Europeans find Indian allies with whom they can work in the
political field, these allies are going to be very much exposed to attack from Indian
leaders who are pursuing a purely communal appeal. They will be asked whether they
support the 14/12 proposals and whether they are prepared to concur in Indians
becoming ‘second class citizens’. Derek and I put it to Mara and Falvey that their
Indian allies must be able to give some effective answer to such attacks. They seemed
to see the point of this though whether anything will emerge, either on the lines of
Derek’s suggestion as to a voting convention or in some other way, seemed rather
dubious. Mara indeed was doubtful whether any concessions of this nature would
actively spike the gun of the Indian leaders who are pursuing a purely communal
appeal; he seemed to think that it might even play into their hands by enabling them
to claim a ‘victory’ and that it was they who really called the tune.
How all this will go remains to be seen. The main point that Derek and I made this
morning was to stress the view that had been expressed by British ministers at the
conference and in the conference report that it would be in the interests of all the
people of Fiji if an appeal were made to the electorate which was not purely
communal and which was put by a group cutting across the racial barriers. This is
very much of a hurried interim report and Derek will be letting you have something
much fuller in a few weeks when the situation has developed further.
97 CO 1036/1067, no 44 30 Nov 1965
[Post-conference situation]: letter from Sir D Jakeway to Trafford
Smith on the Indian reaction and the need for a multi-racial alliance
In the savingram forwarding the Fiji Intelligence Report for October, I undertook to
send a personal assessment of the political position following the constitutional
conference. This is it. Partly because of the leisurely return to Fiji of many of the
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political leaders and partly because of the naturally slow pace at which political
thoughts develop in this country, it is only now that a recognizable pattern is
emerging. As I write, the pace is quickening markedly and by the end of the present
meeting of Legislative Council the picture may be even clearer.
2. Fijian reaction to the constitutional proposals has been one of satisfaction,
even elation. Neither Ratu Mara, in his political meetings, nor Ratu Penaia, in his
perambulation of Provincial Councils (which takes place at this time of the year), has
had any difficulty in selling the cross-voting proposals, despite the expressed fears of
the Fijian delegates in London. We may take it that there will be no more talk of
having to consult the Fijian people before endorsing the voting proposals and the
allocation of Legislative Council seats. The lone critical voice on the Fijian side is
Semesa Sikivou, who continues to murmur about the disqualification by stages of
public officers for election to Legislative Council (largely for selfish reasons) and
about the Bill of Rights. Tora, awaiting trial in custody on a charge of arson, has been
too preoccupied to take any political stand.
3. The Europeans have accepted the outcome of the conference with satisfaction
also, as have the Chinese and, so far as one can judge, the Rotumans and other
Pacific Islanders likewise.
4. It is the Indian reaction, of course, which is the most crucial. It has generally
been one of disappointment, apart from the glee of the National Congress and other
opposition groups over the Federation Party’s discomfiture. Consequently there was
(and still is) a possibility that the Federation Party, despite its own responsibility for
these very results, would be able to rally moderate and hitherto unaligned opinion in
sympathy. However, the Federation Party decided to await the return of their
conference representatives before deciding on a line. And A.D. Patel did not return to
Fiji until the 19th October. They then held a series of public meetings. The first, at
Ba, was was ostensibly for the whole Indian delegation and Deoki and C.P. Singh
attended and spoke. But the meeting was so obviously a Federation party affair that
they stayed away from the others. At these meetings a good deal of strong language of
protest was used by the Federation party spokesmen, and both H.M.G. and myself
came in for criticism. At the Suva meeting on November 3rd, A.D. Patel said ‘If any
protest is to be made this is the time to do it. If a protest is not made now, it will be
too late. Therefore the proposed constitution will have to be broken into pieces and
we will have to take steps to have it wiped out.’
5. But no indication was given as to what these steps would be. At the same time
both Patel and Madhavan have been strictly correct in Executive Council and Patel
has pursued his Member’s duties with rather more zeal than usual (though that is
not saying much). A test came in Executive Council when we considered the pilot
Order in Council. Patel did not oppose it, and made one or two suggestions which
were not intended to be unhelpful. Madhavan said he hadn’t had time to read it but
did not dissent. When Paddy Macdonald took a chance and consulted Patel about the
proposed demarcation of constituencies, Patel expressed himself satisfied! He has
appeared affable and relaxed. My exchanges with him have been limited to matters
within his portfolio and to social functions, and have been cordial.
6. All this has been a bit baffling, particularly as Bob Hamilton1 told me that
Patel had told him that, persuasion having failed, pressure would have to be applied.
1 R Hamilton, head of CID in Fiji.
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I get the impression that the Federation Party have themselves been privately at a
loss what to do. It could be that the clear indication which Patel is said to have
received in New Delhi that they could expect no support from India in their internal
political activities has left them nonplussed. Their appeal for Indian unity exposes
them as a communal party.
7. Deoki has continued to press for a common roll although he had told me
personally that he would be very happy with the new constitution if only the Indians
had as many seats as the Fijian group. At Levuka on November 21st, before a mixed
Indian and Fijian audience, he significantly shifted his line and said that while the
new constitution was not altogether to his liking, he would accept it.
8. C.P. Singh2 has staunchly, if somewhat unhappily, stuck to his views as
expressed at the conference.
9. Since my return I have at every opportunity impressed on Falvey and Mara the
need for quick action to form a multi-racial alliance and keep the initiative. In his
letter to you of 17th November, Tony Fairclough has reported our joint meeting with
them.3 The multi-racial meeting therein referred to was held last Saturday afternoon
(November 27th) and I enclose a copy of yesterday’s report of it in the Fiji Times.4
The Indian representation is still thin and you will notice that Deoki was not present.
I understand that he said he would prefer not to attend the first meeting but would
welcome a later invitation. He is still ploughing his own individualist furrow.
10. In my talks with Mara I have suggested that in return for really solid Indian
backing he might consider making a voluntary concession of two more LegCo seats
to the Indians. This rather sophisticated proposal has fallen on very unreceptive
ground and, garbled as it inevitably became in transmission, has, it is reported,
considerably annoyed the Fijians. All the indications are that this is the one point on
which Indian backers of the newly formed Alliance will find it difficult to answer the
accusations from the other side that they are betraying their community. However, I
am informed, that at the Saturday meeting the Indians present accepted the
proposed division of seats. Their main source of strength lies in the argument that
there is no future for Indians in Fiji unless they cooperate with Fijians and
Europeans.
11. It is too early to say what, if any, effect my remarks in LegCo last Friday will
have. I was grateful to Mrs White and yourself for the comments in telegram No. 114
Personal which, as you will see, I took into account in the final version.5 While I am
writing this letter I have received a verbal Special Branch report to the effect that at a
2 Second Indian nominated member of Legislative Council. 3 See 96. 4 Not printed.
5 In the draft of his speech to the Legislative Council, Jakeway adopted what he described as ‘a fairly
forthright manner against the attitude of the Federation Party’. It alluded to the failure prior to the
conference to reach agreement on the next stage of constitutional development, and then continued: ‘Most
unhappily the process of informal discussion on the issues to be considered at the conference was abruptly
terminated just at the point when the really crucial matters were coming up for examination. The prospect
of reaching unanimous agreement in London receded over the horizon at that moment. What lesson does
one learn from this? Surely that the basis for political unity must be sought and found by the political
leaders here in Fiji. It is no good refusing to discuss matters here and then expecting that a magic wand
will be waved in London and all issues resolved.’ The CO advised the deletion of these references as they
would serve only to increase ‘Indian bitterness’ (CO1036/1054, no 12, Jakeway to Trafford Smith, 16 Nov
1965, enclosing his draft; and no 15, outward tel no 114 from Trafford Smith to Jakeway, 23 Nov 1965).
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meeting held after the ‘Alliance’ meeting on Saturday, the Federation party LegCo
member decided to accept under protest the new constitution. I must leave the full
significance of this step for later assessment but it was cheering news and underlines
the wisdom of the advice in your telegram—although I don’t flatter myself that my
speech and this action were cause and effect.
12. We could find a situation developing in which the predominantly Fijian and
European components of the Alliance are looking for solid Indian support and the
Federation Party is looking for what Fijian and European backing it can rake up. On
the other hand, Patel and Co may simply have decided that cooperation was advisable
during the registration of voters period, leaving election tactics to be determined
later on.
13. Meanwhile the holding together under the present constitution of an
Executive Council which is representative of the three main races will continue to be
precarious. Patel and Madhavan will stay only so long as it suits their party purposes.
Fijians and Europeans may gang up to force the issue, but with LegCo as at present
constituted the alternative Indian representation is not impressive. And my only
freedom of manoeuvre lies in the two Indian nominated seats, held by Singh and
Shah (the latter by convention a Muslim preserve).
14. One thing is certain. If the Alliance is to be an effective political instrument it
will need experienced political advice on party organisation and action. I shall be
pressing Falvey and Mara to tell me where they propose to go for this. What they
should have is a full time salaried secretary preferably with wide experience in a
developing parliamentary democracy. Is there anyone with that sort of background,
in Malaya of the middle fifties, who might be suggested to them?
15. This letter is in danger of being overtaken by events. But it had better go off
in today’s bag, even though it may not stand the test of the lapse of much time.
98 CO 1036/1067, no 47 14 Dec 1965
[Post-conference situation]: letter (reply) from Trafford Smith to 
Sir D Jakeway suggesting contacts who can advise on multi-racialism
and party organisation
Thank you very much for your letter of the 30th November giving your assessment of
the political situation following the Conference and the return of the Party leaders to
Fiji.1 We found it extremely interesting and helpful. I hope you will send us further
bulletins of this kind from time to time.
2. In paragraph 14 you mention a proposal to get experienced political advice on
party organisation and action for the newly-formed multi-racial Alliance, possibly by
the appointment of a full time salaried secretary with experience of developing
parliamentary democracy.
3. As regards the possibility of getting someone with Malayan experience, I have
consulted Henry Hall who has considerable knowledge of that part of the world. His
view is that, while Malaya might be able to produce someone, Lee Kuan Yew2 if he
1 See 97. 2 Prime minister of Singapore.
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would agree to help could probably do better. He has a very efficient political party
machine in Singapore and could no doubt teach the Fijians a great deal about how to
produce a multi-racial machine to put across multi-racial policies. If this is thought
to be worth pursuing, the best way would probably be for Ratu Mara to write to Lee
Kuan Yew and seek his personal help. Hall is sure that Lee Kuan Yew would give an
honest answer. Otherwise Hall could make an informal approach to a friend of his
who is a Counsellor on the High Commission staff—but it does seem best to keep
both the Fiji Government and the Colonial Office out of this as far as possible.
4. If it is a case of getting help with the organisation of a political party machine
with not so much emphasis on the multi-racial aspect, Mrs. White thinks it might be
worth-while to make an approach to the headquarters of British parties in London,
and as the Conservative Party are probably more likely to be able to produce a
suitable man than the other parties, she would be willing to sound Nigel Fisher
informally. On the other hand here again it does seem desirable to keep the
Governments out of it, and if your people want to pursue this suggestion, the best
way might be for someone in the Alliance to get into direct touch with any or all of
the following people in the party organisations in London:—
Sir William Urton, M.B.E., T.D.,
General Director,
Conservative and Unionist Central Office,
32, Smith Square, S.W.1.
Mr. A. L. Williams,
General Secretary,
Labour Party,
Transport House,
Smith Square, S.W.1.
Rev. T. W. Beaumont,
Head of Organisation,
Liberal Party,
36, Smith Square, S.W.1.
5. Please keep us informed of developments in this field, and if we can help
further, let us know.
99 CO 1036/1645, no 4 8 Mar 1966
[Emigration from Fiji]: letter from C A Axworthy (CO) to 
A J Coles (FO)
We would be glad to have the Foreign Office view of a human rights problem, about
which we have had some correspondence with the Governor of Fiji.1 Concern is felt
in the Colony about the loss of skilled people through emigration to the U.S.A. and
Commonwealth countries, in particular Canada. The loss of skilled tradesmen and
1 See 94 & 95.
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some professionally trained people has been increasing, and it was suggested that
powers be taken in Fiji to restrict emigration.
We drew attention to the Article on the freedom to leave any country, including
one’s own, in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the comparable
provisions in the Fourth Protocol to the European Human Rights Convention and
the draft U.N. Civil and Political Covenant. Though none of these instruments as yet
create any legally binding obligation upon Fiji, I think you would agree that
restrictive legislation would run counter to the trend in human rights policy. I
cannot see that the saving clauses in Article 29 of the Universal Declaration, Article
12 (3) of the draft Covenant, or Article 2 (4) of the Fourth Protocol would justify
restrictive legislation unless emigration were running at a rate which so disturbed
the structure of the country that it could be said the general welfare, or the rights
and freedoms of others, were being prejudiced. Emigration in Fiji has hardly reached
the level at which this argument might be employed to justify retrictive measures.
We have of course explained the human rights background to the Governor, and the
thought of legislation has been dropped.
A further suggestion has now been made that the problem might be tackled by
asking the Canadians to restrict by administrative means the number of immigration
visas issued to people from Fiji, keeping the numbers down to about half of the
present level of emigration. This idea is attractive since it is open to any country to
restrict immigration and no breach of human rights principles is involved. However
this smells somewhat of doing by a backdoor method what one is unwilling or
inhibited from doing openly for oneself. The idea however came from a Canadian
immigration Official who was visiting Fiji.
My reaction to this proposal is that we should first satisfy ourselves that
emigration is in fact liable to cause significant damage to the economy of Fiji (the
evidence of this so far is not very convicing). If we find this is in fact the case, then I
think we might approach the Canadians putting the problem in general terms rather
than making a request for specific limitations. We might say that the increasing loss
of skilled people from Fiji is in our view damaging the economy of the country; we
would therefore be grateful if the Canadian Government would take this into account
in determining the number of visas which it issues to immigrants from Fiji.
100 CO 1036/1645, no 5 27 Apr 1966
[Emigration]: letter (reply) from A J Coles to C A Axworthy
I am sorry that you have not had a reply before this to your letter of 8 March (PAC
523/1/02) about the question of the restriction of emigration of skilled persons from
Fiji.1
2. The question whether the restriction of such emigration could be justified
with reference to the saving clauses in any of the instruments mentioned in your
paragraph 2 depends, of course, to a large extent, on a subjective estimate of the
effects of that emigration. You imply that the Colonial Office have reached the
conclusion that the level of emigration of these persons is not yet so great as to be
1 See 99.
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harmful to the general welfare, etc. In this case, as you say, the saving clauses of the
instruments you mention are not, on a strict interpretation, of much help. In this
connection I would merely make two points. The three saving clauses are not, of
course, identical. Article 29(2) of the Universal Declaration allows such limitations
on a person’s rights and freedoms ‘as are determined by law solely for the purpose of
securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of
meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a
democratic society’. Article 12(3) of the Draft Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
is rather different; in particular it permits only those restrictions which are inter alia
necessary to protect national security, public order, public health or morals or the
rights and freedoms of others. The concept of ‘general welfare’, perhaps the most
likely justification for restrictions on emigration, is absent or at least is not explicit.
Article 2(3) (it is I think this, rather than 2(4) which is relevant) of the Fourth
Protocol of the European Convention is different again but similarly does not include
‘general welfare’.
3. My second point is that if it were decided to restrict emigration from Fiji for
the reasons you mention I do not think we would have very strong objections from
the U.N. or Council of Europe point of view. To begin with, if the matter were raised
publicly, I suspect there would be a good deal of sympathy for the Fijian problem
which is probably shared by many other countries. Then as far as the Universal
Declaration is concerned I doubt if this would be held to be a very serious breach of
its principles. Moreover, I am not entirely convinced that the ‘general welfare’ plea is
unjustifiable, the more so if the enquiry envisaged in your paragraph 4 shows that
this emigration does cause significant damage to the economy. As far as the draft
Covenant is concerned the need for a reservation on this point would not add
significantly to the other difficulties which we should be likely to have with this
instrument.
4. However, there is no doubt that the method of achieving the same end
through restrictions on immigration by the Canadian authorities would be less
problematic from the point of view of U.K. human rights policy. I should, however,
point out that the Canadians, if they accept your suggestion, might possibly be held
to be guilty of a breach of human rights. As you say, it is open to any country to
restrict immigration but it is not so clear that immigration may be restricted on a
discriminatry basis. For example, by Article 2 of the Convention on Racial
Discrimination, States, Parties undertake ‘to engage in no act or practice of racial
discrimination against persons’ etc. In the terms of Article 1 ‘racial discrimination
means any distiction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on inter alia
‘national or ethnic origin’ which has the effect of prejudicing the enjoyment or
exercise on an equal footing, of human rights. However, I again doubt whether the
point is worth labouring and the problem would be for the Canadians more than for
us. If they were to adopt your suggestion it seems unlikely that they would run a very
serious risk of challenge on human rights grounds. They are not yet a party to the
Race Convention, and in any event there is clearly room for argument on whether
action by them of the kind which we are envisaging would in practice fall to be
regarded as involving a breach of its provisions.
5. To sum up we would prefer the second course you suggest but, from a political
view, are not inclined to rate very highly the human rights problems involved in
either alternatives.
10-Fiji-85-cpp  10/5/06  6:57 AM  Page 278
[101] JULY 1966 279
101 CO 1036/1663, no 13 18 July 1966
[HMOCS]: brief on staffing problems prepared by the Ministry of
Overseas Development1 for Mr Lee’s tour of the Pacific. Annex:
Supplementary note by ODM on the views of the Fiji Senior Civil
Servants Association
Historical retrospect
From the very beginning it has always been the policy of the British Government to
regard the public services in colonies and protectorates as essentially local services.
The descriptions ‘Colonial Service’, ‘Unified Services’ and ‘H.M. Overseas Civil
Service’ have always been open to misunderstanding to the extent that membership
of them implied membership of a body distinct from the various local public services
in the Colonial Empire. There never has been a precise entity definable as a ‘service’
and this was recently underlined to the observant when the plaque was unveiled in
the Cloisters of Westminster Abbey bearing the Royal Coat of Arms and the words ‘To
all those who served the Crown in the colonial territories’.
2. The responsibility of the Colonial Office and the Ministry of Overseas
Development is to encourage the development of these local public services and to
furnish expatriate staff to the extent that essential posts cannot be filled from local
resources. The territorial administrations furnish indents of requirements and the
Ministry of Overseas Development does its best to recruit suitable expatriate officers
to fill them. Until 1962 it was possible to recruit expatriate staff on permanent and
pensionable terms, or to transfer officers serving on permanent and pensionable
terms in other territories. Conversely it was possible for officers serving in the Pacific
territories to be transferred to other overseas public services so that the service did
not become completely inbred.
3. In 1962, however, it was decided to abandon the policy of recruiting expatriate
staff on permanent and pensionable terms for two main reasons. In the first place the
larger territories had already begun to modify their requirements for expatriate
officers serving on permanent and pensionable terms because of the relatively rapid
increase in the number of suitably qualified local candidates. And in the second
place, the British Government was not anxious artificially to increase the number of
permanent and pensionable officers who would be eligible for compensation when
the territories became independent. By 1962 it was already evident that the process
of granting independence to colonial territories was on the upsurge.
Present position
4. The present position is that expatriate staff required for the administration of the
remaining colonial territories are almost entirely appointed on contract terms. The
1 The Ministry of Overseas Development was established by the incoming Labour government in Oct 1964.
The first minister of overseas development (Barbara Castle) held a seat in Cabinet. The Ministry replaced
the Dept of Technical Co-operation which had been set up in 1961 to co-ordinate and expand the
government’s activities in the field of overseas aid. With regard to dependent territories, the ODM became
responsible for the administration of development aid, leaving the CO responsible for their financial and
economic policies. Under a Conservative government in Oct 1970, the ODM was dissolved and replaced by
an Overseas Development Administration as a functional wing of the FCO.
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remaining members of H.M.O.C.S. in these territories are now virtually tied to their
posts in the absence of any real opportunities for transfer elsewhere. Until these
territories are much further advanced on the road to independence than they are now,
permanent and pensionable members of H.M.O.C.S. cannot look forward to receiving
compensation for loss of career as has been the lot of the majority of their contemporaries
elsewhere. These officers have the choice of retiring voluntarily on reaching the age
of 45 years or of continuing in service until they reach the retiring age of 55 years.
5. The evidence from the territories suggests that the better and brighter officers
who are reasonably confident of obtaining further employment in other parts of the
world, including the United Kingdom, are the ones who decide to retire at 45. It is
the less effective officers who tend to hang their hats on a pension and remain in
service until 55.
6. Contract officers for the most part seem unwilling to renew their contracts
and stay for more than one tour. The territorial administrations are therefore largely
at the mercy of their expatriate staffs, since in the absence of new recruitment on
pensionable terms the average age of permanent officers is rising all the time and
bringing them within the ambit of voluntary retirement on pension. The
administrations of course have no hold on contract officers once their initial tour has
been completed.
7. A limited number of posts are filled by officers seconded from the Home civil
service. This of course is a help, but the presence of too many officers in this category
tends further to lower the morale of expatriates in the public service since the
conditions of service of seconded officers are better than those of either contract
officers or permanent and pensionable officers.
Future policy
8. It is clearly unsatisfactory that the British Government’s responsibility for law,
order and good government in the remaining colonial territories should be so utterly
dependent on the personal attitudes and decisions of a diminishing cadre of
permanent officers who are virtually the prisoners of their terms of service on the
one hand, and of officers appointed on single contracts or single tours on
secondment on the other. It is against this background that a joint Colonial
Office/Ministry of Overseas Development Working Party under the chairmanship of
Mr. W.A.C. Mathieson has recently been set up with the following terms of reference:
‘To consider the arrangements which should be made for the staffing of the
smaller Colonial territories, for which there are so far no definite plans or
commitments on transition to independence or some comparable status, but
where there is a continuing need for expatriate officers, and to make
recommendations.’
The intention is to concentrate attention on the Pacific territories and Fiji in the first
place. The Working Party will have its first meeting on the 17th August.
9. In view of the difficulties likely to be experienced in producing realistic
recommendations which stand any chance of implementation for financial reasons,
it has not been the policy hitherto to publicise the fact that this Working Party has
been established. It will, in the nature of things, be some considerable time before
even the prolegomena of a new policy towards the remaining colonial territories have
been worked out.
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10. The Secretary of State is likely to find that the Acting Governor of Fiji and
the Acting High Commissioner for the Western Pacific regard the shortage,
discontent and unsatisfactory age structure of expatriate staff as the most urgent of
all their immediate problams. They know of the intention to set up the Working
Party referred to above. The Secretary of State can assure them that their anxieties
are shared in London.
11. The Secretary of State is also likely to receive energetic representations from
the staff associations in the territories. They are unlikely to be impressed by
references to ‘studies that are being made in London of the staffing problems’. It is
suggested that the Secretary of State should say in reply that he is aware of the
seriousness of their problems, that he has taken careful note of the points they put
forward and that on his return he will discuss the whole position with the Minister of
Overseas Development.
Annex to 101
In paragraph 2 of their Memorandum the Association ask why officers serving in
different Colonies cannot enjoy the same level of pensionable emoluments with
differential local allowances, and also draw attention to disparities in the conditions
of service of OSAS officers serving in Fiji and in the Western Pacific. The suggestion
that all expatriate officers employed under the Overseas Service Aid Scheme should
have common emoluments, presupposes the existence of a common service with a
common base. The possibility of creating such a service has been examined on a
number of occasions in the past, but it has been found to be impracticable. The latest
official statement on this is contained in Appendix B to the White Paper ‘Service with
Overseas Governments’ (Cmnd. 1193) making proposals for the introduction of the
Overseas Service Aid Scheme. In the absence of a common service of this sort the
Overseas Service Aid Scheme was grafted on to the previous system whereby terms of
service (including salaries) varied from territory to territory. While the introduction
of the Aid Scheme has made possible some levelling up of conditions of service and
some closer approximation between the levels of pensionable pay, differences in local
circumstances—e.g. in climate, health amenities and the relationship between the
gross salaries of expatriate officers and basic salaries—are still justifiably reflected in
the overall terms offered to designated officers in the various countries participating
in the scheme. There are for example differences in the length of tour and in leave
earning rates as well as differences in general salary levels. So far as salaries are
concerned, the relative weight of responsibility is also a factor to be taken into account.
2. There are differences, both as regards salary levels and other terms of service
between Fiji and the Western Pacific. Broadly speaking, these differences are
explained by differences in local conditions. For example, the length of tour is
shorter and the leave earning rate higher in the Western Pacific than in Fiji. On the
other hand, salaries at the superscale level are higher in Fiji than in the Western
Pacific. It is suggested that the Secretary of State should not enter into any detailed
examination of the disparities, but should confine himself to a general explanation of
the reasons for them and to a general statement that so long as the terms of service
of expatriate officers continue to be framed within the context of the Overseas
Service Aid Scheme, some disparities of this sort will inevitably continue.
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3. In paragraph 3 of their Memorandum, the Association draw attention to
disparities between the terms of HMOCS officers on the one hand and of officers
serving on technical assistance terms and seconded Home Civil Servants on the
other. It is correct that there are material differences between these two groups of
officers and that, in the majority of cases, the Technical Assistance officer or Home
Civil Servant seconded to an established post in Fiji are in receipt of salaries higher
than those of HMOCS officers serving on OSAS terms. It is also correct that these
differences have given rise to some discontent among OSAS officers not only in Fiji,
but in a number of other overseas territories also. The reason for the differences is
that these three types of officers fall into three distinct groups, and that their terms
of service are based on quite different considerations. The HMOCS officers are the
employees of the Fiji Government and, while their salaries reflect the level of
emoluments necessary to recruit in, for example, the U.K., their terms of service are
inevitably conditioned by local factors. The Technical Assistance officers on the other
hand are the employees of the British Government, whose services are made
available on loan to overseas governments for relatively short periods: their salaries
and other terms of service are directly related to conditions in the U.K. Home Civil
Servants who are seconded for service in established posts in Fiji are serving abroad
for relatively short periods, and their terms of service are naturally the same as those
accorded to Home Civil Servants who are posted for duty abroad by their parent
department in the U.K. It is not possible to draw any direct comparison between
these different terms of service, and, taken across the board, it is not true that the
advantages are wholly on the side of the Technical Assistance officer and the
seconded Home Civil Servant. For example, the HMOCS officer can retire earlier, has
a higher pension constant and has the prospect of compensation for loss of career as
a result of constitutional change. It is suggested that the Secretary of State should
briefly explain that terms of service for each of those groups are based on quite
different considerations and are designed to meet quite different circumstances, and
that it is not possible to compare them.
4. There is no truth in the suggestion that the availability of officers on
secondment from the Home Civil Service has an adverse effect on the terms of
service of HMOCS officers. The latter’s salaries are assessed on their merits, taking
into account a range of factors covering local conditions (including local levels of
income tax) and the requirements of the recruitment market overseas, without any
regard to the conditions of service accorded seconded Home Civil Servants, who, in
any event, form a very small proportion (some 200 out of a total of 10,000) of the
complement of O.S.A.S. officers at present emplyed by Overseas Governments.
102 DO 181/155, no 74 11 Nov 1966
‘Fiji and the United Nations’: outward FO savingram no 101 to 
UK diplomatic posts
Fiji and the United Nations
This year the question of Fiji has for the first time been included in the agenda of the
General Assembly as a separate item and we may be faced with a hostile rather than
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merely disagreeable resolution. The Committee of 24 have already tabled a resolution
going beyond the terms of any previous resolution, inter alia calling for immediate
self-government, early independence and the appointment of a Visiting Mission.
2. When this question comes to be debated in the Fourth Committee and/or in
Plenary, I shall probably wish you, provided you see no objection, to lobby the
Government to which you are accredited at the level you think most appropriate, in
an endeavour to obtain maximum support in the United Nations for our policy over
Fiji. In so doing I shall also wish you, where you consider this appropriate, to suggest
to the Government to which you are accredited that they should use their influence
with the Afro-Asian group to prevent the tabling of a new resolution on Fiji at this
year’s Assembly. The Assembly will doubtless approve the report of the Committee of
24, but you should argue that there is no need for the Assembly to take further
specific action of its own on this complex and delicate subject.
3. The sticking point in the minds of many of our friends when they consider this
territory is that we are not at present prepared to implement the principle of ‘one
man one vote’ there. For our part we believe that we have very good reasons for going
slowly in working towards that principle. These derive from Britain’s special position
of trust under the Deed of Cession of 1874 in which the native Fijian Chiefs
voluntarily ceded their country to the British Crown in return for good government
and the protection of their interests. But there was during the late 19th century up to
1917 a steady immigration of indentured Indian labourers into Fiji. Today the
indigenous Fijians are outnumbered by the descendants of those Indian labourers,
the latter having a higher birthrate. Of the present half-million population of Fiji,
Indians comprise 50 per cent, Fijians 41 per cent, Europeans and part Europeans 5
per cent and Chinese and others the remaining 4 per cent. Our difficulties in relation
to the native Fijian population arising out of this relatively new population structure
in Fiji are therefore acute and do not admit of an easy or rapid solution.
4. You will be aware that a constitutional conference was held in London in 1965
and you have been briefed on many of the current issues. . . . The present position is
that a new constitution as agreed at the constitutional conference was introduced on
20 September, 1966, and the first elections under it have now been held. Of 36 seats
in the Legislative Council Fijians on a communal roll vote for 9 members, the Fijian
Council of Chiefs vote for 2, the Indians on a communal roll vote for 9 and
Europeans and others vote for 7. The remaining 9 are cross-voted seats. Although a
long way short of the one-man-one-vote system or full internal self-government, the
new constitution represents a considerable advance on its predecessor, reducing the
power of the European minority, increasing the power of Elected Members, and
leading the way to a ministerial system. It also ensures by means of a system of cross-
voting at elections, where persons of different communities vote for candidates
including those not of their own community, that there will be an element which
does not reflect a communal or racial approach in Fijian political life. The results of
the first elections which have just been held have given a resounding victory to the
relatively new multiracial Alliance Party, as follows:—
Alliance (multi racial) 22
Federation (Indian) 9
Independent 3
Council of Chiefs (Fijian) 2
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The Alliance Party won 8 out of 9 cross-voting seats, the other going to an
independent. Of these 8 seats it is significant that 3 have been won by Indians, 2 of
whom have now been appointed to the Executive Council. However the constitution
at present only enables the Indians to obtain twelve seats (i.e. 9 communal and 3 by
cross-voting) out of a total of 36. They are therefore prevented by the constitution
from securing an absolute majority in the legislature. But the success of the multi-
racial Alliance Party particularly in the cross-voted seats of this election is a
promising sign of a non-racial approach to Fijian political life which will of necessity
take time to mature.
5. The objections to our policy in Fiji voiced in the United Nations may be stated
as follows:—
(a) Many of our friends find difficulty in regarding as democratic any system
which does not implement the one-man-one-vote principle.
(b) By following a system which does not accord one-man-one-vote, our policy
favours one community as against another and so increases rather than
diminishes communal differences.
(c) By not allowing a United Nations Visiting Mission we are attempting to hide
something either from the United Nations or from the people of Fiji.
(d) Our delay in giving constitutional advance to Fiji as compared with many of
our other dependent or formerly dependent territories is motivated by either a
strategic or an economic interest in staying there, or a mixture of both.
6. Some of these objections, though often repeated in the United Nations, are
frivolous and easily answered; but there is no doubt that others, particularly those
concerning the differences between a Western type democracy and our present
approach in Fiji, carry weight even among moderate opinion in New York. In dealing
with these points you may draw on the following:—
(a) Absence of one-man-one-vote. The rapid growth of the relatively new Indian
immigrant population at the expense of the native Fijian has led to a serious
communal problem. As the administering power, Britain has to face two
alternatives. Either we could introduce at once self-government on a one-man-
one-vote system, with the very real danger which that would entail of civil
disturbance and bloodshed. Or we can adopt a more gradual approach in which by
various devices the communities are encouraged to work together and to develop a
non-communal approach to their politics, their education and their economic
problems. We have chosen the latter since we have no doubts that the former
solution would lead to civil disturbances even more serious than those which we
faced in British Guiana. Although the slower approach is naturally unpopular
among the Indian community in Fiji and with the Government of India (which has
become one of the principal opponents of our policy in Fiji) and although it is not
simple or easy to explain to those not familiar with the problems of Fiji, it offers
the best hope of a peaceful solution to Fiji’s problems. In the special circumstances
of Fiji, the rapid development to self-government on normal Western democratic
lines is not possible because no such system can flourish in an atmosphere of
violence and communal strife.
(b) The charge that our slow approach deepens communal differences and is
intended to do so. This is a question not only of the efficacy of our policy but of our
sincerity. The efficacy of our policy can only be judged over the longer term and
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the most we ask other nations is that we and the people of Fiji be allowed to try to
work it out without interference from outside. The victory of the multi-racial
Alliance Party is a good start but real progress will only be made if trouble makers,
whether external or internal do not stir things up. The question of our sincerity
depends on our motives which are dealt with at (d) below.
(c) A Visiting Mission. It is important to our policy that its positive aims for
solving the communal, educational and land problems of Fiji should be worked
out in peace, without the glare of publicity, and hostile criticism. The effect on the
already tense differences of view between the two main communities in Fiji of a
widely publicized Visiting Mission from outside would be more likely to polarise
than to harmonize these differences. It would increase existing tension and lead to
distrust of our motives and possible violence from the indigenous Fijian
community who are vigorously opposed to independence at the present time (and
also to the interference of the United Nations in Fiji affairs).
(d) Economic and strategic interests. Although this is easily answered, it will
continue to be repeated by our enemies. There is no major United Kingdom
commercial interest in Fiji. The balance of trade between Fiji and Britain is
entirely in Fiji’s favour (Fiji exports to us roughly twice in value what it imports
from us). There are no British military installations in Fiji nor have we any
strategic interest in establishing them there in the future.
7. You should make no formal approach to the Government to which you are
accredited until you are instructed to do so. In any such approach you may draw
freely on the above; but in the meanwhile you may, of course, draw on it at your
discretion, in any discussion of the Fiji problem with officials or other contacts.
8. To New Delhi only
Unless you advise to the contrary we should not wish you to lobby the Indian
Government as we think that there is no chance that such an approach would cause
that Government to moderate its policy over Fiji. Furthermore any such approach
would probably become known in Fiji with unfortunate consequences, among them
the deduction, perhaps with an echo of truth, that United Nations criticism was
having an undue influence on our policies.1
1 In Dec 1966 a UN General Assembly resolution endorsed a Committee of 24 decision to appoint a sub-
committee to visit Fiji, and called upon the UK to hold a general election on the basis of ‘one man one
vote’ and to fix an early date for independence. The UK voted against the resolution.
103 CO 1036/1667, no 6 15 Dec 1966
[Elections]: despatch from Sir D Jakeway to Mr Lee on the first
elections under the new constitution and the outlook for Fiji. 
Minute by A J Fairclough
I have the honour to address you on the political scene in Fiji as it appears shortly
after the October general election.1
1 This despatch was sent to the Commonwealth Office, following the merger of the CO and CRO on 1 Aug
1966.
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2. That election—the first to be held under the new constitution—was for a
much enlarged legislature of 36 members (plus up to four appointed public officers).
Twenty-five of these members were elected by old-style communal constituencies—
nine Fijian (including other Pacific Islanders), nine Indian and seven General (the
rest of the electorate, mainly European and Chinese). Two were elected by the Fijian
Great Council of Chiefs, and nine were elected by a combination of the communal
electorates into three constituencies, from each of which three members (one Fijian,
one Indian and one General) were elected.
3. The election developed into a contest between the Alliance (a consortium of
the Fijian Association, the General Electors Association and the Indian National
Congress plus some smaller units and associated individuals) and the Federation
Party (a nominally multi-racial but in fact almost wholly Indian organisation). It was
fought in constitutional fashion. A respectable proportion of the potential electorate
registered (75%), despite the somewhat cumbrous procedures for registration, and a
high proportion of the registered electors cast their votes (86%). The election was
orderly. There have been some allegations of bribery and intimidation, mostly
against the Federation Party, but no evidence has so far been forthcoming sufficient
to warrant prosecution. There have been no petitions to unseat any elected members.
4. The result was a substantial victory for the Alliance which won 22 seats
against nine by the Federation Party. The three independent members who got in
and the two Council of Chiefs members have all declared their support for the
Alliance. The Federation Party concentrated its effort on the Indian communal seats
and won all nine of them, with 65% of the votes cast. It failed to win any of the cross-
voting seats despite the fact that in the Western constituency the electorate was
predominantly Indian. This enabled the Alliance, besides scooping all the Fijian and
General seats to pick up three invaluable Indian seats.
5. On the result, the leader of the Alliance (Ratu K.K.T. Mara) was able to insist
on the formation of an Alliance government. I concluded my last review (Secret and
Personal despatch No. 17 of the 12th July, 1966) with the opinion that on the
experience of the membership system of government over the past two years, a
coalition government suited Fiji. I put to Ratu Mara the case for inviting the
Federation Party to join in a coalition with the Alliance, but he rejected the
proposition on the grounds that the policies of the two parties were incompatible and
that his Indian supporters would be alienated. I accepted his view. Even if the
Federation Party had agreed to join, which is most doubtful, it would probably have
stipulated impossible conditions (such as the exclusion of any Alliance Indians from
Executive Council).
6. So Executive Council now consists of six Alliance Legislative Councillors (two
Fijian, two Indian and two European) and four appointed public officers (three
European and one Fijian). It has the making of a good team. Only three have had no
previous experience on Executive Council—of these, Stinson (Member for
Communications and Works) is a successful businessman with seven years as Mayor
of Suva behind him, Vijay R. Singh is a youngish Indian lawyer of courage and ability.
The third, K.S. Reddy, a school-master, is the one light-weight. To assist the
Members with Portfolios (and Ratu Mara himself as Leader of Government Business),
seven posts of Parliamentary Secretary have been created, and filled by Alliance
Legislative Councillors. Some of these could be justified on their merits (those
connected with the onerous Natural Resources portfolio, for instance) but not all.
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Mara has had to find paid jobs for those of his supporters who had been obliged,
under the terms of the constitution, to resign their civil service posts. This is the real
reason for the creation of some of these posts. Their number has predictably drawn
the fire of the opposition in the opening meeting of the new Legislative Council.
7. A full report on that meeting, which has just concluded, will be rendered by
the Acting Chief Secretary. Suffice to say here that the Alliance emerged with credit
from its first encounter with the Opposition across the floor. It was not an easy
initiation. Apart from the Parliamentary Secretary posts, the Opposition had the
ammunition of increased taxation and a reduced rate of development. Neither of
these unwelcome features of the Budget could fairly be placed at the door of the
Alliance, which had been in office for barely a month. Nevertheless, they did not seek
to evade responsibility and, after brisk opening fusillades, the Opposition seemed to
lose cohesion and direction, probably because of the absence for several days of Patel
and Koya, though its championship of the taxpayer has probably helped its image in
the countryside. Personal relations between the two sides were kept at a good level
both within and without the House.
8. The immediate way ahead seems clear. The Alliance, in partnership with the
four public officers on Executive Council, must establish itself as a stable, effective
and non-partisan government. In this way it may reasonably hope to gain further
support from the Indian community while retaining that of the Fijian and General
electorate. To counter the Federation Party it must strengthen its party organisation
and get out into the country. The biggest threat to its success is the world economic
situation and, in particular, the continuing low world price of sugar. It is not a
government which should frighten overseas investors (I hear on good authority that
the Sydney business community looks on it favourably). But good will is not enough.
It will need the sustained support of Her Majesty’s Government in the United
Kingdom and it deserves the support of countries like Australia, New Zealand and the
United States of America. If ever there were a case where generosity now may save an
infinitely more expensive relief operation later on, this is one.
9. The opposition, the Federation Party, faces something of a dilemma. It will be
tempted to foment industrial unrest, particularly amongst cane growers, which it is
well positioned to do, but in this it risks deepening the brand of being a purely
communal party, which is already heavily upon it. It may seek to avoid this dilemma
by appealing to the ‘under-privileged’ Fijians and part-Europeans. To the extent that
this may help to change the present vertical political/racial division of the country
into horizontal social/economic ones this would be no bad thing.
10. Assuming that the present Government remains a stable and effective entity
over the next few years, it is not too soon to start looking into the crystal ball and
envisaging how things may develop. One further assumption which may reasonably
be made is that once on the move, as Fiji politically now is after a long static period,
the pace will quicken. Ratu Mara has established himself as the undisputed leader of
the Alliance. He is ambitious and will not be content with the title of Leader of
Government Business for long. We may expect to move to a ministerial system and a
Council of Ministers next year. The exact timing will depend largely on how quickly
planning can proceed. The Financial Secretary (Mr. H.P. Ritchie) does not
contemplate remaining in his present post for more than another tour and I would
not be surprised if, during that period, it was suggested that a political Minister of
Finance should succeed him. (Ratu Mara had in mind a Parliamentary Secretary of
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Finance when we were discussing the composition of the present government, but
was dissuaded.) Less likely, but still not impossible, is a political Attorney-General
within the next two or three years.
11. Whether or not all, or only some, of these developments take place we shall
very soon be in the position when, outside the Governor’s special responsibilities, Fiji
has virtual self-government. Indeed, we are not far from being there already.
Whatever his legal powers may be, the Governor can in fact exercise his authority
only by influence.
12. In these circumstances we should make up our minds now what the ultimate
goal is likely to be. An understanding on this is important if the conduct of
administration over the next period is to have coherence and coordination. On
present form the associated status which has been worked out for most of the
Windward and Leeward Islands offers the most promising target.2 It would give the
Fijians and Europeans the continuing link with Britain which they still desire, and it
would not close the door to the majority Indian view that independence is the
ultimate objective. Little or no interest in this solution has been evinced to me by
anyone, probably because few know anything about it. If it is agreed that this offers
the most promising way ahead, I should soon begin to drop the idea into the minds of
Executive Councillors, not with the object of initiating any formal discussion but to
stimulate thinking and to gauge reactions.
13. Whether or not this proves to be the ultimate solution, the question of the
Governor’s special responsibilities requires examination. They are:—
(a) Defence
(b) External affairs
(c) Internal security
(d) The public service
Under associated status (a) and (b) would continue to be British responsibilities but
they cannot be handled in isolation from the Fiji Government. For instance, the
racial composition of the Fiji Military Forces is a live political issue which was raised
at the recent meeting of Legislative Council and which Ratu Mara undertook to
consider. (I have since gently pointed out that this will be done by the Chief
Secretary on my behalf but in consultation with him.) As to external affairs, I was
interested to see from Intel No. 31 of the 20th July, 1966, that a wide delegation of
authority to the territorial government is proposed for the West Indian Islands. I am
2 Associated statehood was introduced in the eastern Caribbean in 1967 for those islands which were not
moving towards independence or remaining as dependent territories. The individual islands with
associated status were self-governing but Britain remained responsible for defence and external affairs.
Britain also had a constitutional right of intervention in internal affairs to the extent deemed necessary for
the proper discharge of its defence and external affairs responsibilities. The Anguilla crisis of the late 1960s
(Anguilla unilaterally broke away in 1967 from the islands of St Kitts and Nevis with which it had been
associated) demonstrated the difficulty of deciding when a matter of internal security had crossed over to
become an issue of defence or external affairs. With the exception of Anguilla, the other associated states in
the Caribbean progressed ultimately to full independence. The experiment of associated statehood was not
repeated outside the West Indies. For a more detailed treatment of associated statehood, see S R Ashton &
David Killingray, The West Indies (BDEEP, 1999). On the Anguilla crisis, see S R Ashton & Wm R Louis,
eds, East of Suez and the Commonwealth 1964–1971 (BDEEP, 2004) part III, chapter 11.
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sure this will be necessary here, particularly in the spheres of trade and aid and in
relations with neighbouring territories.
14. Internal security must remain for the time being a responsibility of the Chief
Secretary, but if associated status is the goal we should begin working towards a
separation of those of his responsibilities which would go to the British representative
and those which would pass to a Minister for Home Affairs. Similarly, the office of the
Public Service Commission should gradually be built up so that the transition to
executive control of the Public Service can be smoothly made at the appropriate time.
15. There remains, of course, the 64 dollar question. What should be the future
system of representation? We shall need all the expert advice we can get on the
matter but I am sure it would be unwise to initiate any overt study of it at the present
time. The extension of the cross-voting system offers an avenue of progress and from
this point of view it is a pity that the Federation Party was so conspicuously
unsuccessful in the cross-voting constituencies. The forthcoming elections for six
township boards will be held on a common roll but I doubt if the results will assist
the popularity with Fijians and Europeans of this form of ‘one man one vote’ now
that the Federation Party has decided to contest the predominantly Indian townships
on a party basis. One can but wait and see.
16. I should be grateful to know whether you agree with this assessment of the
situation. If so, I would suggest that the gist of it be conveyed to the American,
Australian and New Zealand governments (and perhaps the French, also). We should
thus be taking an initiative in the development of regional cooperation in the South
Pacific, to which you, Sir, so rightly attach importance.
Minute on 103
Mr. Stacpoole3
Mr. Trafford Smith
Sir Arthur Galsworthy
You should see Sir Derek Jakeway’s fascinating despatch at (6) opposite Commenting
on the results of the recent general election in Fiji and on the political situation as it
is now and is likely to develop. I am sure that Sir Derek is right in paragraph 8 of his
despatch in laying stress as the first objective on the present Alliance Government
establishing itself as a stable effective and non-partisan government. But equally I am
sure he is right in saying that now that Fiji is on the move the pace will quicken and
that it is not too soon to be thinking about what the next steps should be and where
we are ultimately to aim at. Indeed, it was just because we realised that once we had
got constitutional development under way in Fiji (and to a lesser extent, in the other
Pacific territories) we would not have all the time in the world to think out our long-
term policies, that we regarded the promotion of discussion between ourselves, the
Australians, the New Zealanders and the Americans, on these and other matters as
being a field in which action was necessary as a matter of some urgency.
2. We need not now attempt to form conclusions on the ultimate status for Fiji,
although Mr. Stacpoole’s department has, of course, recently done a thorough
3 J W Stackpoole, head of Dependent Territories Constitution Dept, Commonwealth Office.
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exercise on just this question and has arrived at the same conclusion as the Governor
i.e. that associated status on the West Indian model is probably the best ultimate
status for Fiji. We shall however have to develop our thoughts and prepare our
arguments for and against any particular ultimate solution in time for the next
round of Pacific discussions now due in early April, since this question of
constitutional development is one of the principal ones that we shall then be
discussing with our commonwealth partners in the area and with the Americans.
3. As to the future system of representation discussed in paragraph 15 of the
Governor’s despatch, this is indeed a vital matter. But I do not see any sense in
attempting to discuss it in detail at this stage. We shall need to see how attitudes and
party policies develop over a much longer period than we have had since the
elections, before we can decide what line it would be sensible to pursue for the next
step in the direction of normal democracy in Fiji. At this stage I would only say that
whilst a convinced democrat myself and whilst personally of the view that the system
of representation arrived at at the 1965 Constitutional Conference was unduly pro-
Fijian, I do have doubts as to whether it will ever (or for a very long time indeed)
make sense to envisage moving to a full ‘one man one vote’ common roll system in
Fiji.
4. As to the suggestions in paragraph 16 of the Governor’s despatch, I would see
no harm and some virtue in the whole despatch being made available through our
High Commissions to the Australian and New Zealand Governments. As Sir Derek
Jakeway says, this would be an initiative in the development of regional co-operation
in the South Pacific and the despatch would I suggest be a useful background
document for the purposes of the forthcoming discussions in April. If it is agreed that
it can be viewed in this way it would follow logically that a copy should also go to the
Americans. I personally would not send a copy to the French at this stage of the game
although I would see no harm in speaking fairly frankly on the lines of the despatch
to representatives of the French Embassy if at any point they should ask to discuss
Fiji with us. If you agree as to distribution of the despatch, then the file should
return to Mr. Minnitt to take the necessary action. Copies of it should in any case go,
as Mr. Minnitt suggests in his minute of 22 December above, to the Foreign Office
and to Far Eastern & Pacific Dept.
A.J.F.
9.1.67
104 FCO 32/18 18 Jan 1967
‘Membership of the Executive Council’: minute by Trafford Smith to
Sir A Galsworthy on the unexpected outcome of the 1966 election and
the Indian reaction [Extract]
The appointments made with effect from October last are set out in (37) flagged X.
Those chosen from the elected members comprise two Fijians, two Indians and two
Europeans, and there is another Fijian (the Secretary for Fijian Affairs) among the
four official members. As you are aware, the Council was formed on Ratu Mara’s
advice on a ‘government’ basis, i.e. from the Alliance Party and its supporters, leaving
the Federation Party, which represents the main body of Indians, to go into
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‘opposition’. In the documents enclosed with the Governor’s savingram at (38), the
Federation Party protest against their exclusion from the Council, and point to
paragraph 39 of the 1965 Constitutional Conference Report in support of their claim
that the manifest intentions of the report, and the implied undertaking entered into
with the Indian representatives at the Conference that they should be represented on
the Council, have not been complied with. Paragraph 39 of the Constitutional
Conference Report is on page 14 of the copy enclosed.1
2. There is not much doubt in my mind that, at the time the Conference Report
was written, the overwhelming Alliance victory in the elections was not foreseen, and
the Secretary of State no doubt had in mind that the Council would be formed on an
all-party basis as hitherto. As I have pointed out in minutes elsewhere, Fiji crossed a
major Rubicon when it went over to a ‘government’ versus ‘opposition’ system.
3. However, as minutes make clear, the Conference Report does not mean that
the old conventions have to apply to the present constitution: and whatever one may
think about the rights and the wrongs of the matter, it can be cogently argued that
the present Council does provide ‘appropriate representation of the various
communities’ in that the Indians have two representatives.
4. In any case, we cannot unscramble what has happened, and all concerned
must abide by the present situation. As you know, Mr. Patel has accepted the formal
post of Leader of the Opposition, and one of his supporters has become Deputy
Speaker and to that extent it can be argued that they have acquiesced in the
situation. This will not however stop them from making what capital they can out of
the point in the letter on suitable occasions, e.g. if and when they ever appear before
the United Nations. . . .
1 See 90.
105 FCO 32/39, no 8 31 Jan 1967
‘Fiji development plan 1966–1970’: outward savingram no 40 from 
Mr Bowden to the officer administering the government of Fiji
questioning the economic assumptions underlying the plan
The documents constituting the new Fiji Development Plan have been considered
here and in the Ministry of Overseas Development, and we have also had helpful
discussions with Mr Knoblock and Mr. E.A. Jones of the Central Planning Office. So
far as the Sector Plans are concerned, some comments of advisers in the Ministry of
Overseas Development, which are set out in the enclosed Memorandum,1 are as you
will see, generally favourable to the proposals in themselves, we are not however fully
convinced of the validity of the basic economic assumptions underlying the plan as a
whole, as outlined in the Development Planning Review, and the Memorandum by
the Financial Secretary in the Introduction to the Plan itself. Moreover, finance on
the scale suggested in the Memorandum does not unfortunately seem likely to be
available.
1 Enclosures not printed.
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2. The basic economic assumptions appear to be that the Fiji economy will
continue to grow throughout the period of the Plan at an annual rate of 5.6% per
annum (in real terms or in money terms at constant prices) and that public revenue
will rise by 6% to 7% per annum. The latter figure determines the extent to which
services involving increased recurrent cost can be expanded and also the size of a
possible budgetary contribution to development expenditure. Mr. Knoblock and Mr.
Jones were both questioned as to how these estimates of the rate of growth of the
economy and of public revenue, were arrived at. We understand that they were in the
nature of ‘notional.’ rates, i.e. if the economy were to expand at this rate the national
income and public revenue would reach the amounts mentioned in the Development
Planning Review, and the proposals in the Development Plan would be financially
practicable. But if the rate of expansion were less, the Development Plan would have
to be scaled down. These ‘notional’ rates do not, however, appear to be based on a
close study of Fiji’s economic structure and potentialities and do not necessarily
represent what is in fact likely to be the actual rate of growth.
3. We appreciate that in practice the Plan will be kept constantly under review,
but we should find it difficult to accept that what appears to be in the nature of a
statistical exercise should be used as a sufficiently firm basis for forecasting the likely
trends of the economy or for development planning and its financing. In this
connection we are enclosing a paper prepared by one of our Economic Advisers in
which the prospects of economic expansion in Fiji during the next few years are
discussed on the basis of the information on the economic structure of the territory
which is available here. You will see that it is suggested in this paper that the
apparently rapid economic expansion of the last few years has been entirely due to
the boom in the sugar industry: that this expansion is unlikely to continue; and that
unless there is another sharp increase in sugar prices—which does not seem very
likely—there will probably be little, if any, growth in income per head in Fiji in the
next few years.2 In other words the economy will only expand in proportion to the
increase of population, and the growth in public revenue will also be at about this
rate. We should be glad to learn your views on this assessment in due course.
4. We are also concerned at the planning assumptions that have been made as
regards the availability of finance for the Plan. In this connection we have noted with
concern the sharp deterioration in the current financial position of Fiji as reported in
the Financial Secretary’s semi-official letter of 29th October—although in view of
what is said in the previous paragraph this was not entirely unexpected. The situation
2 Fiji’s sugar exports rose from 154,000 tons in 1954 to over 200,000 tons in 1960. They rose to nearly
300,00 tons in 1963, largely due to more favourable production conditions in Fiji and a sharp increase in
demand from countries which had hitherto obtained supplies from Cuba. From 1962 onwards market
conditions for Fijian sugar were greatly improved by quotas for imports into the US (42,500 tons in 1964,
35,000 tons subsequently), and by high world prices which meant that sugar not sent to the UK as part of
the negotiated price quota under the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement (about 140,000 tons) could be
advantageously sold elsewhere. The prospects for Fiji’s sugar production in the future were therefore said
in London to be much dependent on the world demand for sugar. And against the guaranteed sales in the
US and UK had to be set falling world prices and the prospect that Cuban sugar would reappear on the
world market, thus depressing the price still further. Prospects were said to be better for coconuts, Fiji’s
second most important export crop, but of the other agricultural exports, only bananas seemed likely to
show any considerable expansion. The overall prospects for growth over the next few years were therefore
said to be ‘modest’.
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revealed in Mr. Richie’s letter calls into question the extent to which the
contribution from the recurrent budget to the capital budget can be maintained; and
the letter also refers to difficulty in raising loan finance both locally and in Australia.
We also regret to say that because of the continuing restrictions on British
Government expenditure overseas and the fact that overseas aid in 1967/68 will have
to be at a level lower than that originally envisaged for 1966/67, United Kingdom
Government assistance to Fiji, as to all other territories, must necessarily be subject
to limitation.3 For this reason, we can hold out very little hope that it will be possible
to provide Exechequer Loan finance in 1967/68. Indeed we may find difficulty in
providing aid for the period aid for 1968 to 1970 at a rate higher than the present
level.
5. The view that we have reached here, therefore, is that the rate of growth of the
Fiji economy is likely to be less than suggested, and that this will affect both the
budgetary resources available for development expenditure and the amount of
increased recurrent costs which can be borne as a result of such expenditure; and
that the amount of external finance available is likely to be very much less than
postulated. For these reasons, we would be reluctant to approve the Plan as it stands.
You will no doubt be giving careful thought to the financial situation of Fiji in the
coming months, as a result of the deterioration reported in Mr. Ritchie’s letter of
29th October, and we would suggest that in conjunction with this, the Plan should
be re-examined. In re-casting the Plan, it would be desirable, in our view, to place as
much emphasis as possible on schemes which aim at increasing the productive
capacity of the territory both in the immediate future, and in the long run, since it is
only by the increase in this capacity that the growth in services required for Fiji’s
rapidly expanding population can be maintained. This suggests that more attention
should be paid to the development of agriculture and forestry; and that it would be
necessary to reduce the proposed expenditure on the expansion of other services to
some extent for the time being. In the present proposals for capital expenditure for
1966 to 1970 the proportion of total expenditure on agriculture (including
agricultural subsidies not all of which can be regarded as capital expenditure) and
forestry amount to 14.7%, of which forestry only accounts for 1.9%. (Although a
proposal for assistance of the order of some £1.75 million for agricultural
development from the International Bank, which we understand you are considering,
might increase this proportion to about 20%.) We suggest therefore that the
possibilities of increasing development expenditure in these fields should be further
examined.
6. As a great deal of information on the situation in regard to individual services
and fields of development has been provided in the Sector Plans, we do not think that
it will be necessary to undertake the labour of re-casting all of these, although those
for agriculture and forestry may need some re-drafting in the light of the above
comments. It would however be helpful if you could provide a new summary
document setting out the main schemes in the revised proposals; and making clear
the broad outlines of intended development for the next period, indicating the
3 Restrictions on overseas investment was a central feature of the Labour government’s economic policy.
Corporation tax was introduced in 1966. Sterling’s weakness (it was devalued in Nov 1967) also led to
reductions in CD&W programmes and overseas aid more generally. S R Ashton & Wm Roger Louis, eds,
East of Suez and the Commonwealth 1964–1971 (BDEEP, 2004) part III, chapter 13.
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balance between the various categories of expenditure. We would hope that this
document would reflect an increase in the proportion of expenditure to be applied to
economic projects.
7. We are of course anxious to ensure that the absence of formal approval for a
new development plan should not delay expenditure on schemes to be financed from
C.D. & W. funds and in cases of urgency, applications may come forward in the usual
way. It would be helpful however, if such applications could include an assurance
that the scheme in question is regarded as an essential item in the revised Plan. You
may wish to seek ‘if and when’ approval for such expenditure.
106 FCO 32/17, no 3 21 Mar 1967
[Alliance government and local government elections]: letter from 
A J Fairclough to Sir D Jakeway
By the same mail as this letter we are sending an open official reply to your
interesting despatch Fiji No.22 of the 12th January (your reference No.45/40/1) about
the urban local government elections.
2. There is one point of interest in the despatch about which I thought it would
be preferable to write to you separately rather than include any reference to it in the
official reply. We note that the Alliance Party, while not actually campaigning in its
own name, did play some part in these elections. We should be interested to learn, if
the reason is known, why the Alliance Party did not contest these elections directly
To us, unless there is some very good reason, it seems a little strange that the
majority party in the Legislative Council did not also take a prominent part, as a
Party, in these important local government elections. So far as we can see, there
seems to be no reason why the Party encouraged the formation of local
‘Improvement Societies’ from which ‘Independent’ candidates stood for the
elections, if these ‘Improvement Societies’ are, as you say, identical in membership,
organisation and outlook to the local branches of the Alliance. It seems to be an
unnecessary duplication of effort for the Alliance and we should be interested to
learn why this procedure was followed, what purpose the ‘Improvement Societies’ are
thought to serve in view of their identical relationship to the local Party branches
and why the Party was seemingly shy of lending its name to the whole thing. Was it
simply that they expected to lose and did not want the name of the Alliance
associated with electoral defeat?
3. If the Alliance Party is to play a full part as a true political party it seems to us
highly desirable for it to adopt a more forward-looking attitude towards local as well
as national elections. We should however be grateful for your views on the
importance of local elections?
4. We should also be interested to learn, if it is known, how many of the twenty-
two successful ‘Independent’ candidates referred to in paragraph 14 of the despatch,
particularly the thirteen Indians, could, in fact, be said to be members of the
‘Improvement Societies’ encouraged by the Alliance Party as this would give us some
idea of how the success of what might be deemed to be ‘Alliance Party’ candidates
compared with those of the Federation Party.1
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1 The urban local government elections were held under a common roll in six townships outside Suva in
Dec 1966. The electorate in all but one of the Townships was overwhelmingly Indian. 29 Federation Party
candidates were returned, all of them Indian with the exception of one Chinese. 22 Independents were
returned, 13 Indian, 6 European, 1 Chinese and 2 Fijian. The Alliance Party did not lend its name to the
elections, preferring instead to back the formation of local improvement societies whose candidates were
often styled as Independents (FCO32/17, no 1, Jakeway to Bowden, 12 Jan 1967). The Alliance Party stand
disappointed the Commonwealth Office. Fairclough commented on ‘the over-cautious Fijian attitude of
excluding their villages, immediately adjacent to the townships, from within the townships and thus deny
themselves a vote and a voice in the management of the towns which, given their proximity, are bound to
be one of the strongest influences in their lives’ (minute, 1 Feb 1967). Trafford Smith regretted the
absence of a ‘more forward looking’ Alliance Party organisation and continued: ‘A depressing feature is the
familiar Fijian conservatism in living just outside the boundaries & avoiding political (and financial, via
the rates!) involvement & responsibility—while no doubt continuing to insist that they must be
safeguaded against Indian domination’ (minute, 8 Feb 1967). The Fiji government’s reply to Fairclough’s
letter suggested it would not be wise to read too much into the Alliance not having involved itself in the
local government elections. The elections were the first of their kind to be held in Fiji, and there was no
tradition of political involvement in township board elections. Also, the elections were held within two
months of the general election, and were thus completely overshadowed. Following the general election
the Alliance was preoccupied by the formation of a government. In answer to the question why the
Alliance leaders did not support pro-Alliance candidates, the reply suggested the Alliance expected to lose
and did not want to be associated with a defeat. The Federation Party was better organised at district level,
and the electorate in all but one of the townships was overwhelmingly Indian. The Alliance had never been
organised as a proper political party and it was not geared to fighting township elections (FCO 32/17, no 5,
Lloyd to Fairclough, 15 May 1967).
107 FCO 32/55, no 7 31 Mar 1967
[Emigration]: letter from Trafford Smith to Sir D Jakeway rejecting
restrictions on emigration but considering bonds or sureties from
emigrants trained at government expense
May I refer to your letter C.34/38 of 28th November 1966 about Canadian and United
States immigration from Fiji? I am sorry that it has taken so long to give you a
substantive reply. I need hardly say that we fully understand and share your concern
at the drain of skilled and semi-skilled manpower from Fiji. We have given a good
deal of thought to the problem and consulted various authorities here in an attempt
to discover what could properly be done to deal with it.
2. Mr. Lee of the Canadian High Commission in London called on Tony
Fairolough in December. It appears that the Canadian immigration authorities are
aware of Fiji’s concern about the loss of skilled men and Mr. Lee wished to ascertain
the British Government’s policy and views on the matter. The Canadian attitude
seems to be that if we wished to get any limitation on their non-discriminatory
attitude, it would be up to us to make a proposal to them.
3. As you know the U.K. has a somewhat similar problem of the so-called ‘brain
drain’ and it is one for which it is very difficult indeed to find a solution. Generally
speaking any restrictions which might be imposed must be for the country which is
losing people to apply. The receiving country cannot be expected to impose such
restrictions, and one must be very careful indeed about asking a country to restrict
the immigration of people whom, left to itself, it would want to receive. One must
also be very careful about imposing restrictions on emigration. It is generally
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accepted that it is wrong to prevent a person who has a qualification which is
‘saleable’ in another country, from going there in order to improve his standard of
living by earning a higher regard than he can get in his own country. To prevent him
would be regarded as an infringement of human rights which it would be very
difficult to defend.
4. It seems that the Canadians do no more than process applications from people
in Fiji which have been submitted solely on the initiative of the individual concerned,
and not in any way as a result of Canadian propaganda or recruiting in Fiji. In these
circumstances we do not feel that, since they take no initiative, we could properly ask
the Canadians to change their procedures. We have considered whether we might
make an entirely ‘off the record’ request to them to go gently with recruitment in Fiji
for reasons which they will understand, but have reluctantly come to the conclusion
that even this degree of intervention would be improper.
5. I am afraid that this does not provide any comfort for Fiji. What it amounts to
is that we could not agree to Fiji imposing restrictions on emigration by legislation,
since this would be regarded as an indefensible interference with the freedom of the
individual; nor do we think that we could properly ask the Canadians (or the United
States) to restrict immigration from Fiji except, perhaps, in the very limited context
to which I refer in the following paragraphs.
6. The only positive line of thought which does occur to us at the moment and
which we put forward for your consideration is that you might like to look further
at the possibility of making more of the idea put forward at the end of paragraph 8
of your letter of the 5th October 1965 to me, that Fijians who have received assisted
training at Government expense (e.g. by bursaries at the technical training college
etc.) should as a condition of the assistance, undertake to serve in Fiji for a number
of years after qualifying.1 We understand that about ten years ago it was pretty
common form for Colonial Governments providing scholarships or bursaries to
their people to require the recipients to enter into a bond undertaking to serve in
the public service of the Colony for a minimum period, provided that they obtained
the degree or other qualifications which their course of study was designed to lead
up to. But a number of Colonial Governments found that in practice it was not
really possible to take legal action to enforce such a bond. A person could hardly be
obliged to work for the Government if he or she refused to do so, and almost always
a court order requiring the person concerned to refund the amount of the
scholarship or bursary proved vastly more trouble than it was worth—and in any
case, what the Government wanted was not to get its money back but to get the use
of the skills acquired by the recipient of the scholarship or the bursary.
Nonetheless, a number of Governments at any rate continued for some time to
require the recipient of a training award to execute such a bond largely because
they felt that it did at least have something of a deterrent effect. This idea therefore,
has several snags to it as you can see. We have, however, consulted the Education
Advisers about it and understand that although the experience I have quoted above
is true, there is one territory in which the system of bonding worked very poorly
indeed until the Government put some teeth behind the measure by requiring the
1 cf 94.
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students to provide two sureties for the sum of money involved. It was then found
that there were at least two individuals, and people of some substance, who were
united with the Government in pressing the student to use his skill on the
Government’s behalf. The same Government decided that the student would satisfy
the bond if he worked ‘in Government service or in other acceptable service in the
island’.
7. We think it worth while suggesting that you might consider trying a system of
bonding, backed by sureties who would not be men of straw as the student himself
often might be, with a bond which is pretty general in its terms and is satisfied
simply by service in Fiji, not necessarily with the Fiji Government. We fully realise
that, in addition to the snags to this sort of proposal which I have given above, there
may be other snags in Fiji, in that perhaps it might be difficult for students to find
acceptable sureties so that they would therefore be prevented from taking up their
bursaries, etc. But there may perhaps be something in the idea, or in variations of it,
such as only one surely, which might perhaps be possible. In our view, the relevance
of requiring such a bond would be that we think that we could reasonably ask the
Canadians not to grant permission to emigrate to Canada to a person from Fiji whilst
that person is still under a bond or some similar undertaking to the Fiji Government.
We think that would be an entirely proper and defendable action on our part. We
should like to know whether you think that anything could usefully be done along
these lines, or whether it would, at best, only have a very marginal effect on the
problem and therefore scarcely be worth pursuing.
8. While we have not given a firm answer as yet to Mr. Lee’s enquiry, we have
told him that our attitude to the matter is on the lines I have described in paragraphs
2 and 3 above. We should be grateful for your early comments on the views expressed
in this letter so that we can give the Canadians a firm reply.
108 FCO 32/343 Apr 1967
‘Pacific Island talks’: Commonwealth Office notes on four-power talks
in Washington
[The talks were held in Apr 1967 and attended by representatives from the US, UK,
Australia and New Zealand. The UK was represented by Trafford Smith, Fairclough and
Stackpoole (see 103, note 3) from the Commonwealth Office, B Barder (first secretary, UK
Mission to the UN), and B T Gilmore (first secretary at the Embassy in Washington). The
talks originated from discussions the secretary of state at the former Colonial Office, F
Lee, held at Canberra in the summer of 1966, and a follow-up meeting of officials from
the UK, Australia and New Zealand at Sydney in Nov 1966. It was then agreed that a
further meeting involving the US would encourage wider co-operation and co-ordination
on constitutional matters and the issue of how the ultimate status of the Pacific
territories should be decided. The feeling in Australia especially was that the emergence
of mini-states in the Pacific was not yet a problem but would soon become one. France
was not invited, the UK believing that French participation might lead to complications
with repercussions for Britain’s Common Market negotiations. The original idea was to
hold the talks in Australia but the Australians could not guarantee the prerequisite of
secrecy. Washington was chosen to preserve confidentiality and to ensure US
participation (FCO 32/347, no 9, Galsworthy minute to Garner, 13 Mar 1967).]
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Pacific Island territories—highlights of discussions
Informal and exploratory discussions on the Pacific Island Territories took place in
Washington on 5, 6 and 7 April between Australian, British, New Zealand and United
States officials.
Highlights of the discussions are set forth in the following paragraphs.
1. Importance and political future
A general aim should be to encourage political evolution in such a way as to maintain
the stability of the area and to prevent the entry of influences injurious to the
interests of the indigenous peoples and of the Administering Powers.
To this end the maintenance of a continuing close association, whether by
constitutional provision or by agreement, with a metropolitan power, should be an
objective in the political development of each territory. Since it is the reality of
association rather than the form which is significant, retention of the goodwill of the
people of the territory concerned is of first importance. Where possible an ultimate
status combining full self-government and constitutional association with a
metropolitan power is to be preferred.
Some parts of the area, e.g., certain United States Territories and Papua and New
Guinea, are regarded by their respective metropolitan powers as of greater strategic
importance than others. Nevertheless, it was agreed that the area as a whole is
strategically important. Although there is no current external threat, it is desirable to
ensure that security is maintained and so far as possible to avoid the fragmentation
of the area into a series of unattached and non-viable communities.
2. United Nations aspects
(a) Trusteeship Council. It was felt that it would be in the interest of the four
Governments to maintain the Trusteeship Council as a principal organ of the United
Nations. When the Nauru Trusteeship Agreement is terminated, it should if need
arises be argued that the Council can and should continue to function
notwithstanding the impossibility of maintaining parity between the administering
and non-administering members.
(b) Visiting Missions. It was generally recognized that Visiting Missions from the
Committee of 24 to certain Pacific territories would involve unacceptable risks and in
such cases the administering power concerned should be supported in resisting such
visits. Australian, British and United States representatives saw advantage in present
circumstances in resisting visiting missions from the Committee of 24 to Pacific
territories generally.
(c) Reporting on non-self-governing territories. The principle should be
maintained that it is for the administering power alone to decide in each case when
the transmission of information under Article 73(e) of the Charter on a formerly
non-self-governing territory may properly be discontinued, it being however
recognized that it is desirable to obtain United Nations endorsement of such
cessation if this can be secured without sacrifice of principle and without avoidable
embarrassment to any of the four Governments.
(d) The Committee of 24. It was recognized that the question of continuing
membership of and cooperation with the Committee of 24 needed continuing
reassessment between the four Powers, bearing in mind the desirability of acting in
concert.
(e) Mini-States. The question of the relationship of mini-states to the United
Nations requires urgent consideration.
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From the point of view of the Pacific territories, the time seems opportune to
explore the possibility of providing some form of association other than full
membership.
Such an arrangement if applicable to associated states might satisfy the aspirations
of their leaders, and in any case by removing one of the apparent attractions of full
independence for small states might reduce the pressure for it.
(f) Nauru.1 The results of the forthcoming talks with the Nauruans on their
political future will have implications for other Pacific territories. The Administering
Governments will therefore keep the United States Government closely informed as
the situation develops, with the 22nd session of the General Assembly particularly in
mind.
(g) General. It was considered that in settling their position on UN draft
resolutions concerned with the Pacific territories there should be consultations
among the four Powers, bearing in mind the desirability of their acting and voting in
concert whenever possible.
1 An island of 8 square miles, Nauru was under German rule from 1888 until the First World War when
it was occupied by Australian forces. In 1920 it became a League of Nations mandate under Australian
administration. During the Second World War Nauru was occupied by Japanese forces. After 1945 it was
a Trust Territory for which Australia, New Zealand and the UK were jointly responsible to the UN as the
administering authority. In practice the administration was conducted by Australia. The population in
1965 was 5,561, of whom 2,734 were Nauruans, 1,481 other Pacific islanders, 900 Chinese and 446
Europeans. The economy was dependent entirely on the production of phosphates which were extracted
and shipped (mainly to Australia and New Zealand) by the British Phosphate Commissioners, each of
the partner governments appointing one commissioner. An agreement reached in June 1967 provided
for the sale to Nauru of the assets of the Phosphate Commissioners, payment to be spread over three
years ending June 1970. The price agreed was $A21 million. At a meeting of the UN Trusteeship Council
in July 1966 the Nauruan Head Chief made a forceful speech in favour of independence by Jan 1968,
and this demand was supported in a resolution approved by the UN General Assembly in Dec 1966.
Australia, backed by the UK and New Zealand, offered Nauru instead either associated status along the
basis adopted in the Caribbean but excluding the option of full independence at a later date (see 103,
note 2), or independence accompanied by a treaty giving Australia responsibility for external affairs and
defence. The Nauruans rejected both proposals and insisted on unqualified independence while
indicating readiness to continue close relations with the partnership governments and, in the case of
Australia, a friendship treaty. Australia and New Zealand accepted this, Australia deciding that a
friendship treaty should not be made a condition of independence. The UK was concerned about the
impact of Nauru’s independence elsewhere in the Pacific and on Fiji in particular. To the
Commonwealth Office in London Nauru was little more than an ‘English village’, at least in population
terms, and it was undesirable that Nauru should seek membership of the UN and Commonwealth.
However, the British attitude was ultimately decided on the basis that ‘if the Australians and Americans,
who have more at risk in the Pacific than we, are not prepared to make a stand against the appearance
of tiny independent states there, it is pointless for us to do so’ (FCO 32/353, no 237A, note by F G K
Gallagher on the political future of Nauru, 6 Oct 1967). Nauru became an independent republic on 31
Jan 1968. It did not apply for UN membership but has since played an active part in several UN
agencies. Nauru is a ‘special member’ of the Commonwealth, receiving the benefits of Commonwealth
membership while not participating in full regular (as distinct from regional) meetings of
Commonwealth heads of government.
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3. Development and the role of the South Pacific Commission
The need to maintain an active policy of social and economic progress throughout
the Pacific area was recognized.
The South Pacific Commission continued to make a valuable contribution,
especially in encouraging participation in regional affairs by the indigenous peoples.
The British suggestions in regard to the South Pacific Conference had considerable
potential value, although the difficulties of securing French acceptance were
acknowledged.
The other three Governments would inform the British authorities as soon as
possible whether these suggestions were broadly acceptable. The British authorities
would then formally circulate them to all member Governments of the South Pacific
Commission and would hope for appropriate diplomatic support in particular with
the French.
It was recognized that it would be desirable for the work program of the South
Pacific Commission to be strengthened and expanded.
4. Japanese relationship with the Pacific Islands area
It was generally recognized that current Japanese interests in the Pacific Islands area
are economic rather than political or strategic. There is some evidence of increasing
Japanese economic interest in the area although these islands offer few opportunities
for investment. It was noted that some small, subsistence fishing areas feel
threatened by Japanese and other distant water fishing. Some larger areas, however,
are enjoying economic advantages from shore-based Japanese fishing and fish
canning. Interest was expressed in the possibility that Japan would cooperate in the
development of the islands through the provision of funds or technical assistance
and through trade.
5. Arrangements for future consultation
It was agreed that the four Governments should, through their representatives in
Canberra and through other means, keep each other informed on a confidential basis
of policies and developments in each of their territories, and that other four-Power
meetings should from time to time be arranged as occasion requires.
It was agreed that the Government of France, which also has territorial
responsibilities in the South Pacific area, should at the earliest convenient
opportunity be invited to take part in a discussion with the four Governments of
matters affecting the future of the area.
U.S. policy in the Pacific Islands
Unlike the Australian and New Zealand delegations the Americans did not circulate
background papers. This note summarizes what we were able to gather about their
policies in the area and the situation in their territories.
2. The U.S. delegation gave us the impression that for them the area’s primary
importance lies in its strategic relationship to Asia. Thus they are closely interested
in Guam and the Trust Territory of the Pacific; American Samoa comes some way
behind. Given this difference of emphasis, however, and their very different
constitutional approach to their overseas territories, there seemed to be a surprising
correspondence between their ideas about the future of the area and those of Britain,
Australia and, to a somewhat lesser extent, New Zealand.
3. While denying that they had any ‘articulated’ (i.e. clearly formulated) policies
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for the future of their territories, they made it clear that they are averse from
independence or any arrangement that would give the territories an option of
independence. They said openly that they hoped the other metropolitan powers
would not aim at independence for their territories and expressed a preference for
‘association’ arrangements. At the same time they seemed satisfied that they had kept
abreast of, or at any rate alongside, the political aspirations of the people in their
territories; and they contemplate further advances that will take the territories to
what the U.S. Government will regard as, in our terms, ‘final statuses’. In the case of
Guam, this will probably mean some form of integration into the metropolitan
United States. In the case of the Trust Territory they have an open mind as between
‘integration’ and ‘association’. There was no suggestion that American Samoa was
likely to be ‘intergrated’.
4. The Americans gave a cautious but apparently genuine welcome to the
suggestions that were aired for bringing into existance some grouping of locally
elected governments. They were attracted by the possibility of calling forth what they
called ‘an authentic voice of the area’ to offset U.N. attempts to arouse anti-
colonialist opinion there.
The United Nations
5. The following notes should be read alongside paragraph 2 of the paper ‘Pacific
Island Territories—Highlights of Discussions’.
Miss Brown2 who spoke for the Americans on U.N. matters mentioned that the
State Department had made a reassessment last year of the advantages of continuing
cooperation with the Committee of 24. They had concluded that the balance came
down on the side of continued cooperation but a further reassessment was likely
later this year. It was clear that their doubts had grown no less—if anything, they
seemed to be strengthening.
6. They did not seem much concerned about the incompatibility between their
ideas about the constitutional future of their territories and the ‘relevant U.N.
Resolutions’. They expressed themselves as perfectly willing to continue to explain
their policies to the U.N. (so long as this was not made impossible for them by the
Committee of 24) and seemed confident that their plans could be reconciled with the
principles of Resolution 1541(XV).3
7. As regards Visiting Missions they strongly favoured a united front between the
metropolitan powers. Their position was very close to that of the Australians: they
were not free to exclude Visiting Missions from their Trust Territory, but specifically
endorsed the Australian contention that Visiting Missions should be excluded from
other territories in the area. The Americans said however that they were ready to
welcome visits by individual members of the United Nations. As regards the
Trusteeship Council they circulated a paper entitled ‘Future Composition of the
Trusteeship Council—Legal Aspects” (a copy is attached as Annex A4 to Mr. Barder’s
2 Elizabeth A Brown, director, Office of UN Political Affairs, Bureau of International Organization Affairs,
US State Dept.
3 Resolution 1514(XV) of Dec 1960, about the desirability of setting target dates for independence. It was
sponsored by 43 Afro-Asian nations, the UK and US abstaining.
4 Not printed.
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paper on U.N. Aspects of the Talks below) which suggests that the Trusteeship
Council would continue to be legally constituted even if New Zealand were to cease
to be an Administering Member supposing that the Trusteeship Agreement for
Nauru were terminated. They agreed with the Australian view that the United
Nations should be invited to participate in the ‘ascertainment process’ if the
Trusteeship Agreement had to be terminated, and that it would therefore be
necessary to offer the people of Nauru a ‘range of options’. There was surprisingly
little reaction from the American side of the table when the Australians spoke about
the possibility of independence for Nauru.
Aid
8. The U.S. delegation took a very early opportunity to make it clear that they
could not make aid available for Pacific territories other than their own. They
nevertheless arranged for a senior official of the Peace Corps administration to give a
heavy-weight ‘presentation’ of Peace Corps activities in the Trust Territory, and made
it clear that they were ready to see the Peace Corps5 operate in non-American
territories. Preparations are being made for it to do so in W. Samoa and Mr.
Fairclough had discussions outside the meeting with Mr. Pritchard, the Peace Corps
representative, on which he will no doubt be reporting separately.
The American Pacific Territories
a. Guam
Population: approximately 80,000 made up of c. 30,000 U.S. Military
personnel families etc; c. 45,000 Guamanians and ‘State Siders’ i.e. settlers
from the U.S.A.; and c. 5,000 Filipino labourers.
9. Guam’s mixed population are thoroughly American in outlook and loyalties.
Guamanians are U.S. nationals and have free access to the metropolitan United
States, but they are not U.S. citizons—the effective distinction is that they are not
entitled to vote in elections to the U.S. Congress.
10. Guam’s constitution is embodied in an ‘organic law’ of the U.S. Congress.
The Governor is a presidential nominee but there is pending legislation to substitute
an elected governor. This will not go to the current Congress because a similar
proposal in respect of the U.S. Virgin Islands, which is likely to attract opposition,
would have to be brought forward with it.
11. Very large U.S. Defence expenditure dominates the economy. Guam also
receives substantial U.S. Government aid for civil purposes. Social conditions are
described as similar to those in a rather shabby American town. Guam is becoming a
‘metropolis’ for the islands of the Trust Territory, particularly the neighbouring
5 In his inaugural address on 20 Jan 1961, President J F Kennedy challenged the people of the US, ‘Ask not
what your country can do for you, but rather what you can do for your country.’ Kennedy wanted the
young people of the country to help the underdeveloped world and announced the establishment of the
Peace Corps, a scheme intended to send 10,000 young people to serve in Africa, Asia and Latin America.
Kennedy argued that this ‘practical, inexpensive, person-to-person program will plant trust, good will and
a capacity for self-help’ in the under-developed world.
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Marianas. Its university is a full-scale degree giving institution, though many
Guamanians go to the U.S.A. for higher education.
12. The U.S. Government have no settled policy for the ultimate future of Guam,
but separate statehood and unification with Hawaii were mentioned as acceptable
destinations. There is no desire in Guam for independence, but there is a desire for
greater autonomy.
b. Trust Territory of the Pacific 
(Micronesia) (Pop. 88,000)
13. This enormously extensive ‘Strategic Trust Territory’ is administered
through a U.S. High Commissioner. Its constitution, embodied in an Order of the
U.S. Secretary of the Interior, evolved in consultation with an indigenous advisory
council, came into force in 1964 (or earlier). Micronesians do not have free entry into
the U.S.A. or into Guam and this causes some difficulty and resentment. They travel
on documents issued by the High Commissioner and there is extensive movement
into Guam. There is a bicameral Congress which has met twice (1964 and 1966).
Micronesia has a separate judiciary and no appellate court. Legislation to provide
access to the United States appellate courts is awaiting presentation to Congress.
14. The U.S. Government are currently considering an application by the
Japanese to establish a rest base for fishing vessels in the Territory. There is a
problem over Micronesian claims for reparations against the Japanese: the
Micronesians’ line is that the U.S. Government should make itself responsible for
these claims and that whether or not the U.S.A. secures reimbursement from Japan
is not their problem. They are averse from suggestions that the U.N. should
mediate.
15. The official U.S. Government view is that the present constitution is
working well and that the Congress has shown itself ‘cheeringly mature’ (the
Australian Representative on the recent Trusteeship Council Mission to Micronosia
seemed to take a loss optimistic view). Mrs. Van Cleve,6 the Department of the
Interior representative, spoke of increasing restlossness in the Trust Territory;
estimated that 10 to 25% of Micronesiqns favoured independence; but was
confident that the remainder favoured association with the United States. She said
that this feeling was especially strong in the Marianas where U.S. Government
expenditure is heaviest.
16. The U.S. Government is spending heavily on development in the Trust
Territory. It has recently received a report commissioned from an independent firm
of economic consultants (the Nathan Report; fee U.S. 0.33 million) which is
apparently guardodly optimistic about the Territories’ economic prospects especially
as regards agricultural development, tourism and fishing. Mrs. Van Cleve undertook
to try to obtain copies of the Nathan Report for the Australian, New Zealand and
British delegations and to supply a summary. A detailed paper about the very large
scale Peace Corps operations in the Trust Territory was supplied. These operations
were mounted following a petition of grievance by the Micronosians about health
services. Communications have been so improved that no islander is more than one
day’s sail from an air strip.
6 Ruth Van Cleve, director, Office of Territories, Department of the Interior.
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17. It was evident that the U.S. Government want to retain soveroignty in the
Trust Territory for strategic reasons. They are aiming at some form of association
between Micronesia and the U.S.A. as an ultimate status, one possibility being an
association with Hawaii.
c. American Samoa (Pop. 26,000)
18. The people of the territory are, like the Guamanians, American nationals. A
new constitution, to be embodied in an Order by the Secretary of the Interior, was
worked out at a Constitutional Convention in November 1966. This will deprive the
Governor of legislative authority and reapportion the constituencies for the House
of Representatives (which is elected by popular vote) so as to reduce, though not
apparently eliminate, ‘rotten boroughs’. The Congress will, for the first time have
power to appropriate local revenue. There is a separate judiciary. The
implementation of the new constitution is held up because of the 11th hour
insertion by the Samoans of a provision that would secure them ‘eminent domain’
(apparently this means the transfer to the people of Samoa of a notional
fundamental tenure in land). This claim the U.S. Government have decided to
reject.
19. Mrs. Van Cleve described the Samoans as politically passive, and asserted that
the United States had met their political aspirations without difficulty at each stage.
The territory is prosperous by Pacific standards and is benefiting extensively from a
Japanese fishing and cannery enterprise.
20. The U.S. Government has no firm ideas about the ultimate status of the
territory, but neither full statehood nor independence is contemplated. A report that
two American Samoan Congressmen (one of them a person of some local importance
but with a reputation of deviousness) had recently introduced a resolution
advocating the union of the two Samoas under U.S. protection. The Department of
the Interior had not had time to evaluate this report.
Australian policy in the Pacific Islands
Very little additional information about the Australian territories emerged during the
discussions except that they circulated an additional paper on economic development
in Papua/New Guinea. Constitutional problems in their territories were fully dealt
with in a paper circulated in advance of the meeting. Their delegation did however
make it clear that the Australian Government had at present no thought of
integrating P.N.G. into Australia as a seventh State.
2. The other Australian papers revealed a preoccupation with the danger of
penetration of the area by ‘hostile influences’, which their delegation developed and
confirmed. Indonesia and Asian communists seemed uppermost in their minds. They
emphasised the need for solidarity among the Pacific powers and the importance, in
planning for any one territory, of considering repercussions in others. Their doctrine
was that ‘each power is concerned with the image of all’.
3. The Australians also spoke of the need for positive leadership by the
administering powers and the need for some imaginative new form of political
association. They admitted they had no ready-made proposals for this, but gave a
warm welcome to any ideas that appeared round the table. They made no effort to
conceal their displeasure at the precedents created by New Zealand in making
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Western Samoa independent and turning the Cook Islands into associated states.
They were very explicit, too, about Australia’s ‘national interest’ in the stability of
Fiji, which they regard as the key to the island region, and their strong opposition to
any early forward movement there.
4. The Australians did their best to persuade the other delegations to
recommend a solid front against the U.N. in the Pacific. Once or twice, however, they
seemed worried that they might be going beyond their instructions and it seems
likely that the Australian Government’s position on U.N. intervention in colonial
matters may not be substantially harder than that of the U.S. or Britain. The
Australian delegation were markedly more anxious than the others for an early
further meeting including the French. This seems to mark a fairly recent change in
their thinking and one of some importance.
New Zealand policy in the Pacific Islands
The New Zealanders provided fairly full documentation about each of their territories
and Western Samoa;7 their papers were however notably uninformative on the
political side. They remained somewhat more guarded than the other delegations
throughout the meeting.
2. The remaining New Zealand territories are very small. Their surplus
population can be and is being easily absorbed into New Zealand itself. The
inhabitants have New Zealand nationality.
3. Much the same is true of the Cook Islands.8 In responses to direct
questions the New Zealanders admitted that the Government of the Cook Islands
wanted a higher level of aid (the Cook Islands have long been dependent on a New
Zealand subsidy) while the New Zealand Government was trying to find means of
ensuring that the aid they already provide is put to more ‘purposive’ use. The
delegation asserted, however, that the association relationship was proving on the
whole a success and had produced ‘economic galvanisation’. If free association
were to fail, the alternative as they saw it would not be independence but
integration with New Zealand. For that they thought it would be essential to
obtain a United Nations ‘blessing’ and this contingency seemed to bulk quite large
in their thinking.
4. The New Zealanders have also been having difficulty with Western Samoa over
the level of aid. They are worried about the territory’s economic future. They showed
some concern about the effect that the prospority of American Samoa is having on
the neighbouring island but were confident that the conservative habits of the
7 A Trust Territory administered by New Zealand since 1919, Western Samoa became independent in Jan
1962. A friendship treaty with New Zealand was signed eight months later, with New Zealand agreeing to
assist in Western Samoa’s foreign relations in a manner which would not impair the rights of the
government of Western Samoa to formulate its own foreign policies. See Ronald Hyam and Wm Roger
Louis, eds, The Conservative Government and the end of empire 1957–1964, part II, 545, paras 23–25.
8 In 1962 New Zealand placed before the Legislative Assembly of the Cook Islands four possible schemes for
political development—complete independence, full self-government, integration with New Zealand, or
ultimate integration into a Polynesian federation. The Assembly chose full-self government. The Cook
Islands became self-governing in free association with New Zealand. As a single entity the Islands can move
at any time to move to full independence if they so wish, and under continuing association New Zealand
retains responsibility for defence and external affairs, in consultation with the Cook Islands premier. These
arrangements were approved after local elections in 1965 and endorsed by the UN.
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Samoans would continue to restrain them—they attached no importance to the
recent threat by the Premier to appeal to the Russians for aid.
5. The New Zealanders tend to rescent any suggestion that they still exercise
influence over the Western Samoans. They themselves conscientiously abstained
from showing any resentment when it was revealed at the meeting that the Peace
Corps had had detailed discussions with the Western Samoan Government about
operating in the territory, apparently without the knowledge of the New Zealanders.
They said in another context that they welcomed other powers consulting them
before making direct contact with the Samoans, but that they certainly did not
attempt to insist upon it.
6. The New Zealanders gave forthright support to our suggestions about building
up the South Pacific Commission. They were perhaps a little less enthusiastic than
the others about the desirability of creating a political grouping of local governments
and put rather more emphasis on the continuing value of links between the
metropolitan powers and the territories. They were averse from any suggestion of a
line-up against the U.N., but fully appreciated that Britain and Australia had a much
more serious problem in this respect.
7. In general, New Zealand’s attitudes were more cautious and a little more
idealistic than those of the larger powers. At the same time it was clear that the New
Zealanders realise the importance of maintaining a broad consensus between the
administering powers, and had neither the inclination, nor sufficient scope to strike
out a new line on their own.
Future relationships within the area (paper circulated by the British Delegation at
the concluding session)
The U.S., Australia, New Zealand and Britain have a common interest in preserving
the stability of the area. They recognize that the colonial relationship, which has
ensured stability in the past, is becoming increasingly difficult to sustain, both
because it attracts irrelevant criticism from outside the area, and because the people
in the area are coming to maturity.
2. It is obvious that new relationships to replace the colonial one will differ
according to the differing character of the territories and the constitutional
traditions of the metropolitan countries. One ex-colony in the area (W. Samoa) is
already independent, and neither Australia nor Britain could at this stage rule out
the possibility that other territories will also eventually become fully independent.
3. On the other hand it is in most cases inconceivable, and in the rest
undesirable (in the interests either of the territories or of the metropolitan powers)
for each territory to take up the full responsibilities of independent nationhood.
Whether a particular territory becomes independent or an associated state, or some
new status is found for it, in the foreseeable future all will need outside support of
one kind or another—e.g. as regards defence, external affairs, or in the economic
field; to such an extent that the relationship of each to its metropolitan power seems
certain to be a special and formal one.
4. None of the four powers wishes these new relationships to be restrictive; on
the other hand none would wish to embarrass the others by proferring concessions
to one territory that might lead others to make embarrassing demands. There is thus
a further common interest in avoiding a competitive constitutional escalation, which
could itself threaten the general stability.
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5. This is a view that the ‘post-colonial’ governments themselves may come to
share, since once a political leader has committed himself to a given relationship, his
own position will be undermined if that relationship comes to be regarded as
restrictive.
6. On the other hand the new governments will need to be able to show that they
are able to negotiate matters of immediate concern to their territories, and will need
to communicate with their neighbours. It is likely too that they will experience a
need to establish an international identity; and will realize that unless they can group
themselves together for this purpose the small size of each and the remoteness of the
region will make the task a very difficult one.
7. The four administering powers stand to gain if they can encourage the
emergence of such groupings, since the greater the natural cohesion of the region
the better it will be able to deal with external forces, and where necessary to resist
external penetration, without assistance. There could be further bonuses for the
Administering Powers if such a grouping turned out to be averse from any attempt
by individual territories to break or weaken their links with the metropolitan
territories; and if it evolved a sensible attitude towards U.N. activities in the area, for
instance welcoming assistance from the Specialized Agencies by asserting that the
views of the people of the area are of primary significance in regard to political
developments there.
8. What could be the character of such a grouping? First there could be no
suggestion, at any rate for many years, of its filling any supra-national, or federal
role. Second, it should ideally be a grouping of indigenous governments, although
there would certainly be a need for metropolitan guidance and it would be best for
that guidance to be inconspicuous.
9. The most important function of the grouping would be to provide a forum in
which the leaders of the territory governments can discuss regional affairs. In the
first instance it would be best to avoid any suggestion of executive functions, and
with them questions of finance and staff. The fields in which interest might most
naturally centre would be that of relations between the territories themselves. They
might well discuss areas where there was a need for inter-territorial cooperation, and
proposals for effecting it, without taking on direct executive responsibilities as a
group. As time went on they might come to concern themselves with the external
relations of the region generally, to the extent that the metropolitan powers felt able
to delegate their direct responsibility.
10. Membership would be a crucial question. The best course might be to leave it
to a founding group (perhaps W. Samoa, Tonga and Fiji) to work out a formula.
Alternatively, the group might be specifically a ‘post-colonial’ one, admission to
which would constitute a ‘birth certificate’ for a territory that had shed its colonial
status.
United Nations aspects9
General attitudes.
The Australian Delegation said that the United Nations was inevitably an
important factor in their colonial policies in the Pacific, since two of their
9 Paper by B Barder.
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territories (New Guinea and Nauru) were U.N. Trust Territories, and the future of
Papua was bound up with that of New Guinea. But they regarded the Committee
of 24 and the Fourth Committee as thoroughly objectionable and irresponsible
organs whose influence seemed to be in almost every way pernicious. Australia
had done its best to cooperate in both Committees for several years, but the
resolutions passed on Nauru and Papua–New Guinea at the last session of the
General Assembly had come as a disagreeable shook since both resolutions had
been unrealistic, inaccurate and unacceptable. Australia had been much concerned
at the failure of any of its friends except one (the United Kingdom) to support it
in opposing the resolution on Nauru. They were concerned at the debasing of the
coinage involved in the steady stream of increasingly bad U.N. resolutions on
colonial subjects, and were engaging in a reassessment of the pros and cons of
continuing as members of the Committee of 24. At present, the dominant feeling
was that they should remain in the Committee, but they felt it important that the
four administering powers in the Pacific (Australia, the United States, New
Zealand and the United Kingdom) should as far as possible adopt a common
attitude towards continued cooperation with the Committee of 24. They felt that
the four powers, and if possible some of their Western friends, should take a
stronger attitude in future towards bad resolutions, refraining wherever possible
from voting ‘yes’ on resolutions simply because they had been improved from a
worse original. The Australians thought they had noted a firmer and tougher tone
in some of the British interventions in the Eastern Caribbean debate and they
welcomed this.
2. The New Zealand Delegation agreed that the resolutions in the Fourth
Committee on Papua–New Guinea, and indeed on Fiji, had been grossly
unreasonable. On the other hand, they felt that on the smaller territories it was
possible to expect a degree of reasonableness from the Fourth Committee and even
from the Committee of 24, provided that the Administering power was able to
demonstrate that they had the support of the inhabitants of a territory for the
actions taken. New Zealand was therefore ready to welcome an occasional visit of
inspection by the U.N. as they had done in the case of the Cook Islands. But they
recognised that this might be more difficult and risky in larger territories with
special problems.
3. The United States and United Kingdom Delegations both agreed that the
Committee of 24 was a tiresome and difficult body, and that there were arguments
for and against continued cooperation with it. The United Kingdom Delegation added
that their attitude to the Committee of 24 and to the United Nations on colonial
matters generally would be affected more by considerations outside the Pacific
(especially Aden, Rhodesia and the complex of Southern African problems) than by
British responsibilities in the Pacific, although Fiji was a difficult problem. Much
would depend on the outcome of the current United Nations Mission to South
Arabia. Experience so far in the Committee of 24 debate on the West Indies
Associated States seemed to indicate that the U.N. would in future endorse
‘association’ solutions only if they satisfied two requirements: that the associated
state was free to become independent at any time, and that the U.N. had been
associated with the consultative processes leading to association (neither of which
was strictly required by resolution 1541(XV) but both of which had been volunteered
by New Zealand in the case of the Cook Islands).
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Individual territories
(i) Nauru
4. The Australians said that since Nauru was a United Nations Trust Territory,
and the agreement of the U.N. would be required for the termination of the
Trusteeship Agreement, there might in the end be no practical alternative to
granting Nauru full independence despite its intrinsic absurdity. This might be the
only way for Australia to rid itself of its trusteeship obligation. As agreed with the
other two administering authorities, they would make a concerted attempt to
persuade the Nauruans to accept a form of permanent association with Australia
with Nauru coming under Australian sovereignty. However, they were not confident
that this would be endorsed by the United Nations, even if the Nauruans could be
brought to accept it. The form of association which they envisaged would include
‘full internal self-government’, although Australia might retain certain
responsibilities for internal security as well as for external affairs and defence. But
the association would be a final and permanent one, preferably with no open-ended
option for independence once Nauru had attained its new status. It was this
shutting off of an open option for independence later that might prove
unacceptable to the U.N.
5. The United Kingdom Delegation said that they feared that if Nauru was
granted full independence, this might have a ripple effect, especially on Fiji. Other
small territories might come to feel that if tiny Nauru had become independent, they
could aim for nothing less. At the same time, they agreed that it would be difficult to
persuade the General Assembly to approve a form of association for Nauru which did
not include an open option for independence. However, since Nauru was a Trust
Territory, there would no doubt be some U.N. involvement in the final act of choice
by the Nauruans, and this might help to secure United Nations endorsement. The
Australians agreed that refusing an open independence option would make U.N.
endorsement more difficult to achieve, but they felt that to grant such an option
would mean a constant factor for instability in the relationship between Nauru and
Australia.
6. The United States Delegation said they assumed that the widest possible range
of options would be offered to the Nauruans in any plebiscite. They attached
importance to the continuation of some form of association between Nauru and
Australia, for fear that if Nauru became fully independent, it would offer an
opportunity for outside influences to establish themselves in the Pacific.
(ii) Papua–New Guinea
7. The Australian Delegation said they did not envisage that the territory would
be integrated with Australia, in view of the ratio of the inhabitants of Papua and New
Guinea to the population of Australia. The Papuans and New Guineans would no
doubt eventually aspire to full nationhood. Nor did Australia envisage any kind of
relationship between Papua and New Guinea and West Irian, and they were anxious
not to encourage a reopening of the whole question of West Irian since this might
upset the delicate but newly restored relations between Australia and Indonesia.
Papua–New Guinea needed about fifteen or twenty years to evolve into its final
status, but Australia recognised that such a long period was unlikely to be possible.
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Differing standards of economic potential and constitutional sophistication might be
obstacles to any wider Pacific association, e.g. between Papua–New Guinea and the
Solomon Islands.
(iii) Niue and Tokelau Islands
8. New Zealand felt inclined to respond to any U.N. criticism of the pace of
constitutional progress by inviting the U.N. in to see for itself the nature of the
problem. The economy of the three small atolls of the Tokelau Islands was very
procarious and the only possible future for the territory appeared to be integration
with New Zealand. A resettlement programme for some of the islanders was in
progress. The New Zealanders felt that if the United Nations was fully informed of the
nature of these situations, it would probably be prepared to approve the solutions
which New Zealand was working out with the few inhabitants.
(iv) Cook Islands
9. The new relationship, endorsed by the U.N., was so far working fairly well.
New Zealand had not regarded the assertion by the United Nations of a continuing
responsibility to help the Cook Islanders in future to achieve independence under
resolution 1514(XV) if they so wished, as as an appreciable risk. They would contest
any attempt by the Committee of 24 or any other U.N. organ to receive or hear
petitions from Cook Islanders, unless with the agreement of the Cook Islands
Government. However, they might invite U.N. participation if ever the Cook Islands
were to change from association with New Zealand to integration. The United
Kingdom Delegation commented that although this would clearly be a matter for
New Zealand to decided at the time, they would not accept that the U.N. had any
right to be involved if the Cook Islands wanted to change their status at some future
date, any U.N. competence with regard to the Cook Islands having ended when the
Cook Islands became fully self-governing.
(v) Guam and American Samoa
10. The Americans said that pressures in the United Nations on these territories
were regarded by their inhabitants as objectionable and irrelevant. The people of
these territories valued American largesse and their freedom of entry to the United
States. There was no sentiment in favour of independence although in Guam there
was a desire for somewhat greater autonomy.
(vi) American Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands
11. The Americans estimated that something between 10 and 25% of the
population of the territory were beginning to think in terms of independence. The
United States Government had not yet thought through what might be the
ultimate status of the Trust Territory but they were averse from any solution that
involved independence or an option of independence, though they envisaged an
eventual plebiscite with U.N. participation. They expected difficulties in the
Security Council in securing any endorsement of the result of a plebiscite, but if
the plebiscite gave clear and unambiguous backing to the solution proposed, they
might if necessary defy and ignore an adverse decision by the Security Council, if
10-Fiji-85-cpp  10/5/06  6:57 AM  Page 310
[108] APR 1967 311
this seemed unavoidable. It might be possible to declare that the Trusteeship
Agreement was terminated without the matter coming to a vote in the Security
Council. Japan had indicated a readiness to make some move to settle the
Micronesian claim against Japan arising from Japanese activities during the War.
In return, Japan might ask for refuelling stops and other facilities in the Trust
Territory. United States policy had until now been to resist any restoration of
Japanese influence in the Territory, but this was being reassessed. It was hoped
that progress would be made on the claim against Japan by the time of the
Trusteeship Council meeting in June.
Committee of 24 Visiting Mission
12. The Australian, United Kingdom and United States Delegations said that they
had no intention of inviting or admitting Committee of 24 visiting missions to any of
their Pacific territories in present circumstances, but the New Zealand delegation
refused to put its name to any general statement to this effect, reserving their
freedom if they judged it appropriate to invite some form of U.N. visit to their
remaining territories (see paragraph 2 above). They recognised that in territories
such as Fiji, a visiting mission could do great damage and were prepared to support a
British refusal to accept a visiting mission to Fiji. But they felt that this risk was not
applicable to small territories such as Niue and the Tokelau Islands. The United
Kingdom Delegation said that they saw no possibility of visiting missions in the
Pacific in the foreseeable future, especially to Fiji, but that they did not wish to rule
the possibility out completely and preferred to take an empirical view. They might in
some circumstances see value in certain types of mission, and would not wish to
slam the door forever. They would co-operate with the United Nations as far as this
was possible. The American Delegation said they did not wish to see the Committee
of 24 ‘get into the visiting mission business’. This would not be in the interests of the
United States and was likely to encounter local hostility and resentment in their
territories. They hoped that the four Governments could adopt a common attitude to
this problem. The Australians expressed strong opposition to any kind of Committee
of 24 visiting mission, particularly to New Guinea or Nauru which were already
visited by missions from the Trusteeship Council. They urged a common front
among all four Governments in opposition to visiting missions and appeared to see
little or no necessity for leaving any options open for reconsideration of this in
changed circumstances in the future.
Future of the Trusteeship Council
13. The United States Delegation provided copies of a Note by the State
Department’s Legal Advisers on the legal implications for the future of the
Trusteeship Council of the termination of the Nauru Trusteeship Agreement. A copy
of the State Department Note is attached at Annex A. All four Delegations expressed
similar views on this as recorded in paragraph (i) of the agreed Note of ‘Highlights of
the Discussions’.
Mini-states and the United Nations
14. The United States Delegation recalled that they had for some time been
interested in initiating consideration of this problem with a view to action by the
United Nations, perhaps initially in the Security Council, to lay down criteria for full
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membership of the United Nations and thus to exclude very small newly-independent
states from full membership in future. They had been dissuaded, mainly by the
British Government, from pursuing this further until recently, in view of various
problems that would have arisen if the matter had been raised at the United Nations
before the admission of Guyana and Lesotho. They were glad to have been told more
recently that the British Government saw no immediate problems about pursuing
the matter and they looked forward to the proposed consultations between Lord
Caradon and Mr. Goldberg10 in New York, which were to take place soon. The United
States Government would be extremely worried if Tonga or Nauru sought full
membership of the United Nations (although the Australians expressed the tentative
view that even if Nauru became fully independent, it was unlikely to apply for U.N.
membership). They would favour a new status of association of mini-states with the
United Nations, and were inclined to think that this might be arranged without any
need of an amendment of the Charter.
15. The United Kingdom Delegation confirmed that from the point of view of the
Pacific territories, the present would be a good moment to try to work out a solution
to this problem. Any solution would have to be put forward at the United Nations by
others since proposals emanating from colonial powers would be open to the
accusation that the colonial powers were merely seeking an excuse for refusing
independence to small territories. The Australian Delegation suggested that there
might be less pressure for independence by small territories if they could no longer
take United Nations membership completely for granted as an automatic by-product
of independence. This had a major bearing on the attitude of the Nauruans to the
Australian proposals for association and they hoped that the problem could be
tackled urgently, perhaps with a view to a decision by the 22nd session of the General
Assembly.
Asian Development Bank and ECAFE
16. In answer to an enquiry about the possibility of financial assistance from the
Asian Development Bank to territories in the Pacific, the Australians said they would
view any such prospect with a good deal of caution, since it might imply that the
Pacific was part of Asia. The New Zealanders and Americans, however, expressed
interest in the possibility, the New Zealanders pointing out that Western Samoa was
already a full member of ECAFE and therefore in principle eligible for assistance
from the Asian Development Bank. The Western Samoan precedent might be
sufficient to establish that Fiji would also be eligible for associate membership of
ECAFE and therefore for assistance from the Asian Development Bank.
10 US ambassador to UN.
109 FCO 32/59 20 June 1967
‘Fiji integration proposals’: minute by A J Fairclough to Mr Bowden in
preparation for a meeting with Ratu Mara
Ratu Mara has enquired about the possibility of integration between Fiji and the U.K.
He did so in a discussion about the effect Britain’s entry into the Common Market
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might have in Fiji, but this brief deals only with the constitutional and political
implications of integration for Fiji.
2. The matter is to be discussed at a meeting on Friday, 23rd June, with officials
but Ratu Mara may mention it tomorrow.
3. Britain has not made an offer of integration to her dependent territories
generally.1 If a particular territory seeks integration it is therefore for that territory
to make a concrete proposal.
4. The word ‘integration’ by itself means little. The territory would have to say
what it proposed as regards:—
(a) Freedom of movement between Britain and the territory.
(b) Uniform rights for individuals in Britain and the territory.
(c) Representation for the territory at Westminster.
(d) The future status and powers of the local government (legislature and
executive) which would inevitably be greatly reduced. Integration necessarily
implies abandoning any aspiration towards independence.
(e) A programme for achieving economic equivalence including equal rates of
taxation.
We should not apply a predetermined standard when we came to consider such
proposals but we should expect them to make sense as a whole and to suggest a
practicable working relationship.
5. No British Government could consider such a proposal unless it carried the
support of the bulk of the people in the territory and unless the proposal was for a
genuine and permanent union.
6. British Ministers could not back such a proposal unless there was substantial
support for it from British public opinion. The requisite changes in the British
constitution could hardly be made unless the two main parties, at least, backed the
proposal.
7. From the British Government’s point of view integration would mean not
merely reaffirming old commitments to the territory concerned but giving now ones
that would be intended to be permanent. Moreover if Britain were to agree to
integration for one territory on advantageous terms there would almost certainly be
similar demands from about ten others. (These should not be specified to Ratu Mara
but include Gibraltar, Mauritius, Seycholles, British Hondurae, the Falkland Islands,
the Cayman Islands, the Gilbert and Ellice lelands, St. Helena and Trigtan da
Gunha.)
Even from a purely financial point of view this would be a considerable additional
burden.
8. Frankly it seems very unlikely that Fiji could put forward proposals that would
pass these teste and possess sufficient attractions to outweigh these disadvantages.
For instance would there be broad general support in Fiji for integration? Does Ratu
Mara want to submerge Fiji’s separate personality permanently in that of the U.K.?
What arguments would be used to win the support of the British public?
9. Until we see a definite proposal we obviously cannot guess how it would
command itself to Ministers, but we think they would require a lot of convincing and
1 It was considered in the mid-1950s in the case of Malta, for which see Simon Smith, Malta (BDEEP,
forthcoming).
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that Ratu Mara would be ill-advised to spend time and thought in working out such a
proposal in detail.
10. It is suggested that if Ratu Mara does raise questions concerning integration,
the Secretary of State should use points in the preceding paragraphs in speaking to
him on the general political and constitutional considerations which arise. As
regards the question of how any proposal for integration would affect matters in
relation to Britain’s application for membership of the E.E.C., it seems probable that
a territory which was fully integrated with and thus became part of Britain would
have to be treated, also for the purposes of the Community, as part of Britain. Our
understanding in Pacific & Indian Ocean Department is that no other status in
relation to the Community (such as Association—for which in 1962 there was
provisional agreement that inter alia British Dependent Territories should be eligible
when Britain joined) could accord equivalent privileges but account would no doubt
have to be taken of the likely reaction from the Six and the consequences of this for
Britain’s own application if proposals for integration of Fiji with Britain were
suddenly to appear to be seriously under consideration.2
2 Mara did not mention integration at his meeting with Bowden on 21 June. Instead he discussed British
entry into the EEC and how this would affect Fiji’s sugar exports. On domestic politics he observed that
Fiji’s greatest need was for more time, to let the constitution settle down and to enable the Indian
population to adjust to multi-racial politics. ‘The great problem was to weld Fiji into a nation and to
persuade the Indians to see their future in Fiji and not to look outside to India.’ His own attempts to get
Indians into the Alliance were going ‘surprisingly well’, and he thought he was gaining their confidence,
having spent three of the last six months mixing almost entirely with the Indian community. ‘He was
drawing his support mainly from the Indian workers and from Indian businessmen who disliked the
Gujeratis around Patel. His greatest difficulty was with the Indian middle class—teachers, civil servants,
etc—who were more ambitious for power and saw their best road for advancement through Indian
political domination.’ He thought Patel was losing ground but still making overtures to the Committee of
Twenty-Four. Finally he revealed that David Butler, a fellow of Nuffield College, Oxford and
author/commentator on British political parties and general elections, was visiting Fiji shortly to advise on
political organisation (FCO 32/59, no 6A, record by O G Foster, private secretary to Bowden, on the
Commonwealth secretary’s meeting with Mara, 21 June 1967).
110 FCO 32/59, no 66 15 Sept 1967
[Future of Fiji]: minute by Sir A Galsworthy to Mr Thomson on issues
to be discussed with Ratu Mara during his visit to London as part of a
world tour
Ratu K.K.T. Mara,* the recently appointed Chief Minister of Fiji, is visiting London
from 18th to 21st September in the course of a world tour. Personality Notes are
attached at Annex A; details of Ratu Mara’s tour are clear from the telegram at Annex
B; and his programme whilst in London is at Annex C.1
* Ratu is a Fijian Chiefly title; it is accordingly not appropriate to address Ratu Mara as Mr. Ratu Mara or
Mr. Mara; Ratu Mara is is the proper form of address.
1 Annexes not printed.
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2. Ratu Mara is a chiefly Fijian of high rank; a charming person when contact
has really been established, he sometimes appears arrogant and is often moody. He is
cultured and able. He was for many years a Civil Servant and originally involved
himself in politics at a time when the two roles were not incompatible in Fiji. The
new constitution introduced following the 1965 Constitutional Conference made this
dual role impossible and Ratu Mara is now a full-time politician, the leader of the
multi-racial Alliance Party which, in the autumn of 1966, decisively won the first
elections under the new constitution.
3. After the elections, the multi-racial Alliance Government then appointed
chose to continue the Membership system which had already been in force for some
appreciable time rather than move at once to the Ministerial system which the new
constitution envisaged. This latter change was eventually made on 1st September
1967, just before Ratu Mara set out on his present world tour. He is accordingly now
Chief Minister.
4. We have no detailed indication of matters which Ratu Mara will wish to
discuss, with the sole exception of the problem of the retention of expatriate staff in
Fiji (on which see paragraph 6 below) but the matters which seem likely to arise are
clear from the outline programme for Ratu Mara at Annex C.
5. We suggest that you may find it more convenient to treat Ratu Mara’s visit as a
courtesy call and an opportunity to get to know him rather than an occasion for
substantive discussion on any matters which Ratu Mara may wish to pursue. As to
substantive discussion, it is suggested that this should be left to officials in the first
instance with a further meeting between Ratu Mara and Ministers towards the end of
Ratu Mara’s visit, if this seems necessary.
6. The one matter on which Ratu Mara may seek to unburden himself to you is
the problem of the retention of expatriate staff. Ratu Mara has a decided chip on his
shoulder about the whole operation of the Overseas Service Aid Scheme (O.S.A.S.)
which he regards as discriminatory; his attitude on this stems in part from personal
considerations. A separate note suggesting the line that you might take on this
matter if Ratu Mara brings it up is attached at Annex D.
7. Ratu Mara visited London in June this year as Fiji’s representative in the
discussions which were held between the British Government and the Governments
of Commonwealth countries participating in the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement
on the question of the future of the C.S.A. in relation to Britain’s application to join
the European Economic Community. On his return to Fiji after that meeting Ratu
Mara professed himself satisfied with its results and with the assurances British
Ministers had given of their determination to protect the interests of C.S.A.
producers in negotiating conditions of entry into the E.E.C. Ratu Mara did however
ask for more detailed information on the implications of Associated status under the
Treaty of Rome and the ways in which it might be affected by the constitutional
status of an associating country. A note which has been prepared for Ratu Mara on
these matters and will be handed to him on his arrival is attached for information at
Annex E.
8. The note referred to above touches on the question of the constitutional
future of Fiji. This is a very delicate matter owing to the racial split in Fiji between
those (virtually all Indians) who demand independence, one-man-one-vote
democracy and U.N. involvement in the territory, and those (i.e. the Alliance
Government and its supporters who include virtually all the Fijians but also a
10-Fiji-85-cpp  10/5/06  6:57 AM  Page 315
316 THE ALLIANCE GOVERNMENT [111]
substantial minority of the Indians) who oppose all these concepts. Having now had a
year in office since the 1966 elections during which his multi-racial Alliance
Government has settled down extremely well in difficult circumstances, has gained
in confidence and has set vigorously about tackling Fiji’s problems in a determinedly
non-racial manner, and having recently taken the step of introducing the Ministerial
system, Ratu Mara is now probably giving some preliminary thought to what further
constitutional steps and what eventual goal he should have in mind. When he was in
London in June, Ratu Mara made some enquiries at official level concerning
integration with Britain; we were not encouraging. A brief on the point which was
submitted to Mr. Bowden at the time is attached at Annex F;2 but as is clear from the
record of his discussion with Mr. Bowden at Annex G, he did not then pursue the
point.3
9. The deep loyalty to Britain of the Fijians, coupled with their conservatism,
backwardness and fear of Indian domination, make it most unlikely that he will soon,
if ever, think in terms of independence. At official level we ourselves think that some
form of Associated State status is probably the right goal for Fiji; (this would be in
line with the agreement reached with American, New Zealand and Australian
representatives at official discussions in April this year that our joint objective should
be to preserve firm links between the various Pacific territories and their respective
metropolitan powers, and to avoid independence if possible.)4 Above all, time is
needed in Fiji to enable multi-racial government to settle down and take root and to
allow the Alliance Party (which was created specifically for last year’s elections) to
develop its political organisation. As regards this last point arrangements are being
made for Ratu Mara to see both Transport House and the Conservative Central Office
during his visit, to obtain advice on party organisation; we hope they may be able to
offer him some help. This will, however, inevitably take time to have any effect on the
ground in Fiji.
10. It follows from the above that we are in no hurry about further constitutional
moves and it is important that we should not give Ratu Mara any impression that we
would wish him to move fast or far in this field.
11. Ratu Mara’s objectives in making his current world tour, as announced in
Fiji, are plain from the official Fiji Government release attached at Annex H.
2 See 109. 3 See 109, note 2.
4 Marginal note by Galsworthy: ‘Secret. Not to be mentioned to Ratu Mara’. For the discussions to which
Galsworthy refers, see 108.
111 FCO 32/37 11 Jan 1968
‘Fiji: the Alliance Party government’: despatch from Sir D Jakeway to
Mr Thomson on the 1966 general election in Fiji and the
government’s handling of industrial relations
The turn of the year, when the Alliance Government has held office in Fiji for
some 14 months, may be a convenient moment to look back and assess its
performance.
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2. As reported more fully in my Secret and Personal despatch No. 37 of 15
December, 1966,1 general elections were held in October of that year for the much
enlarged legislature established by a new Constitutional Order in Council
promulgated just beforehand. This provided for a Legislative Council of 36 elected
members plus up to four appointed public officers. Twenty-five of the thirty-six were
to be elected by communal constituencies—nine Fijian (embracing other Pacific
Islanders), nine Indian and seven General (the remainder of the electorate, mainly
European and Chinese). Two were to be elected by the Fijian Great Council of Chiefs
and nine were to come from a combination of all the communal electorates into
three ‘cross-voting’ constituencies each returning three members (one Fijian, one
Indian and one General). In effect, therefore, each elector had four votes, one in a
communal constituency, and three in a cross-voting constituency. All men and
women over the age of 21 were eligible to vote. The register of voters, which had
been prepared earlier in the year, produced an electorate of 74,575 Fijian, 75,768
Indian and 6,340 General.
3. The election, which was conducted in orderly fashion, proved to be a contest
between two political groups—there were relatively few independent candidates and
none were successful except those which, though nominally independent, in fact had
the backing of one of the political groups. The two groups were:—
(a) the Federation Party, a well-organised, overwhelmingly Indian party which
had been in existence for some years. Its leader was Mr. A. D. Patel, an Indian-born
lawyer who came to Fiji in the ’thirties and had been active in politics ever since.
This party contested the election under protest as it was opposed to the
Constitution because this did not provide for an orthodox one man one vote
system of election;
(b) the Alliance, a recently formed loose combination of the Fijian Association, the
General Electors’ Association and the Indian National Congress. It could expect
the support of the great majority of Fijians, almost all the General electorate and a
minority of Indians. Its leader was Ratu K. K. T. Mara, a high-born, well-educated
Fijian who had resigned from the Administrative Service to contest the election.
4. The result was a clear-cut victory for the Alliance which won all the Fijian
seats, all the General seats and all the cross-voting seats, a total of 27. The Federation
Party won all the nine Indian communal seats. An analysis of the voting indicates
that the Alliance had the support of just under two-thirds of the electorate and the
Federation Party about a quarter.
5. I consulted Ratu Mara, as leader of the majority party in the legislature, on
appointments to Executive Council. He rejected a coalition with the Federation Party
on the grounds that the policies of the two parties were incompatible and that his
Indian supporters would be alienated. This was realistic, and it is anyway doubtful
whether the Federation Party would have agreed to join except on unacceptable
conditions (such as exclusion of Alliance Indians from Executive Council and
agreement on a new constitutional conference in the near future). Nevertheless it
marked a significant departure from the practice in the previous constitutional phase
of government by a consensus both within Legislative Council and Executive
1 See 103.
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Council. Both Ratu Mara and Mr. A. D. Patel had been members of the outgoing
Executive Council. From this a number of consequences have flowed.
6. By agreement with Ratu Mara, six Alliance Legislative Councillors (two Fijian,
two Indian and two European) were appointed to Executive Council plus four public
officers (three European and one Fijian). The sytem of associating unofficial
Executive Councillors with the formulation and presentation of policy on certain
specified subjects as Members for those subjects, which had been instituted in July
1964, was continued.
7. With one addition this team has continued in office unchanged. In May last
year Ratu Mara gave up the Natural Resources portfolio in order to concentrate on
his functions as Leader of Government Business and party chief. Another European
Legislative Councillor was brought into Executive Council as Member for Natural
Resources. Last September members were formally converted into Ministers.
Although outwardly significant this has not been an abrupt transition since members
had, in the preceeding months, been encouraged to behave and perform more and
more like Ministers.
8. Having relegated the Federation Party to Opposition status, Ratu Mara set out
from the beginning to accord it the constitutional position it has under the British
parliamentary system. He consulted and agreed with Mr. Patel on the election of a
Speaker and Deputy Speaker (one from each side). The position of Leader of the
Opposition was officially recognised and a salary allocated to it. House committees
contained Opposition representatives.
9. At the first three meetings of the new Legislative Council (November 1966,
March and June 1967), the Opposition reciprocated reasonably well. There were
hard-hitting exchanges on the floor of the House but personal relationships were
cordial and the constitutional proprieties were observed. At the September meeting
came a change. Mr. Patel set down a motion which in effect asked the Government to
agree that the present Constitution was all wrong and that it should be replaced by a
straight one man one vote type as advocated by the Federation Party. He could not
conceivably have expected the Alliance to accept the motion. Nevertheless when
various amendments were proposed (which had the effect of turning the motion
inside out) and when Mr. Vijay R. Singh (an Alliance Indian Minister and anathema
to the Federation Party) was speaking, the Opposition walked out in a body. It did not
return for the rest of the meeting and announced a policy of non-co-operation.
10. This walk-out was certainly premeditated. The Opposition has since accused
the Government of behaving like a dictatorship and steam-rollering its measures
through. The Government has been able convincingly to rebut these charges. The
real reasons for this abrupt change of tactics can only be conjectured but they are
probably a mixture of a number of factors at work. The Federation Party has probably
found the role of constitutional opposition politically unrewarding as well as
temperamentally uncongenial. The Alliance was being a mite too successful as a
Government and seemed to be consolidating its position. Fiji was due for its annual
airing in the United Nations and one of the purposes of the Federation Party was
undoubtedly to demonstrate to the Committee of 24 that whatever the appearances,
all was not well in Fiji. It must be remembered too that the walkout is not
uncommon tactic in the politics of India, in which Mr. Patel was reared.
11. The vague and non-committal utterances of the Opposition after the walkout
suggest that they had not at that time made up their minds how permanent it should
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be. Events on the labour front, to which I shall shortly turn, may have decided them
to take on the Government in an open clash and to force by-elections in the nine
seats they held with the hope of returning with increased majorities. Absence at two
consecutive meetings of Legislative Council renders a seat void. They stayed away
from the November Budget meetings and it remains to be seen what they will do at
the next meeting, probably in March. (One curiously inconsistent piece of conduct is
that they have recently accepted the invitation of the Speaker to nominate two
Opposition members to a select committee set up at the last meeting.) This
hardening of attitudes coincides with a noticeable slackening of the reins of
leadership by Mr. A. D. Patel and a strengthening of the influence in the Federation
Party of Mr. K. C. Ramrakha and Mr. S. M, Koya, both fire-eaters in their different
ways.
12. After some lesson-teaching experiences in 1959 and 1960, Fiji had built up
an enviable record of trouble-free labour-employer relationships over the succeeding
years. This was the result of responsible attitudes by the unions represented in the
Trade Union Congress and by employers as represented by the Fiji Employers
Consultative Association of up-to-date legislation administered by an effective
Department of Labour, and of the favourable economic climate engendered by the
sugar boom of 1963 and 1964 which permitted steady annual wage increases in all
industries. When the Alliance Government took up office in October 1966 the Budget
for 1967 had been already determined and it was clear that the economy was not
going to expand during that year at the rate to which people had become
accustomed. In my address to the Legislative Council at the Budget meeting in
November, I asked for restraint in increases of wages, incomes and prices. To their
credit, the Labour Advisory Board, composed of representatives of the Fiji Employers
Consultative Association and the Trade Union Congress endorsed this policy.
Unhappily the Congress, despite repeated advice, has never admitted to the fold the
rogue elephant of the trade union movement in Fiji, Mr. A. V. Tora. Apisai Tora, a
Fijian dismissed civil servant of doubtful mental stability, has over the years built up
a considerable reputation as a flouter of authority, usually getting away with it. He
had not long before been acquitted, after a protracted trial, of the arson of a
considerable portion of a hotel whose employees his union was representing in a
wage claim. The union of which he is president is the Airport, Hotel and Catering
Workers’ Union. He has assiduously and shrewdly built up its membership so that,
although relatively small in number, it occupies a key position in aviation and the
hotel industry; and it branched out into the building industry during the year.
13. In December 1966 Tora’s union presented the Government with an absurdly
inflated wage claim on behalf of the airport firemen, an essential service under the
Trade Disputes Ordinance, together with the required 28 days’ notice of intention to
strike. The strike notice was withdrawn after the Government had indicated its
willingness to refer the dispute to arbitration. The Commonwealth Industrial Court
of Australia was asked to nominate an arbitrator and selected Mr. Justice Gallagher,
its vice-president. The Government thought it had a cast-iron case for rejecting the
union’s claims, but it was mistaken. After a brief hearing, the arbitration tribunal
made a recommendation which ignored all the issues before it and awarded the
firemen an extra 30s. a week, a 20 per cent increase. All hopes of a wages pause were
now dashed and it was only a question of time before the consequences of this
irresponsible award would come home to roost.
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14. They were hastened by the brief but electric re-appearance on the scene of
another noncomformist character, Mr. James Anthony, on his way to take up a
research fellowship at the Australian National University in Canberra after five years
at Hawaii University on a United States scholarship. James Anthony had been the
ring-leader in the 1959 Suva disturbances. His MA thesis at Hawaii was on guerilla
warfare and he is no believer in peaceful evolution. He spent his few weeks transit
making inflammatory speeches on every possible occasion, and he intervened
successfully in a dispute which the Suva City Council had stupidly provoked with the
Municipal Workers’ Union of which he became Secretary. His style of oratory was
heady wine to his listeners and certainly helped to condition them for the
confrontation which took place in October.
15. Tora, flushed with the success of his airport firemen adventure and spurred
on by Anthony, with whom he had been in close contact, now took on Qantas, the
airline which services all aircraft transitting Nadi Airport. Once again the initial step
was the presentation of a log of claims which went far beyond the limits of the realisable.
In this case the increase asked for, drafted (it is thought) by Anthony, were in the region
of 100 to 200 per cent. Simultancously, claims of an almost identical nature were
presented to the Suva City Council by the Municipal Workers’ Union (Anthony’s) and
to two major construction companies operating in Suva by the Airport, Hotel and
Catering Workers’ Union (Tora’s). On 5 October, Tora, in conjunction with the resident
leader of the Municipal Workers’ Union, brought out on strike, without notice, the City
Council employees (other than those engaged on essential services) and the workers
on four construction sites, about 800 in all. On the night of 10 October, the Qantas
workers at Nadi Airport (97 in number) also struck.
16. The morning of 11 October was a critical and anxious one in Suva. Pressures
amounting to intimidation were exerted on bus and taxi drivers to stop running and
so cause a repetition of the 1959 disorders. The oil workers were also under pressure
to strike. The atmosphere in the city was tense and jittery. Shops started to put their
shutters up, expecting riots. Federation Party leaders (notably Koya and Ramrakha)
worked closely with Tora to spread the strike, hoping to make it general and to bring
about a political as well as an industrial crisis. The Chief Minister (Ratu Mara) had
the previous afternoon flown back from a world tour which had ended at Noumea
where he was attending the South Pacific Commission Conference. With his
concurrence I imposed the Public Safety Regulations and at mid-day he made an
admirably firm broadcast. This was really the turning point. The situation remained
delicately poised throughout the remainder of that day and the 12th, but the strike
did not spread. Buses continued running under police protection. Anthony, faced
with the loss of his fellowship if he left, remained in Canberra despite many rumours
to the contrary. On the 13th, first the construction workers and, later, the City
Council employees, returned to work and negotiations were resumed. The return of
the Qantas workers took a little longer, but on the 1 November they went back and
on the 2nd I revoked the Public Safety Regulations.
17. I have recounted these events at some length because there is no doubt that
they developed into a direct challenge to Mara’s Government. He met it with
commendable resolution and has deservedly emerged from it with greatly enhanced
prestige. While it is true that he acted on the advice of myself and senior public
officers, he did so without hesitation. He gave his own particular flavour to his
broadcast and, as with all his public utterances, it came across with unmistakeable
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sincerity. His month-long world tour, which took in Guyana, Jamaica, Trinidad,
Singapore and Malaysia, besides New York, London, and New Delhi as well as the
South Pacific Commission Conference at Noumea enabled him to meet Ministers in
other Commonwealth countries. With many he established a warm personal
relationship, receiving a sympathetic hearing for and understanding of Fiji’s
problems which has fortified his self-confidence. He is the unchallenged, and now
well-nigh irreplaceable, leader of the Alliance and he is the nearest thing to a truly
national leader that the country has. It is a position of great potentiality—and great
responsibility.
18. How in fact does the Alliance Government’s balance sheet stand as we enter
upon 1968?
19. The Alliance had the misfortune to take up office at a time when the
economy had stopped expanding at the 1964–66 rate. This was mainly due to
depressed world sugar prices and to unfavourable climatic factors affecting all
agricultural production. To balance the 1967 Budget it had to agree to fairly
substantial increases in taxation. Fortunately the economy has held up surprisingly
well, largely because of substantial injections of capital expenditure (mainly
Government, but also private) and because of the continued growth of tourism, so
the 1968 Budget was able to maintain development expenditure and to provide for a
modest increase in services with no additional taxation. But many of the capital
projects are dependent on the raising of a substantial overseas loan which is not yet
assured, and so long as world sugar prices remain low the outlook is precarious. This
is an uncomfortable situation for a Government which has to prove itself in the eyes
of an electorate which will judge it only by results.
20. The threat of a wages inflationary spiral, so imminent in September, had
receded by the end of the year. The services of Professor H. A. Turner2 of Cambridge
University had been obtained through the Ministry of Overseas Development’s
Technical Assistance Programme. He was here for only six weeks but he produced a
report of great significance—the most significant for the economy of this country
since the Burns Commission report of 1961, in my estimation. What is of equal
importance is that he produced it at great speed. It was thus possible for it to be
brought specifically within the terms of reference of the Board of Enquiry set up to
examine and report on the disputes between Qantas and the Airport, Hotel and
Catering Workers’ Union which sparked off the October labour unrest. Sir Trevor
Gould, a retired colonial judge living in New Zealand and frequently asked to sit on
the Fiji Court of Appeal, was the Board of Enquiry, and he had an unenviable task as
Tora, infuriated by the decision to appoint a Board, boycotted the Enquiry.
Nevertheless, Sir Trevor duly produced a report which broadly followed the Turner
line and advised that no increase in wages of more than 5 per cent was justifiable.
Meantime, the two unions representing Government unestablished staff
(Government being much the biggest employer in the country), and uneasy
bedfellows in a fairly new Joint Industrial Council had agreed to negotiate their wage
claim. They must have been sorely tempted to jump on the Tora bandwaggon, little
though they like him, but to their lasting credit and thanks to skilful handling on
management side, they agreed to a settlement which did not violate the
Turner/Gould limit. This set the fashion and the Municipal Workers’ Union settled
2 Montague Burton professor of industrial relations, Cambridge, since 1963.
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their dispute with the Suva City Council on similar lines. The construction workers’
dispute went to arbitration and the result was that the union got less than it could
have obtained by negotiation. Seeing the writing on the wall, Tora has settled his
union’s claim against Fiji Airways through conciliation by the Commissioner of
Labour. There remains the dispute which started it all, that between Qantas and
Tora’s union. It has been referred to arbitration. This time one should not have to
fear a repetition of the Gallagher award which sparked off the whole dismal train of
events. Given a responsible award by the arbitration tribunal we have a good chance
of implementing Professor Turner’s recommendation for a mechanism which will
keep wages, prices and incomes synchronised to national productivity. That may
sound gullibly optimistic for a small country which has all the problems of a big one.
Its smallness gives it the chance.
21. The Alliance is most vulnerable through the thinness of its Indian support
and through its dependence on European expertise. It has genuinely tried to govern
without racial prejudice and it hopes that its record of responsible and fair
administration will gain it increased Indian support without losing Fijian or
European. Mara is working hard to build up a network of district committees on a
multi-racial basis. It is too soon to say how successful or lasting this will be.
Certainly he himself is confident that he is gaining ground against the Federation
Party. But it is always easier to oppose than to construct, and the Federation Party
clearly hope to attract Fijian worker support through fomenting industrial unrest.
The majority of workers who went on strike last October were Fijian. This does not
necessarily mean that they have become Federation supporters. The Fijian likes the
excitement of a strike—it is nearly as good as a fight.
22. So far, the Alliance Government has not had much opportunity to acquire a
distinctive image of its own. It has had to live largely on the fat of its predecessor.
The two years July 1964 to July 1966, were years of considerable achievement (see
my despatch Personal No. 17 of 12 July, 1966). The development plan, the exciting
prospect of the University of the South Pacific, the basically sound state of public
administration, were all inherited. Moreover, it took office tarred with a somewhat
reactionary brush. Attitudes have changed noticeably since then. The Chief Minister
recognised that the support of the European community is in some ways a political
liability and is coming more and more to make use of Europeans rather than to
depend on them. In the public service, localisation is to be accelerated even if this
involves a compensation scheme (which was not to be contemplated six months ago).
The Chief Minister expects to be consulted on the whole range of Government
business including matters which, under the Constitution, are the special
responsibility of the Governor. Internal self-government has virtually arrived and the
Governor’s address to Legislative. Council when a new session is formally opened
next March will take the form of a statement of the Government’s policy and
programme as approved by the Council of Ministers. This will be the opportunity for
it to strike a line of its own.
23. In my despatch Personal No. 37 of 15 December, 1966, written shortly after
the present Government took office, I urged that the Alliance, offering as it did the
best prospect of a stable non-partisan Government in Fiji, deserved the whole-
hearted support of Her Majesty’s Government. It has received that support and it
continues to deserve it.
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112 FCO 32/23, no 108 26 Feb 1968
‘Fiji—Overseas Aid Scheme’: Commonwealth Office brief. Annex A:
‘Pacific territories—expatriate staffing’
Background
Difficulties have arisen with Ratu Mara, Chief Minister of Fiji, about the continuation
of the Overseas Services Aid Scheme (O.S.A.S.) under which, in common with many
other countries, Fiji receives financial assistance in the employment of British
Expatriates in her Public Service. A memorandum setting out the background of
O.S.A.S. and the history of the current difficulties in depth, and to some extent
repetitive of what follows, is attached at Annex A.
2. In brief, for local political reasons, Ratu Mara has decided that he would wish
O.S.A.S. to be brought to an end and a new arrangement negotiated with us to
replace it. The matter is urgent because he has placed a time-limit of 31 December,
1968, on certain local legislation essential to the operation of O.S.A.S. as now applied
in the case of Fiji, and difficulties over recruitment, coupled with great uncertainty
and low morale on the part of the staff have already reached serious proportions.
3. Ratu Mara’s proposals are:—
(a) O.S.A.S. should be terminated and H.M.O.C.S. wound up;
(b) as a corollary of (a), a compensation scheme should be introduced;
(c) all future expatriate officers required in Fiji should be employed on contract by
H.M.G. and provided on secondment;
(d) there should be accelerated localisation.
General
4. There are acute difficulties to accepting any such arrangement. In particular,
the Ministry of Overseas Development have indicated that in such circumstances:—
(i) on all previous precedents immediate lump sum compensation should be
payable in Fiji to officers whose careers as members of H.M.O.C.S. would be
terminated;
(ii) since this necessity did not arise from normal constitutional evolution but
from the carrying into effect of a wish of the Fiji Government, they (the O.D.M.)
would not feel justified in paying at once their normal 50% share of the cost of
such a compensation scheme; initially, therefore, the full cost would fall on the
Fiji Government who would only recoup 50% by stages over the standard 5-year
period normal for such compensation schemes;
(iii) all future British staff seconded from employment with H.M.G. to serve in Fiji
would have to be integrated with Home Civil Service salaries, allowances and
conditions of service, and would cost substantially more than the same staff
serving in Fiji at present on O.S.A.S. terms;
(iv) since the consequences in (iii) had been brought about at the wish of the Fiji
Government, the O.D.M. would not feel justified in increasing their contribution
to the costs of any officer above that at present obtaining under the O.S.A.S.
arrangement; each expatriate serving in Fiji would therefore cost the Fiji
Government appreciably more.
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5. Whilst it might no doubt be possible for some of the adverse financial
consequences noted above to be avoided if, in view of the delicate political
circumstances, the O.D.M. could be persuaded to agree to special arrangements for
Fiji, it seems certain that the consequences at (iii) could not be avoided. This is
because of the importance attached by H.M.G. generally as an employer to employing
staff on uniform terms and conditions of service and because it is a cardinal principle
that officials in the employ of H.M.G. are liable to U.K. tax (at present O.S.A.S.
officers pay local tax on their local salary; their Inducement Allowance is tax free).
Quite apart from any other consequences therefore, one result of agreeing to Ratu
Mara’s proposals would be that the differential in emoluments between British
expatriates serving in Fiji and local officers would be substantially increased. It is at
least arguable that this fact would cause Ratu Mara just as much local political
difficulty as does the present situation, even though he would be able to argue that
the individuals concerned were no longer the employees of the Fiji Government but
were employees of H.M.G. (which therefore determined their terms and conditions of
service) loaned to Fiji.
Present position
6. Under the present Fiji constitution staff matters remain the responsibility of
the Governor and not of his elected Ministers. In theory, therefore, it would be open
to us to insist that the O.S.A.S. scheme should be continued in its present form with
its present payment arrangements and for the Secretary of State to indicate that he
would, if necessary, instruct the Governor to certify legislation to ensure this. It is
not, however, considered that it is practical politics to adopt such a course. It would
inevitably provoke an extremely bitter and hostile reaction from Ratu Mara and the
elected members of the Fiji Government, which would be bound to infect the whole
of their relationship with Britain. They would see such action as running entirely
counter to the tenor of the relationship which has been developing between them
and the British Government over recent years. Ratu Mara has been told that his
essentially non-racial policies aimed at integrating the various communities in Fiji
have the full support of H.M.G., and encouraged to move steadily forward into a
situation in which elected Ministers take increasing responsibility for Fiji’s affairs.
He would not accept it as reasonable that we should refuse to discuss with him some
alternative to O.S.A.S. to help him deal with what is undoubtedly a difficult local
political problem. If we took such a course, there would be bound to be a risk of him
turning his thoughts away from building a multi-racial society in Fiji, and thinking
instead of means of perpetuating Fijian hegemony. This could only, in the short or
long run, increase the risk of a violent racial clash in Fiji which could involve us, if
Fiji were still a dependent territory, in an extremely serious security situation, made
more difficult to deal with by our withdrawal in a few years’ time from Singapore,
and of a kind that has always been recognised as being the worst possible in Fiji, i.e. a
situation in which the Fijians were against us and we were thus unable to rely on the
loyalty of the Fiji Military Forces or of large parts of the Police Force.
Line to be taken
7. In these circumstances the only sensible courses open to us are either to
persuade Ratu Mara that, despite the local political difficulties associated with it, a
continuation of O.S.A.S. is in the best interests of Fiji; or, alternatively, to be ready to
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discuss with him how arrangements on the lines he has requested might be brought
into effect. Given that the results of doing what Ratu Mara has asked for would be
essentially ridiculous (i.e. making a change because of local political objections to
financial discrimination in favour of expatriate officers which has as its end result a
substantial increase in the degree of such discrimination), it is our considered view,
which the O.D.M. share at official level, that we ought, as a first step, to do everything
possible to persuade Ratu Mara to see the difficulties of the course he has suggested
and to accept that it is preferable that O.S.A.S. should continue, despite the problems
it poses for him. Only if such an attempt failed would we propose to pursue further
the details of some arrangement on the lines of Ratu Mara’s request.
8. These considerations have been put to the Governor in a series of telegraphic
exchanges (See Annex B, in particular Commonwealth telegram Personal No. 12 of 9
February).1 The upshot of these exchanges was our proposal that personal invitations
might be sent to both the Governor and the Chief Minister to come to London to
discuss Public Service issues with Ministers presiding over these negotiations. Sir
Derek Jakeway has come down against this proposal (his telegram Personal No. 17 at
Annex B) the main argument being that the Chief Minister of Fiji is adamant that
substantive discussions on the problem should take place in Fiji. The Governor has
suggested that a Commonwealth Office Minister should visit Fiji for this purpose in
the near future. He has recommended that his Chief Secretary, Mr. G.P. Lloyd,
should come to London to explore what common ground can be reached prior to the
Fiji discussions. We have accepted this latter proposal and Mr. Lloyd will be arriving
here for discussions.
9. It is now for consideration how far we can get on the lines proposed in
paragraph 7 above. A meeting is to be held at the Ministry of Overseas Development
at 10.30 a.m. on Tuesday 27 February at which the Chief Secretary and
Commonwealth Office officials will be present to decide this or other alternatives.
Annex A to 112
British staffs are provided under the Overseas Service Aid Scheme (OSAS) to serve in
upwards of 40 countries, both dependent and independent, throughout the world. In
each case there is an OSAS agreement between Britain and the receiving government
laying down the arrangements. The most important feature of them is that, although
the staff are employees of the receiving government their emoluments (based on
local salary scales) are topped up by an inducement allowance—and certain other
benefits—to a level which enables the Ministry of Overseas Development to recruit
staff of the calibre required in the open market.
2. These arrangements apply also to Fiji and the Western Pacific territories.
These territories however differ from most of the OSAS territories in that in them are
now to be found the last remaining substantial group of permanent and pensionable
members of Her Majesty’s Overseas Civil Service (apart from Hong Kong where
OSAS was not offered).
3. The permanent and pensionable officers in the Pacific territories have
increasingly felt themselves the forgotten rump of a once proud Service most of
1 Annex B not printed.
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whose members they have seen receive handsome compensation as the territories in
which they were serving became independent, whilst they themselves have remained
locked into small services with rapidly declining prospects of promotion and transfer.
They have consistently pressed us, as have their governments, over recent years for a
winding up of HMOCS and either or both of the payment of compensation (basically
for loss of career prospects and for what they regard as a decline in the power of the
Secretary of State to protect their careers) and the creation of a United Kingdom
based service to which they could transfer and from which they could be seconded to
continue to serve overseas, whether in remaining dependencies or elsewhere.
4. The dissatisfaction of the staff, in particular in the Western Pacific territories,
had reached something approaching crisis proportions some 18 months ago when
Mr. Lee, the last Secretary of State for the Colonies, visited the Pacific. Many officers,
both permanent and pensionable, had voted with their feet and simply left,
abandoning pensions, gratuities, etc., and, particularly from the Western Pacific
territories, we were receiving increasingly insistent warnings that a breakdown in
the administration was not far off.
5. A Working Party consisting of representatives of the Commonwealth Office,
the Ministry of Overseas Development and the Treasury was established to look into
the problem. The Working Party rapidly concluded that, despite whatever efforts the
Pacific territories might make to localise their public services, there would be a
substantial requirement for expatriate officers for as far ahead as could be foreseen.
The Working Party also concluded that the level of emoluments in Pacific territories
was unduly low by comparison with world market rates and that as an initial short-
term measure it was necessary to improve them to what were demonstrably fair and
reasonable levels. As regards the longer-term problem, the Working Party recognised
that we could not continue to staff, in particular, the Western Pacific territories (Fiji
being a more pleasant country and having a larger service did not at that stage seem
such an acute problem) on the basis of simply keeping on the present slowly ageing
staff (permanent and pensionable recruitment had been stopped some years ago and
there was accordingly no new blood coming into the service).
6. After some months of deliberation the Working Party decided to send a
mission to the Pacific consisting of one representative each of the Commonwealth
Office and the Ministry of Overseas Development, charged with looking into the
whole situation and:—
(a) making recommendations on an immediate improvement in emoluments and
terms and conditions of service to demonstrably fair levels,
(b) discussing with the Governments and Staff Associations in the Pacific
territories of various possible longer-term solutions to the problem of staffing
these territories, including a number of particular ideas for improving the present
situation which had emerged in the course of the Working Party’s deliberations.
7. It should perhaps be explained at this stage that in the course of the Working
Party’s consideration of the longer-term problem, the Commonwealth Office had
formally put forward a proposal for the creation of a Home based service as the only
satisfactory means of ensuring effective administration in the long-term. The
essential feature of this proposal was that newly recruited staff should be offered
contracts of varying lengths. After 10 years continuous contract service, if both the
Government and the officers so decided, any further service could be on pensionable
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terms. Existing officers in the territories were to be integrated into the proposed new
service on the basis of their current conditions of service and/or length of service in
the territories, i.e. pensionable officers and contract officers with longer than 10
years service would transfer into the new service on pensionable terms. This proposal
did not find favour with either the Ministry of Overseas Development or the Treasury
since:—
(a) the creation of such a Service on pensionable terms would require United
Kingdom legislation, special arrangements with the Civil Service Commission and
clearance with the National Staff side;
(b) even if such a Service were finally created, compulsory transfer to it would be
so contrary to precedent that it would scarcely be defensible. If compulsory
transfer were not practicable (and many existing officers are in any case unsuitable
for such transfer), a compensation scheme for the pensionable staff under Colonial
306 would be a prerequisite; experience suggests that at this point many existing
officers would be content to retire with compensation, thus reducing the
effectiveness of such a Service.
Further consideration of the proposal was therefore deferred whilst alternatives were
explored. It has never, however, been formally rejected and remains before the
Working Party.
8. The joint Commonwealth Office/Ministry of Overseas Development mission
from the Working Party visited the Pacific territories in April 1967 and on its return
submitted two reports. The first dealt with the short-term issue of terms and
conditions of service, and recommended a substantial increase in emoluments and a
change in the previous arrangements for payment of inducement allowances and
other benefits so that:—
(a) Inducement allowance would in future be paid tax free direct by the British
Government—and thus not have to pass through territorial estimates;
(b) all offshore payments would in future be met by the British Government—
hitherto a part share of certain allowances had been made by the territorial
governments.
The second explored the longer-term problems and, whilst not making a firm
recommendation as to what the solution might be—and indeed envisaging that there
would probably be no simple single solution—made two significant points:—
(i) that before any long-term decisions were taken a study should be made to
assess the likelihood of the Ministry of Overseas Development being able, over a
10-year period, to fill and keep filled on contract with adequate staff the senior
posts in the territories’ Administrations;
(ii) that in all probability it would be necessary for us to think in terms of
introducing a Compensation Scheme (not related to the normal constitutional
criteria for the introduction of such schemes) in the relatively near future; the
Mission envisaged a deferred scheme under which benefits would be frozen on a
current date but compensation would only be paid at a period some years ahead;
the thought was that in the years of grace which this arrangement would give
other necessary steps to enable the staffing of the Pacific territories to be put on a
sound long-term basis, even though relying on contract staff, would be taken.
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9. Implementation of the Mission’s short-term proposals involved legislation in
all the Pacific territories (excluding the New Hebrides) to ensure that the
Inducement allowance was free of local tax and to ensure that for pension purposes a
notional gross figure was taken into account rather than the actual tax free (and thus
net) payment. In the course of the Mission’s discussions in the territories all the
territories concerned undertook that they would make the necessary legislative
changes if the Mission’s recommendations were approved in London. Approval was
given rapidly after the Mission’s return and the territories notified, but the local
legislation required ran into difficulties, particularly in Fiji where, although it was
adopted, a terminal date to its effectiveness was imposed in the ordinances concerned
so that, unless further legislation is introduced, the arrangements adopted, in
accordance with what had been agreed with the Mission, will lapse automatically on
31 December, 1968.
10. Although the Mission had put forward no long-term solution to the staffing
problems of the Pacific territories, the dissatisfaction and uncertainties of the staff in
these territories were considerably alleviated by the rapid adoption by Her Majesty’s
Government of the Mission’s short-term recommendations on pay and conditions of
service. Morale greatly improved and it looked as if we might have something of a
breathing space in which to try and tackle the much more intractable problems of
maintaining adequate Services in these remote territories in the longer term. All
these gains were set at nought, however, as a result of the decision of the Fiji
legislature to put a terminal date on the amending legislation which they passed.
Before the legislation went through the legislative council a considerable public
campaign was mounted in Fiji against pay discrimination in favour of expatriate
officers and against the OSAS scheme as a whole. The Chief Minister of Fiji for
personal reasons has always been antipathetic to the OSAS and, as a result of the
public campaign mounted and remarks made during the legislative council debate by
the Chief Minister and others, the morale of the staff slumped to an all-time low and
uncertainty returned in a greatly accentuated form. In considering the problems of
staffing the Pacific territories, the focus thus shifted dramatically from the Western
Pacific territories to Fiji. In the former the staff were by and large reasonably content
with the short-term improvements, whilst in the latter they immediately petitioned
the Secretary of State and asked for the winding up of HMOCS and the introduction
of a compensation scheme.
11. The Fiji Government for its part indicated that it no longer felt able to
operate the OSAS arrangements and that it hoped that some appropriate
replacement arrangements could be negotiated between it and the British
Government before 31 December, 1968. In the course of discussions with British
Ministers and officials during his visit to London in September, 1967, Ratu Mara, the
Chief Minister of Fiji, made plain his reasons for adopting this attitude although little
progress was made at that time in determining what alternative arrangements to
OSAS might be feasible. Basically the reason given by Ratu Mara for wishing to see
the OSAS brought to an end was that it both was, and was viewed as being,
discriminatory in favour of expatriate officers who were all, as it happened,
European. The whole scheme was thus rightly or wrongly regarded in Fiji as being
racially discriminatory. Ratu Mara was, with the full approval and support of British
Ministers making a determined effort, which posed considerable difficulties for him
within his own community, to evolve the policy of the multi-racial Alliance
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Government on strictly non-racial lines. He regarded this as the only sane course for
Fiji, given its racial problems, to adopt. He was having to take decisions in other
fields which would be unpopular and against this background he could no longer
countenance the continuation of the OSAS scheme given the view that was held of
this in Fiji, not least amongst local Europeans.
12. Further discussions on the whole problem took place at the end of October
1967 when Mr. Fairclough was in Fiji for a few days. Ratu Mara’s thoughts had by
then developed further on the whole matter. An idea of designating posts, rather
than officers, for inducement allowances which had been considered during Ratu
Mara’s visit to London in September 1967 had, on examination, proved to be
impracticable. And the introduction of a compensation scheme which, at the time
the Mission had visited Fiji in April had simply ‘not been on’, so far as Ratu Mara was
concerned, now seemed to have come within the realms of the possible. Moreover,
Ratu Mara’s ideas as to the sort of arrangements which he sought to succeed OSAS
had clarified to the extent that he made plain that he hoped, for the future, that all
expatriate staff provided for Fiji with British Government assistance could be
employees of the British Government rather than of the Fiji Government; this would
bring them into line with other overseas staff working in Fiji (e.g. New Zealand
teachers, United Nations officials, etc.) and in political terms would enable Ratu Mara
to deal with any criticism of the level of their emoluments by insisting that they were
the servants of the British Government rather than of the Fiji Government, and thus
that their terms of service were the affair of that Government, and not his concern at
all.
13. In short, it became plain that Ratu Mara would like to see introduced, to
replace the present OSAS arrangements, a package comprising the following
elements:—
(i) the winding up of HMOCS in Fiji;
(ii) the introduction of a compensation scheme;
(iii) all future expatriate staff provided with British Government help to be British
Government employees on contract seconded to Fiji;
(iv) accelerated localisation.
The Staff Associations, now thoroughly distrustful as a result of what had transpired
in connection with the passing of legislation through the Legislative Assembly, at the
same time demanded a virtually identical package.
14. In response to these demands we have already indicated that the British
Government would send to Fiji a further mission to discuss the whole complex of
problems arising with both the Fiji Government and the Staff Associations with the
object of evolving a long-term solution acceptable to both and to the British
Government. Under pressure from both Ratu Mara and the Staff Associations we
originally undertook that this mission would visit Fiji as early as possible in January.
Subsequently, as a result of difficulties in the Ministry of Overseas Development
thrown up by devaluation, we have had to defer the visit. But for reasons made plain
in the next paragraph it should certainly take place as soon as reasonably possible.
How soon this will be will depend upon the progress of consultations which we must
now have, since there is plainly no point in the mission going to Fiji until we, for our
part, know what line we are going to take and, for preference, there is at least some
reasonable prospect of a solution satisfactory to all concerned being worked out.
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15. The factors which import urgency into the proposed visit by the mission are
obvious. The effect of the imposition by the Fiji Government of the terminal date of
31 December, 1968 to the new arrangements for handling OSAS benefits means that
there is no certainty as to the terms and conditions of service which would apply
after that date. The OSAS agreement between the British and Fiji Governments runs
until 1971 and cannot be varied without the consent of both governments, and thus,
if nothing were done, all that in theory should happen at 31 December, 1968, would
be that the arrangements for paying inducement allowances, etc., would revert to
those formerly in force i.e. the Fiji Government would again become liable to meet
half the passage costs and also to pay gross, subject to net reimbursement by us, the
largely increased salaries of both pensionable and contract staff. But this would imply
that the payment of OSAS benefits would thereafter be made, as formerly, not direct
but through the Fiji Government; and the necessary financial provision would
require to be voted by the Legislative Council. In view of all that has been said in
recent months about OSAS and about expatriate staff generally, the staff can be
forgiven for feeling no certainty that in fact the benefits accruing to them would in
fact remain unaltered; they fear that the legislature might simply refuse to vote the
money for their inducement allowances. This fear, coupled with the related fear that
the Secretary of State no longer has the will, even though he has the power, to insist
upon what he regards as appropriate terms of service for, in particular, members of
HMOCS (for whom he is of course responsible), are the reasons put forward by the
Staff Association in justification of their demand for a compensation scheme under
the classic Colonial 306 terms. Whatever the arguments for or against this point of
view, the staff certainly see 31 December, 1968, as a crucial date from their point of
view. Thus pensionable officers over 45, being eligible to retire with pension, are now
considering whether or not they should do so. If no satisfactory long-term solution
emerges within the next few months, some of these officers will certainly retire
taking the view that by terminating their service with Fiji (including leave) before 31
December, 1968, they will at least know what pensionable emoluments their
pensions will be based upon and what pension they will thus draw; thereafter, they
have no such certainty. Others would no doubt recognise that they stood to gain by
waiting for whatever solution Her Majesty’s Government produces. However, it is
clear that, in the absence of an early and acceptable solution, there will be some loss
of experienced pensionable officers.
113 FCO 77/32 29 Apr 1968
[Merger of Commonwealth Office and Foreign Office]: letter from 
Sir D Jakeway to Sir M James expressing concern about a betrayal of
dependent territories1
When Arthur Galsworthy was here last week I asked him how the affairs of the
dependent territories were likely to be handled when the Commonwealth Office was
merged with the Foreign Office. He told me that no decisions had yet been taken but
1 The letter was signed in Jakeway’s absence by G P Lloyd.
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that there was a body of opinion in the Foreign Office which considered that no
separate division for dependent territories was necessary and that their interests
could be looked after by the division which had responsibility for their particular
geographical area i.e. Gibraltar would go with Spain, the Falkland Islands with Latin
America, Fiji with Australia, New Zealand and the rest of the South Pacific and so on.
2. I can understand the attractions of an arrangement so tidy and potentially so
economical. But I feel I must nevertheless write to tell you of the consternation and
alarm with which I view it. For no matter what was intended, my considered
judgment is that it would in practice make impossible the continuance of the present
special relationship between Britain and her dependent territories. This is, of course,
altogether different from the relationship with independent countries, whether
Commonwealth or foreign. The primary purpose of diplomatic posts in independent
countries it to protect and further British interests. Britain’s first responsibility
towards the dependent territories is to protect their interests, not hers. This may be
an over-simplification of a complex relationship, but in essence it is the truth, and it
depends for its preservation on there being in Whitehall a body of officials with
special knowledge of the dependent territories, with time to study their problems and
with responsibility for representing their interests and promoting their welfare. Less
than two years ago that responsibility was discharged by a separate department
headed by a separate Secretary of State. There is no longer a Colonial Office, nor a
Secretary of State for the Colonies. The diminishing number of dependencies no
doubt made that inevitable but the adverse effects on the remainder have been
cushioned by the retention in the Commonwealth Office of ministers with special
responsibility for them and of departments dealing specifically with them, under the
direction of a deputy under-secretary. Thereby, the relationship has been largely
maintained. I do not believe it could persist once no officer spent more than a
(probably quite small) part of his time on dependent territories. For everyone would
then be preoccupied with more important issues and subject to extraneous
pressures. And indeed I am bound to say that already there has been a noticeable
drawing-away and lack of understanding when our dealings have been with
functional departments.
3. If in the merged office there is to be no separate division charged with
responsibility for the remaining dependent territories I do not therefore see how
Britain can honestly and honourably discharge her obligations towards them. There
will be no identifiable voice in Whitehall to speak for them. They will be left to fight
their own battles with the British Government. While remaining citizens of the
United Kingdom and Colonies, they will have all the disadvantages of dependencies
and none of the advantages. It will be no less than a betrayal. Britain’s
responsibilities towards the dependent territories have not changed in nature just
because the number has diminished.
4. If the geographical distribution of the dependent territories goes through, not
only will the position of a governor be an unenviable one but, in Fiji, the reaction
when the significance sinks in will be sharp and bitter, both in the Government and
in the community at large. The changes so far made have evoked little public
comment (fortunately that third leader in the Times of April 6th was seen by few and
I understand from Arthur that it appeared only in the first edition and was incorrect).
There is a touching faith that Britain will always stand by Fiji and that how she does
it administratively can safely be left to her. But if people find themselves lumped with
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foreigners in an office which, whatever the name, is organised to deal with foreigners
I foresee a growing sense of abandonment; and the personal assurance given by the
Secretary of State in his telegram of the 20th March, and the Prime Minister’s
statement in House of Commons on the 9th April, will sound hollow indeed. The
process of bringing Fiji, in partnership with Britain, to full management of her own
affairs will be hindered, not advanced. Distrust, bitterness and suspicion will take the
place of loyalty, goodwill and faith.
5. There will be no opportunity for me to get this letter typed before I go on tour
so I am asking Peter Lloyd to sign it for me. He agrees throughout with the views I
have expressed.2
2 The Commonwealth Office merged with the Foreign Office to form the Foreign and Commonwealth
Office on 17 Oct 1968. The handling of the affairs of dependent territories in the merged Office was a
major discussion point in Whitehall prior to the merger. For background, see S R Ashton & Wm Roger
Louis, eds, East of Suez and the Commonwealth 1964–1971 (BDEEP, 2004) part II, chapter 8.
114 FCO 32/61, no 55 28 May 1968
[India and Fiji]: letter from A J Fairclough to D L Cole1 on
Government of India concerns over the Legislative Council, the 
sugar industry and cane growers
Mr. P. N. Kaul,2 India House, came to see me on 22 May. He said that Mr. T. N. Kaul,3
following his visit to Fiji at the beginning of the year, had raised one or two points
with the High Commissioner in Delhi. India House had now been instructed to
follow up matters with the Commonwealth Office since it was known that the Chief
Secretary of Fiji had visited the U.K. in February and it seemed likely that the
Commonwealth Office had discussed these matters with him then.
2. The three points which India House wished to discuss were as follows:—
(i) The future composition of the Fiji Legislative Council
(ii) Sugar Cane Farmers
(iii) Land Tenure
We did not pursue the question of the Chief Secretary’s visit or the reasons for it.
3. On (iii) Mr. Kaul said that normal leases were given for ten years. Indian
residents of Fiji had complained that they were experiencing considerable difficulty
in getting their leases renewed. This resulted in hardship since ten years’ tenure was
insufficient to pay off their debts. I went into this in some depth with him explaining
that the issue of land tenure in Fiji was perhaps one of the most complicated tasks
facing the authorities; that there had been introduced (in 1966) the Fiji Agricultural
Landlord and Tenant Ordinance which provides for leases to be for a minimum
period of ten years and for them to be automatically renewable for two further
periods of ten years unless tribunals (established under the Ordinance to investigate
1 Minister (Political), UK High Commission, New Delhi.
2 Counsellor, India High Commission in London.
3 Foreign secretary, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India.
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precisely the type of complaint Mr. Kaul had mentioned, and having as their
criterion for deciding whether leases should be renewed the concept of ‘greater
hardship’)—if the tribunals decided that greater hardship would result from evicting
the farmer from the land than from depriving the owner of the opportunity of using
it himself, then the tenant would have his lease renewed); that this development was
recent and that we had as yet no yardstick of its success; but that we did know
hearings before these tribunals were now taking place in 62 instances and more
references to the tribunals were expected. I expressed the hope that Mr. Kaul would
understand that the Fiji authorities were very much concerned to bring about an
equitable solution and added that it was a hopeful sign that the new legislation had,
when going through Legislative Council, been supported by Members of all races and
indeed by virtually the whole of the Council. Mr. Kaul enquired about the
composition of the tribunals and I said I would find out about their make-up.
4. Turning to the question of sugar cane farmers, Mr. Kaul said that they were
not being paid in cash but by instalments, and that they had to pay interest on
instalments outstanding. I said I thought there must be some mistake about the
interest question since the Fiji Sugar Inquiry Commission had specifically decided
on a system of instalment payments designed to protect the interests of both millers
and growers, which obviated the necessity for growers to ask for interest payments. I
outlined the position on the basis of the information in Fiji Savingram No. 73 and
mentioned that the matter had already been discussed in New Delhi with Mr. Jaipal.4
Mr. Kaul professed to be unaware of these discussions; he noted however that the
present arrangements were those resulting from the investigation of an impartial
commission.
5. On the question of the Legislative Council Mr. Kaul (whilst stressing that it of
course remained the policy of the Indian Government not to interfere in any way in
Fiji and that people of Indian origin who had made their home there should give
their loyalty to Fiji) said that India was naturally interested in developments there.
He said that it had been suggested that the composition of the Council should be
changed so as to be as follows:—
15 Fijians
15 Indians
5 European/Chinese
5 General seats.
The Indians had the idea that the General seats could be used to promote interracial
harmony and might be divided, giving three to the Fijians, one Indian and one
European. I said that we had heard that the Federation Party had discussed such a
possible composition with Mr. T. N. Kaul during his visit to Fiji and that Mr. Patel
had subsequently mentioned this idea informally to the Chief Minister, Ratu Mara;
the Alliance Party were also on record supporting a reduction of the number of
European seats and an extension of the number of cross-voting seats. I naturally,
however, declined to comment on the particular composition suggested by the
Indians or on the possible timing of any change. I said, however, that there could be
little doubt that at the appropriate time H.M.G. would be likely to accept the idea of
some reduction in European representation and an extension of cross-voting. I
4 R Jaipal, joint secretary, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India.
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remarked that there had been signs that a measure of agreement was emerging in
Fiji on changes in the composition of the Legislative Council; I stressed the
significance of this and said that H.M.G. were watching developments with great
interest. Unfortunately, however, by their continued boycott of the Legislative
Council the Federation Party had now forfeited their seats and by-elections were
pending. It seemed likely that local exchanges of view on the composition of the
Legislative Council had now come to a halt and that, until the by-elections had been
fought, there would be no further developments on this front.
6. I concluded by reminding Mr. Kaul that our policy was to encourage a
multiracial approach on the Fiji political scene and any moves to this end will receive
our support.
7. I am sending a copy of this letter to Sir Derek Jakeway in Fiji. I mentioned my
discussion with Mr. Kaul very briefly to Ratu Mara during his recent visit to London.
115 FCO 32/31, no 14 10 July 1968
[Fiji and the Committee of 24]: minute by Sir A Galsworthy on the
prospect of a UN Visiting Mission going to Fiji [Extract]
[The minute was written against the background of a request (in the form of a number of
questions) from the UK Mission to the UN in New York for information about Fiji in
preparation for debate in the Committee of Twenty-Four. Fiji was ‘firmly on the agenda’
of the committee, along with the Portuguese territories, French Somaliland, British
Honduras and the Falkland Islands, and it seemed likely the committee would favour a
visit by a Visiting Mission (FCO 32/31, no 8, J D B Shaw (UK Mission, New York) to A M
Warburton (UN Political Dept, FO), 24 June 1968). The correspondence was passed to the
Commonwealth Office where second secretary G T P Marshall replied to the requests
from New York, observing ‘While we should aim to be as forthcoming as we can, some of
the questions posed do raise difficulties, particularly as regards any premature disclosure
of the substance and timing of changes to the present constitution’ (ibid., no 13, Marshall
to Shaw, 9 July 1968).]
. . . In fact in many of the dependent territories a firm statement now that we were
not prepared to agree to Visiting Missions from the Committee of 24 would be
warmly welcomed and be seen as a considerable reassurance. This is particularly the
case in Fiji. The situation there is that we have an all elected Government. The
Government is formed by the Alliance Party, under Ratu Mara. This is a genuine
multi-racial Party, which is genuinely doing its best to break down communal
attitudes. But the Opposition, in the shape of the (‘Indian’) Federation Party, is
operating on purely communal lines. They are doing their level best to bring down
the Alliance Government and, more than that, destroy the present Constitution.
Thus they walked out of the Legislature, have forfeited their seats, and are trying to
force a new general election. We are clearly not falling for another general election,
although in a few weeks time there will have to be a mini-general election involving
nine seats. We know that the present intention of the Federation Party is again to
vacate any seats they win, and to go on repeating these tactics in the hope that
thereby they will completely discredit the present constitution. And Mr. A.D. Patel,
who is Chairman of the Federation Party in Fiji and recently got himself a trip to the
Committee of 24, as the Legal Adviser to the Banabans, is constantly taking the line
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in Fiji that he will bring the United Nations into Fiji and use the United Nations to
achieve the Federation’s ends.
4. If the Alliance Party in Fiji, and the attempt at Multiracial Government which
they represent, should fail, then we may well be in serious trouble in the Colony,
with communal troubles on a scale which could necessitate the despatch from this
country of a brigade group. Ratu Mara made it clear when he was last here in May
that he would be very strongly opposed to a Visiting Mission from the United Nations,
or indeed to any member of the Committee of 24 going to Fiji in any capacity
whatsoever; and he equally said that it would very considerably undermine his
position in Fiji if H.M.G. were at any time to give the impression that they were
thinking in terms of a Visiting Mission of representatives of the Committee of 24
going to the Colony. . . .
116 FCO 32/37, no 11 18 July 1968
[Governor-designate]: minute by T C D Jerrom on a meeting with 
Sir R Foster
I do not think that we need make any record of our preliminary conversations with
Sir Robert Foster about Fiji; we will now try to arrange a meeting with Sir Arthur
Galsworthy on 13 August for a full discussion in preparation for Sir Robert’s visit to
Fiji later that month. There are however three points of particular interest which
came up whilst Sir Robert was here which I should perhaps put down:—
(a) Sir Robert Foster expressed apprehension about the likelihood of an effective
transfer of power to local politicians in Fiji before there was a straightforward
transfer of responsibility. (By coincidence Sir Derek Jakeway’s letter, in which he
made the same point, arrived while Sir Robert was here and we showed it to Sir
Robert.)
(b) Sir Robert noted with interest the (to me striking) development that Ratu
Mara himself had sent an invitation to a Minister of the Indian Government to visit
Fiji in September. He remarked on the risks of getting further involved with the
Indian Government but took a philosophical view of what was happening on the
basis that the first contacts with senior officials of the Indian Government had
proved generally beneficial.
(c) Sir Robert wanted to get a clear line from the office about the possibility of
Associated Statehood for Fiji. He raised this point with the Secretary of State (no
officials were present) and told me that the Secretary of State’s reaction was that
Associated Statehood was ‘open’. In speaking to me, Sir Robert then said that all
he had wanted to know was whether it was ‘on offer’. It seemed to me that he
might be inclined to put a gloss on what he had been told. I said that I thought
that the word ‘open’ meant that the U.K. Government had a completely open mind
about the future of Fiji. I said that I thought it was important that before he saw
Sir Derek Jakeway we should have a further word about this and that the meeting
with Sir Arthur Galsworthy would be the best time to deal with it. (Incidentally,
Sir Robert told me that nearly all his conversation with the Secretary of State was
about Western Pacific matters, not, as we had expected, about Fiji.)
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2. I am sending a copy of this minute to Mr. Marshall to note these points before
the meeting on 13 August.
117 FCO 32/364, no 8 30 July 1968
‘Fiji and Australia’: Commonwealth Office note on Australian aid to
Fiji
[This note was sent with a covering letter by J C Morgan to Sir C Johnston, UK high
commissioner to Australia. Morgan explained that the priority of Far East and Pacific
Dept (FEPD) at the Commonwealth Office was to persuade Australia (and New Zealand) to
assume part at least of the UK’s former defence responsibilities in South-East Asia
following Britain’s announcement of its intention to withdraw forces from the region by
the end of 1971. FEPD suggested it was important that any initiative on Fiji did not
reduce the prospect of persuading the Australians to retain forces in Malaysia and
Singapore, and did not give rise to renewed Australian suspicion the UK was seeking ‘to
unload responsibility for our Pacific territories on to them’. Morgan suggested Johnston
was in the best position to judge the timing and nature of any approach to the
Australians. Despite the defence imperative he concluded: ‘I know you agree that we
should continue to push hard for the Australians to give more generous aid to Fiji in
particular, and, in due course, our other Pacific dependencies in general.’]
The increasing importance of the Pacific area to Australia’s export trade was recently
highlighted in a statement by the Australian Trade Commissioner for the Pacific. Mr.
Carney at a meeting with Tongan Government and business leaders in May said that
the Pacific area is now Australia’s fifth largest export market and in 1967 exports to
the area topped the $100,000,000 (Australian) mark. Plans are in hand to encourage
this trade and to help with problems of three million Pacific islanders spread over
twelve and a half million square miles with poor communications and restricted
markets for their exportable product. Mr. Carney also stressed the growing aid
provided under the Technical Assistance Programme for the Pacific Territories
(ASPTAP) since it was introduced three years ago; it had already benefited many of
the territories in the area.
2. This expression of continuing Australian interest in the economic and
financial development of the Pacific area is both welcome and encouraging. Australia
has of course heavy commitments in Papua and New Guinea and it is understandable
that she should be reluctant to become over-involved elsewhere in the Pacific. But
there are a number of reasons why her trading and financial role in the area, and
particularly in Fiji, cannot be other than a growing one. In the first place most of the
currencies of the Pacific area are geared to the Australian doller, and most of the
trading companies in that area are based on Fiji and have close connections with
Australia. The greater part of private investment in Fiji is of Australian origin and as
a result there is a large outflow of dividend income from Fiji to Australia. An
examination of Fiji’s trading and economic position vis-à-vis Australia can hardly be
said to present a balanced picture and suggests a very strong case for more Australian
help to Fiji in the economic and financial spheres. A background paper supporting
this thesis is attached.1 Briefly, Australia has a favourable trade balance of some
£5,000,000, a direct income of over £2,000,000 per annum, from investment, and
takes all Fiji’s unrefined gold exports to the order of some £1,500,000 per annum.
1 Not printed.
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3. Our interest in promoting Australian involvement, particularly in the form of
commercial trading and investment, should not be taken to mean that we see their
contribution as replacing our own, but rather as an addition to the help which we
have continued to give to Fiji in a time of financial stringency for this country. But
we do consider that Australia ought to play a greater part in the promotion of general
development as well as private investment in the Pacific Territories.
118 FCO 32/37, no 18 13 Aug 1968
[Future of Fiji]: Commonwealth Office note of a meeting with 
Sir R Foster
Mr. Jerrom raised the question of the formal announcement of Sir Robert’s
appointment to Fiji. He said that the first week in September seemed an appropriate
date. Sir Arthur Galsworthy commented that the announcement would have to be
made in London and it would be necessary to arrange for simultaneous
announcements in Suva and Honiara. The announcement might be drafted this week
and the text telegraphed to Fiji early next week for clearance by Sir Derek Jakeway
and Sir Robert Foster who would then be in the Colony. There was a point to be
considered in that the appointment of Mr. Gass to succeed Sir Robert Foster in
Honiara was not completely finalised. It would be appropriate if the appointment of a
successor could be announced simultaneously with Sir Robert’s new appointment,
but if this was not possible it would be best to go ahead and include in the
communiqué a note to the effect that it was hoped to announce Sir Robert’s
successor in the near future.
2. Sir Arthur Galsworthy then turned to the present position in Fiji. Mini-
elections were about to take place. When he last saw the Chief Minister of Fiji, in
April, the latter had mentioned that he expected the Alliance to win at least one and
possibly two of the Indian seats. If this happened, it would put Ratu Mara in a strong
position. The Federation Party on the other hand seemed confident that they would
win all nine seats. They have stated that it is their intention to continue to boycott
the Legislative Council. Sir Arthur Galsworthy had asked Sir Derek Jakeway whether
in such circumstances he could carry on. The latter had said he could but wondered
how long London would be prepared to let the constitution run in such
circumstances. Sir Arthur thought that London would be prepared to accept the
position provided that the Alliance Party were able to carry on effectively.
3. Sir Arthur then went on to discuss the political future of the Colony. At
present the Opposition Party were led by Mr. Patel who might be characterised as a
typical pre-war Indian congress-party type of man. He was however a very sick man.
Should he go his likely successors were of a different calibre. They were, not to put
too fine a point on it, strong-arm types and it could not be ruled out that they might
have recourse to violence. Sir Robert wondered what sort of warning there would be
that a situation of this nature was brewing. Sir Arthur thought that there would be
ample warning since the special branch in Fiji was a reliable one. Referring to the by-
elections, Sir Arthur said that Sir Derek Jakeway’s view was that the key to future
stability was early agreement on the timing of constitutional development. The Chief
Minister had been thinking of a conference in 1970 but it now seemed that he was
prepared to advance this timing and would not be averse to a further constitutional
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conference as early as the autumn of 1969. But Mara’s difficulty was to avoid giving
the impression that he had been pushed into the position of calling for a conference
by the Federation Party. Mr. Morgan said that in a recent letter from Sir Derek
Jakeway the latter had commented on the way in which ministerial responsibility was
lagging behind power. This could give the Alliance Party a good lever in seeking a
constitutional conference to correct the position. Mr. Jerrom mentioned a press
statement recently made by the Chief Minister. This seemed to indicate that the
Alliance might come out pretty soon, possibly before the by-elections, on its position
regarding a constitutional conference. Sir Arthur Galsworthy then mentioned the
Indian involvement in Fiji. A visit earlier this year by Mr. Jaipal and Mr. Kaul,1 two
senior Indian officials, had been successful and their advice to the Federation Party
was that the latter should be co-operate and abandon their boycott of the Legislative
Council. A further invitation had now been sent by the Chief Minister to a prominent
Indian politician who was expected to visit Fiji shortly after the by-elections. It was
hoped that by the use of the good offices of the visitor, it would be possible to get
Mara and Patel talking again.
4. Sir Arthur went on to say that Sir Derek Jakeway during his term of office had
managed to get things moving. Now however there was some uncertainty about
going further. Our dilemma was that the Federation Party want to speed things up
but we are not sure how far the Alliance would wish to go in a further constitutional
conference. Sir Robert Foster asked what the next step might be at such a
conference. Sir Arthur said that it ought to be possible for our lawyers to devise
further steps towards internal self-government with built-in refinements. In
particular there must be unimpaired clear-cut responsibility for internal security
remaining with the Governor.
5. Mr. Jerrom enquired when Sir Robert would take up his appointment. Sir
Arthur said that he had thought somewhere around Christmas. What were Sir
Robert’s own views? Sir Robert said for his part he would be happy to move from
Honiara at the beginning of December. Sir Arthur agreed that Sir Robert should
discuss the matter with Sir Derek Jakeway next week and send a telegram from Suva.
It was hoped that they could settle on the beginning of December. It would be
necessary to sort out the mechanics of the financial overlap involved in having only a
short interregnum.
1 See 114, notes 4 & 3.
119 FCO 32/429 Aug 1968
‘Report on a visit to Fiji’: report by Professor Stanley de Smith1
suggesting alternatives to communal representation [Extract]
. . .
Defects in the 1966 constitution
13. Viewed in August 1968, the constitutional scheme accepted by the majority of
the participants in the 1965 London Conference and implemented in 1966 has two
1 See 75, note 6; de Smith visited Fiji, 27 July – 4 Aug 1968.
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main defects. It relies far too heavily on communal representation with separate
electoral rolls, and it guarantees too many seats in the Legislative Council to
members of the General electorate.
14. Till the cross-voting system was introduced for the 1966 elections, there had
never been any form of elected representation in the Fiji Legislative Council other
than the strictly communal; indeed, only in 1963 had direct elections been
introduced for Fijians. In this context, as I have already indicated, cross-voting was a
distinct advance in that it compelled European and Fijian candidates to make an
appeal to all races and to shed some of their parochial attitudes. Nevertheless,
separate electoral rolls were maintained; and even the cross-voting electorate was
produced by an amalgamation of separate rolls, though in substance this entailed
common-roll elections with reserved seats. Moreover, the number of members
elected on a strictly communal basis was substantially increased. To this extent the
1966 Constitution could be stigmatised, and was of course stigmatised by the
Federation Party, as a retrograde step. Looking back three years, it may be
unfortunate that the Federation Party’s relatively moderate compromise proposal
(Report of the Fiji Constitutional Conference 1965 (Cmnd. 2783), paragraph 24)
received such short shrift.
15. Communal representation with separate electorates is not necessarily or
usually an artifice cunningly implanted into a body politic by the imperial power to
perpetuate a policy of ‘divide and rule’. Nevertheless, it is widely so regarded on the
international scene. Most of the countries in which it has been adopted at one time
or another (e.g. India, Ceylon, Cyprus, Kenya) have had a depressing record of
intercommunal friction. Of course, matters might have gone no better in those
countries if minorities had been denied this form of protection. One can have just as
much friction, just as narrow an appeal to sectional interests, in a country which has
never adopted this device and has adopted the system of one man one vote one value
on a common roll from the start. Moreover, the system of communal representation
for Maoris in New Zealand was generally approbated till Maori opinion itself began to
shift. And it is perfectly possible for such a system to work well, if it is agreed by all
the main communities to be the best available answer to the problems of a country at
a particular period of time. The Mayor of Suva, Mr. L.G. Usher, insisted that it worked
well, on a basis of parity between the three main racial groups in the Suva City
Council. Be that as it may—and in terms of population Suva is a predominantly
Indian city—it is vigorously assailed by the Federation Party; it will, I believe, be a
continuing obstacle to inter-racial harmony in Fiji if it is retained on a large scale in
the long term; and as far as I am aware it does not exist in any other colonial
territory. For the moment it serves the purposes of reassuring the Fijians that, in
alliance with the Europeans, they will not be swamped by superior Indian numbers,
of reassuring local European business interests that they will have some
representative spokesmen in the Legislature and allaying their misgivings about a
prospective ascendancy of the Federation Party, and of providing the Legislative and
Executive Councils with a good leavening of competent and experienced European
members in a period of transition. But the movement must necessarily be towards a
common electoral roll, with or without racial reservation of seats. The only real
question is one of timing.
16. The second main defect is the over-representation of Europeans. Under the
1966 Constitution 4 per cent of the registered electorate was guaranteed ten out of
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thirty-six of the elected seats. This 4 per cent was composed of Europeans, part-
Europeans and Chinese. As things turned out, nine of these general seats (or 25 per
cent of all elected seats) were won by European candidates. Europeans constituted
1.4 per cent of the population at the census. The average registered electorates for
the Indian and Fijian communal seats were well over 9,000. For the General
communal seats the average was 904. All Europeans to whom I spoke agreed that
their disproportionate guaranteed representation had to be reduced at the next
round of constitutional changes.
17. A third reason why the London decisions were denounced by the Federation
Party (and criticised by a respectable body of independent opinion) was that the
Fijians were allocated two more communal seats than the Indians. The fact that the
two extra Fijians were the representatives of the Great Council of Chiefs was probably
not the main issue, but there is clearly a case for not giving the Great Council of
Chiefs special representation in a unicameral legislative body. This point is
appreciated in Fiji. The possible disadvantages of proposing such a change also
became apparent to me, and I think that this question cannot be discussed except in
the framework of a larger political and constitutional setting.
Lines of approach to reform
18. The next system of election and legislative representation should, as far as is
practicable:—
(i) have adequate regard to the reasonable interests of all sections of the
community, including the two major parties;
(ii) bear especially in mind the apprehensions of the indigenous Fijians, and also
take into account the contribution made to the prosperity of the islands by the
smaller minorities;
(iii) tend to discourage purely communal appeals to the electorate;
(iv) be capable of commanding the greatest possible measure of local acceptance
or acquiescence;
(v) not be over-complicated for the ordinary voter;
(vi) lend itself to justification by the United Kingdom Government and approval
by moderate and well-informed international opinion (whatever view might be
expressed by a majority of the Committee of 24);
(vii) be suitable for a system of internal self-government.
To state these desiderata is enough to emphasise the magnitude of the problem. I do
not believe for a moment that a new system commanding the agreement of both
major parties could be devised in August 1968. One must, however, look ahead in the
hope that a more propitious political climate may emerge.
A. The ‘Kaul’ scheme
19. In 1967 Mrs. Ahman, the Swedish representative in the Fourth Committee of
the General Assembly of the United Nations, had suggested that constitutional
development in Fiji presented peculiar problems and should develop along three
lines: the extension of the cross-voting system, a reduction of European
representation, and the enlargement of internal autonomy. A few months ago Mr.
Kaul, of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs, had proposed a substantial extension
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of the cross-voting system during the course of an official visit to Fiji,2 and Mr. A.D.
Patel, the leader of the Federation Party and then Leader of the Opposition, had
expressed interest in the idea. According to the Kaul scheme, there would be fifteen
Fijians, fifteen Indians, five Europeans (or possibly five General candidates) and five
others; who the five ‘others’ were to be and how they were to be chosen under this
scheme were not altogether clear. The Governor, when I first saw him on Sunday,
July 28th, suggested to me that I should sound Mr. Patel on the Kaul scheme.
20. I saw Mr. Patel in Nandi on July 30th. Mr. S.M. Koya of the Federation Party,
who it was hoped would be present, was unfortunately unavailable, but I was able to
talk to Mr. Patel about political issues for nearly three hours.
21. Mr. Patel was entirely affable towards me and reasonably forthcoming, but it
was apparent that there was no possibility of a rapprochement between the party
leaders at this time on the cross-voting issue. The political temperature in Fiji was
running high. The nine Federation Party members had decided to dramatise their
protest against the 1966 Constitution and subsequent developments by walking out
of the Legislative Council after the introduction of the ministerial system in
September, 1967. They continued their boycott till they incurred disqualification for
membership; the intention was to make a demonstration of the party’s strength in
the Indian community when they stood again as candidates at the ensuing by-
elections. When Mr. Patel thus ceased to be Leader of the Opposition, Ratu Mara
withdrew Mr. Patel’s invitation to accompany him to the International Sugar
Conference in Geneva; this led to further recriminations. The dates fixed for the by-
elections were August 31st–September 7th; the Alliance was contesting all nine seats,
and one of its candidates was Mr. M.T. Khan, a recent recruit from the Federation
Party. The Federation Party was about to issue an election manifesto; this was not
available to me, but Mr. Patel referred me to his presidential policy speech delivered
at the party’s annual convention at the end of June. In this speech he had vehemently
denounced the white colonialists and their satraps who in his view dominated the
Alliance; he had appealed for Fijian solidarity with the Indian population, and had
affirmed that the party stood for immediate independence within the Commonwealth
with a popularly elected Fijian as non-executive head of State; the electoral system
was to provide for one man one vote one value on a common roll.
22. For my benefit Mr. Patel re-iterated and amplified these points. He seemed
confident that his party was gaining ground by its policies and tactics and would not
only win the by-elections by bigger margins than before but also win substantial
Fijian support in a new General Election. He was particularly gratified at having
recruited two Fijians of chiefly blood—Ratu Julian Toganivalu, who had been made
organising secretary of the Party, and Ratu Mosese Varesekete, an economics
graduate who had been made editor of the Pacific Review, the party’s English and
Fijian language organ. (I was later to meet these two gentlemen in the company of
Mr. K.C. Ramrakha, the sophisticated and intelligent General Secretary of the Party.
Ratu Julian proved to be an exceptionally volable and angry critic of the status, quo
in Fiji.) In these circumstances it was not easy to engage Mr. Patel in a serious
discussion of alternatives to his proclaimed views. Battle was about to be joined; the
2 See 114.
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scent of victory was in his nostrils; he was even looking forward to the ultimate
consummation of his political ambitions within the next three years.
23. Nevertheless, he was willing to talk briefly about the Kaul proposals. He said
that he would have been prepared to explore them ‘as an interim measure’ and had
expected to hear further from Ratu Mara about the matter, but nothing had
happened. Mr. Patel indicated, indeed, that he might be prepared to look at them
again if an approach were to be made to him. However, his understanding (or re-
interpretation) of the 15 : 15 : 5 : 5 scheme differed from that of members of the
Executive Council. As Mr. Patel saw it, the forty members would be elected in single-
member constituencies on a common roll, and the last five seats would be open
seats, which could be filled by members of any community. A Boundary Commission
would be necessary to delimit constituencies. He was strongly opposed to a
perpetuation or extension of the cross-voting system, and would not even accept
multi-member constituencies with reserved seats on an overtly common roll; these
contrivances tended to divide Indians from Fijians.
24. It would have been pointless for me to ask Mr. Patel there and then a series of
hypothetical questions in an attempt to elicit an alternative basis for inter-party
discussions. Such a basis, Kaul-like or otherwise, may be constructed after the by-
elections are over; or it may not. Mr. Patel is apt to take up rigid stances; he is also
capable of adopting pragmatic approaches in a spirit of compromise. His objections
to cross-voting and reserved seats in multi-member constituencies are doubtless
influenced by calculations of immediate party political advantage. But I have formed
the opinion that his ideological objections to ethnic identifications run very deep. If
this opinion is correct, the road to an accommodation may be stony.
25. The biggest single obstacle to an accommodation has lain, and probably still
lies, in fears of ‘Indian domination’. These fears often express themselves in different
answers to the question: Who ‘belongs’ to Fiji? In an address recently delivered in
Australia by Mr. James Anthony, a prominent Fiji-born radical of primarily Indian
stock, the following passage appears (Pacific Islands Monthly, May 1968. at pp.
65–66):—
‘Indians must recognise certain facts of political life in the islands. They must
recognise that they are considered by the Fijian to be Vulagi (visitors).
Now, from a legal point of view, second and third generation Indians born
in Fiji and who know no other home but Fiji may consider it an insult to be so
classified. But the fact of the matter is that Fijians have had it drummed into
them that Indians are vulagi and it is what the Fijians believe that determines
their attitudes and political behaviour towards the Indians. . . .
Patel and his colleagues, it seems to me, cannot and will not accept their
being vulagi—consequently any hope of their allaying the fears of the Fijians
is very doubtful—perhaps impossible . . .’
26. Given their numerical inferiority and economic vulnerability, the Fijians are
understandably apprehensive. Certainly Mr. Patel and his colleagues do not accept
that they are vulagi. Of the Indian population in Fiji, they often point out, nineteen
out of twenty are Fiji-born (though Mr. Patel is the twentieth); they stress the
common interests of Indians and Fijians; it is the Europeans, only one in seven of
whom is Fiji-born, who are really the vulagi. And so the Pacific Review (see for
example the issue of July 30, 1968) inveighs against the Colonial Alliance, the
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Expatriate Alliance, and even the ‘whites and their black sycophants’. But at the
convention of the Fijian Association a speaker denounced outsiders who wanted to
smash the Constitution to pieces (Fiji Times, August 1st, 1968). How far the Fijian
and Indian communities are divided within themselves is a question to which I
cannot presume to offer an answer; nor am I willing to make prognostications about
the political prospects of the Alliance and the Federation Party. However, it would be
surprising to me, if any substantial number of Fijians, even if alienated from the
Alliance leadership, were to cast their lot with the Federation Party in the
immediately foreseeable future. In present circumstances there is no obvious reason
why the Fijian leadership should be more flexible than Mr. Patel in its approach to
problems of electoral reform and legislative representation.
B. A ‘radical’ approach
27. In these last few paragraphs I have not painted an optimistic picture. I hope,
however, that it is a reasonably accurate representation of the scene. In this context I
am not interested in surrealism. And because I wanted to follow a strictly realistic
approach in Fiji, I refrained from throwing off ideas which seemed to me to have no
chance of being taken seriously by the majority of the Executive Council at present.
Here I am going to put forward an idea which would be regarded as radical in the
context of Fiji, and which might be thought of as being at best utopian and at worst
fundamentally obnoxious. But what may be an absurdity today may be a basis for
discussion the day after tomorrow. If I had formulated this idea before my last day in
Fiji (when I was sitting by myself reconsidering the problems) I should certainly have
put it privately to the Governor, the Chief Secretary and Ratu Mara in the first
instance to test their preliminary reactions.
28. Such a scheme would be along the following lines:—
(a) There would be a slightly larger Legislative Council, consisting of (say) forty-
five elected members. If this change were to be made for the introduction of
internal self-government, there would be at the most two official members and
possibly none.
An enlargement of Leg Co is supported by some Alliance backbenchers. It can be
justified as a means of accommodating as many interests as possible, and in
particular as a means of finding seats for existing members who would otherwise be
deprived of these seats upon a change in the method or distribution of representation
(cf. Mauritius in 1967). It can also be justified in the light of the increase in
population and a prospective increase in the number of non-official Ministers.
(b) Two of these members would be the elected representatives of the Great
Council of Chiefs. This would be disliked by the Federation Party, but to propose to
take away the representation of the Council of Chiefs (or to demote them to non-
voting members, or members with a vote only on issues affecting special Fijian
interests) would cause alarm in many Fijian circles when other big changes were
being contemplated. There have been precedents for indirectly elected chiefly
representation in unicameral legislatures in the independence constitutions of
Sierra Leone and The Gambia.
(c) The other members would be elected mainly in two-member constituencies,
with some single-member constituencies and perhaps one or two constituencies
returning more members, on a common roll without racial reservation of seats.
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(d) The new constituencies would be delimited by a Boundary Commission
appointed by the Secretary of State; its terms of reference would require it, inter
alia, to have regard to the wide geographical dispersion of population in rural
areas and existing provincial boundaries; I note that at the last census (see Table 2
annexed to the Census Report) the Fijians were in a majority in nine out of the
fourteen provinces. Obviously there would be a good deal of controversy about the
Commission’s terms of reference (which would be potentially helpful to the
Alliance) and its recommendations.
29. From the point of view of presentation outside Fiji the great advantage of
such a scheme would be that it would almost entirely eliminate the overtly
communal features of the present system, which now stand out so starkly. And the
purposes of basing it on multi-member constituencies would be to encourage parties
to put up candidates of more than one community in a constituency—this happened
in Mauritius in 1967—and to facilitate linguistic communications between the
candidaten and the electorate.
30. I do not pretend that I think such a scheme would be readily acceptable to
the Alliance.
(i) The Federation Party would have a reasonable chance of getting into power if it
had significantly more popular support than the Alliance. On the other hand, the
presence of the two representatives of the Council of Chiefs and (almost certainly)
the results of the delimitation of constituencies would give the Alliance a built-in
advantage.
(ii) It would introduce the feared common roll. Voters could, of course, still be
registered on separate communal rolls, merged (as in the present cross-voting
constituencies) for the purpose of the election, if this were thought to be of any
psychological value.
(iii) It would deprive Europeans (and therefore the Alliance) of any guarantee of
securing the election of representative European candidates elected by European
votes; it would seem almost impossible to devise even a single-member
constituency in Fiji in which European voters would be in an overall majority;
where Europeans are settled they are outnumbered by Indians. On the other hand,
one would expect the Alliance to put up, for example, a European and a Fijian, an
Indian and a Fijian, a Chinese and a part-European, a European and an Indian, in
some constituencies where victory could be expected; Europeans who wished to
remain in politics and were prepared to put themselves to some inconvenience
would probably then be elected mainly on the strength of rural Fijian votes. One
notes, incidentally, that several Europeans were elected in open seats in the New
Guinea elections earlier this year.
31. Among five possible electoral schemes which I put to non-official members
of the Executive Council on the penultimate day of my visit—unfortunately Ratu
Mara and the Indian members were unable to be present—was one very similar to
this. The only difference from the scheme I outlined to them as compared with the
scheme outlined in paragraph 28, was that the seats would still be reserved for
members of particular communities. The scheme, which was not received with
obvious enthusiasm, would, I think on reflection, be inferior to the one outlined in
the foregoing paragraphs in two respects: it would still emphasise racial divisions
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without conferring compensating advantages on minorities: and, given the ethnic
composition of the new constituencies to be delimited by the Boundary Commission,
the allocation of particular seats to ‘General’, ‘Fijian’ and ‘Indian’ candidates might
appear very artificial and would overstress unnecessarily any bias against the
Federation Party that might emerge from the delimitation.
C. A ‘realistic’ approach
32. At the meeting referred to in the previous paragraph, I offered, as my own
provisional first choice, the following scheme. There would be a Legislature of about
forty-five members elected on a common roll; a Boundary Commission would
delimit constituencies, which would be mainly two-member; the representatives of
the Council of Chiefs would retain their seats and full voting rights, and there would
be four seats reserved for General candidates; there would be no other reserved seats.
To ensure that the General candidates were not unrepresentative of sentiment
among the General electorate, there would be a primary election conducted by
General voters, who would have to be registered on a separate roll for this purpose.
The two candidates with the highest votes in the primary for each General reserved
seat would then go forward to the main election, and one would then be chosen by
voters on a common roll. (Alternatively, all candidates with more than 20 per cent of
the votes cast at the primary could go forward to the main election.) Another
possibility would be not to have primaries but to declare elected in a reserved
constituency only a candidate who had obtained more than 20 per cent of the
General Vote. It should, I thought, be open to voters in the main election to refrain
from voting for the General candidate in a multi-member constituency without
invalidating their ballot-papers where provision for a primary had been made, but in
non-reserved seats the electors should be required to vote for as many candidates as
there were seats to be filled. General candidates would not be precluded from
standing in non-reserved seats if they so wished.
33. This tentative proposal (inspired by the arrangements made for the Kenya
elections after the Lancaster House Conference in 1960) aroused a good deal of
interest. Its immediate advantage for the Alliance is, of course, as manifest as its
detriment to the Federation Party. Its drawbacks may be:—
(i) It is too obviously disadvantageous to the Federation Party to command that
party’s acquiescence or, perhaps, to be convincingly justified to critics outside Fiji.
(ii) Justification becomes more difficult because the most influential section of
the community will be singled out for special protection.
(iii) There might be a demand by Fijians for similar protection, which would be
difficult to resist.
(iv) Various consequential problems could arise. Should there be special General
constituencies (e.g. two in Suva City, one for the rest of Viti Levu and one for all
the other islands)? If so, there would be an awkward overlapping of constituencies,
and two of the four constituencies would be very large. The holding of primaries in
the very large constituencies would be time-consuming, perhaps to the point of
impracticability. If the reserved constituencies were to be integrated with the
other constituencies, which constituencies outside Suva City could be so reserved?
If a percentage requirement without primaries were to be imposed, a candidate
well down in the poll might be declared elected; this would look very odd. If there
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were to be primaries, a sufficient number of candidates to have a contest might not
in fact present themselves, and the exercise, having aroused much controversy,
would then seem futile.
34. However, I think that a scheme along the lines I have indicated does at least
merit careful consideration.
D. Cross-voting systems
35. The other three schemes that I outlined to the meeting of non-official
Ministers involved large or small elements of cross-voting. To the best of my
recollection, they were generally on the following lines:—
(i) Cross-voting over almost the whole country. There would be sixteen Fijians,
sixteen Indians, four General, two Council of Chiefs and perhaps six other ‘open’
members who might be returned on the basis of proportionality as between the
parties or on the basis of the most successful party (in terms of seats or votes)
taking all. Since cross-voting is an unpalatable to the Federation Party as is the
common roll to the majority of Alliance supporters, this would cause political
difficulties; they would not necessarily be insuperable. I had in mind four large
cross-voting constituencies, each returning nine members (4 : 4 : 1). To have
constituencies of this size as the core of an electoral system would not be very
satisfactory. The Governor later suggested to me a more detailed scheme for
smaller multi-member cross-voting constituencies, returning unequal numbers of
candidates from the various sections of the population but conforming in the
aggregate to a 16 : 16 : 4 distribution; there might be a further eight open seats.
This idea seemed interesting to me.
(ii) Reducing the irritant caused by the fact of cross-voting by having only a
slight extension of the cross-voting system (e.g. to four three-member
constituencies), with the other members (apart from the representatives of the
Council of Chiefs) elected in unreserved open constituencies on a common roll
or combined rolls.
(iii) As in (ii) above, but retaining the present three cross-voting constituencies.
It is worth mentioning that I do not remember any of the European Ministers
objecting to the ratio of 16 : 16 : 4.
E. General
36. These, then, are the main possibilities as I see them. Each of them has
advantages and disadvantages; none of them will command general assent at this
moment of time. Talk of justice and expediency is not particularly helpful: all that
succeeds is success, and whatever is most generally accepted must be deemed to be
the best available solution. In the absence of general acceptance, one must fall back
on basic policy considerations, on which there may be profound differences of
opinion. The great Fijian dilemma is strikingly exemplified by the motto of the City
of Suva, prominently displayed beneath the coat of arms in the City Centre. It reads
‘Valataka na Dina’ (‘Fight for the Right’). The supporters flanking the coat of arms
(devised by the College of Heralds) are an old colonial European and an old colonial
Fijian: the Indian is conspicuous by his absence. What is ‘right’ in Fiji is a question to
which one can proffer no smart answer.
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Some miscellaneous points
37. In the course of my talks I threw off three other suggestions for incorporation
in a new electoral system. The first two were the alternative vote (or ‘preferential
voting’), which is in force for elections to the Australian House of Representatives, and
the second ballot, which is adopted in France where no candidate has obtained an
absolute majority in a constituency. It was rightly pointed out that these devices, which
might be helpful in certain circumstances, would be irrelevant unless there was a
significant third party or a large independent vote. I also indicated that it might be
worth while to think about a proposal put forward by the Banwell Commission in one
of its abortive recommendations for Mauritius (see Colonial No. 362 (1966) paragraph
50): that if a party received more than (say) 25 per cent of the votes at a General Election
but won fewer than 25 per cent of the seats, extra seats should be added to give it 25
per cent of the composition of the Legislature. This idea would be relevant only in a
context where ultimate status was being determined and specially entrenched
procedures for constitutional amendment within Fiji were being considered.
38. I also asked leaders of both parties whether the qualification for candidature
at an election (two years’ residence out of the last three) should not be relaxed. The
present constitutional rule will prevent some former students, returning from
overseas, from standing as candidates. Ratu Mara did not think any change would be
desirable. Mr. Patel, mentioning the name of James Anthony as an illustration,
thought that it would be fairer to modify the present rule.
39. Common roll elections are now held in all towns and townships except
Lautoka and Suva; there is a move in Lautoka for the substitution of a common roll
for the present separate rolls with communal representation but I understand that in
Suva (four Fijians, four Indians, four Europeans, and two nominated members) there
is still a big majority on the council opposed to such a change. I was unable to delve
adequately into this question, but my provisional view would be that although
reform in Suva was inevitable and desirable, this might have to follow rather than
precede change at the national level.
Safeguards for Fijian land rights
40. The Federation Party leaders are still dissatisfied with the law relating to
Fijian reserves and the right to own and dispose of land, though grievances have been
reduced by the progressive landlord and tenant legislation of 1966. I was given to
understand, however, that the Party would be prepared to accept any constitutional
safeguard that the Fijians wished to have for their existing land rights, provided that
an acceptable new constitution was devised. In any event I think it essential that such
rights should be explicitly guaranteed in an appropriate form which would preclude
any erosion except with the concurrence of a representative Fijian body.
A last word
41. My time in Fiji was brief. I came and went while the political situation was in
a state of uncertainty. Opinions among Fijians and Europeans had become more
flexible over the past three years; the Federation Party had adopted a more rigid
stance; but in any event a serious attempt to identify points of likely agreement for
the future while an acrimonious electioneering campaign was being waged was
foredoomed to failure. I hope, however, that some of my comments made in Fiji and
in this report may help to improve the chances for constructive and realistic
discussions on constitutional reform when a more favourable climate emerges.
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42. I wish to express my gratitude to His Excellency the Governor, to the Chief
Secretary and to all who made it possible for me to see a large number of people in a
short period of time. I was also fortunate in finding so ready a response from those
with whom I held discussions.
120 FCO 32/364, no 9 26 Aug 1968
[Fiji and Australia]: letter (reply) from Sir C Johnston (Canberra) to 
J C Morgan
Thank you for your letter QN 6/4 of 30 July about Australian help to Fiji.1
2. As you know we have on numerous occasions made clear to the Australian
Government that Fiji needs more aid and that in our view and that of the Fiji
Government it is reasonable that Australia, because of the benefit she derives from
her special economic position in Fiji, should give this aid. The arguments have been
put by British Ministers (the Colonial Secretary raised it in August, 1966 and the
Commonwealth Secretary raised it in February 1967) and at senior official level to
Australian Departments on numerous occasions.
3. The conclusion which the Australian Cabinet reached when rejecting the Fiji
Government’s request for a Government to Government loan (my telegram 227 of 8
February 1967) was a directive that ‘a study be made of possible ways and means by
which assistance might be offered by Australia to Fiji’. Though we have seen no
results from this study we know from conversation with Australian officials (e.g. with
Jim Plimsoll2 when Harry Ritchie was here earlier this year) that the Australian
position is that any aid to Fiji must fall within the framework of existing Australian
aid policy. This is a pretty limiting restriction given the nature of that policy which is
broadly speaking that Papua/New Guinea get the lions’ share; the rest of the carcass
goes to South East Asia; and the crumbs go elsewhere—including ASPTAP which
covers Fiji.
4. In my view any frontal attack on this position at this stage is likely to be
counter-productive. We know that Mr. Gorton3 feels that Australia’s task is to help in
South East Asia and that he is prickly about suggestions that Australia should do
more in areas which he regards as the preserve of others. What is more, as you
rightly say, we must be very careful not to give the Australians the impression that
we are getting ready to pull out of the Pacific and wish to slough off our imperial
responsibilities onto them.
5. My conclusion is therefore that there is at this stage no profit in seeking to
persuade the Australian Government that they have a responsibility to help Fiji on a
broader basis than they have indicated that they are prepared to do. The Australians
are not prepared to see it that way and H.M.G. will not be able to make them do so,
and would probably be unwise to try. My recommendation is that we should seek to
build on the Cabinet decision which I refer to above. I do not believe that Australian
officials are in practice going to think of any of these ways and means. But I would be
1 See 117, note. 2 Sir J Plimsoll, secretary, Dept of External Affairs, Australia, 1965–1970.
3 John Gorton, prime minister of Australia, 1968–1971.
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very ready to present the Australians with a ‘shopping list’ if Derek Jakeway’s officials
could compile a list of things which they would like Australia to do for Fiji within the
terms of Australia’s aid policy, that is to say in practice within the terms of ASPTAP
or possibly by liberalisation of trade.
6. I do not despair of the Australians taking a more generous view in the longer
term as they become accustomed to the idea of themselves seeking to maintain the
stability amongst their smaller neighbours which is in their interest and which the
colonial powers in the past have maintained for them. There might be ways in which
this development could be encouraged. For example if the Fijian Chief Minister were
to pay a goodwill visit to Australia I do not doubt that the Australians would be very
ready to receive him and that his people’s expectations from Australia could be more
cogently put by him than by us. Major, Fijian Government representative on my staff,
intends to recommend this. Apparently no Fijian Minister has yet visited Australia
officially.
7. In sum I entirely agree that we must continue to push for more Australian aid
to Fiji. But I think we should concentrate our pressure on the doors which are ajar.
We should not give up hope that other doors will be opened but we shall best achieve
this indirectly by ensuring that the problems of Fiji are kept before Australian
Ministers’ minds. I have mentioned the possibility of a visit by Ratu Mara. In addition
Bob Major has suggested that Harry Ritchie might have a chance to talk generally
about Fiji’s problems with Mr. McMahon4 at the Commonwealth Finance Ministers’
Meeting later this year and there would obviously be advantage in that.
8. I am sending a copy of this letter to Derek Jakeway.5
4 W McMahon, Treasurer, Government of Australia, 1966–1969.
5 Johnston returned to the matter of Australian aid in Oct 1968, reporting that Australia had agreed to a
suggestion made by Major to Plimsoll whereby Fiji would receive aid in the shape of flour from Australia
which the Fiji government could then sell. There were precedents about giving food aid in this manner in
relation to Indonesia and India. Australia agreed to give Fiji 10,000 tons of flour (valued at $800,000) in
the year ending 30 June 1969, and might do the same in two subsequent years. This would be in addition
to the aid valued at around $20,000 a year which Fiji received through Australia’s South Pacific Aid
Programme. Johnston described this as a ‘generous gift’. It would not alter consideration of what else
Australia might do for Fiji but it would influence the timing of any further approaches (FCO 32/364, no 15,
Johnston to Morgan, 8 Oct 1968).
121 FCO 32/31, no 35 10 Sept 1968
[Federation Party]: letter from J H Lambert1 to J D B Shaw2 refuting
claims made by Mr Patel in his presidential address to the Federation
Party
In my letter UP 4/238/2 of 3 September I undertook to let you have material on the
two ‘petitions’ from Ramrakha3 which have circulated to the Committee of 24. (Nos.
1868 and 1859).
1 Head of UN (Political Dept), FO. 2 UK Mission to the UN, New York. 3 See 119, para 22.
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2. You will by now have received a copy of the Supervisor of Election’s reply to
Ramrakha’s letter of 16 July. It is typical of Federation Party tactics that while
forwarding their letter to the U.N. Secretary-General they omitted to send Halstead’s
reply which demolishes their case. This exchange of correspondence, incidentally,
has not been published in Fiji.
3. Petition No. 1859 enclosed Patel’s Presidential statement to the annual
conference of the Federation Party. It will not escape you that this rambling
peroration is in fact a party manifesto issued with an eye to the by-elections. But as
you say in your letter of 20 August it will provide a quarry for those of our critics in
the Committee of 24 who wish to throw stones. Its very diffuseness however makes it
difficult of concise rebuttal but the following material may be of help to you in
countering charges to which the more provocative sections of the speech could give
rise.
4. The allegation that Mr. Greenwood, when he was Colonial Secretary, gave
assurances in 1965 that there would be another constitutional conference in two
years, is completely without foundation. Nothing in our records of the conference
could possibly be construed in a way to give support to Patel’s contention.4 For your
own information the Minister of Housing has recently commented that he is quite
certain that he gave no assurance of the sort claimed. Nor does he recollect that he
had any private talks with Patel. If the allegation was true we would enquire why did
the Federation Party walk out after one year and why was it not produced until after
the walk out?
5. Similarly belated is the charge that the elections in 1966 were rigged. No
election petition was filed after they took place. There were some isolated complaints
by pro and anti-Federation candidates of malpractices by a few individual polling
clerks (who were thereupon removed from duty), and defects in electoral regulations
have been corrected by amending regulations made by the Governor after
consultation with leaders of both parties. The fact is, the Alliance won the election
fair and square. There is no evidence to support allegations of pressure on voters.
6. A further nonsense is Patel’s complaint that the Alliance Party have made
excessive use of the guillotine in debates. Debate has been curtailed on only four
occasions and then only when minor matters were being debated. What Patel is really
objecting to is the Government’s use of its majority to get its measure through. In
fact the Government has leant over backwards to treat the opposition
constitutionally but I think I cannot do better than refer you to the enclosed copy5 of
a press release put out in Suva recently which demonstrates in detail the extent to
which the Government has endeavoured to co-operate with the opposition party. I
hope you can agree that in the light of this any charge of non-cooperation could
more appropriately be levelled at the opposition. In the important matter of the
introduction of the Ministerial system you will see that the provisions essential to the
introduction of that system were sent to Patel a month before the Council Meeting,
and, although his comments were invited he made none until the meeting itself (at
which the opposition walked out). Incidentally the composition of the Executive
Council was not changed when it became a Council of Ministers on 1 September,
4 After he left the CO in 1965, Greenwood was minister of overseas development, 1965–1966, and minister
of housing and local government, 1966–1970.
5 Not printed.
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1967. The normal complement is three Fijians, two Indians and six Europeans. Patel
has elected to omit the second Indian (an Assistant Minister) and to pick on the
temporary appointment of a European who was acting for the Fijian Public Officer
on the Council, who was on leave.
7. One could go on indefinitely refuting various matters touched upon in this
rather wide-ranging speech, but I think it will suffice if I mention one further
particularly discreditable smear. This is the claim that the Chief Minister has been
personally associated with the Lomaivua project. It is true that the scheme has been
a disappointment as a banana project but Mara has not been particularly closely
involved with it. It started in 1963 when he was in administrative service and posted
to another division. It was carried into Stage II when he was Member for Natural
Resources, on the advice of Managing Agents. Settlement on the project was open to
all and though a few Indians joined at the outset these did not stay the course.
8. I trust the foregoing will be of use should you come under fire in respect of the
petitions.
122 FCO 32/406, no 2 6 Nov 1968
[Council of Chiefs]: address of loyalty to Her Majesty the Queen
May it please Your Majesty,
Once again this year the Great Council of Chiefs is assembled; and it wishes to convey
to Your Majesty its expression of loyalty to Your Majesty’s person, to the Throne, and
to the British Government.
2. It is with profound feelings of respect and humility that we, Your Majesty’s
obedient subjects and members of the Great Council of Chiefs, beg to bring before
Your Majesty certain matters concerning the Fijian people.
3. It is a source of satisfaction and encouragement to us that, ever since Cession,
the way has remained open for the direct communication to Your Majesty of the
wishes of the Great Council of Chiefs.
4. This Council meets at an unhappy time. For one thing, we are saying goodbye
to our esteemed Governor, Your Majesty’s representative in Fiji, Sir Francis Derek
Jakeway, K.C.M.G., O.B.E., whose counsel and wisdom have greatly contributed to
the political, social and economic advances now taking place in Fiji. Looking back
over the 94 years since Cession, we in Fiji have happy memories of our link with
Britain, and we have much to be grateful for, to the British Crown. One of the
consequences of the current change is localisation, which will hasten the departure
of administrative officers and professional and technical advisers who have brought
to our country invaluable service without which our Colony would be in a much
poorer state to-day to cope with the many problems of modern administration. These
British men and women have, by their example, laid the foundations of integrity,
perseverance and that high standard of moral purpose which pervades the British
Law. For these people, of whom many have gone, but of whom some still remain here
to guide and advise us, we offer our humble and sincere gratitude.
5. In our last Address to Your Majesty, we referred to our grave concern at the
attitudes of the United Nations Special Committee on Colonialism. This concern has
been increased by recent political activities, within Fiji, in support of these attitudes.
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An organization which has the support of the majority of the race which outnumbers
ours but with whom we would wish to live in amity, is increasingly insistent in its
demand for constitutional advances in the direction of independence from Great
Britain and the introduction of a common roll system of election. We strongly
oppose both.
6. We are steadfast in our purpose to maintain and strengthen the link between
the Crown and our people. We know, further, that Your Majesty is aware of the widely
different situations which exist in the United Kingdom and in Fiji; and we are
confident that Your Majesty’s government would not insist that the political system
which is good for the one must necessarily be good for the other. We find ourselves
to be a minority people in our own land. The form of government which is being
demanded by certain elements in Fiji and overseas, in the name of ‘democracy’,
would result in our being placed under the political control of immigrant races. It
was not for this that we ceded our land to your illustrious forbear. And we are
confident that Your Majesty, and Your Majesty’s government, will not allow this to
happen.
7. We firmly believe that Fijian interests will continue to be acknowledged as
paramount in our land by the great power to whom we, in faith and hope, entrusted
the care of our people; that we shall continue to be watched over by the Throne; and
that such decisions as may, in the future, be taken will safeguard these interests.
8. We convey once again to Your Majesty an assurance of our steadfast loyalty to
the Throne and pray for a long and happy reign by Your Majesty, His Royal Highness
the Duke of Edinburgh and the Royal Family.
We, Your Majesty’s most humble servants, subscribe ourselves on behalf of the
members of the Great Council of Chiefs, and of the Fijian people.
1 Signed by Na Vunivalu mai Bau, Na Roko Tui Dreketi, Na Qaranivalu, Na Tui Nayau, and forwarded by
Foster on 14 Jan 1969.
123 FCO 32/401, no 1 12 Nov 1968
[By-elections]: letter from Sir D Jakeway to Sir A Galsworthy1 on the
political situation following the Federation Party victories. Enclosures
When forwarding the report of the Fiji Intelligence Committee for September, I said
I would try to produce a re-appraisal of the political scene, which might have
changed significantly. Now, a month later, one can say with some certainty that it
has. The Fijians, instead of being reluctant to consider further early constitutional
advance are now likely to press for a quick move to self-government—on their terms.
2. Against the advice of Kaul (the senior Indian diplomat who visited Fiji last
January),2 Patel persisted in boycotting the Legislative Council and thus forced by-
elections in the nine Indian communal seats. If his object was to demonstrate the
support of the Indian community for his party it succeeded all too well, for it provoked
a highly emotional, and at times ugly, communal Fijian reaction. The first high tension
1 At this point Galsworthy is now superintending deputy under-secretary of state of the Pacific and Indian
Ocean Dept at the FCO, the FO and the Commonwealth Office having merged as from 17 Oct 1968
2 cf 114.
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has subsided but the underlying feeling of revulsion remains and showed itself at the
meeting of the Council of Chiefs which has just ended. At the time of writing I have
only hearsay reports but it appears that strong opinions were expressed from the floor
and Mara and Penaia had a difficult time in preventing them from being reflected in
thoroughly reactionary resolutions. A proposal to demand the abolition of the Landlord
and Tenant Ordinance (which is regarded as favouring Indian tenants against Fijian
landowners) was referred back to the Fijian Affairs Board, whence it originated. But a
resolution was passed favouring an early constitutional conference and expressing
support for the communal system of voting.
3. The first part of the resolution reflects a view which, as reported by the Fiji
Intelligence Committee, is gaining ground with the Fijian intelligentsia and was
given expression in that committee by Ratu Penaia. It is that self-government with
built-in Fijian paramountcy should be sought as quickly as possible. What exactly
they mean by this is not clear but Mara has gathered round him a group of bright
young Fijian graduates who are doing some hard thinking on it. Judging from his
latest talks with me, Mara himself still favours a continuing link with Britain on the
Associated State pattern.
4. I have, as you know, consistently expressed the view that we should move from
the present constitutional stage sooner rather than later. (See my letters in this
series of 17th February and 16th June 1967.) It now seems likely that both the major
political parties will themselves be pressing for this. The visit of the Indian minister,
Mr Hathi,3 came at an opportune moment in that it was, mercifully, not too soon
after the by-elections but early enough to allow its impact to take effect before the
next meeting of Legislative Council (which begins on 22nd November), when the
Alliance and Federation Party will again be face to face. Hathi achieved as much as
could reasonably be expected of him. Both Mara and Patel have agreed to start
talking again and both have accepted that a racially balanced legislature is necessary
in the circumstances of Fiji. From Mara this agreement was readily forthcoming,
from Patel only reluctantly. How far Patel is sincere must be in doubt, and how far
Mara is going to be influenced by the thinking of his Fijian brains trust must also be
in doubt. But unless something untoward happens meanwhile, the likelihood is that
they will be having private exchange during the next meeting of Legislative Council.
5. So if we are going to be in a position to influence the way these talks go we
ought to be clear in our own minds what outcome we would like. Stanley de Smith’s
visit and resultant paper4 were valuable more, perhaps, in a negative way than a
positive sense. For I remain of the opinion expressed in my letter (also in this series)
of the 25th September, that neither the ‘Radical Approach’ nor the ‘Realistic
Approach’ is the right answer. The ‘Radical Approach’ might now be less
unacceptable to the Alliance than I had then supposed, but only if the constitution
were so arranged as to guarantee a Fijian majority. But de Smith was remarkably
prescient in the two paragraphs which he omitted from his report and sent
separately. For as a result of the Federation Party’s tactics of forcing a demonstration
of Indian solidarity, and at the same time using the United Nations to bring pressure
to bear on H.M.G., the preponderantly Fijian Alliance is rapidly coming round to the
view that it had better take over quick.
3 J L Hathi, Indian minister for labour and rehabilitation. 4 See 119.
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6. So what should be our line? Personally I see no better solution than the
elimination of communal seats by extending the cross-voting one. For presentation
to the Alliance this is the best way to put it but it is in fact a common roll with
reserved seats as proposed by Kaul. Peter Lloyd has independently come to the same
conclusion, and I attach the relevant portion of a thoughtful minute he has written.
7. I shall be leaving in a day or two and the next few weeks could be quite critical
for Fiji’s future. Peter, therefore, takes on a heavy responsibility and if you can send
him quickly your initial reactions to the contents of this letter it would be helpful to
him. With Mara’s concurrence I have written to Patel urging them to get together.
(Copy enclosed.)
8. One final comment. It may sound from this letter that politics in Fiji have
become irretrievably polarised on a communal basis. This is not so. The Alliance
retain a substantial Indian support, more than appeared in the by-elections because
by their nature they invited a communal approach and did not risk any change of the
party in power. To what extent the Federation party has attracted Fijian support is
problematical. It has some and is certainly now trying to attract more, which is all to
the good.
9. I am sending a copy of this letter to Robin Foster.
Enclosures to 123
Note by G P Lloyd, 25 Oct 1968
The Federation Party is evidently of opinion that it may secure changes of the kind it
desires by bringing pressure to bear on the United Kingdom, either through the
United Nations or otherwise. It thus attempts to discredit the present Constitution,
eschews local discussion about possible amendments to it and strikes
uncompromising attitudes; and its behaviour is of the precise kind most likely to
provoke a hostile Fijian reaction by creating anxiety lest the United Kingdom be
forced to accede to its demands. If it had to adjust to a situation in which
constitutional change had become a matter for local decision this might force it
(after an initial squeal of protest) to adopt a quite different and less divisive approach.
In the second place, one clear lesson of the recent by-elections is that we should as
soon as possible ensure that all candidates have to appeal to voters of every race,
probably by replacing all communal with cross-voting seats. Only thus can racial
friction be minimised and the risk of violence be reduced.
In the third place, another clear lesson is that (as stated above) a period of
consolidation has been of no benefit to the Alliance despite the Party’s own impartial
behaviour and our covert attempts to assist it. Nor has such a period provided a
breathing space for the races to learn that they must live together. Admittedly there
seemed at first a chance it might do this. But once the Federation Party mounted a
determined attack on the present Constitution the chance quickly dwindled, and we
have now reached a point where emotions again run high, talk is wild and the
atmosphere tense. There isn’t much point in arguing whether this is the Federation
Party’s fault for being unwisely impatient to get an admittedly undemocratic and
unsatisfactory electoral system revised or for introducing a racial note into the by-
election campaign, of the Alliance for its reluctance to think in terms of early
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constitutional change or of the Fijian Association for over-reacting to the by-election
result. What matters is that the process is likely to be repeated if we think in terms of
another breathing space. Hence there is no valid reason for supposing that further
delays will be to the advantage either of the Alliance or of Fiji. Moreover I am
increasingly inclined to share the view which Ratu Mara expressed that the
Federation Party is unlikely ever to accept Associated State status as a compromise
ultimate goal for Fiji: in which case there is little to be gained from playing for time
in the hope it may eventually do so.
And finally, there are signs that some Fijians, particularly the intelligentsia, are
coming to favour the introduction of early internal self-government; and Ratu Penaia
is on record as believing that arrangements should be devised which will place
responsibility for future constitutional change in local hands. This may present us
with an opportunity to strike a bargain whereunder the United Kingdom will
surrender its powers provided that the electoral system can be cloaked with
respectability. What would be respectable (and defensible internationally) is for
consideration: a suitable reduction of the number of General seats and a change to
universal cross-voting might be.
It would of course be arguable, and the Federation Party would without doubt start
by arguing, that the United Kingdom should not seek to shuffle off its present
responsibilities until Fiji has ‘one man one vote’ democracy. The counter-arguments,
not all of which could be used publicly, are that:—
(a) only thus shall we oblige the people of Fiji to come to terms with one another
and live in peace together;
(b) experience has shown that the Alliance (anyway when not taunted and
threatened by the Federation Party) can be trusted to govern fairly;
(c) we owe it to the Fijians to place them in control of their own country;
(d) there is nothing undemocratic about cross-voting (which is really a common
roll with reserved seats) provided that it does not give grossly undue
representation to a particular community;
(e) Associated State status has by now been accepted, anyway by the
Commonwealth, as perfectly proper in appropriate cases;
(f) any attempt to impose on the Fijians the sort of constitution which the
Federation Party wants would result in bloodshed to nobody’s advantage;
(g) the Constitution being introduced will anyway be capable of further amendment
locally, so that if in due course the Federation Party gains sufficient Fijian support
to win an election it will have an opportunity to introduce amendments.
This may not add up to the sort of case which will convince all the members of the
Committee of 24 that the United Kingdom has acted properly: but some are anyway
not open to conviction. What will perhaps matter more is whether Commonwealth
countries can be convinced. I should expect that with care they could be. For Ratu
Mara has already won the respect of several Commonwealth leaders. Most of them
would probably thus accept a case for the changes I have envisaged, if he argued this
with them. And if he were enabled to meet other leaders I believe he might convince
many of them too.
My conclusion is therefore that we should seek by all possible means to stimulate
an Alliance request for the sort of changes I have described, and should be ready to
concur in such a request if received.
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Letter from Sir D Jakeway to Mr Patel, 7 Nov 1968
I write, first of all, to say how sorry I was to hear that illness had struck you once
again, and again at a most inopportune time. I was nevertheless glad that you were
able to meet and talk with Mr Hathi and Mr Manjit Singh.5
I expect they impressed you, as they did me, not only by their sincerity, courtesy
and friendliness but by their evident desire to be of disinterested assistance in closing
the divisions which have so unfortunately appeared in the body politic of Fiji over the
past 12 months, and which can become progressively more damaging to the national
interest if they continue.
Mr Hathi felt that his talks with you and the Chief Minister and with other leaders
in the Alliance and Federation Party had made some headway in this direction. If so
we all have reason to be immensely grateful to our visitors. At our last meeting Mr
Hathi urged that I should carry on the good work where he had left off. Nothing
would please me more, for if there is one thing of which I am certain it is that the
ruination of this country could be party strife carried to the point at which it
destroyed racial harmony. Recent events have proved that there remains a serious
risk of its doing so, by showing how easily emotions can be aroused and angry
reactions produced. But, as you know, I leave Fiji in a few days and you are not yet
fully restored to health.
All I can do now is to urge on you the importance of resuming your dialogue with
Ratu Mara (which began so promisingly early this year). Opportunities for this can
easily be found—for instance whilst you are in Suva for the forthcoming meeting of
Legislative Council. With goodwill on both sides it should not be impossible for
agreement to be reached on changes to the constitution which remove the elements
distasteful to your party and at the same time preserve safeguards which the Alliance
regard as essential.
I know that my successor will be anxious to offer whatever help he can in this
matter, and very much hope nothing will be done or said before his arrival to
complicate the task facing him.
I have expressed similar sentiments to Ratu Mara and I know that he is prepared to
resume discussions.
5 Director in Indian Ministry of External Affairs responsible for relations with Fiji.
124 FCO 32/401, no 3 15 Nov 1968
[Council of Chiefs]: letter from G P Lloyd to J C Morgan on a
confidential paper prepared for the Council of Chiefs about internal
self-government. Appendix: Extract from the paper
Since Sir Derek reported on political developments earlier this week,1 some more
material has become available. This enables me to amplify, and in one minor respect
to correct, some of what he said.
1 See 123.
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2. First, Special Branch have obtained a copy of a confidential paper prepared for
members of the Council of Chiefs. It apparently takes the form of a report from the
Fijian Affairs Board to the Council; but I suspect that Mara’s bright young Fijian
graduates had a hand in drafting parts of it, including that now copied as an appendix
to this letter.
3. Second, the Public Relations Officer has sent me a report (carefully checked by
Ratu Penaia and the Secretary to his Ministry) releasing to the press for publication
some details of the Council’s deliberations. This is apparently the first time that the
Council has been reported in this way. An exception was made because the matters
discussed had aroused so much public interest.
4. The relevant part of the report stated:—
‘The Council then turned its attention to the Colony’s Constitution.
The Chief Minister, Ratu Mara, in a brief explanation of the difference
between internal self-government and complete independence said that
independence meant complete severance of the existing links between Britain
and Fiji. Internal self-government, however, allowed these links to remain
and Britain would maintain the security and external affairs of the Colony.
Members unanimously agreed to ask the Governor to arrange for an early
constitutional conference.’
5. Third, Special Branch have, in a separate report on the Council’s proceedings,
given a slightly different account of the matter. This said:—
‘. . . the Council decided that the Chief Minister assisted by other (undefined)
Fijian political leaders should press for a Constitutional Conference to take
place in 1969 at which negotiations should take place on the granting of
internal self-government as soon as possible. The change in the present
Constitution should be made within the life of the present Legislature in
order that the power to govern shall remain in Fijian hands. The Council felt
that the interests of the Fijians can only be preserved by taking control of
internal political development.’
6. From all of this two things emerge. On the one hand, the Fijians’ only public
commitment is to seek an early Constitutional Conference. Since the Federation
Party has long been asking for just this, it should now be far easier to secure
agreement over the timing of one.
7. On the other hand, there now seems unlikely to be much chance of
persuading the two major parties to reach accommodation about future
constitutional (and particularly electoral) arrangements either before or during any
conference. Not only that: it is evident that the Fijians think ‘complete internal self-
government’ will give them control. They therefore presumably suppose it will
empower them to amend the Constitution as they may thereafter see fit, without
U.K. concurrence though doubtless subject to any safeguards the Constitution itself
embodies. If as I believe they are mistaken, we may need to disabuse them now—
perhaps simultaneously explaining how their wishes can be met if our conclusion is
that we should endeavour to meet these. As you will have seen from Sir Derek’s
letter, we shall, in my present view, probably be well advised to do this.
8. I am sending a copy of this letter to Sir Robert Foster.
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Appendix to 124
. . . 6. The views expressed in Provincial Councils on the above issues were merely a
repetition and stressing of recommendations made before the Constitutional
Conference in 1965. These recommendations were supported then by the Fijian
Affairs Board and the Creat Council of Chiefs. It is not, therefore, necessary to discuss
their merits or demerits at this stage, unless any members feel that they should be
called in question.
7. Some Provincial Councils did, however, add that the transition to complete
internal self-government should take place as quickly as possible. The Board
supports this for the following reasons:—
(a) There is a growing feeling that the decisions of the United Kingdom on Fiji’s
Constitution are not wholly free from pressure exerted by the United Nations. The
Fourth Committee, which deals with the affairs of dependent territories, may well
sympathise with demands for a common roll, proportional representation, and
majority rule, which are unacceptable to Fijian opinion. When Fiji becomes
completely self-governing, it may be removed from the sphere of influence of this
Committee. Therefore, internal self-government should be sought at the earliest
possible date.
(b) Fijian opinion generally seems to be that political control should be returned
to Fijian hands, or, at the least, to a political structure in which Fijian influence is
paramount. Since the numerical superiority of the Indian population is steadily
growing, the difficulty of handing control back to Fijians is also increasing. For
this reason, also, it is felt by many Fijians that internal self-government should be
pressed for now as a matter of urgency.
(c) Once the complete control of internal affairs has been handed back to a body
which is acceptable to Fijian opinion, Fijian interests can be protected without
external interference. The present political organization is only a short step from
complete internal self-government, and it is felt by the Board that the step should
be taken now to protect Fijian interests and to allow the control of Fiji’s internal
political development to be taken over by Fijians.
The Board recommends that Council press for an early constitutional conference and
that the government of Fiji should be handed back to a political organization in
which Fijian interests are paramount. . . .
125 FCO 32/401, no 8 26 Nov 1968
‘1968 Indian by-elections’: inward savingram no 484 from G P Lloyd
(acting governor) to Mr Stewart. Enclosure: Report by Fiji Special
Branch, 30 Sept 1968
I enclose a copy of a report on the recent Indian by-elections prepared by the Head of
Special Branch.
2. This provides a useful record of the elections and of the campaign which
preceded them. It highlights the efficient organisation of the Federation Party
machine which was far superior to that of the Alliance.
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3. In general I agree with the assessment of the Head of Special Branch, with the
caveat that present Fijian attitudes may have the effect of permanently inhibiting the
Federation Party demands in that it is unlikely that the Party leaders will ever again
dare to be quite so vitriolic in their attacks on the Alliance.
Enclosure to 125
Background
On 1st September, 1967, the 9 Federation Party Members of Legislative Council
walked out of the Council during a debate on the motion moved by A.D.PATEL which
condemned the present constitution and called for an immediate constitutional
conference. The ‘walk out’ took place soon after Vijay R. SINGH had moved a
Government amendment to the motion which reversed its import. The F.P.
subsequently issued a statement to the effect that they had decided ‘to resort to non-
co-operation’ until such time as their motion is ‘implemented’.
2. There followed an initial increase in public meetings by the F.P. to explain to
the electorate their reasons for the ‘walk out’ and much talk of delegations to the
Commonwealth Office and visits from U.N. officials, but this soon subsided.
3. The F.P. members did not attend the Legislative Council sessions in
November 1967 and March 1968 and as a result automatically forfeited their seats.
4. During June 1968 the dates for the by-elections were announced and
immediately after the Party’s Annual Convention on 28/29th June, at which a policy
statement was presented, the F.P. electioneering campaign commenced.
Planning/organisation
5. The F.P. involvement, through the Fiji Canegrowers’ Federation (FCF), in the
campaigning of recent months to gather support for a new purchase of cane
agreement, guaranteed that a vast majority of the electorate would be sympathetic to
the F.P. by-election candidates. It was only necessary to sustain the fervour aroused;
to preserve the image of the Party leaders as champions of the underprivileged
Indian community; and to ensure that the voters reached the polling booths. From
this point of view the Party’s electioneering campaign showed much more direction
and control than was apparent in the 1966 elections.
6. At a Working Committee meeting held at Lautoka on 11th July, 1968, A.D.
PATEL gave the following instructions with regard to the conduct of the campaign:—
(a) All matters relevant to the election campaign would be referred to
Headquarters. Each constituency would appoint an officer who would be
responsible for publicity and that all publicity material would be forwarded to Suva
for approval by the General Secretary.
(b) Each constituency would appoint a transport officer whose duty it would be to
arrange transport for voters to their nearest polling station. A list to be prepared of
those persons who volunteered to supply free transport.
(c) All election expenses to be borne by the local branches of the Party for their
respective candidates.
(d) Before a candidate speaks at a public meeting in a constituency other than the
one he is contesting, he must obtain permission from that constituency candidate
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and his approval of the subject matter of his speech. (This presumably stems from
R.D. PATEL’s complaint against S.M.KOYA during the 1966 elections to the effect
that KOYA was interfering in his constituency.)
(e) Use to be made of the F.P. Youth Groups which would be under the control of
Ratu Julian TOGANIVALU.
7. In early August, confidential instructions were issued to F.P. agents in Labasa
assigning tasks in connection with the by-election campaign. The cyclostyled
directions were aimed at intensifying the Party effort by giving sole responsibility for
electioneering to one Party member in each of 27 pre-determined sectors of Vanua
Levu. They were specific and in a thoroughly professional manner covered all aspects
of electioneering from fund raising, use of volunteers, transport, publicity and
included details of equipment and staff required at polling stations. There was also a
call for the organisation of local F.P. Youth Groups to take charge of all poster
exhibitions and any processions and demonstrations necessary on the polling days.
In a similar manner, the subdivision of constituencies and the emphasis on the use of
the Youth Groups for canvassing and propaganda were reported from two other
constituencies—West Viti Levu, which was divided into 8 sectors and, South/West
Viti Levu, which was divided into 4 zones, but there is no evidence that as much
thought went into campaigns in these areas as did into the Vanua Levu campaigns.
8. Early in the campaign the Party established offices at Sigatoka, Nadi and Ba—
prior to this the only office in Western Division was at Lautoka and this has been
open for three years. These offices were the centres for Party planning at district level
and organised recruiting and fund raising. A fund raising tactic used by the Party
during the course of the campaign was the holding of dinner parties at which
national leaders were present and to which an admission charge of £1 was levied.
Parties were held at Nadi and Sigatoka, the latter attended by approximately 1,000
persons.
The platform
9. The Party statement presented to the Annual Convention contained the
following main points upon which the F.P. candidates based their electioneering:—
(a) Structure of the party
Membership is open to all bona fide residents of Fiji who are over the age of 18
years. Membership of the newly formed Youth Groups is open to all over the age of
16 years.
(b) Aims, objects and ideals
The principal aim is to weld Fiji into one independence as a Republic within the
Commonwealth, recognising the Queen as Head of the Commonwealth but with a
Head of State who will be elected initially from the House of Cakobau and
subsequently from descendants of the original signatories to the Deed of Cession.
Elections should be on the basis of a common roll without gerry-mandering of
groups or boundaries to create artificial results. Fiji should be developed
physically, morally, materially and spiritually, to create harmony and
understanding between its peoples.
(c) Citizenship rights
All persons who were born or have lived continuously in Fiji for a period of 7 years
and made it their home should be assured of full citizenship rights.
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(d) Economic policy
Monopolies should be discouraged but otherwise foreign capital should be
attracted. Any drain of capital from Fiji should be prevented.
(e) Land ownership
The party accepts the fact that the Fijians own the land but advocates that they
should be given rights comparable to those of freeholders.
(f) Commercial
The Colonial Sugar Refining Company Limited’s assets in Fiji are over-valued and
the creation of its subsidiary, South Pacific Sugar Mills Limited, is a farce. The
industry should be re-organised from top to bottom and co-operative mills should
be set up; gold and other minerals belong to the State, and no foreign private
enterprise should be allowed to take it away nor should Government subsidise
such an operation. The Party stands for the immediate nationalisation of all gold
mines; in particular the Emperor Mines at Vatukoula.
10. Whilst the above points were the basis of the Party’s electioneering campaign
and were brought out to some extent by the various speakers, speeches often
consisted solely of donigration of the Alliance; European monopolies, and personal
attacks on Alliance candidates and leaders, in particular M.T.KHAN, Vijay R.SINGH
and Ratu MARA. The theme of all the speeches dwelt upon the basic problems of the
common people with the obvious intent of creating a united front of Indians/Fijians
against European dominance.
Strategy
11. The division of constituencies into sectors giving more responsibility to
minor officials of the Party was a most effective move. It boosted the morale of the
rank and file and gave many of them the opportunity to actively participate in the
elections. Whilst the Vanua Levu constituencies gave detailed written instructions
covering all aspects of election-cering, it would appear that other constituencies
relied mainly on verbal instructions to the branches and officials.
12. Women played a more prominent part in the campaign than in the past.
Apart from Suva, where in 1966 the appeal of Mrs. Jai NARAYAN as the first woman
F.P. candidate, attracted considerable support from women, there had been little
participation by them in political meetings. On this occasion, however, large
numbers attended public meetings and on polling days groups of women were
collected and taken to the polls as opposed to previous elections where women were
very much the responsibility of their husbands. In Lautoka, Mrs. S.M.KOYA
organised a procession of some 60–70 women from her house to the polling
station—a distance of about half a mile; this had good propaganda value and served
to increase the gloom of Alliance officials at the polling station.
13. The control of the Youth Movement appears in the main to have been badly
planned and consequently only in Vanua Levu and Lautoka were they really effective
and to a lesser extent in Suva, Ra and Tavua. In Vanua Levu, Youth members were
alloted the task of preparing posters, placards, banners etc. and guiding and assisting
voters in casting their votes correctly. In Lautoka, in addition to the above, the Youth
Movement were responsible for the collection and return of voters to the polling
stations. In Suva, Youth members were used to hand out pamphlets at public
meetings and at Tavua and Ra they acted as a ‘ginger group’ heckling at Alliance
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meetings and urging support for their own candidate. Generally speaking the
younger element of the Party took a greater part in the elections than hitherto and,
although not well organised in the majority of constituencies gave an indication of
their potential should the Party keep the Youth Movement alive.
14. There was a considerable increase in visual propaganda in the form of the
Party symbol and the Party election symbol on cards and posters which were freely
distributed. The wearing of ‘T’ shirts bearing the Party symbol was not as effective as
it could have been due to the small number available. Only in Ra and on one occasion
in Suva were any appreciable number of ‘T’ shirts noted.
Public meetings
15. The Party held a total of 131 public meetings throughout the Colony in the
course of their election campaign. The meetings were attended by approximately
23,000 Indians and 1,500 Fijians.
16. Generally speaking the reaction of Indian members of audiences was of polite
interst and very few speeches aroused any particular enthusiasm. Fijians present
were interested to hear Party views on the new purchase of cane agreement upon
which their leaders had been rather slow to comment and any enthusiasm shown by
them during the course of the speeches concerned this issue.
17. The most effective speakers during the campaigns were A.D.PATEL,
S.M.KOYA, K.C.RAMRAKHA and Mrs. Jai NARAYAN, but Ratu Julian TOGANIVALU
was undoubtedly an attraction at meetings and his criticisms of European
monopolies and the subservience of the Fijian Chiefs to the European commercial
interests aroused a great deal of interest. The strongest propaganda points raised by
the speakers were:—
(i) The F.P’s fight to obtain a new purchase of cane agreement more favourable to
farmers. This was by far the most effective point. It evinced enthusiasm from
Indians and was the only point to make any significant effect on Fijians.
(ii) The call for a common roll and independence.
(iii) The attacks on European commercial interests and expatriate control
generally.
(iv) The use of the term ‘Taukei’, which was popular with Fijians.
The weakest propaganda point was criticism of Ratu MARA. The majority of Indians,
in the Western Division particularly, are reluctant to participate in any attacks on
Fijian leaders for fear of repercussions. The F.P. leaders, however, justified their
comments about Ratu MARA by stating that having entered the hurly-burly of
political life he must be prepared to accept its consequences.
Fijian support
18. The Party made considerable use of Ratu Julian TOGANIVALU and Ratu Mosese
VARASIKETE in their efforts to capture Fijian support. There was a favourable reaction
from Fijian cane farmers to the Party’s expressed views on the new purchase of cane
agreement mainly because of the absence of proposals from other sources. However,
it is generally felt that most of the few Fijians who supported the Party during the by-
election campaign did so for personal material gain. The proposed affiliation of the
almost moribund National Democratic Party and the F.P. is unlikely to result in any
great number of Fijians renewing interest in either Party.
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Public reaction
19. The majority of Indians were obviously delighted with the result which they
claimed demonstrated Indian unity and eagerly awaited the next move by the leaders.
However, recent developments on the Fijian front are causing them some concern.
Members of the Indian Alliance never really expected a victory but were disappointed
and disillusioned when the F.P. candidates actually increased their majorities. They
also are expressing concern with the recent attitude of Fijians towards Indians
generally, irrespective of political conviction.
20. Fijians were concerned with the increased majorities of the F.P. candidates
and cite this as an indication of the corporate duplicity of the Indian community, vast
numbers of whom had promised support for the Alliance. There is a distinct
hardening of feeling towards the Indian community, the attitude being ‘Give the
Indians nothing’. They feel that concessions granted to the Indians in the past should
be withdrawn e.g. the Agricultural Landlord and Tenant Ordianance, and that Fijian
leaders have been much too lenient in their past dealings with Indians. Many
references have been made to the use of force in order to enhance and maintain what
they believe to be their rightful paramount position in Fiji.
21. Europeans and Chinese have been more vocal this time in their reaction to
F.P. taunts and slander, and there has been a considerable widening of relationship
between the two communities and Indians generally.
Election results
1968 1966
Votes Votes
Received Majority Received Majority
Mrs.I.NARAYAN 5808 4916 5676 2897
* K.C.RAMRAKHA 3718 3322 3220 2543
* UJAGAR SINGH 4878 4376 4380(M.T. 2730
KHAN)
A.D.PATEL 7903 5131 7601 3576
* S.M.KOYA 6105 4371 6318 4097
R.D.PATEL 5561 2338 4704 293
C.A.SHAH 4441 2664 3799 1844
RAM JATI SINGH 2676 2221 2328 1090
J.MADHAVAN 5870 4795 5049 2555
46960 43075
* In the 1966 elections the candidates for these 
constituencies were opposed by more than one person.
22. In all the constituencies the F.P. candidates increased their majorities over
the 1966 figures. Only one candidate, S.M.KOYA, polled less votes than in 1966 (6105
v 6318) probably because on this occasion he was opposed by another Muslim and
religious considerations did not affect the voters’ choice.
23. The average poll over the 9 constituencies was 78.77% which is low
compared with the 1966 elections which averaged 87.25%. 76% of the votes cast
were in favour of the F.P. as against 65% in the 1966 elections.
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Immediate future
24. The recent hardening of feelings against the Indian majority community,
coupled with incidents of assault and the stoning of Indian homes and vehicles, has
served at least to postpone any plans the Party may have had to exploit its victory by
making more excessive demands. The average Indian does not seek or condone
violence and with this in mind, representation has been made to prominent F.P.
leaders advising them to tone down demands for immediate independence and a
common roll and also to stop, at least temporarily the holding of political meetings.
25. The present aggressive Fijian attitude will, albeit temporarily, therefore
inhibit F.P. demands, although the Party will continue to press them with the United
Kingdom Government and the United Nations—both of which are of course, aware of
the outcome of the by-elections and F.P. demands for early Constitutional change.
26. It has already been stated by F.P. leaders that to ‘walk-out’ again from the
Legislative Council would profit nothing as they have now firmly established that the
majority of Indians support their cause.
27. Continued Indian agitation, through the medium of public meetings and
provocative press reports, is not anticipated as this could only result in the aggravation
of the present tense, and potentially explosive, situation. Indications are that the Youth
Wings already formed in several centres, will continue to recruit and to encourage a
lively interest in political events generally whilst national leaders continue to ensure
support for the Party by using their proposals for a new purchase of cane agreement.
SB comment
28. The F.P. increased its majorities in the by-elections, thus demonstrating the
hold that it has over the majority of the Indian community by:—
(a) Representing itself most plausibly as the only political body around which the
Indians can unite.
(b) Exploiting to the full its proposals for a new sugar cane agreement favouring
the grower.
(c) Nominating candidates generally infinitely more attractive than those of the
Alliance.
(d) Organising and conducting its campaign with a professionalism surpassing
any seen before in the Colony.
(e) Appealing to racial emotions.
29. The resultant polarisation of the major races into two distinct political
groupings has potentially serious security implications.
126 FCO 32/401, no 29 10 Dec 1968
[Future of Fiji]: letter from G P Lloyd to Sir A Galsworthy on the
post-by-election situation. Enclosure: extract from ‘Report on Fijian
views expressed in the regional meetings of the Fijian Association’
As James Morgan may not be back in the office until some time after Christmas, I am
writing to let you know of the discussions we had about constitutional matters whilst
he was here last week, and of some subsequent developments.
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2. What took place when we saw Ratu Mara and A.D. Patel I have already reported
in telegrams Personal 115 and 117 of the 3rd and the 4th December. Although I have
seen each of them again since, there is little to add. They have not yet had a further
meeting but they both remain cheerful about the atmosphere in Legislative Council;
and Mara was quite relaxed when I told him about the gist of our conversation with
Patel. He gave me the impression that he considers an Upper House could be a
worthwhile device: his party might of course be able to put some useful Europeans,
as well as Council of Chiefs’ representatives, into it, and it might have powers of veto
in certain matters—like legislation dealing with Fijian land.
3. There seems in consequence a better chance than I had earlier supposed that
they may reach a measure of agreement about the next constitutional step forward—
probably something on the lines which Kaul proposed. The problem is however now
likely to be that whilst Mara will regard this as a sort of final solution insofar as
electoral arrangements are concerned, for Patel it will be no more than an interim
compromise; and that it will not be possible to reconcile these conflicting
viewpoints.
4. As I explained to James, I believe we need to decide what posture we shall
adopt if this happens. We might of course be able to fluff the issue at the next
Conference. But even if we were, we should be left to face it later; and I doubt
whether advantage would come of a postponement, for the reasons set out in the
enclosure to Derek Jakeway’s letter of the 12th November.1 So in my present view we
should for the same reasons be wise to make up our minds to consider whether our
objects could best be achieved by:—
(a) having the next constitution provide for what is ordinarily termed ‘full
internal self-government’, with cross-voting seats replacing communal ones, with
General representation cut down to size, and possibly with an Upper House;
(b) embodying in it arrangements such that the next step, which could be taken at
any time but which it would be a local responsibility to initiate, or which could
follow automatically at a prearranged date, should be a move to something like
‘Associated State’ status;
(c) laying down that only thereafter could further changes, including changes to
the electoral system, be made—unilaterally by Fiji, subject to the provisions of the
constitution itself;
(d) prescribing how full independence could follow, if desired—perhaps as in the
case of the West Indian ‘Associated States’.
5. Both James and I recognised that this would involve United Kingdom
Ministers in taking two decisions. The first would be whether, in view of West Indian
experience, some form of ‘Associated State’ status would be acceptable for Fiji. And, if
so, the second would be whether there might be difficulty in defending
internationally the unusual procedure of placing the initiative firmly in local hands
at such an early stage.
6. It is obviously for you to judge what complications the status might lead to,
and whether it would be compatible with understandings reached with other
metropolitan powers which have interests in this area. But if, as I believe, present
1 See 123.
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policy is to discourage the Pacific territories from opting for independence, and
presuming that integration with the United Kingdom is a non-starter, then it is
difficult to see what satisfactory alternative there can be to some variation on the
‘Associated States’ theme.
7. What might be defensible is equally a matter for your judgment. The principal
considerations which have so far occurred to me were rehearsed in the enclosure
mentioned above. I would, however, now elaborate one. For I have just seen a long
confidential paper which Mara’s bright young Fijian graduates prepared for the
Council of Chiefs. It is still being analysed here. Meanwhile I enclose a copy of the
paragraphs most relevant in the present context. They set out more explicitly than
the extract from another paper sent with my letter of the 15th November to James
the arguments which have led the Fijian intelligentsia and leaders to conclude that
they must assume control in order to achieve their aim, which is expressly stated to
be ‘nationhood with the Fijian voice predominant in the affairs of the country’. I
doubt whether their conclusions (unsound though we may think some) will be
shaken by anything we can say. And I am certain that any attempt to impose some
solution which we believe proper against their will would have the gravest
consequences. For in that event we should be quite unable to depend upon either the
FMF or the majority of the Police Force. This may sound blunt; but I am convinced it
is the harsh reality of the situation.
8. On the other hand, and more hopefully, I still consider that the Alliance would
govern fairly if we were to surrender control in the manner suggested. I also consider
that the replacement of communal by cross-voting seats would oblige both parties to
try and win support from all races, tempering their policies accordingly. This is not
to say there would never be attempts so to amend the constitution that Alliance
control was more firmly entrenched. But I know of no durable safeguard against
these—or against coups of one kind and another: an act of faith is at some point
unavoidable.
9. James will no doubt fill in any gaps in this account on his return. He will also
of course be able to let you know Sir Robert Foster’s initial reaction to our ideas.
Meanwhile it may be of some help to you, and can perhaps serve as a record too.
10. A copy of this letter goes to Sir Robert Foster.
Enclosure to 126
. . . A. Political issues
(a) Common roll
6. In a multi-racial society the majority race invariably demands for obvious
reasons, a common electoral roll with one person, one vote, one value. In such a
society the claim for common roll is often made in the name of ‘democracy’. It is also
argued that common roll, by bringing all races within a single electoral system will
foster national consciousness and hence greater unity. In the British colonies
common roll and one man one vote may also be justified on grounds of being British
practice and the British system is claimed to be most democratic.
7. We find that in Fiji the Indians certainly stand to gain in a system of one man
one vote on a common roll. With them comprising over 50% of the population and
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rising at the highest annual rate of increase their majority in a future common roll is
well assured. The increasing Indian superiority can be illustrated as follows. In 1966
the potential voting population of Indians was about 85% of that of Fijians and other
races. By 1971 the proportion would have risen to over 90% and by 1976 it would
exceed that of all other races taken together and because of their high rate of annual
increase the gap will continue to widen thereafter. The strength of Indians in a
common roll is therefore indisputable.
8. Implicit in the foregoing statement on Indian superiority in a common roll is
the belief that in such an electoral system, voting goes largely along racial lines. The
recent by-election was ample testimony to this belief.
9. We fear that in the event of Indian advent to power on a common roll, such
power will be used for communal legislation adverse to Fijian interests particularly
in land ownership. From demands emanating from the Federation Party and from
the experience of some Asian countries, we feel that our fear is not misplaced.
10. We do not believe that the case for common roll is strengthened when made
in the name of democracy. In the political turmoil of today ‘democracy’ has been a
standard guise for many sinister motives. We are here reminded of the apt analogy
made by the eminent British constitutional scholar Sir Ivor Jennings2 when he
wrote, ‘Fifty years ago when a child was not feeling well he was given a spoonful of
jam. It looked like jam, it tasted like jam, and it was jam, but it also contained a pill
or powder which, taken by itself tasted quite horrid. The jam was a disguise for the
pill or powder. So “democracy” often hides the reality of power exercised by some
person or group of persons trying to maintain himself or themselves in power’.
11. While we appreciated the importance of fostering national consciousness and
unity, we do not believe that constitutional reform can revolutionise popular ideas
and traditions. A process of adaptation to suit the particular situation in the country
is essential.
12. There is no gain saying that the British system of a common roll and one
man one vote one value would be commendable in the right situation. It is certainly
a convenient way of giving representation to the British people, but they are a
homogeneous people organised in an individualist society. We are convinced of the
wisdom of the counsel of Sir Ivor Jennings when he wrote that, ‘A straightforward
copying of the British system is usually the least satisfactory method of dealing with
the problem because the conditions in Britain are so utterly different’.
13. We are of the opinion therefore that an electoral system of common roll is
inadvisable for our multiracial society. We would recommend communal
representation as a more effective form of representing different community
interests and insuring against domination of minority groups by the majority.
Independence not wanted now and the return of the control of Fiji to the Fijians
(b) and (c)
14. These two issues appear to us to be closely and complexly inter-twined. The
Fijians do not oppose independence as a principle. Complete independence is the
2 A professor of political science at the University of British Colombia, 1938–1939, Jennings later became
vice chancellor of the University of Ceylon, 1942–1955, served on the Commission on the constitution of
Ceylon, 1948, was adviser and chief draftsman, Pakistan, 1954–1955, and a member of the Malayan
Constitutional Commission, 1956–1957.
11-Fiji-112-cpp  10/5/06  6:57 AM  Page 367
368 THE ALLIANCE GOVERNMENT [126]
cherished goal of all developing territories. But under circumstances peculiar to Fiji,
the granting of independence now will place the Fijians in a handicap from which
they may not be able to remove themselves completely. Comparatively few Fijians are
now fully trained to shoulder the responsibilities of administration which
independence implies.
15. In our presently weak numerical, educational and economical position, we
should have a close look at our present political status and position in the
administrative structure in relation probably not very far away, in time and in terms
of powers now in the hands of Fiji is our elected representatives, from self-
government. We are of the opinion that further advances towards full internal self-
government should be co-ordinated with a programme to train Fijians for specific
responsible posts and the retention of certain contract expatriate officers so that
when Fiji is fully self governing, the Fijians have a major say in the affairs of the
land. The above is particularly significant since the change from internal self-
government to complete within the British Commonwealth is largely a legal and
formal affair.
16. From the Fijian viewpoint, advances towards internal self-government and
ultimate independence have a significant bearing not only on our representation in
the policy making organs of Government, particularly in the Ministries, where
policies are formulated, but also on our control of specific ministerial portfolios. We
recommend that Fijian representation in the Council of Ministers should be
increased but this measure should not necessarily entail an increase in the
membership of that Council. More specifically we are of the opinion that in order to
facilitate Fijian economic advancement and especially the rapid rise of the Fijians
average income per capita to a level comparable with those of other races, an
essential pre-requisite of social and political stability now and in the future, the office
of the Minister for Natural Resources should be occupied by a Fijian.
(d) Committee of 24 should not visit Fiji
17. We recommend this resolution. It is our view that this committee, should it
visit Fiji, is never likely to offer any assistance in our progress towards internal self-
government and ultimate independence.
18. Should it come to Fiji, it is almost certain that it will be in the Colony for
only a very short time—perhaps two to three weeks at the very most. This period is
obviously inadequate to give members of the Committee a sound grasp of the local
situation and problems peculiar to Fiji. Such a brief sojourn does not warrant the
formulation of recommendations on the path that Fiji might follow in its progress
towards internal self-government.
19. The Committee of 24 consists largely of U.N. delegates of newly
independent nations whose social and political problems are quite unlike our own.
Hence, they are never likely to offer constructive ideas which might assist us in
attaining our goal; nationhood with the Fijian voice predominant in the affairs of
the country.
20. The Committee of 24 has a tendency to recommend independence at any
cost. Without adequate understanding of the situation, particularly the special
position of the Fijians, this practice is certain to lead vexing problems, which will be
for us, and not the Committee of 24, to solve. . . .
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127 FCO 32/401, no 48 4 Feb 1969
[Electoral system]: letter from G P Lloyd to T C D Jerrom reporting
conflicting interpretations of the ‘Kaul formula’
As you may recall, Messrs. Kaul and Jaipal visited here about a year ago.1 The former
then suggested that there might be advantage in considering whether the next round
of constitutional change could provide for an extension of the present crossvoting
system. He had in mind—as a possibility—15 Indian, 15 Fijian, 5 General and 5
other seats. This would in effect be, as he very rightly said, a common roll with
reserved seats.
2. There was some subsequent difference of view about just what he intended
regarding the 5 ‘other’ seats. With this I need not at present trouble you. I am now
concerned with another, and perhaps more important, problem of interpretation.
3. We had supposed that he thought in terms of multi-member constituencies,
with the electorate registered on a single roll in each, but that he left it for local
consideration whether we should have five constituencies, each returning 3 Indians,
3 Fijians, 1 General (and perhaps 1 other) member; or fifteen constituencies, each
returning 1 Indian and 1 Fijian, and being combined in suitable ways to make five
larger constituencies each of which returned 1 General member; or some other
arrangement different in detail but similar in principle. The principle was, of course,
that, as in the present cross-voting constituencies, each voter should have several
votes including one for a candidate of his own race.
4. We heard some months ago that Mr. A.D. Patel had told an academic visitor
that his understanding (or re-interpretation) of Mr. Kaul’s scheme was that there
should be forty single member constituencies. He has recently elaborated this in a
discussion with Sir Robert Foster from whose record of what was said I now quote:—
‘For his ideas on a new Legislative Council, Mr. Patel expressed the following
views which seemed to be fairly firmly embedded in his mind and were his
understanding of what the Kaul proposals were intended to be.
There should be forty seats in Legislative Council all of which would be for
elected members. Officials would entirely disappear. There is no magic in the
number ‘forty’ but that is the number at present in Legislative Council and he
regarded it as convenient and about right. In order to fill these seats the
territory would be divided up into forty constituencies, so that as near as may
be each constituency would have the same number of voters in it. There would
be one roll on which all voters would appear. Having done this, fifteen of these
constituencies which appeared to be the most predominated by Indians would
be reserved for having an Indian member; fifteen other constituencies which
appeared to be predominated in the main by Fijian voters would have a reserved
Fijian member. This accounted for thirty of the forty seats. Five other
constituencies which were predominated by General electors would then be
selected for a reserved General member. The final five would be for a candidate
of any race and it was in these last five where a multi-racial concept would be
specifically introduced. Although Mr. Patel denied that the multi-racial seats
would necessarily be the last five out of the forty, in fact he could produce no
1 See 114.
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other way of deciding which they were, and he said the other thirty-five had to
be selected first. The difficulty that most of the General electorate lived in areas
predominated by Indians (and that that electorate would not predominate in
any area) did not seem to worry him. As regards voting, all people on what was
a common roll of all races would vote for the candidate of their choice who
would be reserved in race to the extent of thirty-five of the forty seats.’
5. Mr. Patel’s idea of having single-member constituencies seems to us
impracticable, quite apart from the fact that it is likely to be unacceptable to the
Alliance. He may however be firmly wedded to it. Hence there is a risk that we may
bring the parties here to accept in principle what Mr. Kaul proposed only to find
there is a breakdown because they cannot agree on what his proposals really were.
The road to an accommodation might then prove very stony. It would obviously help
us to avoid an awkward journey if we could say privately to Mr. Patel at this stage
(before the matter became an issue between him and Ratu Mara, let alone between
their parties) that ours, rather than his, is the authorised version of the Kaul
proposals. Equally obviously, we should not wish to say this unless satisfied it is so.
6. We recognize that it may in these circumstances cause embarrassment if we
try to establish the position from Mr. Kaul (or Mr. Jaipal)—and that any question
that is asked may draw an equivocal answer. We must therefore let you judge
whether to invite the High Commissioner in New Delhi to ask at all, whilst at the
same time pointing out how material a difference a helpful reply could make.
7. I am sending a copy of this letter to Cole in New Delhi.
128 FCO 32/402, no 58 2 Apr 1969
‘Constitutional development in Fiji’: minute by T C D Jerrom to 
G T P Marshall on the problem of reconciling the Westminster
pattern of government and opposition with electoral safeguards 
for the Fijians
I am sorry that I have not time in the Office now to do justice to the papers which
you kindly provided with your minute attached. In fact all that I can do in the time
available is to put down some personal thoughts which on further examination may
or may not prove relevant to our study of the problem.
2. As you know, I have become increasingly doubtful whether the problems of
Fiji can be solved by a combination of the Westminster pattern (by which I mean
Government and Opposition) and electoral devices designed to provide a balance
between Fijian and Indian representation, with built-in advantage of some sort to the
Fijians.
3. These doubts led me to speculate about the possibility of the Governor
retaining powers of nomination under the next Constitution and the possibility that
this, if it proved acceptable, might conceivably open the way to an ultimate solution,
under which Fiji became independent under a Head of State (who would be a Fijian)
possessing constitutional powers in the field of race relations.
4. To illustrate this I take the ‘Kaul’ figures, not because of any intrinsic merit in
them, but because their parentage may conceivably be of some help. I assume that
the basic system of election would be cross-voting, possibly on the general lines set
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out in paragraph 35(i) of Professor de Smith’s report.1 There would be 15 Fijian
members, 15 Indian members, five European/Chinese and up to five others. I have
been wondering whether it would be possible to secure agreement to the Governor
having power to nominate some at least of these ‘others’. There are a number of
possibilities ranging e.g. from the election of two by the Council of Chiefs and the
nomination of three by the Governor, to limitation to two or three nominated
members in all. There is also a wide range of possibilities of definition on the basis of
which the Governor might nominate members, with whom he should consult, and
what purpose he should have in mind in nomination. I do not know whether it would
be possible to include in such an arrangement a discretion for the Governor to
nominate the members at his discretion in the interests of relations between the
races in Fiji.
5. I have also wondered whether it is possible to do anything to get away from
the perils of a Government and Opposition, both with a strong racial basis,
competing for power. I have been told that it is not likely to be possible to enforce or
induce a coalition government including members of both parties. If this is so, I have
wondered whether it would be possible, during the next stage of constitutional
development to devise some mechanism by which the party leaders are brought
together and forced/persuaded to co-operate in the specific area of race relations. I
have never heard of the introduction of a Council of State or similar organisation
including both the Government Leader and the Opposition Leader in its
membership, although I suppose devices of this sort must have arisen in times of war
or extreme emergency in some countries. I do not know whether anything of this
sort would be possible in Fiji. The basic political theory would be to give the Leader
of the Opposition (who could with advantage be given a different title, avoiding the
word ‘Opposition’) a position of importance and influence (perhaps paid as such)
which would involve co-operation between him and the Government Leader, perhaps
under the chairmanship of the Governor. Under such an arrangement, if it is
practicable, the Governor would retain powers over defence and security and also a
special position in a special Council with responsibility in the field of race relations.
6. All this may be wildly impracticable in political terms, or constitutionally, or
both, and I have not discussed the idea with anyone.
7. I suppose that there may be other possible methods of trying to prevent the
struggle between the parties from developing into a struggle between the races. (The
current use of a Special Committee in an attempt to reach agreement on
controversial legislation about public order may be an encouraging sign.) It may be
that there would be more hope for Fiji in indirect action of this sort than in any
attempt to produce special mechanisms in an effort to remove race from the electoral
arena. I only put forward the above ideas because of my doubts about the possibility
of finding a solution solely through electoral devices and the two party system, and
my apprehension that if an attempt to find a solution in that way is pressed too far,
then we shall be presented with some extraordinary piece of gerrymandering which
the Secretary of State could not defend in the House.
8. In all this I do not myself see how a Second Chamber would help significantly.
Nor do I see much point in increasing the number of members in the Legislature.
1 See 119.
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What we want is to concentrate responsibility as far as possible and somehow find a
means of laying the overall responsibility for the peace of Fiji on all the members of
the Legislature. It seems to me that to increase the numbers may be harmful rather
than helpful in this context.
129 FCO 32/402, no 6 9 Apr 1969
[Future of Fiji]: letter from Sir R Foster to J C Morgan on talks with
Mr Patel and Ratu Mara about Fiji’s status and constitution
I have left over answering your letter of 3rd March about constitutional
developments because there has really been nothing very much to report. However,
it might be as well, I think, to bring you up to date with such information as there is
and to end up by giving you my thoughts on how I think things might go.
2. I did have a short discussion with A.D. Patel at Lautoka on 27th February, and
this really got us no further. He maintained again that his ideas for forty single-
member constituencies, the majority of which would be reserved as to race, and a
common roll, was the only way to go about it. I merely took the opportunity to tell
him that having thought about this matter a great deal since we last discussed
things, I had come to the conclusion myself that this proposition was impracticable
and that it would not be possible to divide the country up into such constituencies
even remotely to everyone’s satisfaction. I also told him that since I had not met Kaul
I had been making some enquiries as to what he had said to other people, and the
version given to me by A.D. Patel was not the one that was understood by others in
Suva. I told him what it was and got a lecture on the evils of cross-voting. Patel ended
by telling me that he was then off to Suva for a meeting and was going to seek out the
Chief Minister for another discussion.
3. I next saw Ratu Mara on the 5th March, who told me that Patel had made no
approach whatever to him for a discussion. He said he himself had been giving
further thought to things, but had still not come out clearly in his own mind as to
what would suit best. His thoughts were veering back to communally elected
members and he mentioned the possibility of ten seats each for communally elected
Fijians and Indians and ten each on a cross-voting basis with in addition perhaps
eight general members, five of whom might be by cross-voting and three on the
general roll. In other words he has gone back to communal seats and, partly in order
to maintain European numbers, has considerably increased the size of the Legislative
Council. With two members for the Council of Chiefs it was now adding up to fifty, as
he did not envisage any official members. He had not any figures with him and was
not ready to discuss it so I did not push him on this one. I feel sure that this line of
thinking has emerged from discussions held during and after the Council of Chiefs
meeting and with his panel of bright young men. It is just possible that he is heading
towards an extreme position in order to get a good bargaining position from which to
move off. He ended up by saying he was not particularly anxious to come to grips
with Patel at the moment as he had not got his ideas fully sorted out nor was he clear
in his own mind what his maximum and minimum bracket was. He thought he could
sort this out by May and that would be the time to get down to serious talks.
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4. So much for that front. There is also your Personal and Confidential telegram
No. 9 about a possible visit by Ratu Mara to London in May or early June. I think it
would be very difficult for him to go to London without some cover story and it was
the possibility of the Sugar Council meeting which had attracted us. I saw Dowling
the other day and he too led me to believe that there might still be a meeting of the
Sugar Council in May or June. If this is so we could perhaps use this as we had
originally intended. There is, in addition, of course a remote possibility that Ratu
Mara might like A.D. Patel to go with him so that they would get away for quiet talks
on their own. I have made no suggestion of this sort to him nor has he volunteered
one to me, but it was an idea once before that did not come off because of the ‘walk-
out’ and I wondered what your reactions to it would be. I realise we really need to
know first whether the Sugar Council is to meet or not, because outside such a
meeting I do not see how Ratu Mara can get to London without a whole lot of
awkward questions being asked. But I imagine this may not be settled until much
nearer the time, and it would be helpful if meanwhile you could tell me whether you
would have any objection to my suggesting to Ratu Mara that Patel might accompany
him, should this seem to be a good idea.
5. I turn next to my thoughts on what might come out of a Conference later this
year. Having read the White Paper on the Bahamas’ proposed new Constitution,1
Ratu Mara is I think very attracted by much that is being done there, particularly by
the device used to delegate a measure of responsibility for external affairs. So he will
probably go for the Bahamas model (apart from the electoral system) as his general
aim; and I should have thought Patel too might find it not unattractive as an
intermediate step short of independence. Provided therefore that they can come to
terms about the electoral system, which is the heart of the matter, we seem likely to
emerge with arrangements giving a full measure of internal self government. And
the arrangements are themselves likely to bring back an Alliance Government. I
suggest we should consider two remaining matters in the light of this: the matters
are:—
(a) how to take the final step or steps on the constitutional road, determining
what Fiji’s future relationship is to be with the United Kingdom; and
(b) how to change provisions in the Constitution (including those which deal with
the electoral system) short of taking the final step.
To take the second one first, I imagine it should be possible to write into any new
Constitution provision for changes to it not affecting the United Kingdom to be made
entirely locally. We might have to consider the wisdom of trying to define what
would thus not be for unilateral Fiji decision. But even if no definition were
attempted, we should at least make plain that the electoral system could—and would
only—be amended by local action; for there would be considerable merit in this, as
has been spelt out in our earlier correspondence. Some special procedure for making
constitutional changes would of course have to be prescribed, though this should
1 Under a constitution introduced in May 1969 the governor of the Bahamas retained special responsibility
for certain matters of external affairs and defence, but was required to consult Bahamas ministers through
a Security Council on matters involving the country’s political, economic or financial interests. The
governor also retained ultimate responsibility for the police and internal security, but immediate
responsibility was designated to a minister on the advice of the prime minister.
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present no serious difficulty as safeguards of the kind necessary are commonplace. I
touch on this again below.
6. The other matter (the final step or steps) would in my present view have to be
for negotiation with the United Kingdom at the request and on the initiative of Fiji.
Similar arrangements have I believe been made before.
7. I come finally to the enquiries we have been making about an Upper House.
You will remember that in the Kaul proposals there were five unallocated and
unidentified seats which were supposed to take care of things like the Great Council
of Chiefs. I myself feel that this is an area where there will be considerable difficulty
in reaching agreement, and my principal interest in an Upper House was therefore to
absorb it. After reading the papers which were enclosed with your letter it seems to
me that we might well have one made up of appointed members—for instance, eight
appointed by the Prime Minister, six by the Leader of the Opposition and four by the
Great Council of Chiefs. Any two of these groups ganging up together could then
produce a simple majority, so that if the Leader of the Opposition got the four Great
Council of Chiefs’ members on his side he would be able to prevail over the Prime
Ministers’ nominees. I have mentioned the possibility to Ratu Mara. He seemed
interested and has taken it away to think about. If it seems profitable to do so is there
any objection to showing him the enclosure to your letter of 3rd March?
8. To revert to safeguards for changing the Constitution, it might be laid down
that one would for this purpose need a two-thirds majority vote in Legislative
Council and in addition a simple majority in the Upper House. In this way (given the
sort of composition which I have suggested for an Upper House) it does seem to me
that one could get a fairly solid Fijian safeguard without having really to mention
race very much. Moreover one could extend the safeguard to cover sensitive matters
like land by providing that specified Ordinances could be amended only in the same
way as the Constitution. In respect of anything else the Upper House might have a
power of delay, but not of veto.
9. As I have been drafting this letter yours of the 21st March has come in. Patel
may for his own purposes be adopting in public an attitude of ‘there is only the date
to fix’ but he must privately know that he and Ratu Mara are still poles apart and that
a considerable amount of agreement is needed before matters can be taken very
much further. So I do not think there is any material risk of a sudden agreed request
for an early Conference, say in June or July. On the other hand, I should be
concerned if I were asked to tell Ratu Mara that late October is the earliest
practicable date for one.
10. In the first place, although everybody here recognized that full account
would have to be taken of United Kingdom convenience and of the availability of
Ministers, nobody anticipated that a time might come when we had to be told no
Conference could be held during the next six months. Our understanding was rather
that we could not expect you to accommodate us at a few weeks’ notice and that we
should anyway accept that you might be unable to manage the precise dates most
suitable for our point of view even if we gave you reasonable warning of our likely
wishes.
11. In the second place, Ratu Mara has long had in mind August/September,
particularly the latter month, as about the right time for a Conference. Although he
is not formally on record to this effect (and has certainly made nothing in the nature
of an official request) you should be aware of his thinking as a result of our
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exchanges about the course which the C.P.A. wanted to mount here. So he might be
both surprised and upset if he had to be told now that neither month was possible.
12. And finally, he might very well and very reasonably object to being asked to
rush straight from the S.P.C. Conference to another in London, particularly as I
daresay he anticipates having to spend unusually long in Noumea this year if (as he
hopes) progress is to be made with reviewing the S.P.C.
13. All that said, however, I certainly take your point that there will be advantage
in addressing our minds now to the need for settling as soon as is possible upon a
timetable. This I was anyway trying to do, although admittedly I had approached the
matter from another angle. To explain my approach I must give you a little
background.
14. The contract between the sugar millers and the growers expires next March.
Negotiating a new one is proving difficult, principally because the Opposition are
increasingly seeking to exploit the issue. There is thus a danger of a politically
inspired strike at some stage. Whatever its motivation, a strike would seriously
damage the economy; and it could cause internal security problems. So we must try
and avoid one. Having considered how best to do this, my security advisers have
recommended that a dispute (in terms of Section 14 of the Sugar Ordinance) should
if possible be declared soon and decided by someone appointed by the Chief Justice
before a Constitutional Conference is held. I have not yet had an opportunity to
consult others about this recommendation, and cannot therefore say whether it
would be politically acceptable deliberately to delay a Conference as might very well
be necessary to ensure that a decision about the sugar dispute preceded one. This I
shall be exploring; and I will write again once the position is clearer. I hope I shall
then be able to give a firmer indication of when we shall be asking for a Conference
and, if necessary, to set out in greater detail our reasons for proposing whatever
timetable we do.
130 FCO 32/402, no 82 2 May 1969
[Future of Fiji]: letter (reply) from J C Morgan to Sir R Foster on the
electoral system, an upper house and the next constitutional steps
In my letter of 18 April I wrote about one or two urgent points of timing raised in
yours (S 166/37–2) of 9 April.1 I am writing now about the other important
constitutional issues discussed in your letter.
The electoral system
2. I agree with your reaction to Patel’s ideas as set out in your paragraph 2. Not
only would the idea of 40 single member constituencies be impraoticable for the
reasons you advanced, but even if his suggestions that the majority of these should
be reserved as to race, and a common roll were remotely acceptable to the Fijians
surely the end result would not change the present vertical political/racial division of
the country? But more to the point, can Patel seriously believe that in the present
1 See 129.
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climate of opinion in Fiji his stand on a common roll is ever likely to get other than
short shrift from Mara? This bodes ill for any meeting of minds. I can only venture
the hope, which I expressed earlier, that he has taken up an extreme position in order
to give himself maximum manoeuverability in his dealings with the Chief Minister.
3. However, as you suggest, two can play at this game. I was most interested in
the latest thoughts of Mara. They may be respectable enough in principle but they
appear to need considerable amplification. How many constituencies would a 50
member, all elected, Legislative Council throw up? Our sums here suggest that the
answer might lie anywhere between a minimum of 11 constituencies and a
maximum of 38, the actual number depending on the degree of overlapping that is
acceptable. Most of your constituencies for the 1966 elections did not coincide with
one another geographically and there were considerable variations in the sizes of
electorates because some areas were thinly populated. These problems of
delimitation are likely to be increased by Mara’s latest line of thinking, and the
prospect of ‘selling’ any new demarcation arrangements that might be necessary
appears correspondingly blank.
4. The proposition that the 50 member legislative council would provide seats
for eight General members also seems to call for comment. One of Stanley de
Smith’s criticisms of the present constitution is that 4 per cent of the registered
electorate is guaranteed 10 out of 36 of the elected seats.2 As things turned out nine
of these General seats (or 25 per cent of all elected seats) were won by European
candidates. Europeans constituting about 1.5 per cent of the total population. Clearly
the disproportionate guaranteed European representation needs to be reduced and to
this extent Mara is moving in the right direction. But is he moving far enough? His
latest ideas still seem to indicate that 16 per cent of the seats in the Legislative
Council will be reserved for what is after all about a mere 2 per cent of the
population. One question is, to what extent is it still today necessary to reassure
European business interests that they will still have spokesmen in the Legislature, or
to give any special weight to that body and its Councils not being denied a leavening
of competent and experienced European members. I suspect that Patel would be
likely to take the view that reserving eight seats for General members is somewhat
more than adequate as regards the interests of that section of the community.
An upper house
5. As you will recall, in my letter 58 of 3 March, I expressed some doubt about
how the creation of an Upper House to solve the vexed question of the built in edge
for the Fijians that now exists in the presence of the two Chiefly members in the
Legislative Council would work. All it seemed to me to do would be to remove the
political problem to another arena. And one has in mind the discouraging thought
that Upper Houses are rather out of fashion and those existing (usually invented to
protect ‘state’ rights in federations) are not always effective. British Guiana before
independence did have an Upper and Lower House but the Upper House was
subsequently abolished. However, I certainly take your point that if we go back to the
Kaul proposals and are faced with a considerable measure of disagreement about the
five unallocated seats, it might be wise to consider whether the device of an Upper
2 See 119.
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House could in any way absorb that disagreement. If Patel could be brought to accept
your idea of a House with eight members appointed by the Prime Minister, six by
himself and four by the Great Council of Chiefs, then we would have something
useful to work on. But is this proposition saleable to him? I would imagine that in
any issue of importance he would assume that the ganging up would be on the part
of the Prime Minister and the Chief’s nominees, and if he himself were in power the
Opposition and the Chiefs’ nominees. This may be over-simplifying the issue but it is
the sort of reaction I would expect from Patel. Nevertheless, as I said in my earlier
letter, given that the parties agree they want an Upper Chamber this can certainly be
provided for in the next round. In this connection I enclose the latest note3 on
Bioameral Legislatures which our Commonwealth Co-ordination Department have
now produced. There is of course no objection to your passing a copy on to Mara.
The next constitutional steps
6. I was not at all surprised to hear that Mara was attracted by the Bahamas
model and, the electoral system apart, might go for this type or constitution as a
general aim. While this could take him to about the fullest possible measure of
internal self-government, it would retain that tenuous link with Britain which in his
heart of hearts I suspect he is most unwilling to let go. It is interesting that Patel on
the other hand might also find that model attractive though for a different reason. In
this context, with regard to the two matters which you specifically raise in your
paragraph 5, I agree that it should be possible to write into any new constitution
provisions for changes to it not affecting the U.K. to be made entirely locally. There
is, of course, the danger you point out. I doubt whether we would get away with not
defining what would not be left for unilateral Fiji decision. It would probably be
unwise to attempt any definition at this juncture and I would prefer to see how
matters develop before taking this any further. I would say the same about the
question of whether the electoral system could,—and would only—be amended by
local action. Much will depend on what sort of agreed system, if any, emerges. But I
do agree with you that if other matters go the way we would like to see them go, it
ought not to be too difficult to devise satisfactory safeguards for constitutional
change. Finally, as to the final step or steps on the constitution road to take Fiji to
ultimate status, you and I have always been clear that this would have to be for
negotiation with the United Kingdom at the request and initiative of Fiji.
7. I think the other matters mentioned in your letter have been dealt with in my
interim reply and related telegrams. Looking over what I have written above, I do not
think we can claim to have taken matters much further forward. But we are
necessarily still working to a large extent in the dark with the unresolved question of
electoral arrangements very much the unknown factor in this difficult equation. It
may be that following our talks with Mara later this month we shall find ourselves
further along the stony road to an accommodation. I very much hope so but this
remains to be seen.
8. We need some help from you for this forthcoming discussion with Mara. May I
ask you to telegraph shortly before Mara gets here—say on 15 May—information to
cover:—
3 Not printed.
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(a) a round up of the latest situation in Fiji;
(b) what you think Mara will want to get out of his discussions here about
constitutional matters;
(c) your ideas of what we might any to him;
(d) any matters other than constitutional you think he may wish to discuss e.g.
South Pacific Commission or development.
131 FCO 32/402, no 83 9 May 1969
[Future of Fiji]: letter (reply) from Sir R Foster to J C Morgan on
discussions with Ratu Mara before the chief minister’s visit to
London. Enclosure: Notes by Foster on a meeting with Ratu Mara at
Government House on 4 May
Thank you for your letter of 2nd May1 (HPF 1/6) about Ratu Mara’s visit to London
and the general constitutional issues. I have had a round up with him on Sunday 4th
May, which was of course before I got your letter. Our respective plans rather
dictated this early meeting since LegCo is dragging on and Ratu Mara is straining at
the leash to get off to Lau to see about materials for the restoration of the buildings
on the island of Bau. I am off on tour of Vanua Levu and Taveuni on 12th May
returning on 21st May. Finally, Ratu Mara is off to London over the weekend of the
17th May. Last weekend therefore presented the last opportunity of a calm chat
before he left for London.
2. I made a note of my discussion and I enclose a couple of copies of it. This note
should be read together with this letter but you will see that except for 16, paragraph
12 onwards of it are not relevant. Could an appointment with Czarnikow and Co be
fitted in for him and perhaps someone would take him along to it. Having regard to
your letter I would add to the notes as follows.
3. Electoral system. You will obviously be discussing this in London. Ratu Mara
knows that I do not favour communal seats and he himself can see no particular
purpose in them. Ten Fijian communal seats out of a total of fifty really provides no
protection of any sort whatever, particularly when it is matched with ten Indian
seats. He says his people insist on this because they seem to see some safeguard in it.
I imagine that you are not particularly attracted by this idea either, and you may like
to deploy a line which I have not tried on him yet largely because I did not think of it.
It is that if he wishes to have control over future constitutional changes of the kind
mentioned in paragraph 5(b) of my letter of the 9th April, which include changes in
the electoral system, then he must be prepared to agree to an electoral system which
looks as presentable as possible: for the United Kingdom will not otherwise be able to
defend giving up control, as communal seats even if matched are not regarded as
normal and would tend to make the constitution look much more interim than he
obviously has in mind. This may, I think, be a telling argument as he is particularly
anxious to ensure that this shall be the last constitutional conference for reasons I
will mention later. As regards paragraph 4 of your letter, he himself seems anxious
not to erode the position of Europeans too much, hence this arrangement which
1 See 130.
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increases total members to fifty with at the same time a slight reduction in general
voter members. I agree this is a point that Patel might well object to. The only thing
I can suggest which you might like to try is that the three communal elected general
voter members mentioned in paragraph 6 of my notes might be pushed into the
Upper House if there is to be one. Five Europeans out of fifty on a reserved general
voter basis would perhaps look a bit better. Ultimately this must be a matter I think
between Patel and Ratu Mara.
4. Upper House. I don’t think I have any more to add to the Upper House.
However it comes out its real purpose would be to provide a built-in Fijian protection
regarding a few important matters. There would be no real need for it to consider
anything except these, though presentationally it might have to be allowed to despite
the fact that giving Upper Houses too much to do and too much power is probably
why, in the long term, they come unstuck. If however the Upper House is to examine
all Bills, etc., there may be some merit in it doing so in advance of their introduction
to parliament, so that a Bill arrives there having been examined and with any
comments that have been made. An arrangement of this sort might be better than
giving an Upper House power to delay things. On the other hand, whenever Fijian
affairs such as land are for consideration its power (of veto) should be quite clear.
5. I think that what I have so far said generally covers point (a) in paragraph 8 of
your letter and there now remain the other three points. First of all, as regards (d),
my understanding is that Ratu Mara wishes to confine himself on this occasion to
Fijian affairs with particular reference to the constitution and it seems very unlikely
that he will wish to discuss matters such as the SPC or development. He may
however decide to explore again the possible effect on Fiji’s sugar industry of the
United Kingdom’s possible entry into the Common Market. If at some later stage we
hear he will—or hear of other matters—then I or Peter Lloyd will certainly let you
know. For subjects which Ratu Mara might raise or which you might like to raise
with him other than those already mentioned in my notes I would add the
following:—
(a) You may like to raise with him the question of the Public Service Commission
going executive, and whether he is satisfied with that type of arrangement or
would like some different system involving appeals such as that used in Australia. I
have touched on this but he should be in no doubt in his mind of the requirements
of the U.K. which stem from a P.S.C. going executive. He did not mention it to me
but I gather he would like to have a voice in the selection of permanent secretaries
and Heads of Departments. This would seem to me to be reasonable.
(b) You are bound, I imagine, to get down to discussion on the Bahamas
arrangements. All I know this end of course is the contents of the White Paper.
You might like to check that he will be content with the degree of responsibility
for which it provides, and to confirm that you will yourselves be ready to concede
this. You might also like to get his ideas on internal security and the degree to
which he would hope to be totally responsible for this as opposed to leaving some
authority—perhaps more than the Bahamas—to the Governor. And you may wish
to sound him out on a Deputy Governor arrangement as proposed for the Bahamas
if that is what you would in fact require here too. It seems difficult to avoid it if one
is to have a Governor with residual responsibility at all times at post and at the
same time to have removed all officials from LegCo, which I think is his intention.
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(c) There are the two points in paragraph 6 of your letter about arrangements for
changing the constitution where it does not affect the U.K. and secondly
negotiations for a final step. Both of these you may like to raise. He will in effect
almost certainly raise them himself when making plain his determination, which I
have mentioned already, that this should be the last constitutional conference. He
has told me that conferences in London cause a lot of anxiety out here, which is
why he doesn’t want any more. I am sure this is true as far as it goes. But it doesn’t
go the whole way. For part at least of the truth is that he personally and the Fijian
people in general feel they are put on the defensive at these conferences, coming
under pressure to make concessions they would prefer to avoid. They thus believe,
quite understandably and rightly, that the sooner they can take control the securer
their position will be. Moreover, they may have thought—although I have no
evidence of this and we have certainly not briefed them—of some of the
arguments deployed in our earlier correspondence with you, for instance the
enclosure to Sir Derek Jakeway’s letter of the 12th November 1968.
(d) There is the question of citizenship which I feel you are much more able to
deal with then I am here. I have no views on this myself because I think it is
essentially a matter for the U.K. There seems to be no joy in trying to use any form
of ‘status’ for the purpose that Ratu Mara obviously has in mind.
(e) There is the question of the Ombudsman again, over which I have no
particular views. He will obviously wish to discuss this and whether we end up
with one here or not is not material to me, but it might perhaps form part of some
package deal with Patel.
(f) There is the question of delimitation which is mentioned in the notes at
paragraph 6. From my own point of view I would be happy to go along with either
a commission (provided we can agree on the terms of reference—and thereby will
lie the difficulty) or some direct arrangement such as Ratu Mara would prefer
provided it is acceptable to Patel. In other words, local agreement on the method
to be adopted is really what I would be interested in. If there are any different views
at your end you might care to mention them. A delimitation commission is always,
I understand, regarded as the most respectable thing to have but possibly not
necessarily in our circumstances the best.
(g) I come next to what is probably the most difficult point of all and that is the
timing of a conference. From the notes you will see that the teams are not yet in
the field. But there is a good prospect that something will happen in June. How
long they will need to argue I have no idea, though I should have thought they
would either come to terms reasonably quickly or we could drag on almost
indefinitely. From the point of view of Fiji, seeing this subject has been much
bandied about already, I am sure the right course is to have a conference this year
and not to hang on until next. Delay would obviously cause concern among the
Federation party and could only result in a good deal of heat being generated. I
would very much hope therefore that sufficient local agreement can be reached for
a conference to take place. This I am sure is right. On the other hand Ratu Mara
can if necessary afford to sit back and not be in any hurry and this is one of the
cards which he has. On this front therefore I would be glad if you could adopt a
line that a conference this year is really in the best interest of all concerned so that
this matter can be settled and the heat removed. To be able to spend our time
implementing what the conference decides is a much more positive and
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constructive agenda. I do not know whether you could go so far as to arrange a
tentative date with him on the understanding that sufficient agreement can be
reached. This may first of all help him to focus his eyes on a target and it may also
help you your end to keep that period free, at least for a time. Could one perhaps
say that the Secretary of State is extremely busy, his programme is filling up but
he could keep this week or these days in reserve until, say, the end of June or mid-
July in the hope that local agreement could be reached. The danger here of course
is that Ratu Mara may turn round and say that if the Secretary of State cannot fit
him in now, well then early next year will suit him quite well.
(h) Finally in this category Ratu Mara might raise with you the question of
presiding at Council of Ministers. In the next constitution I would expect there to
be a Cabinet type of government with a Prime Minister presiding. This would not
however come about until late 1970 or early 1971 and it is for consideration
whether the Chief Minister should preside before that date. The issue was raised
before by Sir Derek Jakeway and you then said it was not the intention that this
should happen. However 18 months to 2 years from now is a long time and you
may consider that somewhere along the road we ought to relax this one. My own
view would be to hold the present position until we know what comes out of the
conference and then to decide the issue.
6. I have two other points. The first is that I would be very grateful for any papers
you can let me have on the working of Malaysia which obviously is a pattern which
recommends itself to Ratu Mara and one which he does and will raise from time to
time: I suspect he really wants to find respectable means of discriminating in favour
of Fijians as Malaysia does in favour of Malays. The second point is that you may not
have seen No. 1 issue of Nation magazine and I enclose a copy of it.2 This is an
Alliance paper and you may find the first article of interest as representing at least
some of their published views. I have reason to believe that the views some of Ratu
Mara’s bright young men express to him in private are far more reactionary.
Enclosure to 131
1. I had a meeting with the Chief Minister at 9.0 a.m. on Sunday 4th May at
Government House. This was intended to be a ranging discussion taking place before
his visit to London. What with LegCo and my touring and his movements, this
seemed to be the last occasion we could meet before he went off.
2. We started off on the general state of play on the constitution and he told me
that he had met A.D. Patel and had told him straight out that the common roll was
not on. He said he was, however, prepared to go for a very full form of self
government which he, Ratu Mara, called full internal self-government and which
A.D. Patel preferred to call independence, but in that case good solid Fijian
safeguards were required. What Ratu Mara had in mind in saying all this to A.D. Patel
was, once more, the Bahamas type arrangements. He said that he and Patel had
agreed to have a meeting or meetings on his return from London of two groups of
people from LegCo, the Chief Minister and some of his people, and A.D. Patel and
2 Not printed.
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some of his. All must come from LegCo and Europeans, by which I think he meant
Mr Falvey, would be excluded. From this would spring, he hoped, a measure of
agreement which would lead to a conference. He also thought that Patel’s prime
objective for the conference was full internal self government. He thought that
agreement on that would lead to agreement in other directions. It was at this point
that Ratu Mara threw in the idea of the safeguards as operating in Malaya. (I am
afraid that I am not very well versed in affairs there but we are likely to hear more of
Malaya and should be knowledgeable about it.)3 He did not spell them out, but the
implication was that Fijians would continue to provide government in return for
which some concessions might be given to the Indians. He thought there might be
some advantage in an Ombudsman and he asked if he could discuss the pros and
cons of such an arrangement while he was in London. He said that the Indians
consistently complained against the activities of the government and such an
appointment would provide them with a place where they could legitimately
complain and have their complaints examined. He was not sold on the idea, but was
interested.
3. On the question of safeguards, he raised the matter of an Upper House and he
said he was still very interested in this possibility. I told him that I hoped there were
some papers on the way out which would give some examples of Upper Houses in
various places and that as soon as I received them I would let him have them. (I have
since received and passed them on.)
4. I said it would be helpful if we could identify some of the things that he wished
to discuss in London so that I could send off a warning order. Continuing on
constitutional arrangements I enquired what his views were about the Public Service
Commission—whether he thought it was reasonably satisfactory in its present form
or whether in the next stage it should become executive. He said he was fairly
content with its present form but that he thought it ought to become executive. I
briefly spelt out for him the consequences of such an arrangement i.e. full
compensation scheme, which would allow remaining permanent and pensionable
expatriates to depart, and so on. He said he thought that the heat would come off
localisation after a bit and we could settle down but that in any case we should be
able to wear all this by then. (This is not a final view I think.) Continuing on this
subject he said that he had hoped to be presented with a fairly full picture of each
ministry, showing all expatriates and their posts and indicating which of these posts
would be required to be filled by expatriates for some time having regard to
efficiency. He said he had not as yet seen any chart of this kind and he felt there
ought to be a similar picture as regards Commerce and Industry but of course in that
case on much broader lines. (This I imagine is a matter lying somewhere between the
Ministries, the Director of Localisation and Training and the Manpower Committee.
We may need a prod of some sort here, particularly with the Manpower Committee
from whom I have seen nothing as regards commerce on these lines.)
5. I then asked him to run over his ideas on constituencies again and he said that
they were as follows.
6. There would be ten constituencies, so arranged that as far as possible Fijian
and Indian voters would be about equal, and where this was utterly impossible such
3 cf 57 & 58.
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as in Lau and the Ba area, there would be compensating constituencies, that is to say
one predominantly Indian as against one predominantly Fijian. One of his bright
young men has apparently already drawn up such an arrangement. In each
constituency there would be four members, an Indian member and a Fijian
communal member and an Indian and Fijian crossvoting member; these
constituencies would then be lumped together to form five separate constituencies to
elect five crossvoting general voting members. In addition, the whole territory would
be cut up into three to provide three communally elected general voter members.
Added to this would be the two members nominated by the Council of Chiefs. But he
said he was in fact now rather attracted to the Upper House idea and if this came off
then those two members would disappear from LegCo. I think one of the things he
would like to discuss in London was delimitation and whether it is acceptable these
days to draw constituencies without a commission. He had in mind the Governor
doing it rather on the lines it was done, I understand, the last time. His fear is that we
could come out of a conference with a finely balanced result which might be missed
up by a delimitation commission. I said I thought any arrangement that was
acceptable to all concerned was usually all right.
7. Another point I think he would like to talk over in England is the extent to
which the Bahamas with their new constitution will extract themselves from the
attention of the Committee of 24. He is extremely sensitive about this committee and
he hopes sincerely that the outcome of the conference will be such as to remove Fiji
from their ken.4
8. Ratu Mara said he would also like to have an opportunity for discussion with
the office constitutional lawyers and I told him I thought he would find them in the
room anyway but he may like a special discussion depending, I imagine, on how
things go. He did not spell out any special points he wished to raise in this way.
9. Having re-read the papers on citizenship I had decided to let this sleeping dog
lie. However, Ratu Mara woke it up and raised the matter himself. It seemed, by a
little probing, that what he had in mind was citizenship for Fiji particularly in
relation to voting qualifications, etc. He obviously had it in mind to smoke out the
Indian community in their loyalties. I told him that I thought citizenship in the full
sense was not on for Fiji until it became independent but that there was another
thing, which Bermuda had used, called ‘status’ and this could be explored if he was
interested. He said this was another matter that he would like to raise in London. I
said that if he had ideas of tying voting to some sort of Fijian status he might well
smoke out a few Indians but that he must bear in mind that he might also smoke out
some Europeans. In addition the introduction of some kind of status arrangements
and getting everyone sorted out would take, I should imagine, quite a considerable
time because people could not be forced to make decisions of this sort all that
quickly. Once more he referred to Malaya as a possible example he had in mind.
10. I then referred to the timing of a conference if and when we could get that far
and he said that he still had late September in mind. I pointed out that the Secretary
of State’s diary was beginning to fill up and that we were not in a position to be
accorded exactly the time that suited us. He said that he did not want it later than
that because of the SPC and secondly the cold climate in England meant that
4 Marginal note by Morgan: ‘They can’t. They are still a dependency.’
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everyone had to buy an enormous amount of extra clothes. If it had to be later than
September he thought perhaps the earlier part of next year might be better but it
would be for the UK to fix the date. (From what he told me of his plans (para 2) at this
meeting it would seem that we have no hope of achieving a sufficient measure of
agreement to get to the conference until towards the end of June at the earliest and,
if we achieve that, it may be possible to meet in the vacant period in August if this is
not too rushed.)
11. We next got on to the subject of who would go to the conference. He said that
Patel wished to take his Fijian element which Ratu Mara refers to as his ‘fellow
travellers’. This is presumably for the look of things. Ratu Mara is equally determined
to prevent it. He says that all people who go to the conference must be members of
LegCo. The upper bracket would therefore appear to be the whole of LegCo. Ratu
Mara himself thought that this was an unnecessary number of people even if this was
to be the last conference that took place in London and he thought a few from each
side should in fact suffice. Possibly he thought even the two groups which were going
to discuss together in June might do. This is clearly a matter for negotiation with
Patel but he may raise this too in London for reactions.
12. We then got on to some unconnected and extraneous matters which were as
follows.
13. I said that the Minister of Finance had been talking to Sir James Plimsoll in
Canberra and it is said that he is the person who has done so much to get aid for Fiji.5
Ritchie felt Sir James would like to visit Fiji. I said I thought that this was a good idea
and I had met Sir James but if such a visit took place the Chief Minister should be
present. He agreed that it would be a useful visit and that we should proceed
informally through the Minister of Finance to arrange something to suit Sir James
and the Chief Minister as regards to timing. (I have passed on this information to Mr
Ritchie, who will act on it.)
14. I raised then the question of the motion by Patel to repeal the sugar
ordinance and said that I was worried that if this was to go to a Select Committee we
should on the one hand be declaring disputes and appointing arbitrators under the
ordinance, when at the same time there might be the Select Committee considering
whether the ordinance should continue to exist. I said that I had approached MNR
about this who had in turn spoken to the Independent Chairman, who was
apparently not himself worried about this. Ratu Mara told me that there was no
question whatever of this ordinance being repealed, but that there were one or two
points in it which could be improved upon and that the Select Committee would be
for this purpose. The main reason for going to Select Committee was to get it out of
LegCo now so that everyone could go about their business and not have another long
debate. This in the event seems satisfactory (I subsequently put the Chief Justice in
the picture).
15. He then mentioned Professor Morris who had been visiting here from
Zambia (I think in fact it was Professor Rogers) and he said that there was some
indication from President Kaunda6 about inviting Ratu Mara to visit Central Africa.
Ratu Mara was attracted by this idea, not only to Central Africa but also to Uganda
5 See 120. 6 President of Zambia.
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and Kenya because he thought he might be able to win some support from these
independent African territories for keeping Fiji out of the Committee of 24.7 No time
was mentioned for this visit and in fact no firm invitation has I understand been
made. We must expect I think that this will rear its head again later on. Given the
time for such a trip I think it would be useful. In passing Ratu Mara told me that
there was talk in Africa of President Kaunda as the successor to U Thant.8
16. Finally he said he would like to look into the question of the marketing of
copra and he would like to have discussions while in London with someone at
Czarnikow and Co. He is very much worried I think about the common market,
import duties, and so on. This is another thing that will have to be arranged while he
is in London.
7 Marginal note by Morgan: ‘Ha ha!’ 8 UN secretary-general.
132 FCO 32/426 19 May 1969
[Chief minister]: FCO record of a meeting between Ratu Sir K Mara
and Mr Thomson1 on the chief minister’s knighthood and the political
situation in Fiji
Mr. Thompson welcomed Ratu Sir Kamisese to London and said he thought that
congratulations were in order. He had heard that the Chief Minister would be
attending the Holyrood2 Investiture to receive his knighthood.
Ratu Sir Kamisese thanked Mr. Thompson and said that he had only just realised
the particular honour in being invited to attend the Investiture in Scotland at a
ceremony traditionally reserved for Scots. Mr. Thompson said that this was a
momentous week in Scotland. Her Majesty would be in Edinburgh for the General
Assembly of the Church of Scotland. He understood that the Chief Minister would
also be getting an opportunity to play golf at St. Andrews. This was very close to his
constituency from which he had just returned.
Mr. Thompson enquired about the Chief Minister’s trip. Ratu Sir Kamisese said he
had come to the United Kingdom via the Polar route for the first time. This route was
a great time saver, but he confessed that he himself had lost all sense of time.
Mr. Thompson said he had also heard that things in Fiji had not been easy for the
Chief Minister in 1968, and the latter was to be congratulated for the skill with which
he had handled a difficult political situation. Ratu Sir Kamisese replied that recent
events in Malaysia emphasised how difficult things could be when a country had a
racial problem.3 But getting away from the political background, Fiji’s economy was
1 Thomson was minister without portfolio and chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, 1969–1970.
2 Holyrood castle in Edinburgh, Scotland.
3 In the first all-Malaysia elections for the Federal Parliament in May 1969 the governing Alliance
coalition based on the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) and the Malayan Chinese
Association (MCA) suffered significant losses. Having lost 14 of its previous 27 seats the MCA withdrew
from the Alliance Cabinet. Communally-based opposition parties were the main beneficiaries of the drop
in Alliance electoral support. The elections were followed by inter-communal violence in Kuala Lumpur
which led to a state of emergency and left nearly 200 dead by the end of June. Most of the victims were
Chinese.
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doing very well. Receipts from tourism were most gratifying and ah important
contribution to the economic stability of Fiji. Mr. Thompson asked where the
tourists came from. Ratu Sir Kamisese said that in order of numbers, mainly from
Australia, then the United States and New Zealand and also a few from the United
Kingdom. There were over 60,000 last year and projections suggested a 30% increase
on this figure in 1969.
Reverting to constitutional matters, Ratu Sir Kamisese said that when he returned
to Fiji in early June he would be having conversations with the Opposition party.
Both sides thought that there ought to be a constitutional conference later this year.
Mr. Thompson said that in a matter such as this it was very important to lay the
groundwork conscientiously. Ratu Sir Kamisese agreed. Mr. Thompson recalled that
the Opposition party had been boycotting the Legislative Council. Ratu Sir Kamisese
said that following the by-elections last September, they had returned to the
Chamber and were now participating in the deliberations of the Legislative Council.
Mr. Thompson enquired how the Indians generally were behaving in Fiji. Ratu Sir
Kamisese said that the Indian Opposition were constantly trying to involve the
United Nations in Fiji’s affairs, but he had recently had considerable co-operation
from New Delhi. He was personally on good terms with Indian ministers. The Indian
Minister of Labour had visited Fiji as a guest of the Government at the end of last
year.
Mr. Thompson enquired when the next elections were due to take place in Fiji.
Ratu Sir Kamisese said that they were due in 1971, but conceivably, if a new
constitution was evolved, they could take place sooner. He was very interested in
the Bahamas constitution which might prove a model for a future Fiji constitution.
Mr. Thompson thought that the Bahamas model did not have to provide for the
type of communal problem found in Fiji. Ratu Sir Kamisese expressed deep anxiety
about the riots in Malaysia and the effect they might have on the multi-racial
character of the Constitution Mr. Thompson agreed that the Malaysian
developments were bound to cause concern in a multi-racial community like Fiji.
He enquired whether Fiji had a Chinese community. Ratu Sir Kamisese said that
they had a fair sized Chinese element in Fiji but their behaviour was exemplary and
they were non political.
Mr. Thompson enquired whether the Indians had an overall majority on the
electoral rolls. Ratu Sir Kamisese said that at the moment the Indians had the edge
but projections for the future showed that Indian strength was on the increase. Mr.
Thompson asked what degree of success the cross voting system, introduced in Fiji
in 1966, had enjoyed. Ratu Sir Kamisese said that the ice had been broken with this
arrangement but it was a pity that the last constitutional conference had not
provided for more cross voting seats in the electoral arrangements. Mr. Thompson
commented that a major problem in electoral arrangements was the delimitation of
constituencies. It was also very necessary to try to build up non communal voting
habits.
In conclusion Mr. Thompson thanked the Chief Minister for the opportunity of
renewing their acquaintance and wished him success in the future.
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133 FCO 32/426, no 93 19 May 1969
[Chief minister]: minute by E J Emery to Sir A Galsworthy on Ratu
Sir K Mara’s doubts about democracy and multi-racialism in Fiji.
Enclosure: ‘Electoral arrangements for the Legislative Council of Fiji’
For case of reference in our further talks. I attach notes of the electoral
arrangements under the present Fiji Constitution, the Kaul formula and Ratu Mara’s
current proposals.
2. It emerged this morning that Ratu Mara has been much shaken by recent
events in Malayasia1 and he is more than over convinced that ‘democracy’ and ‘multi-
racialism’ are not for Fiji. In his own words ‘Racialism is an evil, but also a reality’.
(Ratu Mara also stressed the need for a continuing link with the Crown, in which he
seemed to see protection for the Fijian minority and safeguards for their land rights
which stem from the 1874 Deed of Cession. He seemed, despite your efforts to clarify
the matter, pretty vague about the distinction between the link with the Crown and
the link with Britain.)
3. We agreed after the talk with Ratu Mara that, when we met him again
tomorrow, we should try to urge the following on him.
4. He should try to extend his cross-voting proposals and out down the
communal seats. We should point out that the higher the proportion of communal
seats the more vulnerable the constitution would be at the United Nations and the
harder it would be to present to the House of Commons. The proportion of
communal seats is a matter which Ratu Mara must agree with Patel (but presumably
the smaller it is the easier his negotiation will be).
5. We should try to leave details of the means of increasing cross-voting as
against communal seats and numbers to Ratu Mara. (The Governor suggested as a
possibility that the three communally elected general voter members might be
pushed into the Upper House, if there is to be one. This might also be a possibility for
the two members elected by the Great Council of Chiefs.)
6. We shall presumably explore further tomorrow the idea of an Upper House,
which was only briefly touched on this morning. Ratu Mara let fall that his idea
would be to have an entirely nominated House, one-third nominated by the Prime
Minister, one-third by the Leader of the Opposition and one-third by the Council of
Chiefs. We shall presumably also wish to explore what are Ratu Mara’s ideas about
the powers of an Upper House.
Enclosure to 133
Present constitution
There are three separate voters rolls, one of Fijians, one of Indians and one of persons
who are neither Fijians nor Indians.
The Council consists of not more than four official members and 36 elected
members of whom:—
1 See 132, note 3.
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14 are Fijians (two elected by the Great Council of Chiefs, nine by the Fijian roll
and three by the three separate rolls);
12 are Indians (nine elected by the Indian roll and three by the three separate
rolls);
10 are neither Fijians or Indians (seven elected by the roll of persons who are
neither Fijians or Indians and three by the three separate rolls).
In short there are 27 communally elected members and nine elected on a cross-
voting system.
The Kaul formula
Mr. Kaul of the Indian Department of External Affairs visited Fiji in January, 1968.
He suggested an extension of cross-voting. He is reported to have had in mind 15
Indian, 15 Fijian, five ‘general’ (i.e. persons who are neither Fijian nor Indian) and
five other seats—in effect, voting on a common roll with reserved seats.
There has, however, been subsequent confusion about what Mr. Kaul meant.
Mr. Patel, the leader of the Opposition, says he meant 40 single member
constituencies and 40 (elected) members of the Council. There would be a
common roll, 15 constituencies would be reserved for Indian members, 15 for
Fijian members, five for ‘general’ members and five genuinely multi-racial
constituencies.
Our High Commission in Delhi, asked to confirm Mr. Kaul’s view, said he had
confined himself simply to principles:—
(i) the extension of cross voting;
(ii) a reduction in European seats; and
(iii) parity of representation for Fijians and Indians.
Ratu Mara’s proposals
Ratu Mara’s Alliance Party seem now to be thinking on the following lines:—
A Council of 50 elected members. (Ratu Mara says he would need a Council of
approximately this size anyway to give him Ministers and a reasonable number of
backbenchers.) There would be elected:—
By Communal Rolls By Cross-Voting
10 Fijians (i.e. reserved seats for which members
10 Indians would be elected by voters on all three
3 General separate rolls)
2 by the Great Council of Chiefs 10 Fijians
10 Indians
5 General
(The present constitution has in effect 27 members elected communally and nine by
cross-voting. By his new proposals Ratu Mara would be extending cross-voting to 25
out of a total of 50 members.)
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134 FCO 32/404 20 May 1969
[Communal voting]: FCO record of a meeting between 
Sir A Galsworthy and Ratu Sir K Mara
1. Sir Arthur Galsworthy said that he had been giving thought to the problems
discussed on the previous day and he would give the Chief Minister his personal
preliminary reactions. A considered opinion would, of course, require the approval of
the Secretary of State.
2. We fully understood Fiji’s difficulties but provision for perpetuating
communal voting as suggested in the Chief Minister’s proposals would be difficult.
Fiji’s critics in the United Nations or, indeed, Members of our own Parliament who
were sincere advocates of the one man, one vote democratic concept would regard a
pattern of communal voting as a retrograde step. It was to some extent a matter of
presentation. It would be possible to present the Chief Minister’s ideas in such a way
that they did not necessarily appear to be a step backward. Compared with the 1966
Constitution a slight decrease in communal voting and an increase in the cross
voting could be demonstrated. But it would be easier still to present if the formula of
10 Fijian, 10 Indian and 3 General seats on a communal roll were reduced further.
3. Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara asked if the proposal to have 10 Indian, 10 Fijian and
3 General seats on the communal roll were a step backward what would be a step
forward? Sir Arthur Galsworthy suggested an appeal to the electorate on politics and
not on race would be the answer to this. This is what critics in Parliament would say.
Those who said this would not necessarily be critics of Fiji but of the principle of
communal voting and to press communal voting arrangements might alienate the
widespread sympathy there was in this country for Fiji’s difficult problem. The Chief
Minister said that he had not had a chance to discuss the 10.10.3 formula with Mr.
Patel. There had been suggestions that he and the leader of the Opposition should try
to get together outside Fiji for private discussions but this was quite impossible for
him politically.
Sir Arthur Galsworthy said we fully understood the difficulties. What he would like
to suggest was that the Chief Minister should ponder this question of the proportion
of communally voted seats yet again. Our view was that the further he could go
towards a reduction in communal seats and an extension of cross voting the greater
the chances were that the solution would be acceptable all round and in particular to
Parliament.
4. Sir Arthur Galsworthy suggested that the meeting should pass on to one or
two other aspects of constitutional development, which he understood from the
Governor the Chief Minister might like to discuss. The question of delimitation of
constituency boundaries was one. Under Article 54 of the present constitution
constituency boundaries were a direct responsibility of the Governor. Mr. Rushford1
said that the usual pattern was for the Governor to be advised by a special body or a
Commission, or the delimitation of constituencies was decided by an independent
Commission. Some Constitutions permitted the Governor to delimit constituencies
in this way but the important thing was to ensure impartiality. Sir Arthur
Galsworthy said that the Bahamas constitution provided for a Constituencies
1 A R Rushford, assistant legal adviser, FCO.
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Commission. The Chief Minister asked whether it would be possible for a
Commission to take account of the unique racial factors in Fiji. Another difficulty
there was the great expense for some Members of the Legislative Council in keeping
in touch with widely scattered electorates. This was a factor in defining Constituency
boundaries. A Commission could hardly be expected to be as closely in touch as the
Governor. His fear was that the terms of reference of a Commission would be finely
balanced and they would not give due weight in the right areas. Mr. Rushford said
that where the racial balance factor was as important as apparental it was in Fiji it
would be extremely difficult to reconcile conflicting priorities. He wondered what the
result would be in attempting to get a racial balance in each constituency. Ratu Sir
Kamisese said that in endeavouring to get a compromise it was always possible that a
Commission would lean too heavily on one side or the other. Mr Rushford said that it
would be necessary to indicate the priorities to a Commission in its terms of
reference. The Chief Minister then asked why at this stage it was desired to remove
from the Governor responsibility for delimitation. Mr. Rushford agreed that it would
be possible to maintain the present system up to independence, but, thereafter, not
possible. The Chief Minister then said that if the question of a delimitation
Commission was raised the Opposition would certainly opt for such a Commission in
the hope that it would pay scant attention to the racial balance factor. He agreed that
a solution would be a Commission with terms of reference which would take this
factor into account.
5. Sir Leslie Monson suggested that there were other matters that he understood
the Minister might like to raise while he was in London. These included an Executive
Public Service Commission, a Fiji ‘status’, and an ‘Ombudsman’ for Fiji and possibly
further discussions on the question of an Upper House. The Chief Minister indicated
his assent.
135 FCO 32/402, no 85 6 June 1969
[Chief minister]: letter from J C Morgan to Sir R Foster on Ratu 
Sir K Mara’s talks in London
By the time you get this, you will have had copies of the records of all the talks with
Ratu Mara about constitutional matters during his recent visit to London.1
2. On the whole, I gather, the talks went well. I fear I missed all but the last as I
had to go off to British Honduras at short notice just before the Chief Minister
arrived. Arthur Galsworthy was in the chair throughout, but he is on leave this week,
so it falls to me to write to you about them. The first two days of the meetings
coincided with some on Anguilla with Bradshaw,2 and, as Arthur was engaged in
both, it was a little hectic for him. I hope that Ratu Mara did not feel he was given
short shrift. He showed no sign of it and in fact most of his time, when he was not
1 See 132–134.
2 E A Bradshaw was the premier of the associated state of St Kitts–Nevis–Anguilla at the time of Anguilla
secession in 1967 (see 103, note 2). He was in London for unsuccessful talks to resolve the crisis. Anguilla
did not formally separate from its two island neighbours until 1980 and remained a UK dependent
territory. St Kitts (or St Christopher) and Nevis became independent in 1983.
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talking with FCO officials was occupied with his calls on the Parliamentary Under-
Secretary, the Minister without Portfolio, the Secretary of State and others. The
Scottish visit went well. Rain, alas, stopped any play at all at Edgbaston.
3. The only really rough passage with Ratu Mara occurred not intrinsically over
constitutional affairs at all, but over the possibility of Britain’s entry into the E.E.C.
We had, as you know, arranged for a final wind-up meeting on constitutional matters
on the afternoon of Wednesday, 28 May and, as Ratu Mara had asked to be told what
would be the effect on Fiji if we went into the Common Market now, we arranged for
John Killick,3 the Under-Secretary concerned, to be present at the meeting on the
28th to speak about this. John Killick explained that the undertakings given to
dependent territories in 1967 as regards our entry into the E.E.C. stood unchanged
today, but, despite his efforts and those of the rest of us to reassure him, Ratu Mara
was quite unaccountably convinced that we were in some way going back on the
1967 assurances. We quoted to him Lord Beswick’s assurance ‘that we shall, during
our negotiations, seek assurances in whatever form seems appropriate which are
consistent with our undertaking to safeguard your essential interests’. He refused to
be comforted, and got pretty emotional, talking about Fiji having thrown in her lot
with Britain unquestioningly in 1874 and ‘if you declare War tomorrow Fiji is
automatically at war’—and more on these lines. He said that, in the light of the
E.E.C. position, Fiji might as well go for full independence now, and he had been
wasting his time during the previous week’s talks with us; his views were now
changed. In the end he seemed reassured by an interjection by Leslie Monson. We
promised to give him an exact statement of the position in writing and I shall be
writing to you again about this. Ratu Mara then agreed to turn again to the
constitutional issues where we had left them the previous week. But his black mood
continued for the rest of the day, and he was a wet blanket at the Galsworthy’s dinner
party that evening to which Cicely and I went.
4. As Arthur Galsworthy told you in his telegram No. Personal 23, Ratu Mara
turned up for the first of the official talks on constitutional matters much affected by
what he had been reading in the newspapers since leaving Fiji about current events
in Malaysia. He said that it seemed even more important to him now than it had
when he talked with his party before leaving home, to get ‘safeguards’. This was more
important for Fiji than ‘democracy’; it was essential to retain the link with the Crown
(he seemed really to mean the link with Britain).
5. It may be useful to sum up here the outcome on the various points, but I shall
leave you to pick up detail from the minutes:—
(a) Electoral Arrangements. We urged the Chief Minister to try to increase cross-
voting and to cut down on his proposals for 10 Fijians, 10 Indians and 3 ‘general’
members elected communally. We pointed out that this would help
presentationally at the U.N. and among potential critics, including M.Ps. in this
country.
(b) Constituency Boundaries. Ratu Mara is of course anxious to find some means
of ensuring that race is taken into account of in constituency alignments in Fiji
whether boundaries are settled by commission or otherwise. We have promised
3 J E Killick, European Integration Dept, FCO.
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him a note on constituency boundary arrangements in other Commonwealth
countries and this is being prepared.
(c) Upper House. This was discussed pretty thoroughly though inconclusively,
but Ratu Mara is clearly going to give it further consideration. The attraction is, of
course, the use that could be made of an Upper House in safeguarding Fijian
interests. There was discussion of various ways in which the Upper House could be
constituted, how it might be used as a communally based institution with the
Lower House elected by cross-voting, the extent of its powers, e.g. in land matters
(they might extend to a veto) and, generally, how entranchment of constitutional
matters could be achieved if there were two Houses.
(d) ‘Ombudsman’. Ratu Mara came back from his talk with Edwin Sykes,
Secretary to our Parliamentary Commissioner, saying that he had ‘bought’ this
one. He is clearly quite keen on the idea. It will be of interest to you incidentally to
know that the ‘Ombudsman’ recently appointed in Guyana is a Guyanese
‘belonger’ of Chinese race.
(e) Fiji ‘Status’. Discussion on this was, perhaps inevitably, a little confused as
between status and citizenship. We have promised Ratu Mara a note to try to
clarify what was said and to set out clearly the relationship between citizenship
and status and voting rights.
(f) Executive Public Service Commission. There was only brief discussion of this.
Ratu Mara explained that in Fiji circumstances he felt he was sometimes better
placed than expatriates in judging the suitability of candidates for appointments.
He willingly assented when we suggested that a degree of consultation with him in
these matters already existed, but he implied (with a grin) that he had had a tussle
in achieving this.
(g) Internal Security. Ratu Mara did not himself raise this but Arthur
Galsworthy, on the last day, mentioned to him that the new internal security
arrangements in the Bahemas might well suit circumstances in Fiji.
(h) Timing. Ratu Mara agreed with our proposals that:—
(i) We should propose to Ministers that a British Minister, with a senior official,
and a constitutional lawyer, should visit Fiji in October to see what area of
agreement Ratu Mara had by then been able to achieve with Patel on such
important matters as electoral arrangements. (We made it clear that the holding
of a constitutional conference would depend on prior achievement of a
satisfactory degree of agreement between the two parties in Fiji; we could not
risk a conference breaking down.)
(ii) if the visiting Minister found a sufficient degree of agreement in Fiji in
October then there might be a constitutional conference in London about the
end of November or early December. We should not allow too long a period to
elapse between the Ministerial visit to Fiji and the conference. To do so would be
to risk agreement evaporating;
(iii) assuming a successful constitutional conference, independence, which was
the ultimate goal, could probably be achieved without a full soale formal
conference, but this would depend on agreement on the main issues among the
people and parties in Fiji.
6. In connection with the idea of a conference in November/December Ratu Mara
himself mentioned a possible clash with the budget meeting of the Legislative
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Council (your telegram No. 26 Personal) but, as you will see from the minutes of the
meeting on the morning of 23 May, he and Sanders took the provisional view that
things could be adjusted to avoid a clash.
7. We intend to put the proposal for a Ministerial visit to Fiji in the autumn to
Ministers as soon as Lord Shepherd returns to London later this month. In the
meantime (and probably for some time thereafter) it should be kept strictly
confidential. If Patel gets wind of it that would, I suppose, spoil Ratu Mara’s chances
of reaching some compromise with him in the talks they are to have on the Chief
Minister’s return.
8. Ratu Mara did not raise the question of his presiding at the Council of
Ministers before a new constitution comes into force (para. 5(h) of your letter of 9
May)4 and that was not discussed.
9. I do hope you will find that our work with Ratu Mara on the constitutional
point was constructive and helpful to you. We have a few days grace before making
the submission to Ministers referred to in para. 7 above. If you have any further
thoughts that might affect it after talking with Ratu Mara (e.g. if you still think there
are serious difficulties of timing of the conference because of your budget session) it
would be very helpful if you would telegram to reach us by 16 June.
10. Sanders5 will be telling you about the sugar talks but I gather they were
satisfactory and that the Chief Minister’s speech went over well.
4 See 131.
5 R T Sanders, secretary to chief minister and Council of Ministers, Fiji, 1967; secretary to Cabinet, 1970;
secretary for foreign affairs, 1970–1974; secretary for home affairs, 1972–1974. Sanders had served in Fiji
since 1950, with the exception of a period (1956–1958) as secretary to the government of Tonga.
136 FCO 32/421, no 6 11 June 1969
‘Internal security—task and role of Fiji military forces’: letter from 
E J Emery to Sir R Foster
In your saving despatch No. 35 of 30 January you raised a number of questions about
the role of the F. M. F. in an internal security situation in the territory.
2. The current United Kingdom doctrine about the role of military forces in aid
of the Civil Power and in particular for using troops in a police role armed with
batons and shields is referred to in paragraph 136 et seq of ‘Keeping the Peace, Part
I’. However, a revised document about this is at present being drafted and a copy of
an extract from the draft is attached.1 This simply reiterates in Section 12 that troops
should only be used on police duties as a last resort, and then only when ordered by
the Governor and after the necessary legislation has been enacted. The section on
crowd dispersal (Section 11) which considers the use of troops in a military, as
opposed to a police, role includes methods of non-violent crowd dispersal which
should be tried before resorting to force. This includes the use of all means of
communicating with the crowd, e.g. banners, loud-speakers, etc., the photographing
of ringleaders and the use of riot control agents (tear smoke).
1 Not printed.
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3. In short, the answer to the first question in paragraph 3 of your saving
despatch No. 35 is that there is no change in our policy and that when called in to
assist the Civil Authorities, troops should be armed and used as a military force, but
the principle of the use of minimum force should be born in mind; non-violent
methods of crowd control including the use of riot control agents, should be used
before resort is made to opening fire.
4. All troops liable to be employed on I.S. duties are trained in the drills involved
in crowd dispersal. If there is any likelihood of specific units being required to act in
a police role, the units are trained in these drills also. As far as equipment is
concerned, units engaged in aid of the Civil Power use their normal equipment and
in addition have the use of an I.S. pack which consists of items considered necessary
for their role. The pack includes such items as batons, shields, pistols 11⁄2’, together
with C.S.2 cartridges, cameras and additional mine detectors, loud speakers, etc.
Additionally if circumstances dictate that a theatre requires additional equipment
and these items are necessary, then they can be agreed.
5. You ask whether the F.M.F. should follow United Kingdom practice or
whether this should be modified in any way to suit the particular circumstances of
Fiji. In deciding this we must of course take account of the importance of preserving
New Zealand support for the F.M.F. We suggest, therefore, that as a first step, you
discuss the United Kingdom doctrine with the F.M.F. Commander, to see whether he
would concur in modification of the training of the F.M.F. to bring it into line with
United Kingdom practice. You will appreciate that if our reinforcement plan
‘INTENSITY’3 were ever implemented, it could be awkward (e.g. for Ministers here in
answering in Parliament) if the equipment and training of the F.M.F. did not enable
it to pursue the doctrine being followed by the British troops. We leave it to you
whether or not to use this point in discussion with the F.M.F. Commander.
Obviously one could not push it too hard with him. Would you let me know, please,
the outcome of your talk with the Commander?
2 CS—powerful form of tear gas used to control riots.
3 Providing for the reinforcement of Fiji with a force up to a brigade in strength (see 152, para 18).
137 FCO 32/426, no 113 11 June 1969
[EEC]: letter from J E Killick to Ratu Sir K Mara on the defence of
Fijian interests
I understand that, after I left the meeting at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office
on 28 May, when we discussed Britain’s possible entry into the European Economic
Community, and how Fiji might stand in this event, Sir Arthur Galsworthy said he
would ask me to write to you setting out the position. This, of course, I am happy to
do.
As I explained, the possibility of the United Kingdom’s entry into the Community,
although now more of a reality with the change of Government in France,1 is still
1 Charles de Gaulle resigned as French president in Apr 1969 and was succeeded by Georges Pompidou.
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subject to a number of unknown and unpredicable factors. Our application however
remains on the table in the form in which it was originally made in 1967—for full
membership under Article 237 of the Treaty of Rome.
Negotiations were never opened in 1967 and have not yet been instituted in the
new circumstances. Our basic position is therefore exactly as it was in 1967. This,
you will recall, carries certain undertakings and assurances in respect of dependent
territories including Fiji, and much of what was said in the Memorandum on Fiji and
the E.E.C., prepared by the Commonwealth Office in 1967 and passed to you by the
Governor at that time, still applies. Speaking in the Western European Union
Council in 1967, Mr. George Brown explained to the Six, in general terms, our
opening position in any negotiations and, with particular reference to the
Commonwealth Sugar Agreement, explained our contractual commitment until the
end of 1974 and made it clear that we would wish to discuss with the Community
how the interests of developing countries and territories whose economies are
overwhelmingly dependent on their exports of sugar could be safeguarded in the
longer term. Lord Beswick, in his private talks with Commonwealth representatives
that year, also gave an assurance that in any negotiations with the Six we would seek,
and would use our best endeavours to obtain, in respect of developing countries
whose industries are parties to the C.S.A., (that is all except Australia), an assurance
consistent with the British Government’s undertaking to protect the essential
interests of those developing countries. These statements by Mr. Brown and Lord
Beswick still stand.
What this comes down to therefore is that, in our negotiations with the E.E.C., we
shall be basing ourselves on these statements, but cannot, since there will be two
parties to the negotiations, given any indication at this stage of what the outcome
may be. If Fiji, as a dependent territory, wishes to become an Associate of the
Common Market under Part IV of the Treaty of Rome, we recognise it as our duty to
do our best to secure this for her and in the negotiations for her Association we shall
seek assurances in whatever form seems appropriate which are consistent with our
undertakings to safeguard her essential interests. Our responsibility to secure the
best possible terms for Fiji has in no way been diminished by the passage of time. If
Fiji were to remain dependent but did not wish for Association we of course would
recognise that we still had responsibility for her interests but it would then be very
much more difficult to protect and further them within the Community than if she
were a Part IV Associate because the E.E.C. as a whole would have assumed no
obligation towards her. If Fiji were to become independent, while we would retain
our own close links with her, vis-à-vis the Community her independence would
deprive us of our legal responsibility, although it might still be open to us to use
what influence we could to support an application from Fiji, as an independent
country—along with other independent countries in Africa and the Caribbean—to be
associated with an enlarged Community in line with whatever arrangements succeed
the Yaoundé Convention2 and other similar agreements. But in our judgment the
difficulties of negotiating Fiji’s Associate membership of the Community as an
independent country on acceptable terms will be greater than if she were still
2 France signed an aid and trade agreement with its African colonies at Yaoundé in Cameroon in 1957. This
was extended to cover the six countries of the European Community in the Yaoundé Convention of 1963. A
second convention was agreed at Yaoundé in 1969.
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dependent, since Fiji would be negotiating in her own right and only with such
support as we might be able to give.
In brief I confirm that whatever problems we find ourselves up against once
negotiations commence, we shall stand by the assurances we have given. Naturally
we recognise the importance of continuing close consultations with independent
Commonwealth Governments and Governments of Dependent Territories in regard
to developments of interest to them concerning the British application for entry into
the E.E.C. The United Kingdom Government will, of course, be prepared to discuss
the interests of independent Commonwealth countries and Dependent Territories
although much of this work was done in 1967 and will still be relevant. However it is
rather premature at this stage to think in terms of Commonwealth consultations,
but if in the meantime there are further points you would like to raise please let us
know. Incidentally the Decision of the E.E.C. Council of 25 February, 1964, in which
were laid down the arrangements for the Association of the dependent territories of
the Six expired on 31 May, 1969. We are finding out what arrangements the
Community are making to renew the Decision on Part IV Association and if there are
any material changes in the new arrangements we shall let you know about these.
138 FCO 32/403, no 130 7 Aug 1969
[National Federation Party]: outward savingram no 5 from 
J C Morgan to Sir R Foster on an interview with Mr Ramrakha on 
the Indian view of the political situation
Ramrakha accompanied by Downs, [sic]1 called on Lord Shepherd yesterday
afternoon (5 August). I was present.
2. In course of conversation Ramrakha put forward following views:—
(a) His party finds difficulty in negotiating with Alliance which, he suggests, does
not have a common official view on what is required. He personally thinks that
people who before were afraid of change would now welcome it and that Alliance
may be moving towards acceptance of ‘one man one vote’.
(b) He is anxious that parties should not develop on purely racial lines. Both are to
some extent multi-racial but not sufficiently so yet. Alliance has little Indian
support, Federation has no European support. Fijians in Federation are valuable
help in interpreting Fijian wants. Federation could not rule as governing party
without Fijian support.
(c) Decision whether and when there should be a conference should not rest with
Chief Minister alone. Federation wants Conference soon and feels Her Majesty’s
Government should take the initiative. This would not be resented in Fiji where
the people are not hostile to Britain.
(d) The gap between the sides is not yet really narrow. There is general feeling
that Europeans are over represented but no agreement how representation should
be reduced. He doubted there would be agreement on a common role although
before he left Fiji, Fijian Association voted in favour of common roll. He said
1 David Down, partner in the law firm of T L Wilson and Co, who were the inheritors of the law firm of
Henry Polak, an associate of Mahatma Gandhi and a campaigner for the rights of Indians overseas.
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Alliance might agree to extension of cross voting.
(e) Federation recognised special position of Fijians. They earlier suggested there
should be a Fijian President with powers of veto to safeguard Fijians. Later they
suggested that there should be reserved powers over certain legislation giving the
United Kingdom some control.
(f) There is still difference of view over land. Indians would like Landlord and
Tenants Ordinance extended, Fijians would like it abolished. Federation does not
challenge special rights of Fijians but these must be defined. Indians are
emigrating to Canada etc. because they have no land. Even Fijians are feeling
frustrated because of restrictions.
3. Lord Shepherd said he would like to visit Fiji but did not want to go if
everyone expected too much from his visit. It might only make situation worse. Any
question of imposing solutions must be avoided. The people of Fiji have to live with
any solution and an imposed one may be unacceptable to both sides and only last a
few years. We are not trying to cast Fiji off or to hasten a final solution. People of all
races should take their time and reach agreement on what is best for Fiji as a whole.
If they can find an acceptable formula we will be glad to be a party to it.
4. Initiative for a Conference should come from Fiji. If the governing party asks
for one then Her Majesty’s Government must take notice. A party in opposition is
inevitably in different position in this respect from one in power. Lord Shepherd said
he would be glad to go to Fiji before the Conference to consult people on a broad
basis but the initiative for a Conference must come from Fiji.
5. Lord Shepherd stressed the danger of party divisions on racial lines. In Fiji the
Indians are mainly the traders, the Fijians man the police and armed forces.
Government by purely Indian party relying on Fijian police and army would produce
an impossible situation.
6. On the question of reserved powers to protect Fijians, Lord Shepherd said that
these would probably be satisfactory if in the hands of a Governor General with
proper powers to preserve entrenched clauses. He would not want responsibilities to
be left with the United Kingdom without the powers to discharge them.
7. Downs suggested that there was in Fiji a considerable measure of goodwill and
that the parties should go as far as possible along the road to agreement on what is
required. A point will probably be reached however, when further progress is
impossible. They should then be able to call for help from Her Majesty’s Government.
It might be a question of ‘face-saving’. Lord Shepherd said that if this would mean
Her Majesty’s Government being asked to arbitrate, he hoped this stage would never
be reached. He wanted to see progress towards an agreed solution but the pace
should not be forced. It was wrong to impose solutions. It was better to achieve
agreement even if it takes time.
8. Ramrakha said he was worried about the time factor. The present situation is
not satisfactory and should not be perpetuated. The Chief Minister appears to be
delaying decision on a Conference: it would have been better if the Governor had made
the announcement about having a Conference when the time is right. This would
show that the United Kingdom is still concerned with Fijian problems. Lord Shepherd
repeated that it is best to hasten slowly and to achieve agreement even if it takes time.
One must avoid imposed solutions. If we were to agree to this the Indians would be
the chief sufferers. Decisions made now affect not only this but future generations.
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139 FCO 32/403, no 115 2 Sept 1969
‘Fiji: the constitution’: FCO notes on the attitude of the Alliance
Party, the Federation Party, and the British government
I. The Alliance Party
Want:—
(a) the next constitution to give them a very full form of self-government—
perhaps a Bahamas type constitution.
(b) safeguards to ensure retention of political power in the hands of the Fijian
people.
(c) a constitution that will get Fiji out of the U.N. orbit (we have explained that
this is not likely to be achieved before independence).
(d) the next constitutional conference to be the last.
They seem also to favour or to be ready to accept:—
(e) independence coming at a foreseeable time after the next constitution but
subject to (b) above (there is some pretty muddled thinking in this connection
about ‘the link with the Crown’ or the ‘link with Britain’.)
(f) some cutting down of communal voting and ‘general’ seats and some extension
of cross-voting. Their current ideas on this were described by the Chief Minister in
May as follows:—
A Legislative Council of 50 composed as follows:—
(i) Ten constituencies so arranged that Fijian and Indian voters would be about
equal, but, because this is not entirely possible everywhere, there would be some
compensating constituencies where one or the other community predominated.
For each of these constituencies there would be 4 members (1 Indian and 1
Fijian elected on communal rolls and 1 Indian and 1 Fijian elected by cross
voting)—total 40.
(ii) These ten constituencies to be lumped together to form 5 constituencies to
elect 5 ‘general’ members by cross-voting.
(iii) In addition the country would be divided into 3 constituencies to provide 3
communally elected ‘general’ members.
(iv) 2 members appointed by the Council of Chiefs (unless there were an Upper
House when these members might disappear from Legco).
(g) an Upper House (as a safeguard for Fijian rights (political and, for example,
land).
(h) an Ombudsman (to give some reassurance to the Indians).
(i) An Executive Public Service Commission (The Chief Minister seemed, in May,
to accept that it might be better to defer this until nearer independence but, his
views require clarification).
II. Federation party
Want:—
(a) independence.
(b) one man, one vote, one value, geographical constituencies.
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(c) the rights of the minority to be safeguarded by a bill of rights entrenched in
the constitution.
(d) a constitutional conference soon.
They seem prepared to accept:—
(e) full internal self-government as a next stage. Mr. Patel is said to favour a
Bahamas type constitution.
(f) on the electoral problem—something short of (b) at the next stage. But Mr.
Patel seems not to like cross-voting much more than communal voting. His
interpretation of the Kaul formula (15, 15, 5, 5) in 40 single member
constituencies, a common roll, but most constituencies reserved as to race. At the
first of the current series of Ratu Mara-Patel talks Mr. Patel said that Numbers in
the legislature should be between 40 and 60. At first certain seats would be
reserved, racially, and some thrown upon to candidates of any race. As confidence
grows seat reservation could disappear. He argues that under a one man, one vote,
geographical constituency system Fijians would benefit because the Indian
population is concentrated in certain areas only.
III. Area of agreement between the two parties
It seems, therefore, that the only serious obstacles in the way of agreement on the
lines of a new constitution is the wide difference in view between the parties on
electoral arrangements, and the allied problem of safeguards for Fijians.
We must try, therefore, perhaps with the help of the Government of India, to bring
the two sides closer together on electoral arrangements.1 It would help in this if we
could also satisfy the Fijians on ‘safeguards’. These would, of course also have to be
accepted by the Indians. So far we know them to have acquiesced only in an
entrenched bill of rights.
But we should also have to persuade the Chief Minister that constitutional
safeguards cannot be a complete guarantee of successful multi-racialism; they can
even be a dangerous irritant (e.g. Malaysia).
IV. Action required
(a) If Ratu Mara and Mr. Patel are still in the present positions on electoral
arrangements at the end of October it would be useful for Sir Leslie Monson to
have with him some suggestions for discussion. Find out from the Governor how
the Ratu Mara—Patel talks are going, ask him for any suggestions he may have on
devices for bringing the two sides closer together on electoral arrangements, e.g.
can Patel’s reserved seats idea be combined with Ratu Mara’s ideas? Can Patel be
persuaded to accept some communal and cross voting seats? Can we find some
compromise from Professor De Smith’s ideas? Consider these matters also here
with the legal advisers.
(b) Examine further possible ‘safeguards’ (e.g. those listed at V below and any
others we can think of) in consultation with the legal advisers with a view to
drafting notes for the guidance of Sir L. Monson’s exploratory mission.
1 This was the view of the FCO Pacific and Indian Ocean Dept. The South Asia Dept took a different view, as
did the High Commission in New Delhi (see 143, note).
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(c) Consider further (also with a view to drawing up guidance for Sir L. Monson’s
mission) such matters as the following on which we have not yet formulated views:—
(i) Would we be likely to agree to removing all all officials from the Legislative
Council? (?Yes.)
(ii) Would we want the post of Chief Secretary to continue in the next
constitution?
(iii) If a satisfactory agreement were reached between the parties in Fiji on the
electoral problem we would presumably agree to a Bahamas type constitution at
the next round.
Would we agree to delegate external affairs on Bahamas lines? ?Yes.
Would we agree to delegate internal security on Bahamas lines? (? put provision
for it at the Governor’s discretion into the constitution but not for mandatory
immediate delegation.)
V. Safeguards for the Fijians that might be considered include:
(a) An Upper House—as a home for communally elected general members and the
representatives of the Council of Chiefs and as a device for entrenching Fijian
rights (e.g. political and land). It would presumably have special powers in relation
to entrenched clauses in the constitution but perhaps only delaying powers in
other matters. Or there might be arrangements for both Houses to sit together on
matters affecting the entrenched clauses.
Two suggestions put forward so far envisage a nominated Upper House. The
Governor has suggested 8 members nominated by the Chief Minister, 6 by the
Leader of the Opposition and 4 by the Great Council of Chiefs. Ratu Mara has
suggested 1/3 each nominated by the Chief Minister, the Leader of the Opposition
and the Great Council of Chiefs. The Federation Party have said they would prefer
a unicameral legislature.
(b) Constituency delimitation
The Chief Minister earlier favoured this continuing to be done by the Governor.
This could not continue after independence. A Commission to advice the Governor
or an independent Commission to do the job is more normal. The important thing
is to ensure impartiality. Perhaps arrangements like those in Dominion might
help (a commission consisting of the Speaker, as Chairman, two members
nominated by the Premier, two nominated by the Leader of the Opposition. Its
recommendations have to be approved by the House of Assembly.) However, the
latest news from the Governor is that Ratu Mara thought a one-man commission
of someone from Fiji would do.
The Chief Minister was anxious in May to know whether a Commission’s terms
of reference could include taking account of race. We have found no precedent for
this but in an electoral system so widely based on race as the next Fiji one is likely
to be, it would not seem an unreasonable provision.
(c) A Fiji status
The Chief Minister says he sees this as a unifying device but he also seemed to link
it with voting. We discouraged the idea and told him Fiji citizenship could only
come with independence. He seems to have dropped it.
(d) Communal Chambers (on Cyprus lines) to look after the special interests of
each community. But this would not seem to help with the basic Fiji problem
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which is essentially to reassure and preserve some political ‘edge’ for the large
(native) minority over the small majority. It would also look too much like
perpetuating communalism whereas the aim in Fiji is (hopefully) multiracialism.
(e) A Race Relations Council
This might have special powers over matters affecting either of the two
communities. Legislation in this category might, for example, have to be agreed by
such a Council as well as by the Legislature.
The Council might be composed of two persons, one of Fijian and one of Indians
race, nominated by the Chief Minister and two, also one of each race, nominated
by the Leader of the Opposition. Until Independence the Chairman might be the
Governor. After Independence the chairman might be a distinguished ‘neutral’ (as
for the Supreme Constitutional Court of Cyprus) presumably not a Fijian of any
race and not a citizen of India.
140 FCO 32/429, no 6 16 Sept 1969
[Future of Fiji]: letter from E J Emery to Sir R Foster on the
presentational aspects of Sir L Monson’s forthcoming visit
Leslie Monson left yesterday for Seychelles with Lord Shepherd and he has asked me
to write to you on his behalf to send you the attached copy1 of the programme for his
visit to the Western Pacific, which we have just worked out, and to say how much he
looks forward to seeing you again in Fiji.
2. Leslie has not been in Fiji before and would naturally like to see as much of it
as possible. He leaves it to you to suggest how he can best do this. We have found it
difficult to guess how much time will be needed for the constitutional talks, but as
you will see, we have provisionally set aside three days. (We realise this may be tight.)
Leslie hopes, when he leaves Fiji, to visit the New Hebrides and the Solomons. You
will see that the programme provides also for a possible stop in Delhi on the way
home. More about that below.
3. It seems to us that the presentational aspects of Leslie Monson’s visit may be
quite important. Is there a risk that if it is generally known that he is coming for
constitutional talks, that might have just the effect of raising false hopes and the
political temperature which we are trying to avoid by postponing a visit by a
Minister? Would it be preferable, therefore, for you simply to say that he, having just
taken over his new responsibilities in the office2 and not having visited Fiji before, is
coming on a familiarisation visit to Fiji, the New Hebrides and the Solomons?
4. A related question is whether a constitutional lawyer should be on the team.
When, in May, we first contemplated constitutional talks in October (then to be
Ministerial talks) we rather took it for granted that there would be a constitutional
lawyer on the team. From many points of view it would be very useful to have one,
especially if, in order to make progress, we are going to have to work out
constitutional ideas on the spot, but if there is a constitutional lawyer on the team it
1 Not printed. 2 As superintending under-secretary of the Pacific and Indian Ocean Dept.
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would be less easy to present the visit as a familiarisation one. What do you think
please?
5. We should be grateful for your views also about the approach that Leslie
Monson should take in his talks with the politicians you will be arranging for him to
meet. As we see it at present, his mission will be an entirely exploratory one to assess
with you, and the others concerned, the area of agreement which the two political
parties will by then have reached about the constitution and particularly about the
electoral issue and, insofar as they have not agreed, how much ‘give’ there may be in
their respective positions and in what directions each of the two parties might be
prepared to move if given a suitable prod. In the light of these findings, you and
Leslie would then recommend whether and when there should be a Ministerial visit
to follow up and to carry the exploration process further and to decide whether a
constitutional conference would be practicable soon afterwards.
6. At worst, if in October we find virtually no agreement, and no flexibility on the
crucial issues, Leslie could simply say to the leaders in Fiji that he would report the
situation to our Ministers but that he did not see how progress could be made
without more agreement between those concerned in Fiji. Perhaps this would serve
to move them to some degree of compromise?
7. One aspect of this sort of approach on which we shall need your continuing
advice is, of course, what effect continuing delay may have on the security position in
Fiji. If there is too much dragging of feet by the Alliance and if we rest too long on
the position that it is up to the parties in Fiji to find agreement themselves without
our bringing pressure to bear on one side or the other, or both, is the Federation
Party likely to become so restive that the situation could become inflammatory, and
security endangered?
8. We should be grateful also to know what you feel you should say to Patel about
Leslie Monson’s visit and when you should tell him of it. Presumably whatever the
public aspect we give to the visit (see paragraph 3 above) you will want to tell Patel
that Leslie Monson will want, while he is in Fiji, to have talks with him about
constitutional matters and you will have to give him reasonable notice so that he will
be available. You will also want to give him the news at the time you think most
advantage can be gained from it in the talks with Ratu Mara. We were wondering
whether it would be a good idea to tell Patel before Karan Singh’s3 visit to Fiji, but
your telegram No. 44 Personal (received yesterday) tells us that Karan Singh will be
with you next week. That seems, subject to your views, a little early to tell Patel that a
senior official from London will be coming to have talks with him about the
constitution.
9. That brings me to the provisional stop-over in Delhi at the end of Leslie
Monson’s programme. Depending on the outcome of his talks (and Karan Singh’s) it
seemed to us that there might be advantage in his giving the Indians in Delhi a first-
hand account of progress. We shall be consulting Delhi about this, of course, later
on, but the consultations will be, of necessity, a rather last minute business from Fiji.
10. To help us launch our preparatory work here for Leslie Monson’s visit, we
have drawn up the attached rough working paper.4 It consists simply of notes of the
3 Joint secretary, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. 4 See 139.
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position of the two parties in Fiji as we know them at present. (Incidentally, we found
the record of the meeting between the Federation and the Alliance on 12 August,
enclosed with your letter of 28 August, very interesting and illuminating.) The
enclosed paper has not been seen by the constitutional lawyers, nor indeed by anyone
more senior than myself. It is, therefore, very much the production of an amateur. If
you see any inaccuracies in its description of current attitudes in Fiji or if you have
any other comments or ideas to contribute, we should be grateful to have them. I
have flown one or two kites (mainly about ‘safeguards’). I have not really had time to
think them out properly and if you think they should be hauled down at once please
do so.
11. The key issue, the electoral one, is the one on which one feels one ought to
be producing some constructive ideas, but I confess, given the present attitudes of
the parties, I find this very difficult. Perhaps the second meeting, which may by now
have taken place, will give us some inspiration and we should be most grateful for
your own ideas. (We find it, incidentally, rather difficult to understand quite what
Mr. Patel is getting at in the passage at the bottom of page 5 of the record of the
meeting on 12 August.) Can some marriage be made between cross-voting and
reserved seats?
12. There is one further point on which we should be grateful for your advice.
Neither Leslie Monson nor I have been to Tonga, and we should much have liked that
at least one of us should have had a day or two there during our forthcoming visits to
the Pacific. But we have decided that time simply will not stretch to it. A second best
would be to ask Archie Reid5 to come to see us in Fiji. If he were to make such a visit,
it ought, presumably, to be at the end of October when Leslie Monson, as well as I,
will be there. But our time in Fiji then will be very crowded and we felt, therefore,
that we ought to put the idea to you before uniting about it to Archie Reid. Would
you please let me know what you think about this too?
13. It would help us to get on quickly with preparations here if we could have
your answers to the above by telegram.
5 A C Reid, British commissioner and consul in Tonga, formerly (1959–1965) secretary for Fijian affairs.
141 FCO 32/404, no 149 3 Oct 1969
[Future of Fiji]: inward telegram (reply) no 52 from Sir R Foster to 
J C Morgan on talks with Ratu Sir K Mara ahead of Sir L Monson’s visit
My telegram No. Personal 48: Monson’s Visit.1
Miss Emery and I had a long discussion with the Chief Minister yesterday about
arrangements for visit. He has managed in spite of my warning, to get himself
committed to being out of Viti Levu from 25–29 October. It seems that internal
touring should be done first and discussions afterwards.
2. We seemed to catch him in a rather suspicious mood but I have discovered he
may well have been very tired. He said the present constitution was now outlived and
we should proceed as soon as possible to full independence. The existence of the
1 This was Foster’s reply to 140. Emery was now in Fiji pending Monson’s arrival.
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position of Chief Secretary particularly was upsetting Ministers and frustrating them.
It detracts from the appearance of large degree of self Government which actually
exists and should be clearly seen. There was general agreement with Federation Party
over the need for a conference and it was only a matter of timing. On the constitution
there was a large measure of agreement and only one area of difficulty remained
which was electoral arrangements. He would be back from Noumea on 20 or 21
October and there may be a discussion then with the Federation Chief Justice before
he went away on 25th but there was anyway 3 weeks in November before Legislative
Council which was fixed for 21 November. That was ample time he thought for what
would probably only amount to a couple of meetings for reasonable agreement to be
reached. He was not therefore quite sure what real purpose Monson visit was. He was
reminded that the origin of the visit was arranged in May. He said that conditions
were now different from then as both sides had agreed to the conference. There was a
bit about the United Kingdom having brought the Indians in and many Fijians said
that the United Kingdom had better see that arrangements reached left Fijians in
control or there would be real trouble in the country.
3. All this too gives you atmosphere but we finally got back to the problem of
Monson’s programme. We concluded that there was no need for a constitutional
lawyer this time as it was premature and probably did tie visit too firm to
constitutional issues. Mara considered we should say the visit was familiarisation but
also to see what progress was being made over constitutional affairs. If this sparked
off [gp undec]s2 from minority groups then he could see no harm. He visualised
meeting between Monson and a Group Alliance ineffective although all agree with
talks and expect there to be similar meetings with Federation Party but did not show
any enthusiasm at all for joint meetings. The business of coming to terms locally I
think he regards as an advantage to two parties and not one, having regard to outside
intervention. The pattern of the visit therefore seems to be familiarisation,
ascertaining progress so far made, remaining areas of disagreement and ideas on
future plans and timetable. We told him of the possible visit of the Queen in early
March on which I shall telegraph separately. He agreed with it and said in that case
the conference might be held in the Spring just after the visit.
4. I can only record what he said at a fairly unsatisfactory meeting but we have
heard before of plans for dealing with the Constitutional issue which for one reason
or another did not come to fruition on this. This may happen again but he did seem
anxious that now at any rate we must get on. I have promised draft text for
announcement of visit of Monson and will send it by telegram when he has seen it.
We should make some announcement at about the end of next week and I would
write to Federation Party a day or so before publication in similar terms letting them
know that Monson would like to meet them at a time and date to be arranged. We
will work on the draft programme and let you have it.
5. We did enquire what effect Patel’s death3 might have. Mara would be happier
dealing with Koya who is a good starter as successor to party leadership but he
thoroughly dislikes Ramrakha another starter. We noted need for [gp undec] speech
but also that we could within reasonable limits control the contraction of timing.
Such an event could raise passions a bit.
2 Word or words undeciphered in transmission. 3 Patel died on 2 Oct 1969.
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142 FCO 32/404, no 154 10 Oct 1969
‘Fiji constitution’: minute by Sir L Monson to Lord Shepherd on
independence and Fijian paramountcy
There are some points on which I would welcome your instructions before I leave for
Hong Kong and the Pacific.
Background
The latest report is in the Governor’s telegram Personal No. 52 attached.1 This
appears to imply that the two Parties have agreed broadly on the form of a new
constitution but are not agreed on electoral arrangements. These are the crux of the
matter and may cover division of seats and/or delimitation of constituencies. The
points on which I should have instructions (even of a provisional nature)—
(i) The object of the exercise
Do we accept the view that independence should leave the Fijians in control,
although they are a minority of the population? My own view is that we should for
two reasons—one ‘realistic’ and one moral. The ‘realistic’ reason is that the Fijians,
through service in the police and armed forces, are in a position to present us with an
intolerable security situation before independence or to carry out a Zanzibar-type
coup d’état after after independence.2 The moral reason rests on the Deed of Cession
by which the Fijians originally voluntarily put themselves under British sovereignty.
(The counter-argument is that by depriving the Indian majority of political control,
however much we provide for the protection of their property etc. through Bills of
Right and Ombudsmen, we shall be storing up trouble for the future cf. Malaysia and
Northern Ireland where such trouble has come through the deprivation of due
political influence by numerically strong minorities.)
From the point of view of our own interests this seems to me the lesser risk of the
two.)
(ii) ‘Proceeding as soon as possible to full independence’
From our last talk with the Chief Secretary, I believe this is your aim too. More
precisely should we agree to a programme on the following lines:—
(a) Constitutional conference in Apri 1970 to result in Bahamas-type
constitution.
(b) Elections in autumn 1970.
(c) Discussions after elections to complete arrangements for independence.
(d) Independence some time in 1971 (subject to outcome of (c)).
(iii) In discussions with Chief Minister last May3 Sir Arthur Galsworthy urged him to
reduce the number of communal seats in the Legislature as much as possible and to
extend cross-voting on the grounds that this would make the solution more
1 See 141.
2 Zanzibar became independent in Dec 1963 but the sultan was overthrown in a violent revolution in Jan
1964. Zanzibar and Tanganyika were united under President Nyerere in April 1964, taking the name
Tanzania in Oct 1964.
3 See 134.
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acceptable all round and particularly to Parliament (see minutes at (B). The Chief
Minister was not too receptive to this and I suspect may have reached agreement
with the Indians on this. If so, would we for Parliamentary reasons wish to oppose?
Would it not be sufficient for Parliament that both communities in Fiji accept the
arrangement?
(iv) The Chief Minister does not want a conference in London unless both sides
reach a greement. We would share this hope. But there is likely to be a situation in
which one point is disagreed between the sides e.g. the terms of reference of a
constituency delimitation commission on which the prospects of continued Fijian
control may depend. If that sort of a situation arose would we insist on local
agreement before a conference were held or would be ready to hold a conference with
a view to resolving the difference and (in the last resort) give a decision?
143 FCO 32/430, no 154 16 Oct 1969
‘Fiji independence’: draft memorandum by Mr Stewart for Cabinet
Defence and Oversea Policy Committee advocating measured and
patient means to achieve the goal of independence under Fijian
control
[This draft was not in fact submitted to the Defence and Oversea Policy Committee, the
Pacific and Indian Ocean Dept at the FCO deciding it would be better to wait until
Monson had visited Fiji and reported back. Commenting on para 13 (ii) of the draft, South
Asia Dept observed that India would not be pleased if the UK promoted independence
upon the basis of Fijian paramountcy. Hitherto the UK had encouraged Indian interest in
Fiji, as means both to placate Fiji’s Indian population and to avoid Indian government
criticism of the UK at the UN. The independence strategy now contemplated would meet
with strong objections from India. The Indian government would see it as a strategy to
consign Fiji’s Indians to second-class citizenship, and New Delhi would claim it had been
deliberately deceived by the degree to which India had been taken into the UK’s
confidence. However, South Asia Dept also believed any pressure from India could be
contained. India had no right to interfere, and Indian prime ministers from Jawaharlal
Nehru to Mrs Gandhi had always argued that Indian overseas had to think and act as if
they were citizens of the countries to which they belonged. It was significant that when,
as result of Kenyan legislation in 1967 tightening immigrant work permits, hundreds of
Asians had to leave Kenya and were denied entry to the UK by the 1968 Commonwealth
Immigrants Act, Indian attempts to influence Kenyan policy met with no success.1 South
Asia Dept therefore believed the aim henceforth should be for the UK to disengage from
Indian involvement in Fiji; Indian ‘back-seat driving’ would not be helpful. It was just as
well Fiji was not being placed before the Defence and Oversea Policy Committee before
Monson’s visit. Monson would be visiting India on his return from the Pacific and he
would not therefore have any ministerial decisions to reveal (FCO 32/404, no 166,
minutes by T D O’Leary and K M Wilford, 21 Oct 1969). The UK High Commission in New
Delhi concurred. The ‘frequency and intimacy’ of High Commission exchanges with
Indian officials would be reduced. The High Commission also suggested that no further
invitations to visit Fiji should be issued to Indian politicians and officials, although if
India pressed persistently for visits it would be ‘hard and provocative to resist them’ (FCO
32/430, no 74, inward tel 2136 from Sir M James, high commissioner, to FCO, 6 Nov
1969, repeated to Sir R Foster).]
1 On the Kenyan Asian crisis, see S R Ashton & Wm R Louis, eds, East of Suez and the Commonwealth
1964–1971 (BDEEP, 2004), part III, 444–447.
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Introduction
In recent weeks the Governor of Fiji has reported widespread and increasing
pressures from all sections of the community that Fiji should be granted full
independence as soon as possible. This is my reason for referring this problem to the
Committee now.
2. Fiji, our largest remaining dependent territory in the South Pacific (or
anywhere, excluding Hong Kong), has a population of about 512,000, of whom 51 per
cent are Indians, 41 per cent Fijians, and the rest Pacific Islanders, Chinese,
Europeans and part-Europeans. The total land area of the Islands is 7,000 square
miles. They are not at present over-populated but with a high preponderance of
young people among both Indians and Fijians, they could become so. A land problem
arises from the fact that most of the land is owned by the Fijians, while a high
proportion of the Indians are agriculturalists.
3. Race relations in Fiji have until recently been generally good, though race
dominates the political scene. The Fijians are intensely loyal to the Crown. Their
ancestors ceded the Islands to Britain in 1874 by a Deed of Cession. They regard this
historical fact as their guarantee against domination by the more prolific and
economically sophisticated Indians. The latter, on the other hand, maintain that the
Salisbury Declaration of 1875 (which promised that Indian labourers brought to Fiji
would be properly treated and given equality of opportunity) entitles them to a one
man, one vote democracy. The Fijians predominate in the Armed Forces and Security
Forces; they fought well in the War and later in Malaya; but the Indians are the
mainstay of the economy. The Europeans and part-Europeans (mostly with Fijian
blood) generally side with the Fijians.
4. Her Majesty’s Government’s general policy as stated in the final communiqué
of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Meeting in London in 1966 is to the effect
that the British Government stands ready to give independence to territories that
want it and can sustain it. In October last year the Secretary of State for
Commonwealth Affairs (Mr. Thomson) at the opening of the Bahamas Constitutional
Conference further defined our attitude towards the future of the remaining British
dependent territories. He said ‘We have not—and never have had, any detailed
blueprint. A few of these territories may wish to proceed to independence. Others
may not. It is always difficult to forecast. But whatever the future holds we in Britain
will adhere closely to the cardinal principle to which we have adhered in the past
that the wishes of the people concerned must be the main guide to action. It is not,
and never has been our desire or intention either to delay independence for those
dependencies who want it or to force it upon those who do not’.
5. I consider that Fiji can sustain independence economically. But the great
problem is the racial composition. The indigenous Fijian is now outnumbered 5 to 4
by the second and third generation descendants of the indentured Indian labourers
who were brought to Fiji at the end of the nineteenth century to work in the sugar
cane production areas. On present figures the Indian section of the community has a
higher birth rate and, as indicated in Annex A,2 their communities are concentrated
2 Annexes not printed.
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in certain areas. The Indians have made a very considerable contribution
economically, both through sugar production and through commerce and industry
generally.
6. Ultimately, the two main races must come to terms. The Constitutional
Conference held in 1965, however, highlighted the difficulties.3 The Fijians agreed to
attend only if discussion of independence was ruled out, and made it clear that any
attempt to force undiluted democracy upon them would strain their loyalty to the
breaking point. The Indians, although agreeing that the Conference was not directed
towards independence, showed that this was, in fact, their ultimate goal and that
their immediate objective was the straightforward one man, one vote democracy
which, by reason of their numerical praponderance, would ultimately give them
control of Fiji’s destiny.
7. Following this Conference, a new constitution came into force in September,
1966. It provides for a Legislative Council of 36 members elected by universal
suffrage, with four official members; and for an Executive Council over which the
Governor presides and in which there are not more than four officials and such
number of elected members as the Governor may appoint (in practice at present six).
Details of this existing constitution are set out in Annex B.
8. The first elections under the Constitution in October 1966 resulted in a
victory for the Alliance Party (a multi-racial party, mainly Fijian) over the Federation
Party (an Indian association) by 22 seats to 9, with 3 Independent candidates who
support the Alliance Party.
9. For a period of time after the elections the Alliance Party conducted
government business in an exemplary fashion and the Opposition appeared to
conduct themselves in a constitutional manner on the ‘Westminster model’. The new
Constitution provided for the adoption of a Ministerial system under which Ministers
would be assigned responsibilities for the business of government, although with the
Governor still retaining the Chair of the Council of Ministers and responsibility for
certain subjects and having general reserve powers. When the transition to this
system took place in September 1967, and the extent of the de facto authority of the
Alliance Party Ministers became apparent, the mood of the Federation Party changed.
They tabled a motion denouncing the Constitution, and walked out of the Legislative
Council. They continued their boycott of Legislative Council proceedings through
two successive meetings, thereby (under the Constitution) automatically forfeiting
their seats and forcing by-elections. These were held in the autumn of 1968, and the
9 Federation Party candidates were returned with increased majorities on a smaller
poll.
10. During the campaign for these by-elections sections of the Indian
community had indicated that they might support Indian candidates of the Alliance
Party. But when the poll was published it showed an almost solid Indian vote for the
Federation Party. The Fijians regarded this as evidence of Indian duplicity and bad
faith. Violent anti-Indian demonstrations took place and it was only prompt
intervention by the Chief Minister which prevented the Fijians from attacking the
Indian community. This event led to a more rapid movement on the Fijian side to get
early constitutional changes with built-in Fijian control. At the same time the
3 See 87–91.
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Indians were alarmed by the strong Fijian reaction to the by-election events. The
Federation Party ceased to boycott the Legislative Council and an informal dialogue
between the leaders of the two parties began to try to reach agreement on the next
constitutional stage.
11. These attempts at a meeting of minds were recently broadened to formal
meetings between representatives of each party, and although the Governor has not
been able to get full details, I understand that:—
(i) both sides are agreed on a new Constitution which will include safeguards as
regards land, provision for the office of an ‘Ombudsman’ and the inclusion of a Bill
of Rights;
(ii) they differ, however, on the question of electoral arrangements, the
composition of a future legislature and the question of constituency boundary
arrangements.
12. The crux of the issue is Fijian determination that they should go to
independence while they are in a position to ensure that they will remain politically
dominant in the future, with that dominance entrenched in the Constitution. If they
do not obtain this paramountcy by Constitutional means, the risk is that they will
take by force and by unconstitutional means what they consider to be theirs. This
could produce an extremely serious internal security situation, in which we should
have difficulty in protecting the Indian community.
13. In considering the nature and pace of constitutional advancement in Fiji
there are also aspects of international relations which affect the problem:—
(i) The United Nations is taking a close interest in developments. In December
1967 the General Assembly endorsed, by a substantial majority, a
recommendation by the Committee of 24 that Fiji should be given early
independence on a one man, one vote, one value basis. The Fijians dislike
intensely the U.N. preoccupation with Fiji, while the Indians in Fiji, in particular
the Opposition party, use the U.N. interest as a political stick with which to
belabour the Government party.
(ii) India also takes a close interest in developments. Recently they have been co-
operative and there have been a number of Indian ministerial goodwill visits to the
territory which have been most useful in bringing down the political temperature.
Following the visit of a senior official from the Indian Department of External
Affairs (Mr. Kaul) in early 1968 certain proposals regarding the future electoral
arrangements were put forward which seemed to offer the chance of a compromise
between the two parties. These proposals are set out at Annex C.4
(iii) During a visit to Australia in 1966 the then Colonial Secretary, Mr. Fred Lee,
gave a general undertaking to the Australians, and through them to other
metropolitan powers with interests in the area that we should seek to co-operate
with them in constitutional and other planning and thus to ‘harmonise’ policies in
our territories in the Pacific. We are in particular bound to consult fully with the
Australians. They have an interest in the pace of advance in Fiji as affecting the
position in Papua and New Guinea.
4 See 133, enclosure.
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Problem
14. In all these circumstances I have reached the decision that I should now, in
good time, consult my colleagues as to the objects and methods of our policy towards
Fiji; and to that end have set down the following questions:—
(a) Should we work for a new Constitution which will carry Fiji into independence
leaving the Fijians in control?
(b) If the answer to (a) is yes: How quickly should Fiji move forward to
independence?
(c) Should we continue our present policy of allowing time for both sides to try to
reach an accommodation before a Constitutional Conference is held?
(d) Or, on the contrary, should we now force the pace by
(i) Allowing for the utmost effort to be made to get the two sides to an
acceptable compromise, or
(ii) collaborating covertly with the Fijian Alliance Party, and advising them to
ask for an early dissolution of the Legislative Council. Elections would then be
held under the present Constitution and the Alliance Party would make their
platform a new Constitution ensuring continued Fijian control and early
independence under that Constitution itself. The Fijians are virtually certain to
get a majority under the present arrangements. Having then won the election
they would then demand a Constitutional Conference on the basis of the
Constitution for which they had campaigned. We would hold the Conference,
and grant the independence Constitution as reflecting the wishes of the
majority of the people of Fiji. Independence on that basis would arrive 6 months
later.
Considerations
15. As regards (a) above, our dilemma is that the Fijians did cede their country in
all good faith, and they have a strong moral case for the contention that
independence should leave them in control of ‘their’ country. There is also the
practical point that in any event through service in the Police and Armed Forces,
they are in a position to present us with an intolerable security situation before
independence, or else to carry out a Zanzibar-type coup d’etat after independence.5
On the other side, the Indians have contributed greatly to Fiji’s present economic
prosperity and will have a large part to play in Fiji’s future; they certainly enjoy
political rights as the largest community in the Islands; and they have powerful and
vocal friends in the world and the U.N. On balance, I take the view that we will not in
the end be able to justify, either in conscience, or in political terms, in our own
country, a solution that does not ensure that independence will leave the Fijians in
control. The corollary of this, of course, is that the Indians must have exceptionally
strong protection under a new Constitution, by way of a Bill of Rights, provision for
an ‘Ombudsman’ and other safeguards.
16. On the question of timing, my view is that we would wish to arrive at a
Constitution consistent with the wishes of the people of Fiji as soon as possible. Both
possible programmes considered below aim at early independence with Fijian
control. Her Majesty The Queen will be visiting Fiji in early March next year. Bearing
5 See 142, note 2.
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in mind that we should not wish to undertake constitutional initiatives until Her
Majesty’s visit is over, if we decide to continue our present policy of letting matters
take their course, as outlined in paragraph 14(c) above, we should agree to a
programme on the following lines:—
(i) A Constitutional Conference in or about April, 1970, to result preferably in an
agreed Constitution, otherwise in one imposed on the Indian Opposition.
(ii) Elections under the new Constitution in the autumn of 1970.
(iii) Discussions after elections to complete arrangements for independence.
(iv) Independence some time early in 1971 (subject to the outcome of (iii)).
17. The advantages of proceeding at this pace and in this manner are:—
(a) There is the maximum chance of agreement or limiting disagreement between
the two parties.
(b) There is time for adjustment to new circumstances as they arise.
(c) A relaxed pace need not prejudice the object of post-independence Fijian
control and would be the best course for reaching an amicable solution.
The clear disadvantage is the risk of a critical breakdown at the Constitutional
Conference, leading to us being obliged to give an open award against the Indian
opposition, with foreseeable adverse consequences both in Fiji and in the U.N. This
is, however, balanced by the equivalent risk in the programme outlined in paragraph
14 (d)(ii) above, of adverse reaction by the Indians and their friends against our
acceptance of a ‘claim by the Alliance Party to have obtained a ‘mandate’ under the
existing Constitution. There is thus on balance a strong argument for encouraging
the current negotiations between the two parties which may lead to an agreed
position on the basis of a Constitution and the holding of a Constitutional
Conference. The latest known views of the party leaders are at Annex D.
18. But on the other hand if we decide to force the pace, then, after the Royal
visit, we should proceed as in paragraph 14(d)(ii) above. The advantages of this
course of action are:—
(i) It gives the appearance of a democratic process before we come to the point of
awarding a Constitution favourable to the Fijians; (but the Indians and their
friends would have grounds for arguing that it was not a truly democratic process);
and
(ii) by demanding a faster pace and less delay at all stages, it could reduce the
length of time during which we must remain responsible for the internal security
of Fiji, with all the risks involved.
19. There are however three disadvantages to this course:—
(i) It will become obvious at some stage that we are backing the Fijians against
the Indians. This could occur either at the time when the Governor agrees to the
dissolution for a new election; or when the Constitutional Conference is demanded
by the Alliance Party after winning the election; or, finally, at the time when we
acceded to the demands of the Alliance Party at the Conference. At any of these
times the opposition of the Indians and their friends will become manifest and
violent.
(ii) The reaction of the Indians in Fiji itself will lead immediately to a hostile
reaction by the Indian Government, and in turn to developments in the United
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Nations where, in due course, the majority might well refuse to recognise Fijian
independence on terms which would be so patently at variance with General
Assembly resolutions (see para. 13(i) above).
(iii) There is also a risk (which should not be overstated) that during this
altercation the Indian side will accuse H.M.G. of a breach of faith. This would arise
from the passage in the Report of the Fiji Constitutional Conference, 1965, in
which, on the electoral issue, HMG stated ‘the importance they attached to
introducing a system whereby some members would be both elected by and
responsible to voters drawn from all communities.’ (i.e. a great part of the Indian
demand for a one man, one vote, one value system). This could be interpreted as
implying that we saw in 1965 a need for common roll elections before Fiji could
become independent.
20. My conclusion is that the disadvantages of the second course outlined above
outweigh the advantages, and could well run us into greater risks than if we continue
to be patient and hope, on the lines of the first course outlined, that through the
continuation of the dialogue in Fiji a point will eventually be reached when, in effect,
the Indian side will concede that Fiji should go to independence under a constitution
which would, at any rate for a time, give the Fijian side a constitutional advantage.
This is the best for which we could hope, and I do not think we should give up an
opportunity of achieving this because of our anxiety to relieve ourselves early of our
defence and internal security responsibilities in the area.
21. I have arranged for Sir Leslie Monson, a Deputy Under-Secretary of State in
my Department, to have constitutional discussions in Fiji with the Governor and the
leaders of both the parties at the end of October. I am anxious to give him and the
Governor some guidance as to the lines of our thinking. I hope therefore that my
colleagues will agree to my telling them that we wish to work towards a new
constitution which would carry Fiji to independence with the Fijians in control, but
to proceed by the sure and more patient means which I have outlined in the first
course above.
144 FCO 32/404, no 175 29 Oct–1 Nov 1969
[Future of Fiji]: FCO records of Sir L Monson’s meetings at Suva with
the political parties, Sir R Foster and Ratu Sir K Mara
[National Federation Party, 29 Oct] 1
Sir Leslie Monson explained that he had taken the opportunity of his recent visit to
Hong Kong to come to learn about Fiji. Mr Koya outlined recent events in Fiji (the
meeting between the Federation and Alliance parties and Mr Patel’s death), and asked
about Britain’s attitude to independence for Fiji. Sir Leslie Monson referred to the
British Government’s published statements about independence for remaining
dependencies. He also mentioned the threat that political strife and internal divisions
1 Present: Foster, Monson, Emery. Representing National Federation Party: S M Koya, C A Shah, U Singh,
R D Patel, R J Singh, J Madhvan, I Jai Narayan, Ratu Julian Toganivalu, Ratu Mosese Varisekete.
12-Fiji-142-cpp  10/5/06  6:58 AM  Page 412
[144] OCT 1969 413
presented to the Fijian economy (with particular reference to the expanding labour
force and hopes for tourism).
2. Ratu Mosese Varisekete said that the indigenous population of Fiji had been
locked away too long in their communities. They were ill prepared for the future
economically and they now looked jealously at the Indian community. Fortunately,
there was maturity in politics in Fiji; a blood bath could be avoided by judicious
handling of the situation. The extreme traditionalists, however, were a danger. The
National Federation Party was the largest party in Fiji; it included some progressive
Fijians; policies that were in the interests of all; and the largest economic assets.
3. Mr R.D. Patel asked when a constitutional conference would be held. Sir Leslie
Monson said that would depend on the outcome of talks locally between the parties.
The aims in drawing up a constitution should be to achieve something that would
get people to work together, to remove fears and to favour progress. Ratu Mosese
Varisekete said that there were fears that the government were fixing up a
constitution with the British.
4. Ratu Julian Toganivalu asked if Britain would arbitrate on points of difference
between the parties. Sir Leslie Monson said that would depend on circumstances at
the time. Before independence the British government had a part to play, after
independence they were out. Therefore the more real agreement achieved before
independence the better. Ratu Julian asked if aid from Britain would continue after
independence. Sir Leslie Monson said it could, in some forms. Mr R.D. Patel asked if
Britain did not have a moral responsibility to use her good offices. Six Leslie Monson
said that what we could do would depend on the degree of difference between the Fiji
parties. For us to leave an arrangement under which one or both parties were
disgruntled would be to dodge our responsibilities.
5. Ratu Julian asked if Britain regarded the Indians as belonging to Fiji. Sir
Leslie Monson pointed out that Ratu Julian himself had earlier emphasised the
special position the Fijians held in the country. The Indians, on the other hand, had
contributed to prosperity. It was unusual in a constitution to have citizenship
reserved by race. It was usually based on residence. Mr Koya pointed out that there
was a definition of ‘belongers’ in the present constitution.
6. Ratu Julian said the Deed of Cession was important to Fijians. It would be
important to the Fijians that it should be handed back in some suitable way.
7. Ratu Julian said that the Europeans also had fears but it was the duty of
everyone to fit themselves in to the party system. They should seek their protection
in that, not in a communal system. The Governor pointed out that, in independence,
business and commerce usually prospered. Mention was also made of a Bill of Rights;
Fiji already had one.
8. Ratu Mosese referred to the difficulty that those who had traditionally
governed Fiji (the Chiefs) found in seeing themselves in another position. HMG
should impress upon them the inevitability of change. The Governor pointed out that
change was gradual.
9. Ratu Mosese asked what the position would be about defence after
independence. Sir Leslie Monson said that it would be Fiji’s affair. She could choose
to make arrangements with a friendly power. Some countries had chose non-
alignment. The British Government was at present reluctant to accept further
defence responsibilities. The Governor said this was something that should be looked
into during the period leading up to independence.
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10. Mr Koya said that at the 1965 constitutional conference Britain handed out a
working paper. What was Fiji to aim at now? Sir Leslie Monson said that the next
stage would be internal self-government. He again emphasised the need to narrow
and define the areas of disagreement.
11. Mr Koya said that the Federation Party would like to present themselves at a
constitutional conference as a party not as a communal delegation. They would like
to bring members who were not members of the Legislature. Sir Leslie Monson said
that constitutional conferences were usually composed of members of the Legislative
Council but others might come as observers. This was something that might be
taken up nearer the time through the Governor. Mr Koya commented that tax payers
might have something to say about all the members of LegCo going.
12. There were questions about who would be responsible for internal security
under a self-government constitution and reference was made to the Bahamas
constitution.
13. Mr Koya said that the Federation party was a multi-racial party, the Alliance
was not. How did one achieve multi-racial parties? The Governor said that this was
something that might come with constitutional advance.
(In a private talk with Sir Leslie Monson Mr Koya gave him in confidence a
message from Ratu Mara who was away from Suva. Ratu Mara had asked him to say
that the Alliance and Federation parties had agreed to meet for further constitutional
talks on the 3rd and 20th November and during the LegCo meetings which would
begin on 21st November. They would thus be ready for a conference in January. Mr
Koya said also that he had an easy time getting agreement in his party. Ratu Mara
had difficulty?)
[Sir R Foster and Ratu Sir K Mara, 30 Oct] 2
The main points that arose in discussion were:—
Sir Leslie Monson referred to his meeting on the previous day with Mr Koya and
members of the National Federation Party. The Chief Minister said that the Federation
had been, in the past, in a hurry for independence. Both parties were now in a hurry.
The Federation Party, under Mr Koya, were now beginning to realise that with
independence they would be left with the Fijians (not under the wing of India or the
U.K.). This realisation was making them begin to focus on the problems that would
arise, and it was clearing the air. The Chief Minister said that he still had problems in
getting agreement on some constitutional issues within the Alliance Party.
2. There was discussion of the common roll. The Chief Minister pointed out that
the unacceptable aspect of the Federation Party proposals was ‘one value’ in their
slogan ‘One man, One vote, One value’. He confirmed that his ideas on cross-voting
were still those he held in May. Cross-voting taught the races to work together; the
common roll would lead to confrontations between the worst kind of politicians. Sir
Leslie Monson said that if communal voting seemed right for Fiji, the more the Chief
Minister could get the Federation Party to agree to it the easier it would be to get it
accepted in London.
3. Sir Leslie Monson said that both sides in Fiji should bear in mind the dangers
that threats of internal divisions and international controversy about Fiji presented
2 Present: Foster, Monson, Emery, Ratu Sir K Mara.
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to the Fijian economy. This provoked some remarks by the Chief Minister about
Fijians being the ‘have nots’ now: they had their traditional way of life and would be
happy to continue with it. They wanted their own values. The British had rivilised
them but they could not be a European civilisation. He also spoke of the ‘soul-
destroying’ effects of O.S.A.S.
4. The Chief Minister said he was concerned about the role Britain would play in
the constitutional conference. He wanted it to be the last conference. If necessary Fiji
would go to independence on the present constitution. Sir Leslie Monson said that
for them to do that would give rise to a very difficult debate in Britain. The main
concern was for the future of Fiji. Fiji would have to live with the independence
constitution.
5. The Chief Minister raised the possibility that the constitutional conference
might be in Fiji. Sir Leslie Monson said that there had been constitutional
conferences in dependent territories but, he thought, only when a large measure of
agreement had been reached locally. He thought that Lord Shepherd, who was the
Minister likely to be handling the Fiji conference, would hope to visit Fiji to get a
first hand look at the problems. He had not come in October because now he might
simply have been a divisive influence. But if there were a wide measure of agreement
between the parties in Fiji by, say, January, it might be possible for him to come
then. We should also try to avoid the Queen’s visit taking place at a time of a
controversy. It was agreed that a possible time-table might be a visit by Lord
Shepherd in January, the Queen’s visit in March, and the constitutional conference
thereafter.
6. The Governor and Chief Minister discussed, and reached a tentative
agreement on, a proposal by the Governor that they should set up a secret working
party to set out the ‘area of agreement’. The working party night include the
Governor (as necessary), the Chief Secretary, the Attorney-General, and persons
nominated by the Chief Minister including possibly non-officials from the Alliance.
The document setting out the area of agreement produced for this party might then
be shown to Mr Koya.
7. There was some discussion about an Upper House. The Chief Minister had
clearly not yet made up his mind about this. It was agreed that the Upper House
might have powers especially in relation to the constitution, racial problems, and
land. Its composition, powers, etc, would require working out to fit Fiji’s needs.
8. The Chief Minister suggested that Sir Leslie Monson should meet members of
the Alliance Party in the afternoon and that was arranged.
[Alliance Party, 30 Oct] 3
Sir Leslie Monson told this gathering of leading members of the Alliance Party as he
had told representatives of the National Federation Party on the previous day that he
had taken the opportunity of his visit to Hong Kong to come to learn about Fiji. He
spoke also of the need for the two parties to achieve as wide as possible an area of
3 Present: Foster, Monson, Emery. Representing Alliance Party: Ratu Sir K Mara, Mr Vijay Singh, Mr
Stinson, Mr Reddy, Mr Falvey, Mrs Livingston, Mr Barrett, Mr Yee, Jonate Mavoa, Jone Naisara, Ratu
Edward Cakobau, Ratu David Toganivalu, Ratu George Cakobau, Emosii Vuakatagane, Penaiame
Nagasima, Alipate Sikivou.
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agreement on constitutional issues. He also referred to the British Government’s
published statements about independence for the remaining dependencies.
2. Mr Barrett asked what Britain’s views were on the common roll. Sir Leslie
Monson said that any constitution must be tailored for the country concerned. It was
therefore always our policy to get agreement locally and to give people what they
wanted.
3. Mr Stinson said that the climate was now right for independence. This should
be achieved before Fiji dealt with other problems that were coming up e.g. those
arising from the increasing labour force. What would the UK do if the Alliance did
not get agreement with the Opposition? Sir Leslie Monson said this would have to
be a Cabinet decision in the light of the circumstances. Ratu Mara asked if the UK
had contemplated that Fiji might seek independence e.g. at the United Nations. Sir
Leslie Monson said that this was a hypothetical situation which he had not
contemplated.
4. Mrs Livingston asked what a Conservative government in Britain would do.
Would they be more sympathetic? Sir Leslie said that all parties were pragmatic in
office.
5. The Chief Minister said that it was not the communal roll that pulled people
apart, but a common roll, in the Fiji situation, would.
6. Mr Vijay Singh said that Fiji was ready for independence and independence
was wanted by all. The issue would be the system of election. To allow the
opposition to hold up independence would be tantamount to giving them control.
The common roll was not necessarily the best solution for Fiji. It was no panacea
e.g. Ireland. The people of Fiji wished to come together in other ways. A common
roll would undermine what they were trying to do. Mr Singh said also that Mr Koya
was only recently elected as leader of the N.F.P. and was in no position to
compromise.
7. Mr Stinson said that the solution was cross-voting.
8. Questions were asked about responsibility for the conduct of Fiji’s external
affairs and defence under a constitution giving full internal self-government and in
independence. The discussion centred mainly on defence (in which term at least
some speakers seemed to include internal security). Sir Leslie Monson explained
that if there were a constitution giving full internal self-government Britain would
still be responsible for Fiji’s external affairs and defence (and internal security) but
with independence Fiji would be responsible for such matters. Once independence
[sic], it would be for Fiji to negotiate whatever arrangements she wanted about
defence. When asked if Britain would conclude a defence treaty with Fiji he said
that the British Government were reluctant to takes on further defence
commitments. The discussion that followed revealed great confusion in the minds
of many of the Alliance party present about future responsibilities for defence and
also a failure to distinguish clearly between such terms as ‘full internal self-
government’ and ‘independence’. Commenting on Sir Leslie Monson’s statement
that Britain was reluctant to take on further defence commitments, Ratu Mara
expressed surprise that we might not defend an independent Fiji. If this was so
what status had Britain in a constitutional conference? In a conversation with the
Governor on 2nd October some remarks by the Chief Minister showed clearly that
he fully understood that Fiji would have to negotiate her own post-independence
defence arrangements.
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[Ratu Sir K. Mara, 1 Nov]
I paid a call on the Chief Minister at 9.30 a.m. today primarily to pay my respects
before departure. He raised a number of points in discussion, of which the following
seem worthy of note:—
(a) The thought that the feeling that the Federation Party under Mr Koya were
ready for compromise was spreading among his own party and this should make
the latter more flexible in the coming talks.
(b) Timing of a conference. He very much hoped that any conference would not be
held before the Queen’s visit. It was unfortunate that the idea of a conference in
January had been implanted in his Party’s minds before the Queen’s visit was fixed.
He would be holding discussions in the coming week in which he would hope to
get acceptance of the end of March as a target date.
(c) He would like to keep us in touch with the forthcoming talks as they
developed. He agreed to do this through the Governor.
(d) Defence and external affairs after independence. The anxieties about defence
expressed at the meeting with the Alliance representatives were not related to
defence against external aggression but to internal security. He was worried about
the possibility of small incidents escalating in Fiji over a period into communal
disorder as had happened in India. He would therefore like to be able to call upon
British white troops (not Gurkhas) for assistance to maintain law and order. In
reply to a question from me he said he did not anticipate any security threat from
the Indian community, but if trouble arose, he could not rely on Fijian troops etc
to restrain themselves as they should without the steadying influence of white
troops operating alongside them. I thanks [sic] him for clarifying the position.
On external affairs he thought of Fiji having overseas missions after independence
only in a limited number of places, e.g. the U.N., London, Australia, New Zealand and
perhaps in South-East-Asia. Could the U.K. act as necessary for Fiji elsewhere? I
explained the Commonwealth convention and also told him of the device of multiple
accreditations and of the practice by which source new Commonwealth states used
their missions at the U.N. or in London as a channel for diplomatic negotiations with
other countries in whose capitals they were not represented but which had missions
in New York or London.
145 FCO 32/404, no 175 31 Oct 1969
[Civil service]: note by E J Emery on a meeting between Sir L Monson
and representatives of Fiji staff associations about service concerns
over the pace of constitutional planning
The points that emerged were as follows.
The Representatives seemed suspicious of the visit by Sir Leslie Monson and
myself; they seemed to believe that constitutional planning was going forward with
greater speed than it is in fact and that developments affecting their future were
being concealed from the senior service.
2. Questions were asked about the renewal of OSAS and the revision of
inducement allowances. These were answered in accordance with the briefs. The
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Representatives asked for an assurance that the biennial review of allowances should
be dealt with expeditiously. If it could not go through quickly each time perhaps an
annual review would have better results?
3. The Representatives said that the limited compensation scheme was
‘repugnant’ to them. The need for a general scheme was already here. Suggestions
were made that the Chief Minister interfered with recruiting and the Council of
Ministers with staff housing. The Chief Secretary said that there was no such
improper interference.
4. The Representatives said that they wished to be given an opportunity of
planning their futures. They had never agreed to the limited compensation scheme.
It had been imposed on them. Now there were increasing references to
independence. They needed more information e.g. adequate notice of a general
scheme. It was unusual, as Mr Morgan had said in discussing a limited compensation
scheme with them, to have such a scheme without knowing how long it would be
before it was succeeded by a general scheme.
5. There was discussion of how much notice of a general scheme the service was
likely to get. The Chief Secretary and Sir Leslie Monson explained that there was no
constitution timetable as yet and that one could not be forecast but it was fair to
assume that the service would get about nine months notice of a general scheme i.e.
it would take about six months and probably more between a conference and the
implementation of full internal self-government (with a general compensation
scheme and an executive P.S.C.).
6. The Representatives asked that there should be satisfactory negotiations with
the staff on the general scheme. The last one had not been negotiated.
7. The Representatives also appealed for a replacement for Sir John Field1 as
liaison officer with HMOCS. Their request was noted.
1 Staff liaison officer, HM Overseas Civil Service, 1968–1969; subsequently (1972–1973) first governor of
Gilbert and Ellice Islands.
146 FCO 32/430, no 69 3 Nov 1969
‘Fiji constitution’: inward telegram no 73 from Sir L Monson to J C
Morgan on his talks with the Fiji leaders [Extract]
. . . 2. In speaking to both Alliance and Federation gatherings1 I emphasised the
need for agreement to be achieved locally and threats to economy involved in local
division and controversy.
3. Ratu Mara thinks that there are better prospects of talking constructively with
Koya than there were with Patel and more hope of narrowing the difference with
him. He appears to regard Koya as more moderate than Patel and does think the
Federation are more ready to face up to the issues (and to make compromises) now
that independence seems near. Koya for his part professes high regard for Mara and
understanding of his difficulties with the Alliance back benchers. This is new and
hopeful factor in the situation.
1 See 144.
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4. Before I arrived the Chief Minister and Koya had agreed to hold further inter-
party meetings about constitution on 3 and 20 November and during Legislative
Council meetings beginning on 21 November. Mara thought they should be ready for
a conference in January (but see Para. 8 below).
5. Mara now professes to be in as great a hurry for independence as the
opposition. He has once or twice hinted at something like a unilateral declaration of
independence apparently with the idea bringing us to abandoning any idea we might
have of pushing them into a Common Roll. (This need not be taken seriously). His
ideas are still for a 50-member Legislative Council. On the electoral structure he
described in London in May he and his party argue strongly that communal system
(in which they include cross voting) will teach people of Fiji to work together
whereas a Common Roll would be divisive and dangerous in creating confrontations
in elections.
6. The Federation Party revealed no readiness to move from a Common Roll but
they did declare understanding of and readiness to recognise the ‘special position’ of
Fijians in Fiji. I think it very likely there is some give in their position.
7. Both Koya and Mara have said to me that the Federation Party is united on
constitutional issues but that Alliance is not. This was clearly demonstrated at my
meetings. The Federation representatives were articulate and clearly worked to a
prearranged plan. The Alliance representatives were ill-briefed and many of them
seemed ignorant of Mara’s policies and intentions. They seem also to be not entirely
united in a desire for independence. There was evidence that some of the Europeans
at any rate hankered for some associated statehood or something just short of
independence. There was some great confusion in attacks of most of those present
about implications of and distinctions between full self government and
independence and what, for example, would be the position about external affairs and
defence in either of these positions. In my last private talk with Mara, however, he
made it clear he hoped for a continuing commitment for British support in internal
security situations on the ground that this alone would keep Fijian forces in line. On
external affairs they hoped that we would act for them where they were not
represented.
8. When Ratu Mara spoke of a conference in January I referred to the Queen’s
projected visit in March pointing out that we would need to avoid risk of the Queen
coming to Fiji at a time of controversy, such as might come after a difficult
conference. He said (and repeated today) that his personal wish was for a conference
at the end of March after the Royal visit. He would have to bring his party into line (I
do not believe he will have difficulty). He wondered whether if the conference were
postponed until March, it would be possible to have a ‘British presence’ in Fiji in
January, who could, under cover of a routine visit help to close any gaps between
parties so that the final conference would be routine affair. I said this would fit in
with Lord Shepherd’s usual predeliction to visit a territory before presiding over a
conference on its affairs but I thought that Lord Shepherd would not wish to come if
his visit were to heighten tension. All depended therefore on success of interparty
talks in November. Subject to that and Minister’s own views, the programme he
suggested seems sensible.
9. This timetable agrees in fact with plan outlined in enclosure to your letter of
21 October. It is impossible to be sanguine about outcome of interparty talks but at
least there is a readiness to talk. I do not think at least until after the end of party
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talks in November we should exercise pressure on either side. A post Christmas visit
by a minister would provide an opportunity if we decide some pressure on one side or
other or both is necessary.
10. On present prospects I doubt if we could bring Alliance party to agreement to
a Common Roll even with constituencies drawn to take account of special position of
Fijians. The best hope most likely to provide the satisfactory foundation for
independence still seems to be in an extension of the cross vote though a change to a
name of greater political sex appeal would be desirable.
11. Meantime Mara has tentatively agreed to proposal by the Governor that they
set up (in parallel with talks) a working party to include Chief Secretary, Attorney-
General, the Governor as necessary and some Alliance members nominated by Ratu
Mara, to draw up confidential paper setting out in some detail areas of agreement.
These might be used as a working paper for presentation to Koya and reduce
discussion at any future conference.
12. Before your Tel no. PERSONAL 78 arrived on 31 October, I had had a talk at
his request with Indian Commissioner. He referred to Indian Government’s
recognition that United Nations resolutions were all very well but that really
constructive effort had to be made locally to solve the Fiji constitutional problem.
They were anxious to help maintain harmony within limits of manoeuvre which
their domestic policies imposed on them. He said he had been concerned lest Britain
had responded to Indian initiative by losing interest in a settlement in Fiji.2 He was
however reassured of our continuing interest by my visit. Patel had seemed to step
backwards (i.e. to be more than ever adamant about Common Roll) before his death
but, with Koya, Venkateswaren saw some hope of the two sides here getting together.
He also said that we should not assume that, if Indians are provoked again as after
December, 1968 by elections they would not retaliate. I made it clear that my visit
was purely exploratory. I also mentioned that I hoped to call in at Delhi on my way
home and he has no doubt reported this. I think you will agree since the situation is
still as fluid as described in this telegram there is no harm in my adhering to that
plan.
13. All the above has the Governor’s agreement. We have also shown him
enclosure to your letter of 21 October and he is in general agreement with that.
2 See 143, note.
147 FCO 32/405, no 195 12 Nov 1969
[Political situation]: letter from Sir R Foster to J C Morgan on
National Federation Party proposals for a constitutional conference
and Ratu Sir K Mara’s style of leadership. Enclosure: Draft NFP
proposals for a constitutional conference
Leslie Monson’s telegram Personal No. 73 of the 3rd November1 will already have
given you full details of the state of play here and of our latest thinking. So this letter
is sent principally to let you have for the record copies of:—
1 See 146.
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(a) an N.F.P. document headed ‘Draft Proposals for Constitutional Conference’
which was obtained covertly. Both Leslie and Eleanor Emery saw it, and asked that
we copy it to you. Ratu Mara is not, as far as I know, aware of its existence. We
understand that the N.F.P. hierarchy have approved it;
(b) a cutting from the ‘Fiji Times’ reporting on the inter-party talks held on the
3rd November; and
(c) draft confidential notes of the same talks. This was sent to me by Ratu Mara.2
2. From all this you will see that the atmosphere remains amiable, though none
of our politicians appears to be versed in constitutional terminology. This could lead
to misunderstandings, and will have to be watched. I hope that the working party
mentioned in paragraph 11 of Leslie’s telegram will get off the ground soon, giving
us an opportunity to help people clarify their ideas.
3. Something else that we shall have to watch (though we probably shan’t in
this case be able to help much) is increasing Alliance impatience with Ratu Mara’s
style of leadership. Many of the party, including Ministers and Assistant Ministers,
are irked because he does not consult them, yet hesitate to tell him this because
he is very short-tempered when criticized. The disarray which Leslie remarked on
in paragraph 7 of his telegram is the result; and it is instructive that Ratu Mara
had (I am told) never intended or wished Alliance representatives to meet Leslie at
all.
4. I have one separate matter to mention. Delhi telegram No. 2136 of the 6th
November suggests that the Government of India is taking what could become an
uncomfortably close interest in Fiji’s affairs, which we should gently discourage.3 I
appreciate that embarrassment could result if in due course we appeared to have
been disingenuous. But in my present view there are decisive arguments for at least
continuing to foster contacts between the Indians and Fiji Ministers. For one thing,
these would be almost impossible to prevent: Ratu Mara is not in the habit of asking
anybody whom he may invite here. For another, they have led to far greater Indian
understanding of Fiji’s problems. This has been of advantage to everyone; and it is no
exaggeration to say that the advice and help we have received in place of tiresome
lectures has played a major part in getting people here to talk constructively to one
another.
Enclosure to 147
The purpose of this paper is to outline NFP proposals for changes in the forthcoming
Constitutional Conference.
2. At the outset it must be made clear that the principles and policy of NFP has
not altered and stands by its decision of making Fiji into a Nation of One Country and
One People. This in short means Independence and a Legislature elected on a
Common Roll. We feel that this is necessary for the progress and future well being of
Fiji and its people. There can be no Economic Salvation without Political
Independence.
2 Cutting from The Fiji Times and confidential notes not printed. 3 cf 143, note.
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3. In going out to achieve this the NFP are very much aware of the factors and
components of races that live in the country and also the economic foundations that
have sustained the country over the last 90 years. In particular the NFP also is
concerned with the special position that the indigenous population of this country
hold and the fact that they own the largest portion of natural resources in land and
yet are so economically backward compared to the other races living side by side with
him. The NFP is also mindful of the sentiments he attaches to his Social Structure,
tradition and customs and his attachment to the British Crown and the emphasis he
places on the Deed of Cession signed in 1874.
4. On the other hand one has to look at things realistically and realise that
Britain herself is gradually shaking off her colonial hold on her dependent territories
and allowing or encouraging them to emerge as Independent states within the
British Commonwealth. Therefore whatever we may feel and uphold, the change will
come also to Fiji. Now that the wheels of change have already begun our objective
should be to accomodate the change and the aspirations of the people and allow the
wheel to continue and complete its revolution discarding in its movement the things
that brings about strife and ill will and keeping with it in its momentum the good
things that will emerge this country into a peaceful and respectful Nation containing
within it the good things that allow people to live together in peaceful coexistence.
5. We also understand that there is no ready made solution tucked away in
Westminster to accomodate the changes to be adhered to by every emerging Nation
and we therefore feel that our problem if one likes to call it that, is best solved by the
people who now make up the inhabitants of Fiji.
6. We are also mindful of our strength and weaknesses if and when we have to
stand face to face with the outside world as an Independent Nation but these are
problems that have to be faced squarely and dealt with as they arise. No Nation is
devoid of this. We also realise that in place of Britain the vacuum will be taken up by
other large powers closest to us, but no country is4 free of this inevitable contact and
it is to our people alone that a solution beneficial to all can be found.
7. The question is how do we go about getting this Independence and how soon.
The following are put forward as talking points to accomodate not only NFP wishes
and desires, but also we hope those of the Alliance.
8. We propose that the country undertakes to get full independence in two stages.
Stage I
(a) The Country be given full Dominion status and the change effective as from the
next General Election in 1971.
(b) A Governor General be appointed by the Queen. He would continue to have
power of veto and be still responsible for Defence and Internal Security. He will be
representing the Queen and is the Traditional Head of the Country.
(c) There is to be a fully elective Legislative Council of fifty members elected on a
Common Roll. Whichever Party returns the most seats at the General Election
becomes the Government of the Day. The head of that Government becomes the
Prime Minister. He will run the country with his cabinet of Ministers. The other
parties become Her Majesty’s Loyal Opposition.
4 Emphasis throughout in original.
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(d) The system of election and representation is on both population density and
geographical boundaries, based on the standard tikina boundaries within Provinces.
Attached are Appendices showing boundaries, distribution of population, its racial
composition and numbers. To be more precise about how we arrived at the figure of
50 seats we did the following:—
(i) Divide the whole country into its existing 79 Districts plus Suva City and
Rotuma making a total of 81 Constituencies.
(ii) Having done this we then placed the population figures in each
constituency and this ranged from 290 in the District of Cikobia to 62,660 in the
City of Suva. For the population and areas to be fairly and equally represented
we did the following, we combined smaller districts until we arrived at 50
constituencies. Each constituency to have at least the required population per
representative; giving extra seats proportionately to those constituencies that
had over the basic population requirement.
(iii) We arrived at the basic population figure by dividing 50 into the total
population projected for 1971 which will be 553,200 giving us roughly about
11,000 people per member.
(iv) By this method some constituencies will return one and some more
depending on the size of the population.
(v) Whilst we have shown the total population we have also shown its racial
composition but we have left the racial representation to the House entirely in
the hands of each Party. Some constituencies will be found to have
predominantly Taukei5 population, others Indians and in some the people on
the General Roll will hold the balance of majority. The question then of a
balanced representation of race is a domestic one for each Party and the
criterian of election will then be the Party Policy.
9. This is the first change without further details and the next change we
envisage should be full Independence with a Taukei Head of State to be brought
about in 1974.
Stage II
We have already pointed out, our concern for the sentiments of the Taukeis with
regards his social structure and the sentiments he attaches to Britain and the Deed of
Cession. To accomodate these we put forward the following proposals bearing in
mind that a Nation must have its own traditions and customs. As a mark of respect to
the Taukei we feel that it is their traditions and customs that should be adopted as
the recognised National Tradition and Custom.
(i) An Upper House be established in 1974. This House is to have thirteen
heridatory seats to be occupied by the direct descendants of those that signed the
Deed of Cession. Fifteen other seats to be occupied as follows, at least five to be
Taukeis and the remaining seats for others occupied for life. Nomination to this
Upper House to be by invitation of the 13 Heridatory Chiefs on the advise of the
Head of State.
(ii) The Country to elect by common plebiscite a Taukei Head of State from the
Upper House. This appointment to replace the Governor General.
5 The indigenous people of Fiji.
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(iii) At this stage Fiji should be given her full Independence and it would be
appropriate that the giving of Independence be by Her Majesty herself gracefully
giving Fiji back to the Chiefs that had Ceded Fiji originally.
(iv) The Head of State will then have the power of Veto advised by the Upper
House, which would have as one of its functions the censuring of all legislation
and revision of Bills before being passed by the Legislature.
(v) It also should be the full authority on Traditions and Customs and any
legislation or change affecting land and any change in Constitution, to have the
approval of the Upper House before it can be dealt with by the Lower House.
10. By implementing Stage II we feel that we are invoking a machinery that will
preserve Fiji’s indentity with the past, making the Taukei first amongst equals,
accomodating the sentiments of the Taukeis about the Deed of Cession and her
relationship with the Crown, at the same time bringing Fiji into line with other
Independent Nations of the world and a member of the British Commonwealth of
Nations, deciding her own affairs and destiny.
11. For some years now there has been in existence the traditional Council of
Chiefs membership of which has continually changed, until today it has reached the
stage where perhaps there are more commoners than there are chiefs making up this
Council. Its functions has become all and nothing but one thing it has been able to
maintain a link and identity of the Fijian Social and Traditional structure. With the
establishment of the Upper House, this Great Council of Chiefs is truly accomodated
and replaced.
12. There will also be a need for the setting up of a Judicial Boundaries’
Commission to determine from time to time the new boundaries of constituencies
considering the shifting and growth of population.
13. As it has been pointed out from the start the proposals are put forward as
talking points and any detail would have to be dealt with in discussions.
14. The aspect of achieving Independence in two stages is more to overcome the
fear that has imbedded itself into our system over the last 90 years and if one knows
in advance that Independence will come definitely within so many years, then the
whole country and the people will have the time to prepare themselves adequately to
meet the change and fit themselves into the new enviroment, new economic changes
and above all, emancipation then does not become an evil but a reality and a reward.
148 FCO 32/43, no 84 17 Nov 1969
‘Fiji’: report by Sir L Monson following his visit, on the character of
Ratu Sir K Mara and the decisions to be made by the British
government
One could be very critical of the administration of Fiji. I believe that it always was
‘sloppy’ and it may well be more so than ever. This is partly the result of ‘localisation’
but even more so, I suspect, because of the lengthy campaign waged against U.K.
expatriate officers by the present Chief Minister and by the resident white population
(which is larger, more locally-based and influential then I had appreciated).
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2. The Governor is, I think, basically unhappy that his talents cannot be better
utilized but accepts that at the present stage of constitutional development he has to
work through his local Ministers. Even so the Chief Minister’s habit of evading
discussions which run contrary to his pre-conceived and ill-tutored ideas hampers
still further the Governor in his task of guiding Fiji to a secure and respectable
‘ultimate status’.
3. The character of the Chief Minister is a disturbing factor in the present
situation. He has not sorted his ideas out. He wants to cut a leading figure in Pacific
politics and therefore wants independence especially after the achievement of that
status by Nauru and (in the near future) by Tonga.1 He is genuinely frightened of an
escalation of racial conflict and therefore wants independence accompanied by a
defence agreement with Britain to maintain internal security: if told, as the Governor
has and I did, that Britain was unlikely to accept a position of responsibility without
authority, he turns petulant and says that in these circumstances we have no moral
right to demand a voice, let alone the final decision, in determining Fiji’s
independence constitution. He carries in any case a lasting grudge against H.M.G.
because he was refused admission to O.S.A.S. when in the Civil Service and argues
that we are the real racialists. It is difficult to determine his real internal political
strength. He undoubtedly seems to have wide popular support but remains unsure of
himself. Has leading political opponent speaks sympathetically of the Chief Minister’s
difficulty with his back-benchers but the latter apparently thinks nothing of brow-
beating his Ministerial colleagues by stalking out of Ministerial discussions which
take a course of which he does not approve. (The Governor believes that if his Party
was sure after an election of five years’ security of tenure they would seen ‘ditch’ him
for a less complex and more self-confident Fijian.)
4. Against this there are compensating factors:—
(a) The economy seems to be self-sustaining without a ‘strong’ system of
administration: there is a boom at the moment which reduces the political
temperature.
(b) There is little sign of racial tension despite undoubted racial differences. The
best assessment is that since the Fijian’s ‘flexed their muscles’ after the 1968 by-
elections, the Indians have kept their heads down and the Fijians their tails up.
(c) There is undoubtedly a far greater degree of mutual regard between the two
leaders of the political parties than has existed in the past.
5. It is right for us to stand aside while they seek a mutually acceptable solution.
But about the turn of the year we shall have to consider:—
(a) whether we should move in to ‘arbitrate’ on such gaps as still remain between
them, or
(b) to avert their putting us in a position which we should want to avoid e.g.
responsibility in respect of internal security after independence.
6. We should not however close our minds to any ‘unorthodox’ solution the
parties work out if it offers a chance of the country moving forward in conditions of
stability and racial harmony.
1 Jan 1968 for Nauru (see 108, note 1) and June 1970 for Tonga (a UK protectorate).
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Footnotes on Fiji.
(a) Australia: the officials I met in Canberra seemed to accept that Fiji was on the
path to independence but were worried about Australia’s image in the emergent
country. This suffers from (a) Australian firms’ predominance in the economy of Fiji,
(b) the more restrictive attitude, adopted by the Australian immigration authorities
as compared with those in New Zealand, to Fiji Islanders applying for work permits,
and (c) the behaviour of R.A.N. personnel on the last visit of an Australian warship to
Fiji which has led the D.E.A. to advise against any repetition of such naval visits.
(b) India: it is obvious that the desk officers in the Ministry of External Affairs have
studied Fiji in great detail. I did not get the impression that their superiors had any
positive policy as regards Fiji. They struck me rather as conscientious Civil Servants
getting themselves into a position to allow their Ministers to defend themselves
against domestic criticism if anything went wrong in Fiji. Our Deputy High
Commissioner thought I had made an impression on them by stating that our direct
long-term interests in Fiji were minimal.
149 FCO 32/405, no 216 15 Dec 1969
‘Fiji constitutional advance’: minute by Sir L Monson on the ‘good’
and ‘less satisfactory’ points in the Fiji situation
The attached submission1 from the Department refers to the latest report received
from the Governor (as of 27 November) on the discussions between the two Parties
in Fiji.
2. The following summary may be of use to Lord Shepherd.
Good points
(a) The talks between the Parties are becoming more businesslike and
meaningful.
(b) The Chief Minister has apparently dropped the idea of a defence agreement
with the UK (covering internal security after independence).
(c) The Governor is making progress in persuading the Chief Minister that there
are practical objections in moving straight to independence without going
through the customary short period (say six months) of internal self-government.
3. Less satisfactory points
(1) The talks at the time of writing had not touched on the major difference
between the Parties, viz. the method of electing members of the Legislature, i.e.
whether by common roll or by communal rolls with of course voting for seats
elected by all on the communal rolls but reserved as to the members returned by
race.
(2) The Chief Minister continues to keep his Party in the dark as to what he is
thinking and working for (this may cause difficulties later on on (b) but if the
1 Not printed.
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Governor is successful on (c) these difficulties will not come alive for nine months
or so, depending on the result of the election to be mounted after the next
Conference is held.
(3) There is a dispute between the Parties as to whether they want a
Constitutional Conference in London in January (the Opposition) or at Easter (the
Chief Minister)—Easter weekend is the 27th to 30th March.
4. The Chief Minister has asked for our support on (3) above. I agree with the
submission on this apart from the facts that more time will be needed in Fiji to
prepare the ground and that Lord Shepherd has British Honduras commitments in
January, PIOD is to be re-organised (and strengthened) over January and February
and we could not service a Conference satisfactorily until that reorganisation has
taken place. On the question of The Queen’s visit I think we can take the Chief
Minister’s view that the conditions for the visit will be more auspicious if no decision
has been reached on the future Constitution rather than if one Party or the other had
suffered a defeat at a Constitutional Conference before it.
5. I therefore recommend the drafts should issue as soon as the Minister of State
has approved them.
6. We can discuss at our meeting on Thursday whether Lord Shepherd still
ought to make a visit to Fiji in advance of the Conference, whether in January or
February.
150 FCO 32/405, no 229 23 Dec 1969
[Future of Fiji]: letter from Sir R Foster to E J Emery on a proposal
that there might not be an election until after independence.
Appendices
I forward a copy of a letter of the 16th December which the Chief Minister has sent
me. This letter completely alters the position and appears to us to remove the main
point of difficulty. The idea of not having an election until after independence had
been reached is entirely new and, coming from the Opposition, a little unexpected.
This, coupled with the extremely cooperative and friendly relations which at present
exist between the Chief Minister and the Leader of the Opposition, seems to point to
a breakthrough. I thought I should probe a bit to see how firm the proposal was and
I arranged to see separately both the Chief Minister and Koya. I attach copies of the
notes I made after each meeting. The results show that both sides are quite serious
and firm. More particularly the meeting with Koya disclosed no reservations—on
the contrary he was very anxious indeed to come to terms with the Chief Minister
and get on to Dominion Status. This term is used in its correct sense of
independence within the Monarchy whereas independence is apparently used to
mean a Republic.
2. All this would I think now point to the usefulness of a visit by Lord Shepherd
in the latter part of January if this can be arranged. You may also think that on this
occasion a constitutional lawyer could be very usefully added to the party. A possible
course of events after such a visit might be a conference in London at about the end
of March with a view to producing an independence constitution for bringing into
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force by perhaps the end of 1970. This would provide for an election under the new
arrangements to be held during 1971, when we were due for an election in any case.
3. I am sending copies of this letter and enclosures to Arthur Galsworthy in
Wellington, Charles Johnston in Canberra, Morrice James in Delhi and Michael Gass
in Honiara.1
Appendix A to 150: letter from Ratu Sir K Mara to Sir R Foster, 16 Dec 1969
Thank you very much for your letter of 4th December setting out various proposed
steps on the road to Dominion status.
This letter is by way of reply to yours but I am also authorised by the committee of
the two parties on constitutional reform to say that it represents a unanimous view
of that committee. I would go further and say that though the following views have
the full support of the Alliance members of the committee, they were in fact initiated
by the National Federation Party. In these circumstances I would hope that they
would be given considerable weight and be passed on to the Secretary of State with
your own support.
Our view is that, when there is such a strong consensus of agreement, not only
between the parties but also in the country on our future as a Dominion, there is a
real danger that concord and impetus will be lost if we cannot proceed to that status
in the most direct possible way without following through step-by-step all the
preliminaries which have become the established pattern with other dependent
territories moving to independence.
We have been influenced in this view by the experience of Mauritius where the
delay in achieving full independence led to opposition, riots and bloodshed.
In our view and having regard to repeated assurances by the United Kingdom that
in regard to the pace of constitutional advance it is Fiji’s own wishes which are
considered paramount, it is our duty to inform the United Kingdom what these
wishes are and to ask how they can best be implemented.
Briefly these wishes are that we should have Dominion status immediately
following a Constitutional Conference in London and that the present system of a
Chief Minister and Council of Ministers be replaced by a Prime Minister and a
Cabinet. It would be agreed that questions of electoral boundaries and representation
could be settled thereafter and that a general election would be held within a stated
time after achieving Dominion status. It may well be that agreement on the electoral
system can be fully achieved before the Conference. So much the better. It is fully
appreciated by the Opposition that this proposal gives a position of advantage to the
Government of the day. They accept this and have said they will fully support a Prime
Minister during the period when final details are being worked out, particularly with
regard to elections. A declaration of this nature cannot be lightly disregarded, and it
is also appreciated by the Alliance Party that such an expression of confidence
confers obligations upon them to ensure that this trust is not abused. It is our view
that the Government in power after the Conference should have full authority to
1 Respectively, UK high commissioners to New Zealand, Australia and India, and (Michael Gass) high
commissioner for Western Pacific (at Honiara, British Solomon Islands Protectorate) and British high
commissioner for New Hebrides.
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carry through any agreements reached in London and that this will not be so if we do
not at that time have Dominion status. Moreover it makes the constitution a
thoroughly bi-partisan matter and takes the political sting out of it. The last thing we
want is an election incorporating the independence issue. This was the trouble in
Mauritius.
We appreciate that this would be a departure from normal practice by the United
Kingdom Government, and clearly there are matters of foreign relations, internal
security and defence tied up with it. However we believe that given the goodwill at
present existing these matters can be satisfactorily arranged to form a method of
procedure to enable the unanimous wishes of the political parties’ representation for
early Dominion status to be met.
I should add that agreement has been reached by the committee on proposed
chapters of the Constitution dealing with Human Rights, the Governor-General, the
Judiciary, the Executive Authority, the Public Service Commission, the Ombudsman
and Finance.
I would therefore be grateful if these matters could be laid before the Secretary of
State so that the United Kingdom may indicate to us a formula which could enable
them to be implemented.
Appendix B to 150: note by Sir R Foster of a discussion with Ratu Sir K Mara, 
18 Dec 1969
I had a discussion with the Chief Minister on the morning of 18th December in
connection with his letter 1106/1 of the 16th December. Following are notes made as
a result of the meeting.
I said that the idea that there should be no election until after independence was an
entirely new idea and was one which I could not in our circumstances normally
support. In this case however it had been thought up and was backed by the Opposition
which changed the picture considerably. The Opposition seemed to be putting
themselves at a disadvantage and I could not understand why this was so unless in fact
Koya did not want to be or could not see himself as a Prime Minister over the next five
or ten years. The Chief Minister thought that perhaps this was in fact so, though he
did not know. The timetable, he thought, should now go firm if possible on a visit to
Fiji by a Minister in the second half of January to prepare for a conference at the end
of March. This visit in January would also be able to serve the purpose of allowing the
minority groups to say anything that they wished to say before the conference. He said
that the dialogue with the Opposition would continue for some time to come, in the
hope of working out mutually agreed electoral arrangements. He thought it was more
than possible that sufficient agreement on this would not have been reached by the
time of the conference but that the discussions would go on in any case after the
conference and before the new constitution came in. The new constitution could say
that there should be an election under the new arrangements within a year of it
coming into operation. He felt quite sure that they would in due course come to
agreement. The constitution would in all respects be an independence constitution
although it might be necessary to work out details about how they would operate
things like defence and external affairs after the conference rather than before it. This
would depend on the time available.
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I probed the matter of the timing for the introduction of this new constitution and
he said that it was appreciated by both sides that it would take some time to bring it
into being. They were talking about this and a possible date suggested by the
Opposition had been Cession Day 1970 (10th October). I said this might be too early
but I did not know until things had been worked out a bit more. From his point of view
independence Day and Cession Day should be celebrated on the same day if possible.
Otherwise he thought that Independence Day would become the main holiday and
Cession Day would gradually fade away. He thought that would be a pity. I said that if
this was the pattern he would need now to go into the question of citizenship and have
a look at the various models. He said he would do this. I also said if there was to be an
Upper House it would be as well to get this cleared with the Opposition. I understood
that both sides were attracted by the idea. I reminded him that I had given him a paper
showing details of various Upper Houses some time ago and he said he still had it. I
asked if he could let me have minutes of the various meetings they had been holding
so that I could start trying to produce for them drafting instructions for the chapters
of the new Constitution which had been agreed. He said he would certainly do so but
the drafts were going the rounds at the moment.
He confirmed to me that although Koya had not seen his letter because he was
away, Ramarkha and members of the Opposition had in fact done so and had cleared
it. I said that I thought it would be courteous on my part to ask Koya to come and see
me as soon as convenient so I could say how pleased I was that progress was being
made and run over some of the ground with him, particularly as to possible
timetables. It would give him an opportunity to send the Secretary of State a message
if he so wished. This I hoped would confirm his support of the contents of the letter
which we were discussing and would further have the effect of committing Koya to it.
I said I was slightly worried that there might be a volte face on the part of the
Opposition. The Chief Minister said he thought this was unlikely although he
supposed one could not rule it out entirely as impossible.
The Chief Minister then went on to talk about the defence agreement with New
Zealand and he said both the Alliance and Federation parties would like this
continued. He understood it expired early in the year. I said I was grateful to have
this information and would let the New Zealand Government know his views. We
would then discover the New Zealand reaction. I thought that once Fiji became
independent the New Zealand Government would wish to re-negotiate or confirm
any agreement of this sort with the new Government. So far as I was aware they were
quite happy with the present arrangements and would be willing to go on with them.
Appendix C to 150: note by Sir R Foster of a meeting with Mr Koya, 19 Dec 1969
I saw Mr. Koya on the morning of Friday 19th December. He told me that the
position was perfectly correctly stated in the Chief Minister’s letter of 16th December
and it had been his idea that we should try to go through without an election. He said
that if there was anything calculated to cause discord it was an election. The
atmosphere at the moment was exceptionally good and he personally wanted to keep
it that way. He would like to see a conference with 100% agreement. He appreciated
that this suggestion would put a good deal on the shoulders of the Chief Minister
who would be on trust to see that an election was held after independence. They
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would prefer, however, to go through to independence with a Chief Minister they
knew and a person whom they thoroughly trusted. An election might change the
leadership and we would then possibly have to negotiate all over again about
independence. As regards timing for an election he thought anything up to a year
after independence would be quite satisfactory. He went on to say that he thought
the next election would once more throw up an Alliance government but that the
Opposition would be very much stronger.
We then talked about electoral arrangements and Koya said he fully appreciated the
difficulties which the Chief Minister had. If he was saddled with communal seats then
it was because his people demanded this as a protection. They had their fears and these
must be catered for. It was no good he and Mara agreeing about arrangements at a
high level if in fact they did not carry the people along too. He said he would be happy
as regards a common roll if in fact Mara would say that although it is not possible to
have it now it is not ruled out for all time and in 5, 10, or 15 years it will probably be
possible. Whatever safeguards were needed would have to be spelt out and looked at.
He was not against this sort of thing at all. With a laugh he said that the Fijians
controlled the Army and Police and he did not think that they had a great deal to worry
about. He said he thought that with this sort of give and take it would be possible to
settle election arrangements by the time of a conference which he agreed could not
now be held in January and a good time would be soon after the Queen’s visit.
I asked him what he thought about the possibility of a visit by a Minister in the latter
part of January and he said he thought it would be an excellent idea if it could be
arranged as the Minister could see for himself the great degree of cooperation that
existed here and it would also smooth the way for a conference. It would result he
thought in a whole lot of people endeavouring to put views forward but these minority
groups were entitled to have a say even if they did not carry much weight. He realised
that if it was a matter of going straight to independence with an election afterwards
then there was still a great deal that had to be done and this would take a few months.
He seemed to appreciate that most of 1970 would have to run out on this process.
He certainly is in an extremely aimiable mood these days and the conditions do
seem right for pressing on. He claims that these conditions can persist but could
easily be disrupted by an election and I think he is almost certainly right.
151 FCO 32/582, no 2 2 Jan 1970
[Future of Fiji]: letter from E J Emery to Sir R Foster on Britain’s
conditions for the grant of independence
Many thanks for your letter (S. 166/37) of 23 December about Ratu Mara’s letter to
you about the Constitution.1 The notes enclosed of your talks with the Chief Minister
and Mr. Koya have been particularly helpful.
2. To help us in considering how we should respond to the initiative that has
been taken by Ratu Mara and Mr. Koya we have written a draft memorandum setting
out the relevant considerations. I enclose a copy of this.2
1 See 150. 2 Not printed.
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3. At the departmental level here our present thinking is that provided we are
satisfied that the agreement of the parties in Fiji is guaranteed, Britain should agree
that:—
(a) Fiji should have independence as soon after a constitutional conference as can
be arranged and a conference as early as possible.
(b) The independence Constitution should embody present electoral
arrangements or any other electoral arrangements on which the parties agree.
(c) No election will be necessary before independence; there would be no need if
the independence proposals are agreed by both parties.
(d) We should give no guarantees in relation to the external defence or internal
security of an independent Fiji.
(e) We should not agree to any status for Fiji that would leave us with defence or
internal security responsibilities but with no control over internal affairs, e.g. we
should refuse any request for Associated Statehood or a Constitution of the Bahamas
type (which provides full internal self-government with external affairs and defence
reserved to the Governor and also the ultimate responsibility for the police and
internal security resting with the Governor but entrusted to a local minister).
4. If for any reason, e.g. failure of the two parties to give the necessary
guarantees of their agreement, it proves impracticable to proceed with the two-party
independence proposal we could, however, agree to a request from the Chief Minister
for some further advance short of independence, e.g. for the Chief Minister to preside
over the Council of Ministers (instead of the Governor) and for the Chief Secretary to
withdraw from the Council of Ministers and for an elected Minister of Finance.
5. We also have it in mind to propose that the Minister of State should visit Fiji
towards the end of this month. The object of his visit would be:—
(i) To ascertain that the two parties in Fiji are in full agreement about (a), (b)
and (c) above, and to obtain from them clear, firm and public guarantees of their
agreement.
(ii) To reach agreement on the timing, composition and other arrangements for a
Constitutional Conference.
(iii) To reach agreement on publicity for the guarantees at (i) above,
announcement of the Conference, etc. either on the spot if possible or ad
referendum on his return to London as he may decide.
6. If you have any comments on the above or on the memorandum enclosed with
this letter, I should be very grateful if you would let us have them by immediate
telegram as soon as possible.
152 FCO 32/569, OPD(70)1 8 Jan 1970
‘Fiji: independence’: memorandum by Mr Stewart for Cabinet Defence
and Oversea Policy Committee
Introduction
Fiji has had good fortune in that under colonial rule race clashes have been avoided,
despite the introduction of a large number of Indian indentured labourers at the end
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of the 19th century. We have always recognised however the dangers of racial
difficulties as the growing Indian population began to outstrip in numbers the Fijian.
Indeed, it may well be that while Fiji remains a dependent territory the risks are
increased, for, apart from the disparity between the races, so long as they can turn to
us for help if they get into difficulties, there is less incentive to them to establish a
real national identity cutting across racial divisions.
2. Over the past few years we have sought quietly to bring the leaders of the
Fijians and the Indians together to work for co-operation and to create multi-racial
political parties. Progress has been slow but steady, and we now have a situation that
provides an opportunity for a big step forward, leading to independence, as a
consequence of the apparent agreement between the political parties.
3. Independence for Fiji has always been the ultimate goal and it is clearly in our
interests that Fiji should attain this as soon as possible. As this memorandum shows,
apart from potential racial difficulties, Fiji is quite capable of sustaining
independence.
4. Fiji has an advanced constitution, and while the Governor has residual powers
over a wide field of subjects, Fiji has to all intents and purposes achieved internal
self-government. The question now is whether we should agree to an accelerated
advance to independence as proposed by the Chief Minister and Leader of the
Opposition. The alternatives are:—
(a) to insist on a period of full internal self-government and an election after a
constitutional conference and before independence. I think this unnecessary and
disadvantageous in the Fiji circumstances (see paragraphs 24–26 below);
(b) to offer a Bahamas-type constitution (which provides full internal self-
government with external affairs and defence reserved to the Governor, but with
responsibility for the police and internal security, though ultimately resting with
the Governor, entrusted to a local minister). I could not recommend our thus
retaining responsibility for internal security in Fiji with no other powers over
internal domestic policy.
5. In this memorandum I therefore invite my colleagues to consider the
conditions on which we should grant independence to Fiji and agree to the
immediate steps to be taken. My proposals under these two heads are set out in
paragraphs 29–33 below.
I. Background
Size
6. The Crown Colony of Fiji (total area 7055 square miles) comprises two major
islands and over eight hundred small islands and islets.
Population
7. Fiji is our largest remaining dependent territory except Hong Kong. Its
population is 512,000, of whom 51% are Indians, 41% Fijians and the rest Pacific
Islanders, Chinese, Europeans and part-Europeans. The indigenous Fijian is thus
now outnumbered five to four by the second and third generation descendants of the
indentured Indian labourers who were brought to Fiji at the end of the nineteenth
century to work in sugar industry.
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The economy and finance
8. The economy is predominantly agricultural and based mainly on the export
sugar and copra products and also of unrefined gold. Tourism is also making a
significant and increasing contribution. Visible exports in 1968 amounted to some
£24 million. Budgetary expenditure is now running at about £16 million per annum
and there was a small surplus on the 1968 recurrent account. Recurrent revenue
amounts to about one quarter of the Gross Domestic Product (which has been
increasing in recent years at the rate of about 7% per annum at current prices) a not
inappropriate figure for a country at Fiji’s stage of development. The rate of
population growth though still something of a strain on the economy is reported to
have fallen to 2.5% in 1969. Fiji is not a grant-aided territory but current United
Kingdom Development and Overseas Services aid amounts to about £2 million
annually. (Fiji has made very sensible use of her development funds.) Fiji has
substantial quotas under the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement which absorbs a
major part of her exports.
The present constitution
9. Since 1967 the Colony has had a ministerial system of Government with a
majority of elected ministers. The Governor retains responsibility for defence,
external affairs, internal security and the public service, and also has general
executive and legislative reserved powers.
10. The Legislative Council comprises not more than four officials and thirty-six
elected members. Of the latter nine Fijians, nine Indians and seven ‘General’ (i.e.
persons who are neither Fijians nor Indians) members are elected on three
communal rolls. A further nine members of the Legislative Council are elected under
a system of cross-voting under which seats are reserved in equal proportions for
members of the three groups. These members are elected by people of all races
voting together. There is universal adult suffrage. In addition, two Fijians are elected
to the Legislative Council by the Council of Chiefs.
The political parties
11. There are two main political parties. The Alliance, which forms the present
Government, is predominantly that of the Fijians, with the support of Europeans,
various people of mixed blood and a number of Indians. The National Federation
Party is supported by most of the Indian population but by few others. By mid-1969
both parties had come to aim at full internal self-government and eventual
independence. The National Federation Party also wants ‘one man, one vote, one
value’; they probably believe that, because of the numerical superiority of the
Indians, this would give them political supremacy, although they are on record as
saying it would not, because they do not command the support of the whole Indian
community. The Alliance Party have aimed at inbuilt guarantees for the enduring
political supremacy of the native born Fijians. For this reason the communal voting
system appeals to them most, but they have accepted the present degree of cross-
voting and might agree to a limited extension of it.
12. The difference between the parties has therefore turned mainly on the
balance of power to be guaranteed to each of the two main racial groups in the future
Legislature, and hence on the electoral arrangements. This was the crucial issue at
the 1965 Constitutional Conference in London and the present electoral system was
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put forward then by the British Government as an attempt at compromise between
the two sides. (It was stated in the White Paper about the Conference (Command
2783) that ‘Her Majesty’s Government, for their part, recognised that election on a
straight common roll basis was not practicable for Fiji until a greater degree of
integration of the Co communities had been achieved’.) The Indian Group at the
Conference withheld its acquiescence in the British government’s compromise.
II. The proposal of the two parties in Fiji
13. In recent months the two parties in Fiji have been holding talks to try to
reach agreement about the next constitutional steps. Progress was at first slow but
has been better lately since Mr. S.M. Koya succeeded to the leadership of the National
Federation Party. He seems to be more moderate than his predecessor (who died in
October) and the Chief Minister, Ratu Mara, apparently finds him easier to work
with.
14. On 16 December, the Governor received a letter from the Chief Minister
written on behalf of both parties. A copy of the letter is at Annex A.1 In this letter the
Chief Minister states that a strong consensus of agreement exists between the two
main parties in Fiji that the Colony should move to ‘Dominion Status’ (by this they
appear to mean independence as a Monarchy within the Commonwealth—see
paragraph 23 below) immediately following a Constitutional Conference in London.
(In private conversation with the Governor, the date of 10 October, the anniversary
of the Fijian Chiefs’ Deed of Cession to the Crown, has been mentioned.) They
propose that a general election should be held within a stated time after the
achievement of ‘Dominion Status’. The question of the electoral system would be
settled either before or after the Conference. The Opposition have said that they will
fully support a Fiji Prime Minister while final details with regard to the elections are
being worked out. The Chief Minister’s letter points out that an arrangement of this
sort would make the Constitution a thoroughly bi-partisan matter.
15. The Parties have also agreed on some of the less controversial aspects of a
new Constitution including a Bill of Rights and an Ombudsman.
16. The Governor considers that both sides are sericus and firm about their
proposals and urges that we take full advantage of the new situation which their
letter represents.
III. Considerations relating to the independence of Fiji
17. The balance of the races
Race relations in Fiji have been generally good though race dominates the political
scene. The Fijians at their own initiative ceded the islands to Britain in 1874 by a
Deed of Cession and contend that independence should leave them in control of
‘their’ country. The Indians on the other hand have contributed greatly to Fiji’s
present economic prosperity and they maintain that the Salisbury Declaration of
1875 (which promised that Indian labourers brought to Fiji would be properly
treated and given equality of opportunity) entitles them to democracy based on one
man, one vote. On balance I take the view that we would not in the end be able to
1 See 150, Appendix A.
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justify, either in conscience or in political terms in this country, a solution that did
not ensure that independence would leave the Fijians in ultimate control, but with
full and adequate safeguards for all other communities. The two-party proposal, if
sincerely adhered to, would achieve this by the will of both sides in Fiji; and the two
parties have also agreed on strong constitutional protections for individuals of any
race (Bill of Rights, Ombudsman, etc.). We should have an opportunity at a
Constitutional Conference to set the seal on these.
18. Security
The two-party proposal also seems to offer the best possible prospect of a peaceful
progress to independence. The security risk lies more from dissatisfaction among
Fijians than from dissatisfaction among Indians. Through past service in the police
and the Fiji Military Force and through their predominance in these forces the
Fijians are in a strong position. The Indians have a clear interest in keeping the peace
not only because of their economic stake in the country, but also because, if there
were violence, they would almost certainly get the worst of it. Indian fear of a violent
reaction from the Fijians will also be a strong sanction in persuading the National
Federation Party to adhere faithfully to any bargain they may make now with the
Alliance. The best guarantee of continued internal harmony in Fiji will be an early
political settlement on lines agreed by the Parties. Without such a settlement the
internal security position could deteriorate, in circumstances in which we would
continue to bear the responsibility. (The present Fiji Internal Security Plan envisages
the reinforcement of Fiji with a force up to a brigade in strength.)
19. Economic viability
As indicated in paragraph 8 above an independent Fiji would be economically viable.
20. International aspects
The two-party proposals are also attractive from the international point of view:—
(a) The United Nations takes a close interest in Fiji. In 1967 the General Assembly
endorsed by a substantial majority a recommendation of the Committee of 24 that
Fiji should be given early independence on a one man, one vote, one value basis. In
this context it is therefore very important that the circumstances in which Fiji
goes to independence should be supported by the National Federation Party as well
as by the Alliance Party.
(b) India also takes a close interest in the fate of the Indian community in Fiji.
Recently the Government of India have been cooperative both in the United
Nations and in Fiji where a number of Indian ministerial goodwill visits have
helped to bring down the political temperature. Though the Government of India
have, strictly, no standing in the matter it is clearly in the interests of our good
relations with them that we should be able to demonstrate that the Indians in Fiji
are content with the conditions and arrangements for independence.
(c) We are bound to take into account the views of other metropolitan powers in
the Pacific, and especially Australia and New Zealand, in planning the
constitutional futures of our territories in the area. We have kept the Australian
and New Zealand Governments closely informed of recent developments.
Consequently these two Governments have known for some time that Fiji would
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probably become independent before long and if the circumstances described in
Ratu Mara’s letter obtain, I do not think the Australians (or indeed any of the other
Pacific Powers) will comment adversely. Their concern will be for a peaceful hand-
over and a stable future for the Colony.
21. Defence
We had indications in recent discussions with political leaders in Fiji that although
they seek independence they were also inclined to hope that Britain will still—to
some degree at any rate—be ready to help over the external affairs, the defence, and
the internal security (especially the latter) of an ‘independent’ Fiji. These discussions
however preceded the inter-party talks which led up to the Chief Minister’s letter,
annexed to this paper, and it may be that the degree of agreement now reached has
reduced their hankering for some such arrangement. The understanding and views
of the local leaders on these matters require further probing and clarification. We
would not wish to assume any responsibility for the defence and internal security of a
Fiji over whose internal affairs we have no control. This would have to be made clear
to both parties in Fiji before we were to agree to their proposals.
22. So far as external defence is concerned, Fiji, as the communications centre of
the Pacific, is in a strong position to seek Australian and/or New Zealand assistance
in developing her defence arrangements. She has already a Defence Finance
Agreement with New Zealand and New Zealand provides up to $NZ 20,000 per
annum for the upkeep of the Fiji Military Force. The Commander of the Force is an
officer of the New Zealand Army.
23. ‘Dominion Status’
The Governor has confirmed that in asking for ‘Dominion Status’ the Chief Minister
and the Leader of the Opposition mean independence with The Queen as Fiji’s Head
of State. We could agree to this. Fiji will almost certainly also seek full Membership
of the Commonwealth. We would have to explain that this is not in our gift but is a
matter for all Members of the Commonwealth, but we could undertake to sponsor
Fiji’s application for full Membership.
24. Elections
It is sometimes necessary to hold an election in a dependent territory after a
Constitutional Conference and before independence to confirm that the
independence proposals conform to the will of the people. The Party leaders in Fiji
have asked that the next election there should be postponed to a stated date after
independence. There are precedents for this, e.g. Kenya, Malawi, The Gambia. We
could agree to the proposal if they adhere to their present bi-partisan attitude to
independence arrangements. There is much force in their argument that an election
could disrupt the present harmony in Fiji and if this happened while we still had
responsibility for internal security, we could be placed in an invidious and
embarrassing position.
25. Early independence
The Chief Minister and Mr. Koya want Fiji to proceed to independence as soon after a
Constitutional Conference as the necessary arrangements can be made, i.e. without
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necessarily having an intervening period of at least a few months of full internal self-
government.
26. All the necessary changes and procedures could be accomplished with
despatch given goodwill and cooperation on both sides. It would also leave a
minimum of time for local differences and frictions to develop between a Conference
and independence. We should therefore not object, and should be prepared to
compress all procedures for which we are responsible, and to help the Fijians in
expediting theirs.
IV. Advantages to Britain in accepting the two party proposal
27. (a) Fiji would achieve early independence on a basis fully agreed by the two
main political parties in the Colony who in effect represent the two main racial
groups and the overwhelming majority of the people.
(b) Such an agreed basis for independence is the best and only guarantee we can
have that Fiji will proceed to independence on a peaceful basis.
(c) The agreed basis also provides the answer to potential critics, e.g. India and at
the United Nations.
V. The agreement between the parties in Fiji
28. Before going along with the two-party proposal we should have to make
absolutely certain that the agreement which the parties at present profess will stick.
The Party leaders would have to place publicly on record their unanimity in asking
for independence for Fiji and their agreement on the arrangements generally and in
particular for a post-independence election. We must be sure that there will be no
reneging. It is because of this that I recommend in paragraphs 31–33 below that we
should respond favourably to the invitation for a Minister to visit Fiji soon.
VI. The British attitude to the two-party proposal
29. Provided we are satisfied that the agreement of the parties is guaranteed
I propose that we should agree that:—
(a) Fiji should have independence as soon after a constitutional conference as can
be arranged and that to that end a conference should be arranged as early as
possible. (The two party leaders hope for a conference soon after The Queen’s visit
to Fiji in March and 10 October, ‘Cession Day’, has been mentioned by the Chief
Minister as a suitable independence day);
(b) the independence Constitution should embody present electoral arrangements
or any other electoral arrangements on which the parties agree;
(c) no election will be necessary before independence; there would be no need if
the independence proposals are agreed by both parties;
(d) we should undertake no obligations in relation to the external defence or
internal security of an independent Fiji;
(e) we should not agree to any status for Fiji that would leave us with defence or
internal security responsibilities but with no control over internal affairs, e.g. we
should refuse any request for Associated Statehood or a Constitution of the
Bahamas type (see paragraph 4 above).
30. If for any reason, e.g. failure of the two parties to give the necessary
guarantees of their agreement, it proves impracticable to proceed with their
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independence proposal we could however agree to a request from the Chief Minister
for some further advance short of independence, e.g. for the Chief Minister to preside
over the Council of Ministers (instead of the Governor) and for the Chief Secretary to
withdraw from the Council of Ministers and for an elected Minister of Finance.
VII. Proposal for a visit to Fiji by a minister of state
31. The Chief Minister and the Leader of the Opposition in Fiji are both anxious
that a British Minister should visit Fiji this month to see for himself (as the Leader of
the Opposition puts it) the ‘great degree of co-operation that exists’. The Governor
strongly supports this proposal.
32. I recommend that we should inform the Chief Minister and the Leader of the
Opposition, through the Governor, that a Minister will visit Fiji as they request as soon
as practicable; that the purpose of the Minister’s visit would be to consult with the
Chief Minister, the Leader of the Opposition and any others that the Minister may
consider necessary in seeking to ascertain opinions on the constitutional proposals;
and that the visit in itself would not lay any commitment on Her Majesty’s Government.
33. If my colleagues agree to this visit, I intend to ask the Minister of State with
direct responsibility for Dependent Territories, Lord Shepherd, to visit Fiji at the end
of this month. If, after his discussions in Fiji he is satisfied that the steps outlined in
paragraph 29 above and as proposed by the two political leaders are the right course
to adopt and that they thoroughly understand the conditions stated in the same
paragraph, Lord Shepherd should, on obtaining from the two political leaders clear,
firm and public statements of their agreement to these steps (and any other
guarantees he might think necessary) be able to offer to the Chief Minister and the
Leader of the Opposition Her Majesty’s Government’s agreement to a constitutional
conference at a very early date and their agreement in principle to the steps which
are detailed in paragraph 29.
153 FCO 32/580, no 5 13 Jan 1970
[Future of Fiji]: minute by H Steel1 to E J Emery on the use of the
term ‘dominion status’ in the context of Fiji’s independence
With reference to Mr. Bennett’s2 minute to you of 12 January, my impression from
what I have seen in the telegrams is that the reason why we used the term ‘Dominion
Status’ in our telegram to Fiji was that this was the term which the Fiji politicians
themselves used. But I echo Mr. Bennett’s hope, from the point of view of the
Spain/Gibraltar dispute, that we shall be able to avoid resuscitating the term for
public use. As Mr. Bennett says, the Spaniards (like a good many other people) tend
to confuse it with the term ‘part of Her Majesty’s dominions’ and this necessitates a
good deal of tiresome explanation on our part, not all of which, I suspect, is
successful. I suppose that, logically, the fact that the terms are both current ought to
make it easier to distinguish between the two concepts they represent but it does not
seem to work that way in practice. As an example of the difficulties we have, in a
1 Legal counsellor, FCO. 2 J S Bennett, head of Gibraltar and South Atlantic Dept, FCO.
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communication which we sent to the Secretary-General of the U.N. in August 1969
in reply to a Spanish memorandum commenting on the new Gibraltar Constitution,
we found it necessary to include the following passage with reference to the
preamble to the Order in Council which Mr. Bennett refers to:—
‘It should be noted that the term “Her Majesty’s dominions” is written with a
small “d” and should not be confused with “Dominion Status”, the term
formerly used to describe the independent and self-governing members of the
Commonwealth (e.g. Canada and Australia). The use of this term in the
preamble to the new Constitution does not involve or imply any change in the
international status of Gibraltar.’
(It is fair to add that the confusion that we were trying to dispel was manifested at an
earlier stage in the dispute and did not, so far as I can see, appear in the particular
Spanish memorandum which we were answering. In that memorandum the
Spaniards seemed to be running the rather different point that, since Gibraltar had
been ceded to us only as a fortress and garrison town, we had acted improperly in
turning it into an ordinary ‘colony’—a status which, so they said, was implicit in the
term ‘part of her Majesty’s dominions’.)
2. As borne out by what I have said about the Spanish memorandum, we must
not think, of course, that if we confined ourselves to the term ‘part of her Majesty’s
dominions’, we shall avoid the risk of misunderstanding. That term is also capable of
being misleading except when it is used by experts talking, precisely, to experts. On
the one hand, while most British dependent territories are ‘part of Her Majesty’s
dominions’ there are others which are not, even though they are certainly dependent
and are just as British for all practical purposes (e.g. the B.S.I.P). On the other hand,
many territories which are not British dependencies in any sense of the term, are still
‘parts of Her Majesty’s dominions’ (e.g. Sierra Leone, the Gambia, Jamaica and
Malta). Indeed, one of the many strange things that we sometimes did: ‘in the
decolonisation of Africa in the late fifties and early sixties’ was to annex (and thus
alter the status of) a part or a whole of one of our dependencies at the point when it
achieved independence so that the whole country could come into independence ‘as
part of Her Majesty’s dominions’ and thus have a Governor-General as local Head of
State. Thus, in the case of the Gold Coast, Nigeria, Sierra Leone and Kenya (to take a
few examples) we annexed those parts of those countries which had formerly been
Protectorates (the remainder always having been colonies) while in the case of
Tanganyika, Uganda, and Nyasaland we had to annex the whole of each of those
territories since none of them had previously been a colony. All these countries were
thus ‘parts of Her Majesty’s dominions’ for a substantial period after the respective
dates of their achieving independence (and they still are deemed to be so for certain
purpose of our own municipal law).
3. Finally, just to add to everybody’s confusion, I would remind you that there is
always the complicating factor of the Australian dependencies, some of which are
‘parts of Her Majesty’s dominions’ but which cannot be described as ‘British
dependencies’ in the ordinary sense of the word ‘British’ (i.e. the U.K.).
4. What I have just said—apart from the fun of increasing everybody’s
confusion—seems to me to reinforce Mr. Bennett’s plea that we should not add to
our difficulties by re-introducing a further confusing term which we have been
sensible enough to allow to fall into virtual disuse.
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154 FCO 32/569, OPD 1(70)2 16 Jan 1970
‘Fiji: independence’: Cabinet Defence and Oversea Policy Committee
minutes
The Committee considered a memorandum by the Foreign and Commonwealth
Secretary (OPD(70) 1)1 making proposals for bringing Fiji to early independence.
The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that the division of the
population of Fiji as between 51 per cent Indians, 41 per cent Fijians and other minor
elements was reflected in Fiji’s two political parties, of which the ruling Alliance
Party under the present Chief Minister represented mainly the Fijians, but with the
support of Europeans and a number of Indians, while the Opposition, the National
Federation Party, was supported by most of the Indians but by few others. It had
always been our intention to grant Fiji independence and there had now been a
significant development which suggested that this could be achieved at an early date.
Last month the Chief Minister, writing on behalf of both parties, had sent a letter to
the Governor stating that agreement existed between then that Fiji should advance
to ‘dominion status’—by which the parties appeared to mean independence as a
monarchy within the Commonwealth—immediately following a constitutional
conference in London. (The suggestion had been made separately that independence
should be granted on Fiji’s ‘Cession Day’, 10th October, i.e. the day on which the Fiji
Chief ceded the islands to Britain in 1874.) The letter further proposed that there
should be no elections before independence, but that arrangements for holding then
after independence should be agreed at the constitutional conference. This
agreement between the parties was an opportunity which we should not let slip, but
it was important to be absolutely certain that the parties were fully committed to the
terms of the letter. It was therefore proposed that as a first step the Minister of State
Lord Shepherd should visit Fiji, on the invitation of the Chief Minister and Leader of
the Opposition, in order to examine the situation at first hand. If he was satisfied in
all respects, and this would include obtaining agreement from the two leaders that
the United Kingdom would not accept any responsibility for the defence or internal
security of an independent Fiji, he would be authorised to state that Her Majesty’s
Government were prepared to hold a constitutional conference at an early date with a
view to grant of independence as soon as possible thereafter. As regards financial
arrangements, there would be a bill for about £2 million in compensation for public
service officers, of which £1 million would be the responsibility of the United
Kingdom.
In discussion general agreement was expressed with the proposals of the Foreign
and Commonwealth Secretary. Attention was, however, drawn to the dangers
inherent in constitutional arrangements designed to perpetuate control by the
indigenous Fijians who—for reasons for which we could, historically, be held
responsible—were now numerically in a minority. Such arrangements might in
practice prove fragile; and indeed, the agreement as expressed in the Chief Minister’s
letter might from this point of view seem suspect. Unless the Indians were genuinely
satisfied with the agreement, there was a risk that independence on such terms
might lead to racial or other troubles in the future. On the other hand it was pointed
1 See 152.
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out that since the Indians outnumbered the native Fijians and were moreover better
educated and more sophisticated, independence on a straight ‘one-man, one vote’
basis would turn the Fijians into a minority in their own country. They would not
accept this; and if we hesitated to grasp the opportunity of a settlement on agreed
terms which had now presented itself, independence might be indefinitely
postponed. In any case it was precisely to ascertain the situation in this respect that
Lord Shepherd’s visit was now proposed: and he would hold consultations with all
the political leaders. The outlook was the more encouraging in that the Governor
had just reported agreement by the Chief Minister and Leader of the Opposition to
issue a joint public statement which would include a declaration of their intention to
ask the Fiji Legislature, in due course, to debate a resolution to the effect that Fiji
should proceed to dominion status as soon as possible without fresh elections being
held before independence. The statement would also indicate that they had invited
Lord Shepherd to visit to acquaint himself at first hand with the position.
Nevertheless it was clear that the situation as between Fijians and Indians needed to
be kept carefully in mind and when the proposed constitutional conference took
place, it would be important to ensure that the constitution was so drafted as to give
the best possible chances of integration of races in the future.
The point was also made that if trouble occurred in Fiji during the period between
March and October and it became necessary for us to maintain a military presence
there, this could have unfortunate repercussions on the important Far East
reinforcement exercise BERSATU PADU.
The Prime Minister, summing up, said that the Committee approved the proposals
of the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary. They were therefore agreed that the
first stop should be the visit of Lord Shepherd who, in his discussions with political
leaders, would bear in mind the points made in discussion. The possibility of racial
disturbances could not be dismissed at this stage and emphasised the need for us to
proceed throughout in the closest touch with the Australian and New Zealand
Governments.
The Committee:—
Approved OPD(70) 1.
155 FCO 32/594, no 62 27 Jan 1970
[Council of Chiefs]: FCO record of a meeting between Lord Shepherd,
Ratu Sir K Mara and the Council of Chiefs in the Council Board
Room, Suva
The Chief Minister said that he thought it was important that Lord Shepherd should
meet this representative body of Fijian opinion. It was a responsible body which
served a useful purpose as well as being a forum for Fijian views. Fijians were often
blamed for the slow pace of political development; but, for their part, the Fijians felt
that they had been responsible for the rapid pace of political development over the
past few years. Fiji was multi-racial and the different races were able to live together
in harmony. In this, Fiji was in advance of other Pacific territories—and, for that
matter, many other countries in the world where legislation in respect of race
relations was often necessary.
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2. Lord Shepherd said that he was glad to have the opportunity of meeting this
important body of Fijian leaders. He then outlined the purpose of his visit to Fiji,
emphasising that there was no pressure from Britain to bring about constitutional
change. He said he had been heartened by the attitudes adopted by the two major
political parties and by the fact that there was such a wide area of agreement between
them. He hoped that a report on the discussions which had gone on since his arrival
would be produced later today.
3. Continuing, Lord Shepherd said that he had been impressed by the happy
relationship which obviously existed between the races in Fiji. That being so, he was
shocked at British press reports that he was in Fiji to assess whether the Royal visit
should be called off because of growing political and racial tensions. He had already
refused these mischevious [sic] reports: so had Buckingham Palace.
4. Reverting to the constitutional position, the Minister of State said that he was
convinced that Fiji was ready for Independence. He believed that Fiji’s problems
could only be resolved by the people of Fiji. In this, he thought that the Council of
Chiefs had an important role to play.
5. Lord Shepherd then invited questions.
6. Various questions on land were asked, e.g. how would Schedule A and B
Crown Land be dealt with in future? Lord Shepherd said that he thought that this
was something to be settled by the Fiji Government, perhaps by legislation. Fear was
then expressed by several members that if a future government should not be
predominantly Fijian, it might introduce legislation which would be detrimental to
the interests of the Fijian people. Lord Shepherd thought that these fears would be
relieved when members saw the report of the recent discussions.
Reference was made to land obtained by non-Fijian before Cession, very often at
what now would be regarded as a ridiculously low price. This gave rise to the
question: could anything be done at this stage to secure redress? Surely other
territories, particularly in Africa, had faced a similar problem? Lord Shepherd said
that it was not for a British Minister to offer advice on this. He was not aware of any
parallel situation in Africa or elsewhere.
8. Lord Shepherd was asked if he would give his views on the size of the Upper
House. He pointed out that it was difficult to give an answer unless he knew what
exactly the functions of the Upper House were going to be. But he would suggest that
it should be in the region of 50% of the size of the Lower House.
9. Several members asserted strongly that the Fijian people had a special
position in their own country and that their interests must be safeguarded. Lord
Shepherd said that he was sure that this was fully accepted in Fiji. It was significant
that all Indians he had spoken to had recognised that the Fijians had a special
position in the country.
10. The Minister of State was then asked to what extent Britain could assist in
the resettlement or Indians (those who were unemployed or wanted to leave) in
other parts of the world. Lord Shepherd said that even if Indians wished to leave,
Britain’s ability to assist would be limited—especially as we had our own problems in
respect of racial minorities. But he was sure that Indians in Fiji already regarded
themselves, in the widest sense, as Fijians.
11. Lord Shepherd was asked to comment on the Banaban people on Rabi—in
particular he was asked whether the Banabans ‘deserve a seat in the Lower House’?
Other questions asked, and replied to, were:—
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After Independence, would Fiji be able to consult Britain before making new
legislation?
In the event of Britain joining the European Common Market, what financial ties
with Fiji would be severed?
To what extent would Britain be able to lighten the burden which Fiji would have
to shoulder, after Independence, in the field of External Affairs?
Should provision be made in the Constitution for a Ministry of Fijian Affairs?
Would Britain continue to give economic assistance?
What could be done to stop the press from carrying mischevious reports?
12. In conclusion there was some discussion about whether the term Fijian
should apply to everyone who had the right to live in Fiji. The point was made by by
one member that if everyone was called ‘Fijian’, it would leave the way open to the
introduction of a common-roll. This led another member to say that he assumed that
Lord Shepherd was fully aware that the Fijian people were not prepared to consider
common-roll. They were absolutely against it.
13. The meeting adjourned at 10 a.m.
156 FCO 32/571, no 81 18 Feb 1970
[Future of Fiji]: minute by Lord Shepherd to Mr Stewart on his visit.
Annex: Official report on the visit published in Fiji on 1 February
Although I have already reported verbally to you about my visit to Fiji, you may also
wish to see this short written account.
2. As you know, talks which had been going on for some months between
representatives of the two main political parties in Fiji (the Alliance Party and the
National Federation Party) about constitutional changes culminated in a statement,
conveyed in a letter to the Governor by the Chief Minister, that both sides had agreed
between them to press for Independence this year without fresh elections being held
beforehand. It was against this background that I went to Fiji to ascertain, at first
hand, the position reached in these talks.
3. During my visit I had discussions with the Chief Minister and the Leader of
the Opposition and the other members of the Alliance and National Federation
Parties who had been engaged in the inter-party constitutional talks. In addition I
had talks with representatives of the Great Council of Chiefs1 and with various
organisations and individuals in Fiji; and received submissions from others about
constitutional advance.
4. In approaching my task I felt that I should attempt to seek answers to two
fundamental and connected questions: was there a wide area of agreement between
the two parites; and, if so, was this agreement likely to stick? At my very first meeting
with the Chief Minister and Leader of the Opposition and other members of the
inter-party Working Committee, I therefore took the following line:—
(a) that I was in Fiji to learn and not to negotiate;
1 See 155.
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(b) that I had been charged by Her Majesty’s Government with the responsibility
for assessing the wishes of the people in Fiji in regard to Independence and the
way it was to be achieved;
(c) that if before Independence there was to be no General Election or
Referendum because a strong consensus of agreement existed, it was important
that the area of agreement reached by the parties should be widely known
throughout Fiji—thus
(d) details of any area of agreement should be incorporated in a published report
so that the people of Fiji would know exactly what was envisaged and the basis on
which their political leaders proposed to take them into independence; and
(e) that thereafter it would be necessary for the Legislative Council to endorse the
proposals after first debating them.
5. No sooner had I made these points than the Chief Minister and Leader of the
Opposition, no doubt anticipating my approach, immediately produced a paper
setting out a summary of the agreements reached so far. The area of agreement on
fundamental issues – except one to which I refer in the succeeding paragraph—was
wide. It confirmed that Independence in 1970, without a prior general election, was
the goal and that this proposal had originated with the Opposition. With the expert
help of my advisers, who are well versed in producing White Papers on advanced
Constitutional changes, it was possible during my visit to weave these heads of
agreement into a comprehensive draft Report which I proposed should be published
before I left Fiji.
6. The one major point of disagreement was over the method of election. The Fiji
[sic] argument was simple: they had a special position in their own country and they
feared that this would soon be lost if common-roll voting (i.e. one man, one vote)
were to be introduced at this stage. Already Fijians felt that the increasing impact of
the numerical and economic strength of the non-indigenous peoples threatened
their political future. It was only in 1963 that the Fijians, for the first time in their
history, had the vote. In 1966 they accepted cross voting: this was a major step
forward. Any further advance would have to be taken slowly. Although the Alliance
Party did not have a ‘closed door’ policy in respect of common-roll, the fact was that
in the minds of most Fijians, common-roll carried the connotation of Indian
dominance. The primary need was to dispel those fears. This would take time and
education.
7. The Indians, on the other hand, maintained that the fears held by the Fijians
that Indian politicians would achieve a position of dominance over them as a result
of the introduction of a common-roll system were understandable but not justified.
They recognised the special position of the Fijians and conceded that they should
have the right in an Upper House to veto any legislation involving land, traditions
and customs which the Lower House might pass. In short, their view was that there
should be an Upper House designed to give protection to the Fijian people in addition
to its normal function of acting as a House of review. This, they thought, ought to
give the Fijians the safeguards they wanted and remove the present obstacles to
elections to the Lower House on the basis of a common-roll. They considered that
there was a case for common-roll and that they should press it.
8. Most of my discussions with both parties centred round this controversial
issue. Progress was not easy. While the Alliance Party made it plain that they could
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not at this stage budge on common-roll, the National Federation Party persisted in
their contention that there should be at least a nod in the direction of such a
system. In the circumstances, I sought to produce a formula which, if agreement
could not be reached, would make it clear to the outside world that a dialogue was
still going on between the parties. This I considered important since any public sign
of real disagreement could easily be magnified by the press etc. with unfortunate
results. On the morning of the day prior to my departure from Fiji, the National
Federation Party came up with such a formula. What it said was that it was agreed
that both parties needed more time to do some detailed research and to study the
implications of various formulae put in by both sides on the composition of the
Legislature and methods of election. It added that the talks which had gone on had
narrowed the differences between both sides who were hopeful of producing an
agreed formula between now and the Constitutional Conference. It went on to say
that it was further agreed that if, at the Conference, these matters remained
unresolved between the two parties, Fiji should go into independence without an
election and that the first election should be held under the new Constitution on a
formula approved and settled by the British Government. This was acceptable to the
Alliance Party—and, of course, to me subject to a proviso to which I refer in the
following paragraph—and it was agreed that this formula should be included in the
Report.
9. While on the basis of precedent it would not be unusual at a Constitutional
Conference for the British Government to lay down a solution in a matter of this
sort, I felt that in the circumstances of Fiji, it would be prudent to let both sides
know in advance what our ruling was likely to be so that neither party would have
grounds for kicking up a fuss on this issue—if it were then politic for them to do
so—at the Constitutional Conference. I therefore said that I would include in the
report of my visit a paragraph to the effect that, if no agreement was reached and
circumstances remained as at present, it would be necessary that the constitutional
instruments for independence should reflect, subject to any formal changes arising
from independence, the provisions of the existing Constitution. This was acceptable
to all sides.
10. From the very beginning, I had made it clear that I expected all members of
the interparty committee to sign the report describing the area of agreement. This
was acceptable to the committee. I was, however, particularly gratified when I was
asked by the Chief Minister and the Leader of the Opposition if I would have any
objection to the report being seen, in confidence, by the other elected members of
Legislative Council (before the formal signing of the document), and to their being
invited to sign it also. I readily acceded to this and, in the event, it was signed by all
elected members of the Legislative Council except one. The exception was a
European Independent who, not being a member of the major parties, had
regrettably been overlooked and was not shown a copy of the report until shortly
before he was asked to sign it. Not unnaturally, he declined to do so.
11. Thus there was recorded agreement between the parties on Independence
this year, without a prior election, and also an understanding of the basis on which
the next election would be fought if no agreement could be reached before the
Constitutional Conference. Of the utmost significance and importance was the fact
that this agreement and understanding had been endorsed by 33 of the 34 elected
members of Legislative Council.
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12. In conclusion, may I make one further observation. Why, I wondered, had
the Indians changed their line of approach since the death last September of their
leader, A.D. Patel? There were, I think, two reasons for this. First, A.D. Patel was born
in India and had been brought up against the background of Congress Party
traditions; therefore to him independence on the basis of one man, one vote was a
fundamental issue. With his death, this link with the Indian Congress Party was
severed and the Indian leadership in Fiji passed to Indians who were born there.
Secondly, the Indians in Fiji have been clearly frightened by the display of strength
shown by the Fijians in a situation of strain in 1968: they have also been disillusioned
by the situation in Mauritius, where strained racial relationships in their view have
hampered economic progress. It is against this background (and their realisation
that they are living in a country where they have good economic prospects) that they
have, I think, come to the conclusion that they ought to get together with the
Fijians, while the Fijians are still ready to treat them fairly.
13. If, as I expect, the Fijian Legislative Council debates and passes a motion
calling for independence without fresh elections this year, the Independence
Conference will take place in the week beginning 20 April. If the Conference goes as
smoothly as present circumstances would indicate, Independence would be achieved
on 10 October, 1970. All this seemingly justifies our decision to take advantage of the
new situation in Fiji without delay.
14. Finally, let me record how greatly impressed I was by the courtesy and
respect which the local politicians, both Fijians and Indians, paid each other. Around
the working table they dealt with controversial issues in an understanding and
conciliatory way; and socially they mixed easily. This, I thought, reflected the general
pattern of the country where, when no one deliberately stirs up trouble, all races live
and work in harmony.
15. I attach a copy of the official Report of my visit which was published in Fiji on
1 February.
Annex to 156
Following talks between representatives of the Alliance Party and the National
Federation Party in Fiji about constitutional changes, the Chief Minister of Fiji, the
Honourable Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara KBE, and the Leader of the Opposition, the
Honourable S.M. Koya, invited Lord Shepherd, Minister of State for Foreign and
Commonwealth Affairs, to visit Fiji to acquaint himself at first hand with the position
reached in the talks. Lord Shepherd accordingly visited Suva and had discussions
between 26 January and 2 February 1970 with the Chief Minister and the Leader of
the Opposition and the other representatives of the Alliance Party and the National
Federation Party who had been engaged in the inter-Party constitutional talks.
2. The representatives of the two parties explained to Lord Shepherd that they
had begun discussions in August 1969 to consider further constitutional changes
with the aim of identifying areas of agreement and disagreement and of finding a
mutually acceptable settlement of those issues on which the parties differed.
3. Realising that consideration of a wide range of matters to be provided in any
written constitution would be affected by the constitutional status aimed at, they had
agreed that this issue should first be resolved.
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4. The National Federation Party had re-stated its previously declared objective
which envisaged Fiji as an independent state with an elected President as Head of
State, but as a member of the Commonwealth. The Alliance had favoured Dominion
Status with all its implications, namely, full self-government with The Queen as
Constitutional Monarch represented in Fiji by a Governor-General.
5. After discussion the two parties had agreed that Fiji should proceed to
Dominion Status, i.e. that Fiji should become a fully sovereign and independent state
with The Queen as Head of State and that Fiji should seek Membership of the
Commonwealth.
6. The two parties had carefully considered the steps by which the new status
should be achieved. On the proposal of the National Federation Party, and in view of
the wide area of agreement between the two parties about a new constitution, they
had agreed that Fiji should proceed to independence as soon as constitutional
instruments could be drawn up after a constitutional conference and without an
election before independence. They also agreed, however, that the constitutional
instruments should provide for a general election not later than an agreed date after
independence.
7. Within the framework described above the two parties had also agreed the
proposals set out below.
Name of an independent Fiji
8. The name of the country should remain Fiji on independence.
Preamble of the constitution
9. There should be a preamble to the Constitution in which reference should be
made to the Deed of Cession and to the economic and political advancement made by
Fiji since the cession.
Fundamental rights and freedoms
10. The Constitution should include provision, substantially on the lines of
Chapter I of the existing Fiji Constitution, for safeguarding the fundamental rights
and freedoms of the individual, including the right to life, liberty, security of the
person, the protection of the law, protection for privacy of the home and other
property and from deprivation of property without compensation, and freedom of
conscience, expression, assembly and association. Subject to safeguards, derogation
from certain of these fundamental rights and freedoms should be permitted during a
state of war or other public emergency.
11. Provision should be made in the Constitution for the enforcement by the
courts of the fundamental rights and freedoms. In particular any person who alleges
that any of the protective provisions is being or is likely to be contravened in relation
to him should have a right to apply to the Supreme Court for redress.
12. As regards the provisions relating to compulsory acquisition of property the
existing provision should be modified so that acquisition for the purpose of land
settlement will cease to be permissible. It is also proposed that the Constitution
should oblige the Government, failing a negotiated agreement with the owner:—
(a) to give notice to the owner of its intention to acquire the property
compulsorily;
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(b) to apply to the Supreme Court for an order authorising compulsory
acquisition, to obtain which the Government would have to justify the necessity or
expediency of acquisition for the stated purpose;
(c) to apply to the Supreme Court for an assessment of the compensation payable
if the court grants the order authorising the acquisition; and
(d) to pay the costs of the owner in connection with the Supreme Court
proceedings. This proposal would have the effect of placing on the Government the
onus of justifying the acquisition.
Citizenship
13. The Constitution should provide for the following classes of persons to acquire
citizenship of Fiji automatically on the date of independence:—
(a) citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies born in Fiji;
(b) citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies by virtue of naturalisation or
registration in Fiji;
(c) citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies born outside Fiji whose fathers
fall within (a) or (b) above.
14. The Constitution should also automatically confer citizenship of Fiji on
persons born in Fiji after independence and on persons born outside Fiji after
independence of a father who is a citizen of Fiji otherwise than by virtue of the
latter’s father having been born in Fiji.
15. The Constitution should confer a right to acquire citizenship of Fiji on
application on any woman who at any time has been married to a citizen of Fiji or to
a person who would have become a citizen of Fiji automatically on the date of
independence had he still been alive.
16. The Constitution should enable the Parliament of Fiji to make provision for
the acquisition of citizenship by other classes of persons, for deprivation of
citizenship in the case of any person who has acquired citizenship otherwise than
automatically, for the renunciation of citizenship, and for the deprivation of
citizenship in the case of any citizen of Fiji who attains the age of twenty-one after
independence and who, being a citizen of some other country, has not, in a
prescribed period, renounced his other citizenship or, where he is unable to
renounce it, made such declaration as may be prescribed.
Governor-General
17. The Governor-General should be appointed by The Queen and should hold
office during Her pleasure.
Parliament
18. It was agreed that the parties needed more time to do some detailed research,
and study the implications of various formulae put in by both sides, on the
composition of the legislature and method of election. The talks so far had narrowed
down the differences on these matters quite a lot and both sides were hopeful of
producing an agreed formula between now and the constitutional conference
referred in paragraph 48.
19. It was agreed that there should be an Upper House consisting of some
members nominated by the Council of Chiefs, one Rotuman and some members
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nominated by the Prime Minister and some members nominated by the Leader of the
Opposition.
20. It was agreed that if at the constitutional conference these matters remained
unresolved between the Parties, Fiji should go into independence without an election
and the first election should be held under the new constitution on a formula
approved and settled by the United Kingdom Government.
The Executive
21. The Executive authority of Fiji should be vested in Her Majesty and, subject
to the provisions of the Constitution, be exerciseable on Her behalf by the Governor-
General or through officers subordinate to him.
22. There should be a Cabinet, which should be collectively responsible to
Parliament, consisting of a Prime Minister and such other Ministers as the Governor-
General may appoint. The Governor-General should appoint as Prime Minister the
member of the Lower House who appears to him best able to command the support
of the majority of the members of that House, and should appoint other Ministers in
accordance with the advice of the Prime Minister from among the members of the
two Houses. (Discussions are continuing on the question of whether it should be
possible to appoint a person who is not a member of either House to be Attorney-
General.)
23. The Governor-General should be empowered to remove the Prime Minister
from office if a vote of no confidence in his Government is passed in the Lower House
and he does not within three days resign or advise a dissolution, and also, following a
general election, where the Governor-General considers that as a result of the
election the Prime Minister will not be able to command a majority in the new Lower
House. Any other Minister should vacate office if the Governor-General revokes his
appointment on the advice of the Prime Minister, if the Prime Minister goes out of
office in consequence of a vote of no confidence or on the appointment of any person
to be Prime Minister. The Prime Minister and any other Minister should vacate office
if he ceases to be a member of the Lower House or, as the case may be, either House
otherwise than by reason of a dissolution or if, at the first meeting of Parliament
following a dissolution, he is not then a member of the Lower House or, as the case
may be, either House.
24. In the exercise of his functions the Governor-General should be required to
act in accordance with the advice of the Cabinet or of a Minister acting under the
general authority of the Cabinet except in cases where the Governor-General is
required by the Constitution to act in accordance with the advice of, or after
consultation with, some person or authority other than the Cabinet or in his own
deliberate judgment.
25. The Constitution should provide for the appointment of Assistant Minister in
the same manner as Ministers other than the Prime Minister and for Assistant
Ministers to hold office on the same terms as such Ministers.
26. The Governor-General should be required to appoint as Leader of the
Opposition the member of the Lower House who, in the Governor-General’s
judgment, is the leader of the largest Opposition party in that House or, if there is no
such party, whose appointment would be most acceptable to the leaders in the House
of the Opposition parties. The Governor-General should have the power, exerciseable
in his own deliberate judgment, to revoke the appointment of the Leader of the
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Opposition if he considers that he has ceased to fulfil the qualifications for
appointment.
27. The Constitution should place the police force under the command of the
Commissioner of Police and provide that, in the exercise of his power to determine
the use and control the operations of the police force, the Commissioner will be
under an obligation to comply with general directions of policy with respect to the
maintenance of public safety and public order given him by the responsible Minister;
in the exercise of his command of the force in other respects the Commissioner
should act on his own responsibility and be independent. The organisation,
maintenance and administration of the police force should be the responsibility of
Ministers.
28. The Constitution should provide for a Director of Public Prosecution who
will have independent powers in relation to criminal prosecution corresponding to
those vested in the Attorney-General by the existing Fiji Constitution. A person
should not be qualified to be or act as Director unless he is qualified for appointment
as a Supreme Court Judge.
29. (Further consideration is being given to the provisions governing the
exercise of the prerogative of mercy).
The Judicature
30. The Constitution should contain provisions to secure the independence and
impartiality of the judiciary. The Constitution should continue to provide for the
Supreme Court. The judges of the Court should be a Chief Justice and such other
Puisne Judges as may be prescribed by Parliament. The qualifications for
appointment should follow the present qualifications. The Chief Justice should be
appointed by the Governor-General acting after consultation with the Prime Minister
and the Leader of the Opposition. Puisne Judges should be appointed by the
Governor-General in accordance with the advice of the Judicial and Legal Service
Commission.
31. The security of tenure of the judges of the Supreme Court should be
protected by a provision on the same lines as exists in the present Constitution. The
procedure for removing a judge should be initiated by the Governor-General, acting
in his own deliberate judgment, in the case of the Chief Justice and by the Chief
Justice in the case of the other judges of the Supreme Court.
32. The Constitution should continue to provide for a Court of Appeal consisting
of the judges of the Supreme Court ex officio and such other judges, being persons
qualified for appointment as judges of the Supreme Court as may be appointed.
(Further consideration is to be given to the provisions for the appointment, tenure of
office etc. of additional judges of the Court of Appeal.)
33. In addition to its jurisdiction regarding enforcement of the fundamental
rights provisions, the Supreme Court should have jurisdiction to determine whether
any other provision of the Constitution has been contravened and to make a
declaration accordingly where a person alleges such a contravention and that his
interests are being or are likely to be affected thereby. The Supreme Court should
also have jurisdiction to supervise civil or criminal proceedings before all
subordinate courts, with the power to issue the necessary orders for the purpose.
34. The Constitution should provide for a right of appeal from the Supreme
Court to the Court of Appeal and from the latter to Her Majesty in Council in cases
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relating to the enforcement of fundamental rights or the interpretation of the
Constitution. It should also provide for appeals to lie to Her Majesty in Council in
other cases as at present.
Service Commissioners and the Public Service
35. The Constitution should provide for a Judicial and Legal Service
Commission, a Public Service Commission and a Police Service Commission. These
Commissions should be executive. (Further consideration is to be given to a number
of points. These include the composition of each Commission and the method of
appointment and tenure of office of members; the precise responsibilities of each;
and the question of appeals from the decisions of each.)
36. Magistrates and Legal Officers will come within the jurisdiction of the
Judicial and Legal Service Commission. The Commission should also appoint the
Director of Public Prosecutions, but the latter should enjoy security of tenure similar
to that of a judge. Police Officers other than the Commissioner should come within
the jurisdiction of the Police Service Commission. (Further consideration is to be
given to the position of the Commissioner of Police.) The Police Service Commission
should have power to delegate its powers of removal and discipline to the
Commissioner and other officers of the police force. Other public officers should in
general come within the jurisdiction of the Public Service Commission. (Principal
diplomatic representatives abroad, the Secretary to the Cabinet, Permanent
Secretaries and Divisional Commissioners may be exceptions. Further consideration
is being given to this.) The Public Service Commission should have power to delegate
its functions to any of its members or any public officer.
37. Provision should be made for the protection of pension rights of public
officers and for preventing the refusal, withholding or reduction in amount of
pension benefits unless the appropriate Service Commission concurs.
Ombudsman
38. The Constitution should establish the office of Ombudsman and provide for
appointments to it to be made by the Governor-General after consultation with the
Prime Minister, the Leader of the Opposition and such other persons as appear to the
Governor-General, in his own deliberate judgment, to be leaders of parties in the
Lower House. The Ombudsman should hold office for a period of four years and
should be removeable only on grounds of inability or misbehaviour after a tribunal
consisting of persons who are or have been judges have investigated any allegation
against him and have recommended his removal; the procedure for removing the
Ombudsman should be initiated by the Governor-General in his own deliberate
judgment.
39. The Ombudsman should have jurisdiction to investigate complaints
regarding the acts, omissions, decisions and recommendations of specified public
bodies and other officers which affect the interests of individuals or bodies of
persons. He should be entitled to act upon his own initiative or upon receiving a
complaint from an individual or a body, and Ministers and members of the two
Houses should also be able to refer matters to him for consideration. The bodies
which the Ombudsman should be authorised to investigate should include
Government Departments, their officers, tender boards, the police and prison and
hospital authorities, local government authorities and statutory bodies. The personal
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acts and decisions of Ministers and decisions of the Service Commissions should be
excluded from investigation by the Ombudsman.
40. The Constitution should contain provisions enabling the Ombudsman to
examine witnesses and also provisions to prevent the disclosure of information on
the grounds that it prejudices defence, external relations or internal security or that
it might divulge the proceedings of the Cabinet. The Ombudsman should be entitled
to refuse to investigate any complaint that is more than six months old or on the
ground that it is vexatious or too trivial or the complainant is insufficiently
interested in the matter, and he should be enabled to discontinue an investigation for
any reason that seems fit to him. He should be precluded from investigating any
matter in respect of which there is a statutory right of appeal to or review by a court
or tribunal. However, he should not be precluded from investigating a matter merely
because it is open to the complainant to apply to the Supreme Court alleging a
violation of fundamental rights.
41. The Ombudsman should be entitled to report unfavourably on any decision,
recommendation, act or omission on the ground that it is contrary to law, based
wholly or partly on a mistake of law or fact, unreasonably delayed or otherwise
manifestly unreasonable. He should address his report, recommending any remedial
action that he thinks appropriate, to the department or organisation concerned. If no
adequate remedial action has been taken within a reasonable time, he should be
empowered to make a special report to the two Houses. He should also make annual
reports to the Governor-General, which should be laid before the two Houses.
Finance
42. The Constitution should contain provision on the usual lines with respect to
the appropriation and expenditure of public monies in order to ensure control of
these matters by Parliament. The Constitution should provide for the establishment
of a consolidated fund and regulate payments into and withdrawals from that fund
and for the laying of annual estimates of revenue and expenditure before the Lower
House and for the introduction of appropriation bills in respect of each financial
year.
43. There should be provision for a Director of Audit who should have the
function of auditing all public accounts and reporting on them to Parliament. The
Director of Audit should be appointed by the Public Service Commission after
consultation with the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition, and should
have security of tenure similar to that of a judge.
44. The salary and conditions of service of the Governor-General, judges of the
Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal, members of the Service Commissions, the
Director of Public Prosecution, the Commissioner of Police, the Ombudsman, and
the Director of Audit should be protected in the same manner as the salary and
conditions of service of judges and certain other officers are protected under the
existing Constitution.
45. The Minister of State thanked the Chief Minister of Fiji and the Leader of the
Opposition in the Legislative Council for their invitation to visit Fiji to acquaint
himself with the Agreement reached by the Political Parties there on constitutional
advance. Lord Shepherd also noted in the joint statement issued by Ratu Sir
Kamisese Mara and Mr. S. M. Koya on 17 January 1970 their intention that Fiji
should reach dominion status as soon as possible.
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46. In addition to his talks with the Political Leaders the Minister had talks with
representatives of the Great Council of Chiefs and with various organisations and
individuals in Fiji and received submissions from others about constitutional
advance.
47. The Minister of State took note of the account given to him by the Chief
Minister and the Leader of the Opposition of the discussions they had held and of the
Agreements reached between their parties. He hoped that it would be possible for the
Parties between now and a constitutional conference to reach agreement on the
matters referred to in paragraph 18, but he was bound to say that, if no Agreement
was reached and circumstances remained as at present, it would in his view be
necessary that the Constitutional Instrument for Independence should reflect,
subject to any formal changes arising from Independence, the provisions of the
existing Constitution.
48. As a consequence of what he has seen and heard during his visit and in
particular of his talks with the Chief Minister and Mr. Koya and their colleagues in
the Alliance and National Federation Parties and in view of the Agreement between
the two parties recorded above, Lord Shepherd wishes to state that, subject to the
Legislative Council endorsing by means of a formal resolution the proposals so far
agreed, Her Majesty’s Government will be willing to convene a Constitutional
Conference in London at a date in April next to be mutually agreed with a view to
finalising arrangements (including the date) for the independence of Fiji.
157 FCO 32/613, no 22 11 Mar 1970
[South Pacific Sugar Mills]: FCO record of a meeting in London with
representatives of the Colonial Sugar Refining Company Ltd1 on the
Denning award. Addendum
[In 1969 an independent inquiry into the sugar industry headed by Britain’s master of the
rolls, Lord Denning, made far-reaching recommendations for profit-sharing between
growers and millers, long a major bone of contention. Denning’s award was published on
27 Jan 1970 (The Award of the Rt Hon Lord Denning in the Fiji Sugar Cane Dispute,
Suva, Government of Fiji, 1970). The principal recommendation was a new formula
under which proceeds from sale would be shared between the growers and millers in the
proportion of 65 per cent and 35 per cent respectively, and the provision of guaranteed
minimum price of $7.75 per ton of cane, with $5.75 within five weeks after delivery and
the balance within six weeks of the end of crushing. The CSR found this ‘intolerable’ and
proposed to sell its SPSM shares to the Fiji government, but the offer was declined.
Whitehall refused to intervene, advising the CSR to give the Denning award time. The Fiji
government eventually purchased the SPSM in 1973 and the Fiji Sugar Corporation took
over its operations.]
Mr. Wheen said that the Award of Lord Denning in the Fiji Sugar Cane Contract
dispute had placed his company in grave difficulty. He understood that there would
shortly be a Fiji Constitutional Conference in London and that Fiji Ministers would
be coming here. He was therefore anxious to set out the position of his company
following the Denning Award. He was sure that all were anxious to see an
economically stable Fiji but the outcome of the Award could have disastrous
1 CSR was represented by P T Wheen, assistant general manager, and B Dowling, London representative.
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consequences there. The CSR position was that, after serious consideration, they had
come to the conclusion that they could not advise the Directors of the South Pacific
Sugar Mills (S.P.S.M.) to sign the Award. This would mean bankruptcy for the South
Pacific Sugar Mills (S.P.S.M.). Acceptance of the Award would also place the whole of
the CSR group in jeopardy and indeed would place its Board of Directors in a position
of malfeasance. But legally it was an awkward situation since there was a possibility
of a Court Order being obtained in Fiji to compel the S.P.S.M. to sign. The Award
therefore could also have grave political consequences.
2. Mr. Wheen went on to say that no one was in any doubt about Lord Denning’s
stature. He was a great legal authority, Master of the Rolls and one of the three
Senior Appeal Judges in this country. There was no gainsaying the Award. The
purpose of his visit therefore was not to complain or to ask for any Foreign and
Commonwealth Office action but to bring to the attention of the F.C.O. the likely
consequences of the Award. Talks would be going on in Fiji with Fiji Ministers and he
was anxious that what he had to say now should not prejudice the position there. The
first reaction of Fiji Ministers to a recent C.S.R. approach had been disappointing.
The C.S.R. had explained that they were distressed by the Award and both S.P.S.M.
and C.S.R. took the view that to accept the Award for the 10 year period would put
them in financial jeopardy. The Fiji Ministers had proposed trying out the Award. But
Lord Denning’s basis for arriving at a 65%–35% division to the growers and millers
was based on a totally incorrect series of calculations. Furthermore his financial
projections were similarly inaccurate. The C.S.R. had completed a serious study of
the position that would obtain following acceptance of the Award and had concluded
that by 1974 their losses would be running at $F.9 million per annum.
3. The guarantee of a minimum price for the growers rested with the millers and
this was entirely without precedent. No private enterprise company could take on
this liability especially for a period of 10 years. There were two possibilities open to
the C.S.R. They could give two years notice to cease crushing but they hoped that
they would not be forced to do this since it would have enormous local
repercussions. The second alternative was to start talking with the Fiji Government.
This they had undertaken to find ways and means of solving the problem.
It seemed to the C.S.R. that the best solution would be for the Fiji Government to
take over, on terms feasible to Fiji. Their major concern now was with the stability of
Fiji. While they were convinced that the C.S.R. could never recover its former
position locally they were anxious to come to some agreement with the Fiji
Government. They would be happy to see the S.P.S.M. pass into other hands and
would be prepared to continue to serve whoever took over for as long as required.
They regarded Fiji not as a country for economic exploitation but as a social
responsibility. The C.S.R. were much disturbed at the completely negative Fiji
reaction to their proposal to pull out. The Fiji attitude was that the S.P.S.M. had to
sign the Award. But the C.S.R. had taken the advice of three Queen’s Counsel and
there was no doubt that if they advised the S.P.S.M. to accept the Award the Directors
of the C.S.R. could be sued by shareholders for malfeasance. There was to be a
further meeting between the C.S.R. representatives and Fiji Ministers next Sunday.
The Eve Contract expired on 31 March 1970 and there was little time left to sort
matters out. Fiji Ministers would be coming to London in mid-April and he therefore
thought it would be the right thing to do to come to the Foreign and Commonwealth
Office and state the C.S.R. case.
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4. Mr. Morgan said that he must make it plain at the outset that while the
Secretary of State still had ultimate responsibility for Fiji, the present constitutional
situation was such that the subject under discussion lay within the remit of elected
Fiji Ministers. The Governor could of course override Ministers but the use of such
power was a very grave matter indeed and impossible in present circumstances. We
were naturally concerned at the possible repercussions which Mr. Wheen outlined
but positive action by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in this situation was for
all practical purposes ruled out. Power of direction no longer rested with us although
the possibility of persuasion was not ruled out. Mr. Morgan went on to enquire
whether it had been open to the S.P.S.M. to evade arbitration proceedings. Mr.
Wheen confirmed that had S.P.S.M. accepted the extreme terms put forward in the
dispute by the growers, arbitration would have been unnecessary, but the answer was
in practical terms that the arbitration was inevitable. Nor was there power to appeal.
Mr. Morgan said that while we had no power to alter the Law we did retain power to
disallow certain laws which the Fiji Government might propose to make. Mr. Wheen
made the point that Lord Denning’s Award had no special standing in Law and the
Award itself confirmed this. Mr. Morgan said he thought that the Government of Fiji
would like to settle the problem without disorder.
5. Mr. Morgan enquired what Mr. Wheen had meant in his point that matters
might be discussed here but that these talks should not impinge on the talks in Fiji.
Mr. Wheen said that he would prefer to speak informally. Mr. Morgan wondered what
an informal conversation could be expected to lead to. Mr. Wheen said he thought it
was his duty to come and explain the C.S.R. position and to establish what the F.C.O.
functions were vis-à-vis Fiji as a Colony. He was not pleading a case but the Award
could have far reaching ill-effects. It was impossible for the C.S.R. to carry on. Mr.
Morgan suggested that the C.S.R. might wish to opt out. Mr. Wheen said they had no
intention of withdrawing and felt it their duty to stay even if they suffered a very
substantial loss of money. They had gone to Fiji in a spirit of co-operation and were
given an ultimatum. He was not asking for any F.C.O. action, indeed this might be
counter-productive, but he thought it necessary to explain the C.S.R.’s position.
6. Mr. Morgan enquired whether it was the intention of the C.S.R. to make
further attempts to persuade the Government of Fiji to take up the equity in the
S.P.S.M. Mr. Wheen said there was a problem here. Fiji obviously would not want to
go forward to independence with it clear for all to see that among its first acts had
been the nationalisation of the sugar industry. This would frighten off possible
investors. But Fiji had said they might compel the S.P.S.M. to sign the Award. He
therefore thought it right to let the Foreign and Commonwealth Office know what
the C.S.R. was thinking prior to the next talks.
7. Mr. Morgan pointed out that there were basic rights of access to the Secretary
of State by persons in a Colony. These were clearly defined and took the form of a
petition. There was no right to make a representation here in London. The correct
procedure was to refer to London through the Governor. Anything said here
therefore would have to be referred to the Governor. Mr. Wheen said he understood
this. Mr. Morgan said that clearly the Government of Fiji was concerned about the
situation which portended possible economic disruption. What they would like to see
was the S.P.S.M. giving the Award a trial. The Fiji Government were well aware of all
the factors. There were two sides to the coin. The S.P.S.M. could appeal by petition
via the Governor. But this was unlikely to be a very efficacious remedy. The
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constitutional position made it difficult and practically speaking this was really no
solution. But clearly a solution must be found.
8. Mr. Wheen stressed that neither the C.S.R. nor the S.P.S.M. wished to injure
Fiji. They had long helped Fiji and were proud of this. They would continue to do so.
This was his message. They had no wish to harm anyone but wanted to help. But it
was not possible or even within the Law to sign the Award.
9. Mr. Morgan said he appreciated Mr. Wheen’s position and the duty of the
C.S.R. to its shareholders and employees. The last reports he had from Fiji suggested
that the position was that the Fiji Government wished to give the Award a trial at
least for a time. Clearly the Fiji Government did not wish to plunge into the
operation of nationalisation at this moment. If Mr. Wheen had no objection we would
like to let the Governor know about this talk and would emphasize the goodwill
aspect mentioned by Mr. Wheen. Mr. Wheen signified he had no objection. Mr.
Morgan then said that Mr. Wheen had made one particularly important point. There
could not be negotiation here. The matter must be settled in Suva.
Addendum to 1572
1. Mr. Wheen, during the discussion, expressed considerable criticism of the
tone of the Denning Report. Of its 193 paragraphs, he said, some 70 were concerned
only with impugning the reputation of the C.S.R. The company was so concerned
that they were considering producing and publishing a critique of the Award.
2. He alleged inaccuracies in Lord Denning’s Report. Its conclusions flowed from
premises which were massively wrong. The critique which the C.S.R. were
contemplating would point up the major areas of misunderstanding. Mr. Morgan
said he understood the C.S.R. argument that there was an accretion of points in Lord
Denning’s analysis of figures but he was not clear why it was necessary to publish a
critique. Mr. Wheen repeated that the good name of his company had been impugned
in many respects and in depth. The integrity of the independent Chairman had also
been gravely challenged. With specific regard to the C.S.R. there was a definite
inference that they had acted just within the Law in taking substantial moneys out of
Fiji. There were allegations that in a number of cases the C.S.R. acted in a way no
company should. These were misrepresentations stemming from Lord Denning’s
contention that the Eve Contract allowed the millers a big slice of the cake before it
was ever divided. This was totally wrong. The Eve Contract was a far more
sophisticated analysis and Lord Denning simply did not understand the
complications involved.
3. Mr. Morgan said it was not for him to judge but what the C.S.R. appeared to be
saying was that Lord Denning was unsophisticated. It would be very difficult to
overrate Lord Denning either in United Kingdom or Australia. Mr. Wheen said he
had no wish to denigrate but Lord Denning had put the C.S.R. in a very difficult
position and they were very conscious of the need to defend themselves. Mr. Morgan
said that the C.S.R. had obviously taken account of the consequences of publishing a
critique but he personally thought it would be a risky matter. Mr. Wheen reiterated
that the C.S.R. Board could not take the matter lying down.
2 The addendum was not for circulation outside the FCO.
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158 FCO 32/615, no 48 10 Apr 1970
[Defence]: minute by E J Emery to Sir L Monson on defence
arrangements for Fiji after independence
Problem
To decide the line of our brief for the Fiji Constitutional Conference about defence
arrangements and in particular to decide what we should do to carry out the
Chancellor of the Exchequer’s request that our position on defence and internal
security in Fiji should be made quite clear to the Fijians at the Constitutional
Conference and that they should be asked formally to agree to it.
Recommendation
2. I recommend:—
(a) that our brief should advise Lord Shepherd to reiterate our attitude about
defence and internal security clearly in full conference and make sure that the
Fijians, both Government Party and Opposition, accept it. He should, however,
decide in the light of the two Parties’ reactions and according to how the
Conference goes generally (and in consultation with other British Ministers as
necessary) whether or not to press that a statement of our position and its
acceptance by the two Parties need be written into the published Conference
Report. An alternative would be to exchange letters about it with Ratu Mara and
Mr. Koya on the understanding that they could be published if we were pressed on
the matter in public later.
(b) that we should warn the Overseas Development Ministry and the Treasury that
the Fijians may use our position on defence and internal security as a lever to get
more aid or a more generous ‘financial settlement’ generally and that if we appear
to fail to take this consideration into account we may jeopardise the success of the
Conference.
[If you agree with this line I will draft a brief accordingly and agree it with other
Departments in and outside the F.C.O. There is a slight additional procedural
difficulty in that Mr. Moon’s1 letter of 25 March records a request by the Prime
Minister that the Chancellor and the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary should
arrange for the point raised by the Chancellor to be discussed by their officials with a
view to the point being resolved. My own view would be that this does not require a
further reference back to the Prime Minister except perhaps just a P.S. note to say
how we (at the official level) propose to play it. The Ministry of Defence and the
Treasury can make up their own minds whether or not to refer to their own
Ministers. In our case Lord Shepherd will not be back until about the 15th and the
Secretary of State will be away from the 16th to the 23rd. (You may wish to discuss
how to handle the matter ministerially in this Office with the Private Secretary to the
Secretary of State.)]
1 P J S Moon, private secretary to the prime minister.
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Background and argument
3. The O.P.D. Committee instructed Lord Shepherd when he went to Suva in
January to obtain agreement from the two Fiji leaders that the United Kingdom
would not accept any responsibility for the defence or internal security of an
Independent Fiji.2
4. On Lord Shepherd’s return the Secretary of State in a minute to the Prime
Minister on 23 April said, ‘While the matter was not raised formally, both political
leaders in Fiji are aware, and have accepted, that the United Kingdom would not
accept any responsibility for the defence or internal security of an independent Fiji.
By tacit understanding it will not be an item on the Agenda at the Constitutional
Conference’.
5. In the House of Lords on 10 February in answer to a Supplementary Question
by Lord Lansdowne3 about whether the question of defence had yet been
inexhaustibly discussed, Lord Shepherd said: ‘On the question of defence this is
clearly a subject that would be discussed formally at the Constitutional Conference’.
6. Meantime, there have been the following developments in Fiji:—
(a) On 25 February in speaking on the Resolution in which the Legislative
Council endorsed Lord Shepherd’s Report, the Chief Minister said there were a
number of matters (e.g. aid) to be settled before the date of Independence could be
settled. He said also, ‘there is the question of defence and security. This
negotiation is already under way but any further comments may prejudice the
outcome of this negotiation’. Ratu Mara said on that occasion that he was
appointing committees (from among the Delegates to London) to discuss,
apparently in London, the various matters outstanding including defence.
(b) Fiji has a Defence Finance Agreement with New Zealand, under which the
latter assist the F.M.F:—
(i) with $F20,000 per annum;
(ii) provide but do not pay a Commander and four cadre personnel;
(iii) maintain and train some fifty F.M.F. soldiers in New Zealand annually;
(iv) provide material and advice at minimum costs.
The Chief Minister has been pressing for a decision from the New Zealand
authorities about their willingness to continue assistance to Fiji in the defence
field, saying he wanted to know where he stood on this before going to London. In
a letter to Ratu Mara went on 6 March, Mr Holyoake4 said: ‘We appreciate,
however, that, particularly during the first years of Independence, Fiji will
continue to need assistance with the organisation, administration and training of
the Fiji military forces, including the provision of personnel in Fiji and of training
in New Zealand, and I am confident that appropriate understandings can be
worked out. I need hardly add that, as at present, New Zealand would not be
prepared to undertake any obligation to assist in the maintenance of internal
security’.
2 See 154.
3 Formerly joint parliamentary under-secretary at the FO, 1958–1962, and minister of state for colonial
affairs, 1962–1964, and Commonwealth affairs, 1963–1964.
4 Prime minister of New Zealand, 1960–1972.
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(c) In March Mr. Laking, the Secretary for External Affairs, New Zealand, visited
Fiji and the Chief Secretary had told us that this visit was valuable in that, apart
from indicating warm New Zealand interest in Fiji’s future, it provided an
opportunity to establish beyond all doubt that Ratu Mara now recognises clearly
the inevitability of Fiji becoming fully responsible for its own internal security
commitments after Independence. Ratu Mara told Mr. Laking, however, that he
would be in a better position to comment on all future New Zealand Fiji/defence
links after the London Conference during which he proposed to ascertain what
assistance in this field may be available from the United Kingdom.
(d) Also in March Colonel Morris, the New Zealand Commander of the Fijian
military force, gave Ratu Mara a paper setting out rather extravagant proposals for
Fiji’s military and police needs after Independence. Ratu Mara’s reaction to the
paper was that though some of the proposals in it might err on the side of
extravagance, it should prove handy when he came to have discussions with the
United Kingdom.
(e) The Chief Secretary has pointed out to us that even though we persuade Ratu
Mara of the extravagance of Colonel Morris’s proposals, it remains the case that
Britain, on Fiji’s independence, will be relieved of a present liability and that
precedents will dictate a consequential increase in Fiji’s police and perhaps in the
military forces too. We must expect it to be argued by Fiji at the Conference that
Britain should offer some help towards what becomes necessary.
7. If the Fijians, even, as a matter of tactics, are disposed to press us for some
defence guarantees they will have at least the precedent of Mauritius to point to.5 I
attach telegrams to Mr. Lloyd about this showing the answers that can be given.
8. The precedents as regards writing the defence position into the report of the
Conference are that if there is to be a defence agreement that intention is written
into the report. If there is to be no agreement, nothing is said on defence in the
report. It might be difficult therefore to press for a mention of ‘no defence or internal
security commitment’ in the Fiji report. It would also not accord with how things
were left at Lord Shepherd’s talks in Suva (paragraph 4 above). The alternative I
suggest, the exchange of letters, would protect us later if need be and would enable
us, even short of publishing them, to answer satisfactorily further questions such as
Lord Lansdowne’s (paragraph 5 above).
5 Mauritius became independent in Mar 1968. British troops, flown in from Singapore, were retained until
June because of communal disturbances. The UK also provided training for the Special Mobile Force, a
para-military branch of the local police.
159 FCO 32/95, no 13 11 Apr 1970
‘European Economic Community’: FCO brief (FCC(70)13) for Fiji
constitutional conference. Annex A: Extract from Mr Brown’s
statement to WEU ministers in 1967
Objective
To explain to the Fijians our present thinking on our application for full membership
of the E.E.C; and to let them know how we envisage their own future relationship
with the Communities.
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Talking points
Our policy is to achieve full membership of the European Economic Communities.
We have persisted in this despite setbacks and delays. Following recent developments
in Western Europe, we hope that negotiations for membership will open in the next
few months. We are anxious that they should proceed reasonably quickly, but Fiji
seems likely to achieve independence before the outcome of the negotiations is
known.
The position of Fiji
2. After our entry into the E.E.C. we should expect our pattern of trade with
third countries to undergo certain alterations. The system of Commonwealth
preferences at present in force would, over a period of years, be eliminated; and we
should extend the common external tariff of the Communities to imports from those
third countries not members or associate members of the E.E.C.
3. Our negotiating position for membership remains that laid down in the
statement by the then Foreign Secretary, Mr. George Brown, to the W.E.U. Council
of Ministers in July 1967. Fijian Ministers will be aware that at that time we
envisaged association for Fiji with the Communities under Part IV of the Treaty of
Rome, since Fiji was still a dependent territory. For independent Commonwealth
countries of Africa and the Caribbean, we hoped to reach agreement with the
Communities for their association under a renegotiated Yaoundé Convention.1 We
still hope that such arrangements can be reached for the latter.
4. Since, however, Fiji will probably become independent in the course of our
negotiations for entry, we hope it may be possible to arrange with the Communities
for some solution to the problems for Fiji raised by our entry, to be worked out along
the lines envisaged for the independent Commonwealth countries of Africa and the
Caribbean. In any case we consider that the problems for Fiji of our entry will be at
least eased by the schemes for generalised preferences for developing countries at
present under consideration at UNCTAD.
Sugar
5. Fiji’s sugar interests and the effect on them of our entry to the E.E.C. are
covered in a separate brief (U.K. Brief FCC No. 16).2
Consultation with Fiji over our E.E.C. entry
6. I welcome this opportunity for discussion with you as prospective partners
within the Commonwealth. As you know, the process of Commonwealth
consultation is a continuous one. In the special conditions of our entry negotiations,
we are considering whether some other form of consultation, along possibly more
formal lines, should be initiated. When we know the opening date for negotiations,
and what subjects the Communities will propose for negotiations, we shall be in a
better position to make a decision on this. Meanwhile we shall continue to keep you
in touch with our thinking on this subject in the normal way.
1 See 137, note 2. 2 See 160.
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Background
7. By the time the Conference opens, the subject of our entry to the E.E.C., and
its effects on Fiji, will already have been discussed by a special Fijian delegation with
Mr. Luard. The record of this meeting will be submitted in due course.
Association for Fiji with the E.E.C.
8. The position of Fiji in 1967 is explained in the Talking Points. Relevant
extracts from Mr. Brown’s statement to the W.E.U. Council of Ministers are attached
as an Annex to this Brief. Since Fiji is likely to be independent before we can expect
to enter the E.E.C., we shall have to consider, in negotiations with the Communities,
how best to treat her interests. We hope that some form of association may be
arranged for Fiji, although up to now the Communities have indicated that
association under such arrangements as the Yaoundé Convention is open to
developing Commonwealth countries in Africa and the Caribbean only. It is not yet
clear whether the scope of such Conventions could be extended to cover countries in
the Pacific and Indian Oceans.
UNCTAD Preferences Scheme
9. This is at present under consideration within O.E.C.D. and at UNCTAD in
Geneva. Several schemes for generalised preferences for developing countries are
being discussed, and we should not expect the scheme to come into effect before the
middle of 1971 at the earliest. Whichever scheme or schemes are adopted, they
should extend some measure of help to Fiji’s exports.
Copra/Coconut Oil
10. Fiji is one of the main Commonwealth Pacific Islands producers, accounting
for some 1% of world production of coconut oil and copra. 10% of Fiji’s export
earnings come from these products, the United Kingdom being a major market. The
enlarged Community will continue to be a major importer of copra and coconut oil.
Annex A to 159
. . . 36. During the 1961–63 negotiations between the Community and Britain it
was provisionally agreed that, with one or two exceptions, association under Part IV
of the Treaty of Rome would be appropriate for our dependent territories. We trust
that you would still agree that for these territories this is the best arrangement. We
should discuss together the position of any dependent territories for which
association is not appropriate.
37. It was also provisionally agreed during the 1961–63 negotiations that
association under what was later negotiated as the Yaoundé Convention should be
open to independent Commonwealth countries in Africa and the Caribbean. The
Community subsequently repeated this offer in the Declaration of Intent issued by
the Council of Ministers of the Community in July, 1963—a Declaration of Intent
which was in no way dependent on Britain’s becoming a member of the Community.
I trust that we can quickly confirm that the alternatives contemplated in this
declaration will be open to independent Commonwealth countries in Africa and in
the Caribbean.
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38. I realise that the Yaoundé Convention is due to expire in May, 1969. It would
scarcely be practicable for the Commonwealth countries in question to negotiate
accession to the present Yaounde Convention. I therefore suggest that these
countries should be allowed to continue their present trading arrangements with
Britain until new arrangements come into force after the expiry of the Yaoundé
Convention in the negotiation of which it should be open to them to take part.
39. Agreement was also reached in principle in the 1961–63 negotiations that
there should be certain trading arrangements for developing independent
Commonwealth countries for whom association was not thought appropriate. We
hope it will be possible to revive that agreement.
160 FCO 32/595, no 12 11 Apr 1970
‘The Commonwealth Sugar Agreement’: FCO brief (FCC(70)16) for
Fiji constitutional conference. Annex A: ‘The Fiji sugar industry’
Objective
This brief is for background information and in case Fiji delegates raise matters
relating to the C.S.A.
Talking points
Effect of independence
As you know, the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement is a commercial purchasing
agreement between the British Minister of Agriculture and certain Commonwealth
sugar industries, in the case of Fiji the Colonial Sugar Refining Co. Ltd. Fiji’s
position under the Agreement will thus not be affected in any way by independence.
What are you going to do for us in negotiations with the E.E.C.?
2. H.M.G. have always made it quite clear—in Mr. Brown’s W.E.U. statement1
and in subsequent Ministerial statements—that our obligations to the developing
countries belonging to the C.S.A. are something which must be dealt with in the
negotiations. The Six are fully aware of this; and the E.E.C. Commission’s Opinion of
October 1969 on the applications for membership of Britain, Denmark, Ireland and
Norway, specifically (paras. 65–66) recognises this as a problem warranting special
attention. We are confident that a solution can be found.
3. (For use only if asked). It would be premature at this stage, before
negotiations begin, to speculate on the precise nature of the arrangements to be
agreed.
Background
4. The C.S.A. is a purchasing agreement between the Minister of Agriculture and
certain Commonwealth Sugar Industries, originally negotiated in 1951, but evolved
from arrangements for purchasing sugar from the Commonwealth during the war.
The following quotas are in force:—
1 See 159, Annex.
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Tons
Australia 335,000
West Indies and Guyana 725,000
Mauritius 380,000
Fiji 140,000
East Africa (not taken up) 7,000
British Honduras 20,500
India 25,000
Southern Rhodesia (suspended) 25,000
Swaziland 85,000
1,742,500
5. The price, which is supposed to be ‘reasonably remunerative to efficient
producers’, is negotiated every three years (next review is November 1971), and is
currently £43–10–0d. per ton (cf. world price of about £32 per ton). There is a
supplement of £1–10–0d. for the developing members (i.e. all except Australia) and
another supplement for developing members which varies inversely to the world
price and at the maximum is £2–10–0d. per ton.
6. The Agreement is now of idefinite duration but Britain cannot be committed
to continue our contractual obligations under the Agreement beyond 31 December
1974 if we enter the E.E.C. Changes in the Agreement (unless mutually agreed)
require three years notice from a review, or six in the case of provisions relating to
the quantities which the U.K. is required to purchase from the developing members
(unless we join the E.E.C.).
E.E.C. entry and the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement
7. The Commonwealth Sugar Agreement will be one of the major problems in
any negotiations to join the E.E.C. This is not merely because the E.E.C. sugar
regime contains no provisions for giving preferential entry, or paying special prices,
to particular third countries (the former French Colonies in Africa no longer enjoy
their previous preferential access to the French market). More important is that the
high common prices for sugar in the Six are resulting in a surplus from current
production (excluding stocks accumulated from previous years) of at least one
million tons per year. This is either exported to the world market at considerable cost
(because of the E.E.C. export subsidies), or else denatured and used for animal feed
in the Community which, taking into account the loss of levy income or cost of
export restitution on the equivalent amount of grain, is also very expensive. If the
Commonwealth Sugar Agreement did not exist, the whole of this surplus could easily
be sold within an enlarged Community, almost all of it in the U.K. However
assuming a continuation of the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement, the greater part
would have to be exported to the world market. As with other commodities, no
agreement has been reached in the E.E.C. on how to reduce this surplus. Unless
something fairly drastic is done, this surplus will increase still further.
8. In June 1967, Lord Beswick gave to the Governments of the Commonwealth
countries whose industries are members of the C.S.A. the following assurance:—
‘The British Government during the negotiations will seek from the Six for
the period after 1974, and will use its best endeavours to obtain, in respect of
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the developing countries whose industries are parties to the Commonwealth
Sugar Agreement, an assurance which is consistent with the British
Government’s undertaking to protect the essential interests of the developing
countries which the C.S.A. at present safeguards. We cannot commit
ourselves here and now as to its exact form, but the basic point on which you
can be assured is that we shall, during our negotiations, seek assurances in
whatever form seems appropriate which are consistent with our undertaking.’
9. On 4 July, 1967, the then Foreign Secretary in his speech to the Western
European Union said:—
‘For sugar as you know we have an agreement with Commonwealth sugar
producers which runs until the end of 1974. Your own transitional
arrangements are due to expire six months later. The commitment we have
under the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement is a contract which we must
fulfil. We believe that the sugar exported to Britain under the Commonwealth
Sugar Agreement can be accommodated within a reasonable production
quota under existing community arrangements and without departure from
the precedents which you have set for yourselves. We have also to look to the
longer term interests of the developing countries and territories, many of
whose economies are over-whelmingly dependent on their exports of sugar,
and we believe that it is in the Community’s longer term interest that we
should do so. In due course we shall wish to discuss with you how these
interests can be safeguarded in the longer term.’
10. A note on the sugar industry is annexed.
Annex to 160
Sugar cane is the most important crop in Fiji, accounting for about seventy per
cent of export earnings and providing employment for about twenty per cent of the
total labour force. Most of the cane is grown by Indian farmers on land leased from
either the South Pacific Sugar Mills (a subsidiary of the main Australian company)
or from the Fiji community. These are about 15,000 small growers (mainly Indians)
who produce about 98 per cent of the cane. The processing of the crops is carried
out by the South Pacific Sugar Mills. The industry has the lowest production costs
of any Commonwealth sugar producers. The costs will have been somewhat raised
by the new sugar cane contract which came into force in March 1970 following an
award by the Master of the Rolls, Lord Denning, who arbitrated in the contract
dispute.2
2. Lord Denning’s award involved a new formula by which the millers get 35 per
cent and the growers 65 per cent of the proceeds of sale of suga—compared with a
split of about 41 per cent and 50 per cent respectively which obtained previously. The
millers, who were very reluctant to accept this, said it would ruin them, and tried to
persuade the Fiji Government to buy them out. The Fiji Government urged the
2 See 157.
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millers to try the Denning formula for a period and they finally agreed to do so but
said they would only guarantee to remain operating in Fiji until early 1972.
3. Fiji exports sugar to the UK (159, 287 metric tons), mainly under the CSA; the
USA (38,822 metric tons under the US Sugar Quota) and 150,107 metric tons at the
free world price (mainly to Canada, Malaysia and Japan).
161 FCO 32/595, no 21 13 Apr 1970
‘Commonwealth membership’: FCO brief (FCC(70)5) for Fiji
constitutional conference
Objective
To ensure that the Fiji delegation is aware of the steps required to obtain
Commonwealth membership.
Talking points
It is customary for Dependent Territories to pass a formal resolution in their
Assembly before independence to express their wish for Commonwealth membership
and to request the British Government to sponsor their application for membership
with other Commonwealth members.
Once this resolution has been passed, the British Government will ask the
Commonwealth Secretary-General to carry out the usual consultation with all
Commonwealth Heads of Government on Fiji’s application.
Background
Though there have been cases where a country has not passed a resolution before
independence, we have generally preferred that there should be such a resolution
(passed unanimously, if possible) so that the general wish of all shades of opinion is
properly recorded.
The Alliance Party and the National Federation Party confirmed in their
discussions with Lord Shepherd in January 1970 that Fiji wished to become a fully
sovereign and independent state within the Commonwealth with The Queen as Head
of State.1 The report signed at Suva on 2 February, 1970 was endorsed by all the
members of the Fiji Legislative Council save one. The Legislative Council passed a
motion on 25 February, 1970 (with only one dissenting voice heard) approving and
confirming the report of Lord Shepherd’s visit. As the section on Commonwealth
membership was only a small part of the report, the separate formal motion would be
desirable.
It has been our practice to take informal soundings of old members of the
Commonwealth before proceeding with the application of a Dependent Territory on
independence for Commonwealth Membership. In the case of Fiji, it would probably
be politic to include India in these informal soundings. These soundings in no way
pre-empt the formal consultation now carried out by the Commonwealth Secretary-
General of all Commonwealth Heads of Government which is the final formal step
before membership is agreed.
1 See 156, Annex, paras 4–5.
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162 FCO 32/595, no 23 13 Apr 1970
‘Rotumans’: FCO brief (FCC(70(6) for Fiji constitutional conference.
Annex: Background note
Objective
(a) To reassure the Rotumans that their essential rights will be protected in an
independent Fiji, and
(b) in so doing to discourage any Rotuman ‘separatist’ tendencies.
Talking points
2. The Rotuman requests for a representative in the Upper House and special
protection of their Ordinance in the Constitution are not likely to be resisted by Fiji
and once the Fiji delegates have indicated at the Conference that this is so, we can go
along with them.
Background
3. A note about Rotuma is attached.
4. When Lord Shepherd was in Fiji the Rotuma Council of Chiefs sent him a
telegram saying that they and the people of Rotuma supported the change to
‘Dominion Status’ provided:—
(i) the link with The Crown was maintained always;
(ii) Rotuma was given a separate constituency for the election of a Member to the
Lower House;
(iii) Rotuma was represented by a Chief in the Upper House;
(iv) there were safeguards for the Rotuma Lands Ordinance as in the present Fiji
Constitution.
5. Immediately before Lord Shepherd’s visit the Chief Minister had had a private
talk with a leading Rotuman and Ratu Mara told Lord Shepherd that he had taken
the line that a seat in the Upper House for the Rotumans would be no problem. This
was in fact proposed in Lord Shepherd’s report and in March the Rotuma Island
Council approved that report.
6. On 24 March two representatives of Rotuma called on the Governor. They said
they spoke for everyone in Rotuma. They said they agreed with what was happening
in Fiji, but there must be no question of breaking the links with The Queen. The
Rotuma Ordinance and the Rotuma Lands Ordinance must be preserved. The
Governor said that he did not see difficulty in these being protected in a future
constitution as they are in the current Constitution. The Rotumans said they would
like a representative in the Upper House; they would like him appointed by the
Rotuma Council. They would like to have a Member in the Legislative Council as
well. The Governor explained the difficulties in the latter proposition and they
seemed to accept them.
7. Lord Shepherd, with the Chief Minister’s agreement, invited the Rotumans to
send observers to the Constitutional Conference and two are coming, Chief Maraf
and Wilson Inia, both Members of the Rotuma Council.
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Annex to 162
Rotuma, which lies 250 miles North-west of the main islands in the Fiji Group and
some 360 sea miles from Suva, was discovered by H.M.S. Pandora, in 1791, when a
search was being made for the mutineers of the ‘Bounty’. It was offered to Great
Britain by the three principal Rotuman Chiefs in 1879 and was formally annexed on
the 13th May, 1881.
2. The island itself is some 8 miles long by 21⁄2 miles wide. Its soil is rich and
fertile and it produces some 2,700 tons of copra (its only export) a year, worth about
$379,000.* About 3,200 Rotumans, who unlike the Fijians, are Polynesians and
whose language and culture differ substantially from those of other Pacific peoples,
live in Rotuma itself, but practically nobody else does. Another 3,000 Rotumans are
settled more or less permanently in the main islands of the Fiji group.
3. Geographical isolation (there is no air service and shipping services are irregular),
the separate cession of Rotuma to Gt. Britain, and language, cultural and ethnic
differences have led Rotumans in Rotuma to consider themselves a race apart not
necessarily linked to the destinies of Fiji proper, although since its cession it has formed
part of the Colony of Fiji and all Fiji Ordinances run there unless expressly excluded.
4. Provision is made for the good government and wellbeing of its population by
the Rotuma Ordinance and for the ownership of land there by the Rotuma Lands
Ordinance 1959. Both are entrenched under section 74 of the present Constitution of
Fiji which reads:—
‘74.(1) Any Bill to amend or repeal any ordinance to which this section
applies or which is in any way repugnant to or inconsistent with the
provisions of any such Ordinance, or any resolution the effect of which would
be to recommend any amendment of the provisions of this Constitution, shall
not be passed by the Legislative Council, unless, in the case of a Bill it has
been supported on the second and third readings in the Council, or in the
case of such a resolution upon the motion being proposed, by the votes of
more than two-thirds of all the elected members of the Legislative Council.
(2) The Ordinances to which this section applies are:—
. . . . . . . . .
(e) The Rotuma Ordinance;
(f) The Rotuma Lands Ordinance, 1959.’
5. The Rotuma Ordinance provides for a Rotuma Council, consisting of the
chiefs of the seven Rotuma districts, one elected representative from each district,
the resident medical officer and the District Officer as Chairman. The Council makes
regulations which are subject to the approval of the Fiji Legislative Council.
6. For the purposes of Legislative Council elections Rotumans and other Pacific
Islanders are grouped with Fijians. The island of Rotuma itself comes within the
Fijian, Lau/Rotuma Constituency. (The Hon. J. Mavoa, the Minister for Social
Services, is member for this constituency). It also comes within the
Northern/Eastern Cross Voting Constituency. Of the present population of Rotuma
itself, some 1,200 are registered electors able to vote in Legislative Council elections.
The Rotumans settled in Fiji can vote in the Fijian constituencies concerned.
* $F.2.09 = £1 Sterling
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163 FCO 32/596, no 22 13 Apr 1970
‘Banabans and Fiji independence’: FCO brief (FCC(70)7) for Fiji
constitutional conference1
[Phosphate-rich Banaba (alternatively called Ocean Island) formed part of the Gilbert and
Ellice Islands Colony. It was annexed by the UK in 1900. Japan occupied the northern
Gilbert Islands in 1942–1943 until driven out by the US army in some of the Pacific war’s
fiercest fighting. Phosphate mining made Banaba almost uninhabitable and at the end of
the war the inhabitants were moved to the Fijian island of Rabi. The Banabans became
citizens of Fiji upon Fiji’s independence in 1970 but retained ownership of land on
Banaba. In 1981, after years of discussions and litigation over phosphate royalties and
environmental damage caused by open-cast mining, the Banabans accepted A$14.58
million compensation from the UK government (FCO 32/625–627, 821, 972–979, 1981,
1059–1080, 1085). They continue to have special rights of residence and representation
in Kiribati, the new name of the Gilbert Islands at independence in 1979 (the Ellice
Islands having separated from the Gilbert Islands in 1975 and become independent as
Tuvalu in 1978).]
Objectives
(a) to encourage the Banabans to identify themselves with Fiji, adopt Fiji
citizenship and abandon separatist tendencies;
(b) to encourage the Fijians to treat the Banabans as citizens of Fiji, to help them
integrate into the Fiji community and to develop Rabi as their home;
(c) with the objectives at (a) and (b) to try to obtain at the conference Fiji’s
agreement that the Banabans should have representation that the Constitution
should provide protection of Banaban custom, particularly land tenure.
Talking points
2. We believe that Fiji Independence affords an opportunity from the Banabans
to confirm that they wish to safeguard their future and ensure the economic
development of Rabi by integration with the life of Fiji. We believe the Banabans
intend to take up their status in Fiji with the obligations and privileges which that
status carries.
3. We wish to suggest that the Fiji Government should consider making allowance
for Banaban customs, in particular as regards their system of land tenure and Local
Government and should meet their request for representation in the Upper House.
4. In return we feel the Banabans should take advantage of the help which the
Fiji Government is prepared to offer them and focus their efforts and resources on
the development of Rabi and their future in Fiji. In these matters they have already
the benefit of the wise advice of the Fiji Government including that of Mr. Naisara
(Assistant Minister for Natural Resources) in whose constituency Rabi falls.
5. The British Government has a special interest in the Banaban people deriving
from the circumstances of their transfer from Ocean Island. Lord Shepherd was able
to see for himself the economic potential of Rabi during his visit there in January
1970. We hope the Fiji Government will agree that H.M.G. in co-operation with
them, should explore further ways in which we might help the Banabans over the
development of the Island.
1 The Banabans were represented at the conference by observers.
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Background: Banaban requests
6. The Banabans are the original inhabitants of Ocean Island (Gilbert and Ellice
Islands Colony). In 1942 Rabi was purchased for them with funds held in Trust for
them from their Ocean Island Phosphate revenues. The freehold of the Island is held
in Trust for the Community by the Council. There are now about 2,000 Banabans,
most of whom, principally the younger element, will become Fiji citizens
automatically at independence, remaining, however, also United Kingdom citizens.
7. The Banabans are obsessed with obtaining an increased share of the divisible
benefits deriving from the Ocean Island Phosphate operation. They have recently
petitioned for an enquiry into their case and have asked us to offer a larger share of
benefits from remaining uncleared phosphate areas. They hope to discuss these
questions after the Conference. The arrangements governing the phosphates
operations were reviewed by the Partner Governments in Suva in March 1970. At the
time of that review other matters were also discussed by the United Kingdom
delegation (led by Mr. J. C. Morgan) with the Banaban representatives and their
advisers (including Sir Dingle Foot).2 The discussions of those matters affecting the
position of the Banabans at the Independence of Fiji is summarised below.
Parliamentary representation
8. The Banabans enquired about the possibility of having an elected Banaban
member in the Lower House and a nominated representative in the Upper House. We
believe that the Fiji leaders would certainly not agree to the former, but might agree
to the latter if the Banabans put it to them tactfully. We should support the request
for a member in the Upper House as necessary.
Discrimination between communities
9. The Banabans asked for inclusion in the Constitution of a special provision
similar to that in the Ceylon Constitution prohibiting discrimination between
communities. For our part, we would expect the Human Rights provisions in the
present Constitution to cover this. However, the Fiji Attorney General will look at
the Ceylon provisions. He may be able to persuade Sir Dingle Foot that the existing
Human Rights clauses are adequate.
Protection of Banaban custom, especially land tenure
10. The Banabans operate an exceptional system of customary land tenure,
safeguarded at present by the Fiji Banabans Land Ordinance. Under native Fijian
custom, land is held under communal ownership; Banaban custom provides for
individual land ownership. The Banabans have asked for this custom and their other
customs to be specially protected by, for example, entrenched provisions in the
Constitution. The Fiji Government may not see difficulty in this. We should support
it as necessary.
11. The Banabans have also said that they wished the Rabi Island Council
(established under the Banaban Settlement Ordinance) to be restyled The ‘Council of
Leaders’ and given enhanced status combining the functions of a Local Government
authority with a degree of authority in respect of their customs and land tenure
system so that these could not be altered without the agreement of the Council.
2 Labour MP and former solicitor-general.
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12. Fiji officials are already considering the desirability of a review of the
arrangements concerning the administration of Rabi since the existing
arrangements give the Government more control over the Banabans than is normal
for a Local Government Administration. The objective of a review would be to leave
the Banabans at Independence under no greater control by the Central Government
than other local authorities. We think the Fiji Government may not object to this
and might even agree that the Lands Ordinance could be entrenched in the
Constitution. We can support this as necessary.
Banaban finances
Taxation
13. The Banabans are subject to Fiji taxation laws except that their phosphate
royalties are expressly exempted from Fiji tax (Fiji Banaban Funds Ordinance). The
Banabans have asked for this exemption to be enshrined in the Constitution. We have
said that we could not impose conditions on what Fiji might do after independence
but that nevertheless our view was that the Banaban royalties were already taxed in
the Gilbert and Ellice Islands Colony and that if Fiji taxed them we would have to
consider how we might remedy the position.
14. The Banabans put forward also a proposal that their revenues in Fiji outside
Rabi should be subject to central government taxation but that their earnings inside
Rabi and also outside Fiji should be subject only to Council taxation and central
government services to the Banabans would be limited accordingly.
15. It is highly unlikely that the Fiji Government would grant the Banabans
special tax privileges (beyond those they already enjoy for their phosphate royalties).
The Banabans would be well advised not to ask for them.
The Banaban Trust Fund
16. After Independence it will be inappropriate for the Governor-General or
Chief Minister to the Trustee of the Banaban Trust Fund. If the money could be made
available to a Rabi Island Development Corporation with some business expertise and
if the Council’s hold on it loosened effective development might become possible.
This can be pursued outside the conference.
Economic assistance
17. Because of their obsession with securing an increased share of the divisible
benefits from the Ocean Island phosphate industry and their tradition not towork for
others the Banabans have not applied themselves to the development of Rabi.
Professor Joy, an Agricultural Economist, revisited Rabi under technical assistance
arrangements last year. He recommended that to avoid a disastrous fall in living
standards after 1976 the Banabans should get down to the development of Rabi’s
considerable productive potential rather than waste royalties on imported food and
subsidised public services. Primarily because this advice failed to lend support to
their phosphate case, the Council eventually rejected it. A modified version of
Professor Joy’s report now nearing completion suggests heavy external aid related to
a five-year programme of full employment on productive projects at a total cost of
£700,000. This report has not yet been made available to the Banabans.
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18. If the matter arises we should explain our view that only a sustained effort
concentrating on expanding production on Rabi will meet the situation.
Claim to Independence
19. As long ago as 1948 the Banabans’ claim for independence for Ocean Island and
Rabi Island was rejected. Their claim was again rejected by Lord Shepherd at the
Ocean Island phosphate talks in London in October 1968. At Suva last month they
suggested that after exhaustion of the phosphate deposits Ocean Island might be
transferred to Fiji as a ‘national monument’ for the Banabans. This seems an unlikely
starter but we have not yet thought about it.
Ocean Island
20. The independence of Fiji will not affect the Banabans’ continued ownership
of Ocean Island and their right subject to law and the convenience of the British
Phosphate Commissioners to travel freely between Rabi and Ocean. In our view the
Banabans will have a continued right to make representations to the British
Government over the royalties which they receive from the phosphate operation. The
Fiji Government do not of course like this much.
164 FCO 32/596, no 26 15 Apr 1970
‘General compensation scheme’: FCO brief (FCC(70)45) for Fiji
constitutional conference on compensation arrangements for
expatriate civil servants
Objective
To secure the Fiji Government’s agreement in principle to the introduction of a
General Compensation Scheme to provide for the payment of compensation to those
officers for whom the Secretary of State has a special responsibility (e.g. designated
pensionable officers) whether such officers continue to serve in the public service of
Fiji or whether they elect to retire. Special provision will be made for those officers
who are required to retire as a result of constitutional changes. Similar but less
beneficial arrangements may be necessary in respect of certain other officers (e.g.
non-designated officers).
Talking points
2. General Compensation Schemes are brought into effect from the date of
executivisation of the Public Service Commission, normally at least six months
before Independence. This established procedure has the intention of:—
(a) enabling those officers who do not wish to serve on Independence, to give six
months notice and proceed on retirement leave on Independence Day;
(b) enabling the Government to give six months to those officers who will not be
required to serve on Independence;
(c) ensuring that the Government has the earliest possible indication of the public
service staffing situation on Independence;
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(d) providing for payment of the initial instalment of compensation to all entitled
officers on the operative date.
3. We have been informed of proposals for the introduction in Fiji at
independence of promotions appeals procedure and certain other features based on
Australian practice. We understand that these may involve some reduction in the
functions of the PSC. In view of this the question arises whether the executivisation
of the PSC for a short period followed by reduction in some of its responsibilities
could be avoided by deferring its executivisation but proceeding nevertheless with
the introduction of the Compensation Scheme.
4. The idea of deferring the executivisation of the PSC until appeals
arrangements can be introduced at Independence may have been dropped by the Fiji
Delegation. If so, we should simply propose that the executivisation of the PSC
should take place on 10 July, 1970, together with the operation of the General
Compensation Scheme from that date and the commencement of payments
thereunder.
5. Should the Fiji Delegation press for the deferment of executivisation of the
PSC until independence we should say that this would not be in the interest of the
Fiji Government or the staff or the British Government. We should explain that
the British Government must be seen to transfer stable Public Service
arrangements at independence and that these must pass fully into the hands of the
Fiji authorities before officers can be permitted to give notice of retirement with
compensation. In order to plan its staffing the Fiji Government will need
reasonable notice of such retirements, and the power to require officers to retire
not long after Independence (six months notice is required). The officers have a
traditional right to exercise an option to proceed on retirement leave on
Independence if they so wish. We must therefore press for agreement to the
arrangements in paragraph 4 above.
6. In either event (and whether the promotion appeals procedure is to be
operated by an independent Committee or by the Public Service Commission) we
expect the promotions appeals proposals to be regarded as imposing less favourable
conditions of service on expatriate staff and as being capable of adversely affecting
their componsation and pension position. We propose the following measures to deal
with this:—
(a) In connection with the executivisation of the PSC an announcement should be
made that this is a transitional arrangement pending the introduction of
promotion appeals procedure;
(b) provisions should be included in the Compensation Scheme to safeguard
officers against any adverse effect from the promotion appeal proposals.
7. The Independence Constitution could include enabling provision for the
introduction of promotion appeals procedures—on the assumption that the Fiji
Delegation decide in favour of such procedures. If the Fiji delegation are able at the
present Conference to define the new arrangements for making promotions, acting
appointments and other functions to be removed from the PSC, the Independence
constitution can be drafted accordingly. Otherwise it will be necessary to provide for
an executive PSC with normal full powers. This can be discussed further under the
subject of Service Commissioners.
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Background
8. General Compensation Schemes derive from paragraph 6 of ‘Colonial
306 1954’ and from paragraphs 16 and 17 of ‘Command 1193 1960’ (see Appendices A
and B).1 Over the years the provisions of such Schemes have become standard and it
is proposed that these provisions should be followed in the Fiji Scheme with the
addition of necessary additional provisions safeguarding against any adverse effects
on compensation and pension entitlements resulting from the Promotion Appeal
proposals.
9. The financial aspects of the compensation scheme were discussed briefly in
the aid talks on 15 April. On the assumption that Fiji wish to take advantage of the
British Government’s now pensions/compensation policy for expatriates announced
by the Minister of Overseas Development on 11 March—and the Fiji delegation
confirmed that they were in principle proposing to do this—we said that we were
prepared, instead of providing loans to meet their compensation and commutation
liabilities, to make a grant of the order of £245,000 in respect of their compensation
and commutation costs arising between now and April, 1971. As from April 1971
HMG would be meeting expatriate benefit costs except for those arising from service
after independence.
10. In view of these discussions we do not expect much difficulty about the
timing of the introduction of the compensation scheme referred to in paragraph 3–5
above.
1 Not printed.
165 FCO 32/596, no 28 15 Apr 1970
‘Banaban citizenship and Fiji independence’: FCO brief (FCC(70)7)
for Fiji constitutional conference
The following note is relevant to the policies proposed in U.K. Brief No. FCC(70)7.1
2. There are now about 2,000 Banabans of whom about 500 were born on Ocean
Island in the Gilbert and Ellice Islands Colony. The rest may be assumed to have been
born on Rabi Island in Fiji.
3. If Fiji adopts the citizenship proposals set out in Lord Shepherd’s Report
(paragraphs 13 to 16) and if she, after Independence, passes other citizenship laws on
lines which are normal to Commonwealth countries (and in particular if she has a
law compelling persons with dual citizenship to choose one at the expense of the
other). The citizenship position of the Banabans would then be:—
(a) One quarter of the Banabans will be U.K. citizens only but with the option of
surrendering U.K. citizenship and becoming Fiji citizens instead on registration,
and
(b) three-quarters of the Banabans will be dual Fiji/U.K. citizens but of these the
great majority will have to choose one and reject the other at various times within
the next twenty-two years or so.
1 See 163.
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(c) For one generation after Fiji Independence, but not beyond that, there will be
a large proportion of Banabans who could remain U.K. citizens.
4. We should accept this situation which, at worst, will only marginally
complicate our ‘Banaban problem’ and we should not try to persuade Fiji to make
special citizenship arrangements for the Banabans. Fiji’s main concern will be to
compel Indians to show whether they are true ‘Fijians’ or not and to try to persuade
Fiji to make special arrangements for the Banabans would only irritate.
5. Recent indications from Fiji are that the Banabans accept that in due course
they will all become citizens of independent Fiji. We should leave it at that and
concentrate, as the brief advises, on oncouraging the Banabans to identify themselves
with Fiji and in encouraging the Fijians to treat the Banabans as citizens of Fiji and
to help them integrate into the Fiji community and to develop Rabi as their home.
166 FCO 32/596, no 32 17 Apr 1970
‘Defence’: FCO brief (FCC(70)8) for Fiji constitutional conference
Objectives
1. Both political leaders in Fiji are aware and have accepted that Britain will not
accept any defence or internal security commitment for an independent Fiji. It is
tacitly understood that this will not be an item on the conference agenda. Our
objectives are therefore:—
(a) To arrange with the Chief Minister and Mr. Koya what answer should be given
to public questions about this.
(b) to counter claims of Fiji delegates that the absence of a defence commitment
by us leaves them with a financial burden which we should relieve by aid etc.
Recommendations
2. Informally and outside the conference the Minister of State should obtain the
agreement of Ratu Mara and Mr. Koya that questions on this subject in Parliament or
elsewhere should be answered by saying that as it had been agreed that defence need
not be on the agenda of the conference it was not therefore discussed there.
Talking points
3. If the Chief Minister deploys the argument that we will be relieved of our
present defence laibilities and we should offer some help towards what becomes
necessary in Fiji to make up for this our comment must be that Fiji will not really
need a much enlarged and probably under-occupied army. Other Commonwealth
countries with whom a comparison might be drawn have nothing so substantial and
elaborate as has been suggested in Fiji.
4. A comparison of the size of the defence forces in Mauritius, Guyana, and Trinidad
does not provide any useful yardstick. Their populations of 3⁄4 million and up are greater
than the population of Fiji. These countries are thus able to sustain higher forces levels.
Also, Guyana for example has a disputed land frontier with Venuzuela.
5. There is no external threat to Fiji.
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6. (If the Fijians press for some form of defence guarantee and point to
Mauritius.)1 It was the strategic importance of communications facilities in
Mauritius which led the British government to concede exceptionally a consultative
defence guarentee of limited duration to the Mauritian Government.
Background
Britain’s position regarding Fiji defence
7. The OPD Committee instructed Lord Shepherd when he went to Suva in
January to make it clear that and get acceptance by the two Fiji leaders that the
United Kingdom would not accept any responsibility for the defence or internal
security of an independent Fiji.2
8. On Lord Shepherd’s return the Secretary of State minuted to the Prime
Minister on 23 April that:—
‘While the matter was not raised formally, both political leaders in Fiji are
aware and have accepted that the United Kingdom should not accept any
responsibility for the defence or internal security of an independent Fiji. By
tacit understanding it will not be an item on the agenda at the constitutional
conference.’
9. Precedents are that if there is to be no defence agreement with a territory
coming to independence nothing is written into the conference report. A mention of
defence in the conference report would not be consonant with the way things were
left at Lord Shepherd’s talks in Suva. There would be positive damage if the report
said that defence guarantees were requested and refused. To press for some mention
of defence in the report of the Fiji conference would also be likely to be unpalatable
to the Fiji delegates.
10. Meantime on 25 February, speaking on the resolution in which the Legislative
Council endorsed Lord Shepherd’s report, the Fiji Chief Minister said there were a
number of matters, e.g. (aid) to be settled before the date of independence could be
settled. He said also ‘there is the question of defence and security. This negotiation is
already under way but any further comments may prejudice the outcome of this
negotiation’. Ratu Mara said on that occasion that he was appointing committees
(from among the delegates to London) to discuss, apparently in London, the various
matters outstanding, including defence. Reports from Fiji indicate that Ratu Mara
accepts that we shall accept no defence commitment but that he will try to get as much
financially from us as he can and to use defence needs as ammunition for this.
Fiji’s military forces and police force
11. Fiji’s defence and police forces stand at present at:—
Fiji Military Force,
Regular forces — 2,152
Territorials — 2,601 all ranks
Reservists — 2,300 all ranks
Police — 2,783
Reserves — 2,645
1 See 158, note 5. 2 See 154.
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12. The Chief Minister has recently received from his police and military advisers
papers setting out proposals for Fiji’s needs in the defence and internal security
sectors after independence. In addition to increases already planned in the
establishment of the police force for the period 1970–1975 of 200 men, the Fiji
Police Commissioner has proposed the creation of a police mobile force of 192 all
ranks. The Inspector General of Colonial Police has advised that the extension of 200
already planned would be barely sufficient to meet future commitments and he
supports the formation of the police mobile force as being necessary if the police
force is to have a reasonable chance of containing a threat to internal security. A very
rough estimate of the cost of the police plan is approximately $F400,000 recurrent
expenditure and almost $F3 million capital. (This includes estimates for
sophisticated equipment all of which, in our view, may not be necessary).
13. The Fiji Military Force Commanders estimate of future needs has not been
costed. It should be less expensive.
Fiji–New Zealand Defence Finance Agreement
14. Fiji has a Defence Finance Agreement with New Zealand under which the
latter assists the Fiji military forces with up to $NZ20,000 per annum. New Zealand
provide but do not pay a Commander and 4 cadre personnel, maintain and train
some 50 Fiji military force soldiers in New Zealand annually and provide material
and advice at minimum costs.
15. The Fiji Chief Minister had been pressing for a decision from the New
Zealand authorities about their willingness to continue assistance to Fiji in the
defence field. In a latter to Ratu Mara on 6 March, Mr. Holyoake wrote ‘we appreciate,
however, that particularly during the first years of independence Fiji will continue to
need assistance with the organisation, administration and training of the Fiji
military forces, including the provision of personnel in Fiji and of training in New
Zealand and I am confident that appropriate understandings can be worked out. I
need hardly add that as at present, New Zealand would not be prepared to undertake
any obligation to assist in the maintainance of internal security.’
167 FCO 32/572, no 109 20 Apr 1970
‘Fiji constitutional conference’: speeches by Lord Shepherd, Ratu 
Sir K Mara and Mr Koya at the first plenary session at 
Marlborough House
1. Speech by Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs
Lord Shepherd said: ‘Your Excellency, Honourable Chief Minister, Honourable
Leader of the Opposition and Members of the Legislative Council of Fiji. May I
welcome you very warmly on my behalf and that of the Secretary of State and of the
British Government and people. The Secretary of State regrets that he cannot be
here to preside over this meeting today. But as you know, he is in Japan. He hopes to
return in time to meet all of you before this conference ends.
I hope that you will enjoy your visit to London as much as I enjoyed my own visit
to Fiji earlier this year. Your Excellency, I shall not forget the beauty of your lovely
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islands and the warm welcome that I received everywhere, from yourselves in Suva,
and from people in other towns and villages throughout Fiji.
True, it is a spring day with sunshine in London; but I do not believe I shall be able
to offer you the same abundance of sunshine that I saw myself in Fiji; but perhaps,
with a degree of luck, we might have a little less rain. But I can assure you, on behalf
of the British people, a very warm welcome indeed.
While in Nadi and in Suva I saw something of the preparations you were making
for the visit of Her Majesty The Queen, Prince Philip and Princess Anne. We, in the
United Kingdom, reading the reports of that visit were delighted to know how much
it was enjoyed both by the visitors and the visited alike. I think it was a particularly
happy circumstance that the people of Fiji had an opportunity of thus reaffirming
their well known loyalty and affection for Her Majesty just as they were about to take
a great new constitutional step forward.
I think it is right and proper that the work we began together in Suva should be
continued here in this historic Marlborough House. This house has been the scene of
other Conferences that have resulted in the creation of new, independent
Commonwealth Countries, and like your own in 1966 have marked the constitutional
advance of others. This house is now the headquarters of the Commonwealth
Secretariat, and I am very pleased to note that the Secretary General, Mr. Arnold Smith,
is himself present here today. It is also the special meeting place of members of that
unique association of people which Fiji hopes soon to join in her own right.
Our task this week is to complete together the work we began in Suva last January.
May I remind you that the Chief Minister and the Leader of the Opposition who had
been having talks with other representatives of their two parties over a number of
months about Constitutional changes, invited me to visit Fiji to acquaint myself at
first hand with the position they had reached in their talks.
I thought then it right to remind them and also other members of the Legislative
Council as to what Her Majesty’s Government’s position was on constitutional
advance in Fiji. It was simply that Her Majesty’s Government would not hold back
advance, nor however would we in any way press changes on the Government and
people of Fiji, and that what we would be guided by would be the basic principles of
what were the wishes of the people. In other words, the pace and the timing of
independence would lie in Fiji.
I found firm agreement between the Alliance Party and the National Federation
Party that at an early date Fiji should become a fully sovereign and independent state
with The Queen as Head of State, and that Fiji should seek membership of the
Commonwealth. I also found that the Chief Minister, the Leader of the Opposition
and their colleagues had reached a wide area of agreement about the Constitution. I
found also amongst other people I was able to meet in a number of centres of Fiji a
widespread acceptance and understanding of these objectives.
During our discussions in Fiji we, that is the Chief Minister, the Leader of the
Opposition and their party colleagues and I, identified the areas of agreement that
existed between the two parties on the Constitution and we also identified the areas
where further thought and discussion was required; and we set them out in the
Report of my visit to Fiji, which you know was at a historic meeting on the 2nd of
February, signed by thirty-three elected members of the Legislative Council.
This Report was itself approved and confirmed by the Fiji Legislative Council on
the 25th of February, and in consequence the British Government have invited the
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members of the Legislative Council of Fiji to meet here to draw up the principles of
an Independence Constitution.
May I also express a welcome to our friends the Banaban people and the Rotumans,
who are present at this Conference as observers.
Our meeting here this week is the culmination of nearly a century of partnership
between our two peoples. In the years that have passed since Cession, Fiji has
developed stable political institutions, a thriving, healthy, economy and high social
and educational standards. The peoples of Fiji are thus fitted to take the next
important step in their progress among the nations.
The growth in the Fiji economy during recent years is a matter of great
satisfaction to us all. We see every reason for this to continue. With Independence
new sources of economic aid would be open to you. You can be sure, however, that
British help will continue to be available to Fiji after Independence, both by way of
technical assistance and capital aid.
I think credit for Fiji’s progress can be shared by the peoples of both our countries.
But there is one aspect in particular of Fiji’s development which is uniquely the
contribution of the people of Fiji. No one from outside could have given it to you or
imposed it upon you. It comes and could only come from the characters and hearts of
your own peoples. I refer, of course, to the harmony in which the various peoples of
Fiji live and work together. Since the Vunivalu of Bau, whose descendant, Ratu
George, we are indeed fortunate to have taking part in our counsels today, and the
other Chiefs, ceded Fiji to Queen Victoria, the local Fijian people have been joined by
people from the sub-continent of India. They now live together in your islands in
roughly equal numbers as well as with peoples of other races. We are all aware in the
world today that this is a situation which brings with it problems. The peoples of Fiji
have surmounted those problems in remarkable degree. Their racial tolerance and
mutual understanding, their ability to live together in goodwill, have placed them in
high regard among their friends and neighbours in the world. As The Queen said in
Suva the other day, these are invaluable assets. They are a vital element in the
agreement on which this Conference is founded. They will be as vital in the future as
in the past if the problems which we know remain are to be overcome, to ensure a
happy and prosperous country. These problems in my own view can best be solved by
the people of Fiji themselves when they have full responsibility for their affairs, and
here I have no doubt that they will be solved in due course.
Another thing I should like to say is that the Constitution which we shall resolve
together, must be a Constitution desired generally by the peoples of Fiji. Only a
Constitution shaped by the people who will live with it and under it can be lasting
and effective. It will be subject to change no doubt in the future, for, as the Chief
Minister said in the speech I was privileged to hear him make in the Legislative
Council Chamber in Fiji on 2 February, a Constitution is a living creature, subject to
growth, susceptible to change; it is a sign of life, vigour and maturity to be ready to
change when change is required. But Your Excellency, the initial framework as well
as subsequent change must reflect the wishes and the agreement of the peoples of
Fiji as expressed through you, their elected representatives.
If we are successful in the work at this Conference, as I am sure we shall be, Fiji
will become a sovereign, independent country, fully responsible for all her own
affairs, internal and external. She will retain her links with The Crown and she will
have the expectation of becoming a Member of the Commonwealth. But she will take
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her place independently in the comity of nations, beholden to no one, but fortunate
in her friends, far and near. Among those friends, I hope that Fiji will always include
this country. Our work in the coming days may alter the Constitutional links
between Britain and Fiji, but the ties of mutual regard, affection and friendship will
not thereby be weakened. Indeed, I believe they will be enriched and strengthened by
the free association on which we shall enter.’
2. Speech by the Chief Minister of Fiji
The Hon. Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara said: ‘Lord Shepherd, members of the United
Kingdom delegation, Hon. Leader of the Opposition, ladies and gentlemen. May I
thank you first, Sir, for your very kind words of welcome, which we greatly
appreciate. Though many of us are not strangers to these walls, they nevertheless
have an atmosphere which could be daunting, were it not dispelled by the warmth of
your address. We in Fiji are perhaps more sensible to atmosphere than subtle
argument. And we have already sensed, both during your visit to Fiji earlier this year,
and since our arrival in London, that this new venture on which we are embarking
has all possible goodwill from the British Government, and that your only wish is to
assist in an arrangement which will meet the aspirations and desires of the people of
Fiji, our various races and parties, and will also benefit the country widely as a whole.
We also appreciate that it is not the intention nor the wish of the British Government
to impose any solution upon us.
We, for our part, feel that we bring a new atmosphere from Fiji to the conference
table. It is not an atmosphere of complete agreement: it has room for the frank
expression of sincerely held differences. It is an atmosphere which admits of give and
take, and which shows tolerance for differing views. Above all, it is an atmosphere
where the united and determined aim is the progress and welfare of Fiji as a whole.
Our links with the British Crown are strong and treasured, forged in war and in
peace. And all of us in Fiji, of whatever race or age, can look back in gratitude for the
wisdom and trust shown by the Chiefs of Fiji who ceded our islands to Queen
Victoria. And looking back over nearly one hundred years, I can say that their
wisdom cannot be questioned, and their trust has not been misplaced. For those who
have come after, from whatever quarter, we have had a welcome; we have appreciated
the contribution they have made in our economic and social life and we look to them
all to join us in making Fiji one nation. But we have looked to Britain for our defence
and our external affairs. You have sent us civil servants over the years who are today
training our own people in the areas where they can most quickly aspire to
responsibility. You have generously given us Colonial Development and Welfare
grants both to increase our economic growth and to accelerate our social service
programme. But our need will not end suddenly, or become less, on Independence.
Rather the reverse. And we were therefore glad to have your Lordship’s assurance in
Fiji that you would continue to do what you could to provide economic capital
assistance to Fiji. This is most reassuring. For political independence and stability
must be based on sound economic foundations. It is to secure such foundations that
we rely on aid from our friends overseas. But it is not only for ourselves that we ask
for aid. We have played, and continue to play, a leading part in the South Pacific. In
so doing we are following in a heritage and a tradition bequeathed to us by the
British Government. And we are proud to carry on this generous tradition as
evidenced in the South Pacific Commission, the Pacific Islands Producers’
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Association, and our role in regional schemes with the United Nations agencies.
Through the Fiji School of Medicine we have trained men who have become leaders
in nearly every country of the South Pacific. This role of Fiji as the crucible of the
South Pacific is hallowed by history and is now highlighted and projected into the
future by the establishment of the University of the South Pacific.
I spoke at the outset about atmosphere. We are also here in a businesslike
atmosphere. It is our aim to leave London with not only broad principles settled but
with the drafting of our new Constitution well under way. To this end, joint
committees of both parties have been working in Fiji and will continue to work here
with your advisers. This is the reason why we have come in such force.
To revert to the political aspect, I would like to refer briefly to a statement by the
head of the Foreign Ministry of Malaysia, a country whose situation and racial make-
up have many similarities to our own. He said, ‘The creation of a harmonious united
society is a long and arduous process but it must be done. All our actions must have
one over-riding aim in mind—the survival, the unity and the progress of the nation.
Without trust and understanding between the different communities there is no
hope for Malaysia.’ The same is true for Fiji. And this is a view which does not only
find its expression in Fiji from the Government side. The Honourable Leader of the
Opposition put it another way just before he left Fiji. He said, ‘We cannot afford to
condemn or hate any race, we will have to live like brothers and sisters.’ And he and
his colleagues by their constructive approach to our problems have complemented
our efforts towards trust and understanding in Fiji.
Trust and understanding may seem too tenuous and intangible to be the basis for
the survival, unity and progress of a nation. But in a multi-racial society, trust,
understanding and tolerance are the cornerstones of peace and order. These qualities
are nourished and developed by the traditions and culture of every race. Hence the
provisions in the Constitution to safeguard the culture and interests of the various
units which make up the multi-racial society of Fiji. You have yourself, Sir,
recognised this fact by your invitation to the Rotuman and Banaban observers here
today to be present at a conference whose results will affect them as well as everyone
else in Fiji.
I wonder, Sir, if it has occurred to those of us who have come to this Conference by
air that at the time of taking off and coming into land, we all had to fasten our safety
belts. This is always done during the transitional periods, since this is when such
safeguards are needed. And that is why our Constitution must provide safeguards.
And it must, as you so rightly say, reflect the general desires of all the people of Fiji.
It will be a measure of the success of this Conference if the Constitution we finally
approve will enable us to create a Fiji where people of different races, opinions and
cultures can live and work together for the good of all; can differ without rancour,
govern without violence, and accept responsibility as reasonable people intent on
serving the best interests of all.’
3. Speech by the Leader of the National Federation Party
The Hon. S.M. Koya said: ‘My Lord, Your Excellency, the Honourable Chief Minister,
the Honourable Members of the Legislative Council, Ladies and Gentlemen.
I thank you, my Lord and the United Kingdom delegation, for your kind invitation
and for the kind words of welcome which you have expressed on this historic occasion.
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The main purpose of this conference, as we all know, is firstly to endorse the
agreement already reached in Fiji on the 2nd February 1970 that Fiji should become
an independent and sovereign country; and secondly to recommend to Her Majesty’s
Government of the United Kingdom a complete framework for a new Constitution
for Fiji.
It is important to remember that prior to the signing of the Deed of Cession on the
10th October, 1874, Fiji was a free and independent country in the full sense of the
word. The immediate pre-Colonial era prior to 1874 demonstrates this vividly. If Fiji
was not independent, the signatories to the Deed of Cession would not have had the
power in the eyes of international law to cede Fiji freely and voluntarily to Her
Majesty Queen Victoria. Independence, therefore, is not something which is new to
Fiji.
The Deed of Cession was signed on the 10th October 1874. Thereafter Fiji was
governed as a Colony by the United Kingdom Government through its Colonial
Office until about the end of 1966.
The first Constitutional Conference for Fiji was held at this very historic place on
the 26th July, 1965. Dealing with the question of Fiji’s future, my predecessor, the
late Honourable Mr. A.D. Patel, made a very significant and far-reaching statement.
He said Fiji should become independent and acquire the same status as had already
been acquired by Australia, New Zealand, and Canada. He expressed the hope that Fiji
would become independent ‘in the not too distant future’.
The 1965 Constitutional Conference produced the existing Constitution and it
gave some measure of internal self-government to the people of Fiji. Elections were
held under this Constitution. The present Constitution has been severely and
consistently criticised by my party. Between 1966 and 1969 positive views and
declarations were made from our side that Fiji should become independent without
delay. Talks on the future of Fiji commenced in August 1969 and on the 3rd
November, 1969, the two major political parties, namely the Alliance Party and the
National Federation Party, agreed that Fiji should become independent by way of
Dominion status. In January of this year, your Lordship on our invitation visited Fiji.
After some talks with the Fiji delegation, a Report prepared by your Lordship was
signed on the 2nd February, 1970. This document we understand will form the basis
of our deliberations here. This in brief is a summary of the Constitutional
developments in Fiji.
In the economic arena Fiji must acknowledge the fact that each community living
there has made a positive and everlasting contribution. The Fijians, who are the
autochthonous race, were generous in allowing their land to be used and developed
for agriculture, urban and rural settlements and for other public purposes at a rent
far below the rent demanded by landlords of other countries. They were generous in
not hindering the national economic progress. They fully appreciated that the
country’s progress could only be made by the employment of labour and capital
which were in the hands of other races. In dealing with other races the Fijian people
as a whole consistently displayed their national characteristic, namely kindness and
sympathy, throughout the history of Fiji. The Indians contributed to Fiji’s
development firstly by way of labour and hard work and secondly by investing their
capital in Fiji. The Europeans, Indians and other races alike are to be congratulated
for investing capital in Fiji without which the country would not have reached the
stage of economic development in which she finds herself today.
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In the field of administration of justice, law and order, Fiji must pay tribute to the
British Government. It encouraged the building up of various institutions along the
well-established and traditional lines. We now have very sophisticated courts of law
and a police force of which we can be really proud. Our public service is in no way
inferior to any public service of other Commonwealth countries. In the
circumstances, therefore, it should not be a matter of any real surprise that both
major political parties should want independence for Fiji.
At this juncture I would like to outline to you, my Lord, with your permission,
some of the significant points pertaining to the forthcoming Constitutional
Conference.
Firstly, there is no political competition between the two major political parties to
seek or obtain independence for Fiji.
Secondly, unlike other former colonies, Fiji desires to acquire independence
without following the traditional formula laid down by Her Majesty’s Government on
this subject. In other words, Fiji has not had full internal self-government but
nonetheless she wants independence now without going through a second stage of
its constitutional development.
Thirdly, Fiji wishes to become independent without holding a prior election for it.
Fourthly, Fiji’s desire to become independent emanates from the mutual
understanding between the two main political parties and its leaders without any
pressure or violence from within or without.
Fifthly, it is a common ground that Fiji’s sovereignty should be transferred to the
people of Fiji as a whole.
Sixthly, after Fiji attains its independence she will continue to have strong and
close links with the Crown.
Seventhly, it has been agreed that Fiji’s future legislature should have an Upper
House, not necessarily to act as a House of Review like the House of Lords in
England, but as a House of Protection for the autochthonous race whose forefathers,
as I have already said, generously ceded the beautiful islands of Fiji to Her Majesty,
Queen Victoria. Pausing here for a moment, it is interesting to note that the Upper
House will give the Fijian people an effective constitutional power to prevent, in a
sophisticated way, any legislation being enacted against their wishes which affects
their land, their customs, their culture and their way of life. It is pleasing to note that
this aspect of the proposal for the establishment of the Upper House was proposed by
my party and graciously accepted by the Fijian people through its leaders and
Council of Chiefs.
Eightly, it is a common ground that the provisions for citizenship in the new
Constitution should be made on the most liberal lines. It is felt that it will not be in
the national interest to permit the people of Fiji to have dual citizenship, or indeed
any other citizenship rights which would be inconsistent with Fiji’s sovereignty.
Fortunately for us we would not have to face problems of the Kenya Asians who held
British passports and citizenship after Kenya became independent. In this regard I
am duty bound to pay my humble tributes and that of my colleagues to the Council
of Chiefs. In proposing that the citizenship laws should be made on the humane
lines, the Council of Chiefs have acted with wisdom and as statemen of the world.
Ninthly, it is accepted that Fiji’s constitution should be regarded as a living
organism susceptible to changes and be changed when changes are required to meet
the general wishes of the people.
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Tenthly, we have achieved inter-racial harmony in our complex and multi-racial
society.
I would therefore say to you, my Lord, that we have come to London for this
historic conference as one people and with one voice.
Having agreed on nearly all the important provisions for the new Constitution and
having signed your Lordship’s Report, we can confidently say that we would not
require much of your time, energy and advice when the deliberations begin.
However, there are one or two important subjects, on which we shall require
guidance and help. Allow me to say, my Lord, and without being impertinent in any
way, that the United Kingdom delegation has a grave responsibility to give us advice
on matters which may at first sight appear to be controversial. I take the view that in
addition to taking a decision that Fiji should become independent on the appointed
day and thus relinquish your power as the administering authority, you have an
important additional role to play. This additional role, in my humble view, is one of a
mediator and a friend to all parties. It is important to note that any Constitution
which has been worked out or drafted in haste has invariably been found to be
unworkable or unacceptable subsequently and thus lent itself to grave criticism. All
we ask is a patient and sympathetic hearing.
May I point out, my Lord, that it is a common ground between all three parties,
namely the United Kingdom delegation, the Alliance delegation and my delegation,
that Fiji should become a nation. It behoves therefore all of us to see that the new
Constitution is one which will expressly and/or by clear implication guide the people
of Fiji to unite rather than divide. It should produce conditions which would be
conducive to and consistent with the making of the country into one nation and one
people.
In my view we are the framers of the new Constitution and as such we have a
solemn duty not only to ourselves, the people of Fiji, the world opinion, but also to
posterity. I do beseech on all the delegates and make this humble plea; that we
should throughout the deliberations guard ourselves of any proposal which may bear
the characteristic of divisive forces. Let no historian indict us that on this day—a day
of grave moment for all the people of Fiji—that we fell into the cardinal error of
taking a short-term or a racial view concerning Fiji’s future and its body politic. We
must strive to see that we only borrow such provisions from the Constitutions of
other countries which have commanded universal approval and reject those which
have received universal condemnation.
We are not oblivious to the fact that the old concept of Empire no longer exists and
that we now belong to the Commonwealth. This is an institution which has been
accepted by nearly all former colonies administered by the United Kingdom. The
United Kingdom delegation is looked upon by us not only as the retiring trustee for
Fiji but as a potential Commonwealth partner and a friend and a guide. It can help us
to frame the Constitution which will be viable, and sufficiently flexible to meet the
ever-changing conditions of the world. These changes do inevitably affect everyone’s
lives in the modern world and Fiji would be no exception. It is for this reason we
desire that the new Constitution should be one which would meet the aspirations
and the general wishes of the people of Fiji at any give time in the foreseeable future.
I firmly believe that Independent Fiji can and should play its part, however small,
in the comity of nations for the benefit of mankind. Indeed in a regional sphere and
notwithstanding its status as a Colony, Fiji has contributed in a small way in
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uplifting the economic and social progress of some of its neighbouring islands. There
is a school of thought to which some of us belong, that the world is one. It is
therefore imperative that a citizen of any enlightened and independent country
should strive and work for the betterment of not only himself and his country but for
the people of the world at large.
I firmly believe that the world has become one. This may be most controversial but
it is also the fundamental point, and most of the controversy arises from a
misunderstanding of what is meant when it is said that the world has become one.
This one world no longer accepts the supremacy of any of its parts over the whole
or any other part.
In this one world any war or threat of war has become an immediate danger of
overwhelming catastrophe for the whole world.
In this one world, respect for the dignity and worth of the human person has come
to be widely accepted as the foundation of fundamental and inalienable human
rights.
This one world recognises a common responsibility for the common welfare,
among as within nations.
This one world needs a common discipline to ensure advanced science and
technology serve man and do not destroy him.
This one world is in the process of organising itself by conscious efforts as a world
community.
This concept of one world has inspired great powers including Great Britain to
assist dependent and independent countries in various ways.
Independent Fiji therefore will sooner or later join the world community and
would therefore I am sure belong to one world school of thought. Our future success
as a nation therefore will depend firstly on a liberal and far sighted democratic
constitution and secondly the initial help which may be forthcoming from friendly
nations to put us on a sound economic base. Given the opportunity we shall
endeavour to see that the present standard of living of our people is further enhanced
and that Fiji’s economy is developed to such a degree that she is self-sufficient and
plays its deserving role in the comity of nations. I hope therefore that the United
Kingdom delegation will note that we attach supreme importance on the subject of
political independence and the new Constitution for Fiji. We do in addition attach a
great importance in our proposal for the continuance of British aid for such
reasonable period as may be agreed upon for the mutual benefit.
In conclusion, my Lord, Your Excellency, Honourable the Chief Minister,
Honourable members of the Legislative Council and Ladies and Gentlemen, I say
that we are living in a wholly new world, a new world than any of our conflicting
ideologies has sufficiently appreciated; a world in which politics, strategy, economics,
science and technology and not least the range and intensity of human aspirations,
have been transformed within our lifetime; a world in which change at an ever-
accelerated rate has become the status quo. In this new world man must re-find his
true vocation.
The vocation of man in our age is to secure a mastery of his own destiny
comparable to the mastery which he has secured over the world of nature. He can
secure it only in the same manner, by learning and respecting the laws which govern
the life of society no less than the world of nature. If we fulfil this vocation, the
prospects before mankind are infinite. If we fail to fulfil it, civilisation as we have
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known it has run its course. In political terms, for us the essence of this vocation is
to develop a united independent Fiji, in which men of varied races, cultures and
ideologies can live together in peace and freedom on a shrinking planet. We must
develop ‘laws’ which are the natural order of society into a ‘law’ which is the accepted
basis of an orderly government.
In my humble submission human freedom in political society presupposes law.
The development of a united and independent Fiji therefore poses acutely the
question of the role of its new Constitution in its affairs. Can the new Constitution
play a part in promoting the unity, freedom and welfare of its inhabitants in the
nuclear age comparable to that which it plays in securing freedom and good
government within a well-ordered state? How effective a contribution can the new
Constitution make to securing peace with justice, protecting the dignity of man,
promoting economic stability and growth, and ensuring that scientific and
technological progress serves the common interest and does not enslave mankind?
Would it be one which would serve the citizens of Fiji or would it be one of the
inherited inhibitions from which they are seeking to win their freedom? If the new
Constitution fails us in these high matters, can there be a united Independent Fiji
standing for peace and freedom? The answers to all these questions lie in the hands
of the delegates attending this Conference. I am confident that this Conference can
produce a flexible, democratic, non-racial and humane Constitution for the
Independent Fiji and for the common good.
I join all of you in the solemn prayer that God guide us in all our deliberations.’
168 FCO 32/572, no 112 22 Apr 1970
‘Fiji constitutional conference’: FCO record of Lord Shepherd’s joint
and separate meetings with the two parties on a common roll
electoral roll
Lord Shepherd (accompanied by Sir Leslie Monson, Mr. D. Gordon Smith, Miss
Emery and Mr. Posnett)1 met first with the Joint Constitutional Sub-Committee of
the Alliance and National Federation Parties.
The Chairman asked what progress the two parties had been able to make since
his visit to Suva in reaching agreement about a new electoral arrangement for Fiji.
The Chief Minister of Fiji said they had not been able to reach agreement. Ratu David
said that the Federation Party had put in a paper and the Alliance Party had prepared
a critique of it. These would be given to Lord Shepherd.
Mr. R. D. Patel said that all were agreed that there should be a common roll—but
not yet. For forty years the same excuse against it had been put forward. The National
Federation Party were not advocating a common roll for party gain. They had tried to
reassure all communities. The desire for one nation was common ground between
the parties. They sought from Britain a solution that would provide a way to build
Fiji into one nation. They looked for friendly mediation and advice from Lord
Shepherd.
1 Gordon-Smith was an FCO legal counsellor; R N Posnett served on the UK Mission to the UN in New
York, 1967–1970.
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Ratu Edward said that the common roll was a distant thing for Fiji. It was not the
common roll but cross-voting that had brought people in Fiji together in the last
four or five years. Elsewhere, where the common roll had been embraced, there had
been bloodshed. The common roll now in Fiji would mean bloodshed now. This was
the reality that had to be faced.
Lord Shepherd then adjourned the meeting to have separate meetings with the
representatives of the two parties.
Lord Shepherd’s meeting with representatives of the Alliance Party
Lord Shepherd referred to his undertaking in Suva to rule on the electoral problem if
the two parties had not reached an agreement themselves.2 He said that he
appreciated the need to approach change in this matter in Fiji with a degree of
caution. The Chief Minister, during the Suva talks, had put forward a new formula
for a Lower House of 50; 11 Fijian, 11 Indian and three General communal roll seats,
and 10 Fijian, 10 Indian and 5 General cross-voting seats. The Chief Minister
confirmed that he was still prepared to offer this. Lord Shepherd said that he was
concerned that this formula gave undue weight to the General vote as compared with
the Indian and Fijian. Ratu Mara said that the ‘General’ were small in numbers but
their contribution to the development of Fiji was greater than that of the other
communities and had in recent years increased.
Ratu Mara said that Britain’s fault was arrogance. It was only recently that she had
had a racial problem and she was creating a complicated legislative structure to hide
it. In Fiji they faced facts. The Alliance had already done, in the cross-voting
arrangement, all they could to move to a common roll. The majority of countries
that had tried it had not succeeded with the common roll; success in it was on the
whole confined to countries populated by people of British descent. The Federation
Party wanted the common roll for domination.
Lord Shepherd reminded the meeting that in Suva he had deployed the idea that
we should indicate that the door was not irrevocably closed on the common roll. He
had suggested a Royal Commission in say, five or seven years’ time to make
recommendations on the desirability of a common roll or a greater measure of
common roll in Fiji. Its recommendations would not be binding on the Government.
A proposal of this kind would help him in debates on the Fiji Constitution in the
British Parliament.
Ratu Mara tabled a paper by the Fijian members of the Alliance Party on the
common roll. This said that the Fijians looked to the Constitution to safeguard
their position by giving them representation in no way inferior to that of any other
race in the country. To ask the Fijians to accept the common roll now was to ask
the impossible. They were, however, prepared to agree to the appointment of a
Royal Commission after the first post-Independence general election to enquire
into the electoral system and make recommendations. Ratu Edward said that it had
taken a hundred years for people in Fiji to get together. They could not put the
common roll to their people. Mr. Barrett3 said that introduction of the common
roll would cause the part-Europeans to feel betrayed.  Mr. V. J. Singh [sic]4 said that
2 See 156, para 8–9. 3 Wesley Barrett, European member of Alliance Party.
4 V R Singh, Indian member of Alliance Party.
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there was talk of the common roll being the long term objective. He personally did
not accept that.
Lord Shepherd referred to his reluctance to rule and said if he had to do so he
must be trusted to do the right thing.
The Alliance Party representatives then withdraw.
Meeting with representatives of National Federation Party
Mr. Koya said that the concern of his party was to achieve political integration. Mr.
R. D. Patel5 said that this must start now or there would be no hope. Fiji would settle
into communal compartments. In the National Federation Party view the common
roll was the starting point for making Fiji one nation. In the past Britain had divided
to rule but now it was her task to help people about to be independent to unite. The
National Federation Party looked to Lord Shepherd for a solution which would not
make the Alliance feel they had lost their cause or the National Federation Party feel
they had lost their ideal of a common roll.
Mr. Ramrakha said that to write the present electoral formula into the
Constitution would mean that the Conference had been a failure. There should be an
introduction to the common roll now. Mr. Koya said that it was not true that the
Federation Party was an Indian party. There had been a merger with a Fijian Party in
1968. Their call for common roll was not an Indian call.
Ratu Julian6 said that a stigma had come to be attached to the common roll. The
Fijians feared that it meant the Indians would rule. The Europeans, who had had the
best of it politically, also feared Indian domination (yet they were ready to share the
economic prosperity of the Indians). The Europeans were sitting pretty on the
present arrangement. Ratu Julian also said that the Chief Minister had said that the
common roll should begin with local government. Where was a common roll in the
election of the township boards and some Fijians were beginning to be elected. But
in Lautoka and Suva the rolls were still communal. There was also communal
distinction in the provincial councils (Fijian) and the advisory councils (the rest).
Lord Shepherd said that he believed the solution to Fiji’s problem would be found
in Independence. In considering the problem before him he must take into account
the fact that the Fijian was a rural man. Among the Fijians there was fear and
uncertainty about what the common roll would mean. He had agreed to the holding
of the Conference because when he had visited Fiji he had found give and take and
understanding among the communities. We must not turn the clock back in Fiji and
we should be doing that if Fiji did not become independent at the time when
independence was now generally expected.
Lord Shepherd said that the Alliance Party had not closed the door irrevocably on
the common roll but he could see no prospect of getting the common roll accepted
generally now; to attempt it now would be disastrous. Equally, if the Conference
failed the good relations between the communities in Fiji would become bad
relations. But the problem should not be too difficult. The Alliance have not closed
the door on the common roll. They had also confirmed their offer made to him in Fiji
of a 50 member Lower House (see paragraph 6 above). In the view of the National
5 R D Patel, member of National Federation Party.
6 Ratu Julian Toganivalu, member of National Federation Party.
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Federation party would this be preferable to the present arrangement?
Mr. Koya said that the Federation Party would not accept a ruling that represented
something that was not in Lord Shepherd’s report. Lord Shepherd said that if he had
to rule it would be for the status quo but if the enlarged House suggested by the
Alliance Party was acceptable to the National Federation Party he would be happy to
receive this proposal from both sides. He was only seeking a compromise. Mr.
Ramrakha said the only way they could compromise was to introduce some degree of
common roll in the Lower House.
Lord Shepherd asked whether a Conference Report would be acceptable
containing a ruling by him as forecast in his report together with a statement that
there would be a Royal Commission to consider the electoral problem with a view to
a common roll (i.e. keeping the door open).
Mr. R. D. Patel said that the common roll must be a closed issue. It must be
understood that all were dedicated to it in the long run. Mr. Koya said no-one must
feel victorious or defeated.
Lord Shepherd said that he would be happy not to rule. He would like now to propose
that it should be on the record that he had had these two meetings with representatives
of the parties and had asked Mr. Koya and Ratu Mara to meet further together. Mr.
Patel, with Mr. Koya agreeing, said that that was not enough. Lord Shepherd then
agreed that he would meet with the two leaders for further discussion.
169 FCO 32/582, no 28 28 Apr 1970
[Common roll]: letter from National Federation Party delegation to
Lord Shepherd protesting that their views on a common roll have
been misrepresented in the compromise formula put forward by the
UK at the constitutional conference
Dear Lord Shepherd,
The compromise propounded by the United Kingdom delegation this morning comes
as a grave shock to all of us. Worse still, it is based on a gross misconception, and it
clearly misstates our position. We have never advocated common roll as a ‘long-term’
objective. To ask us to sign a document in which our objective for common roll is
described as ‘long-term’ would mean that we would be betraying our own party, and
the voters who voted for us thrice on a party platform that called for immediate
introduction of common roll.
That the United Kingdom delegation should be guilty of such a gross
misconception of our stand on how to weld Fiji into one nation shows that the
United Kingdom delegation has not studied much less considered our case on
Common Roll. Common roll has been in issue for the past forty years, and yet we are
now being told to accept it as a ‘long-term’ objective. Any compromise must be a
mid-way between the views of both sides and not an acceptance of one side’s views
rejecting the other side’s views completely.
We reiterate that it is a serious matter that the United Kingdom delegation should
have gone against its own solemn document like the White Paper which states that
the parties’ views in 1965 to be as follows:—
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‘There were, however, strongly opposed views within the Fiji delegation on
the method of election to the Legislative Council and the representation
therein of the different communities. The Indian group contended that the
proper course was to proceed at once, with appropriate safeguards, to the
replacement of the existing system of elections on communal rolls by a
system under which all the elected members of the Legislative Council would
be returned, by single member constituencies, on a straight common roll,
that is to say, with neither communal qualifications for electors nor
communal reservation of seats for candidates. The Fijian and European
groups, on the other hand, took their stand on the retention of a fully
communal system of elections as at present. While both these groups
recognised that election on a straight common roll basis was a desirable long-
term objective, they could not agree to its introduction at the present stage or
in the foreseeable future. Faced with this conflict of views the Conference did
not succeed in reaching agreement on when such a system should be
introduced.’ 
In the last paragraph of your paper, you have completely accepted the Alliance
proposals made to us in Fiji and rejected by us there and then. Hence, we do not
agree that it is a compromise. May we remind you that the United Kingdom has been
responsible for creating and preserving racial electorates and they cannot divest
themselves of their responsibility in the matter by merely taking shelter under
disagreement of the two parties. They must at least propose a start in retracing and
undoing the harm and mischief that racial electorates have done in Fiji and
prevented it from becoming one nation.
Soon after the last conference the Alliance had committed itself to introduce
common roll at local government level and yet in the City of Suva, and town of
Lautoka it has not been introduced. All these facts do not inspire any confidence in
us that the Alliance will act according to vague declarations they usually make and
people think they are merely paying lip-service to common roll.
Our basic point is that the entire United Kingdom delegation proposals rest on the
basic misconception that we profess common-roll as a ‘long-term’ objective. Since
this distorts the entire thinking of the United Kingdom delegation, we call upon you
(a) to correct this impression in the plenary session and (b) to submit fresh proposals
taking into account the correct viewpoints of the two parties.
Lastly, we stress that we are not averse to compromise.
170 OD 34/301, no 39 29 Apr 1970
‘Capital aid—Fiji’: ODM brief by J M Kisch1 to Mrs Hart2 for a meeting
with Ratu Sir K Mara’s on Fiji’s expectations of UK aid
1. The Chief Minister is making a further approach to the Minister, seeking an
improvement on the capital aid offered at the Aid Talks on 14 and 15 April. A
1 Assistant secretary, Ministry of Overseas Development.
2 Judith Hart, minister of overseas development, 1969–1970.
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summary of these talks is attached3 and paragraph 12–14 thereof sets out the
position reached. For the transitional period and pending receipt of the Fiji
Development Plan 1971–74 our offer was:—
i. the carry forward of C D & W money, £2.4m., for use on schemes already
approved: this is the current figure, and it will have run down to, say, £2m. by
independence.
ii. a further six months of grant aid at the current annual level ie £677,000. This is
itself something of a bonus for Fiji since very little will be spent before
independence.
iii. a similar figure by way of loan at the Exchequer rate but with a five years
waiver of interest, and exemption from capital repayments for the first two years
and for the five following years the graduated capital repayments reaching the full
annual rate in the eighth year.
iv. the terms and amount of loans thereafter to be settled in the light of detailed
consideration of the Development Plan when it is ready.
2. Fiji reactions have been:—
i. They need grant support for the whole period of their new Plan; otherwise its
vital objectives, particularly raising the rural Fijians from their present poverty
and so avoiding racial strife between them and the Indians, cannot be achieved. We
have demonstrated quite clearly that there is no reason to think that loan
repayments will strain their growing resources and that there is therefore no
reason to think that their Plan will be prejudiced. In fact, we believe the Fijians
realise by now that after the transitional period aid will have to be by way of loan.
ii. The Foreign Office are pushing them into independence and the ODM are
increasing the cost of aid at the same time. We are certainly happy that they are
now on the road to independence and assume they are too. It is natural that the
regime over aid, as in other things, should be different after independence but we
are making transitional offers we regard as generous.
iii. They will have to meet new costs for a Diplomatic Service and subscriptions to
the IMF and the Asian Development Bank, and additional defence costs and police.
(It has been made clear that Britain will undertake no defence or internal security
commitments). All this is true but the costs do not appear very heavy (they have
not been quantified). Fiji will derive benefits from the International Bank and the
Asian Development Bank and they are also likely to get more aid after
independence from other donors.
iv. They are making contributions to regional development in the area. This is
commendable but Fiji also draws dividends from it: most recipients of
development assistance from us are themselves givers of technical and other
assistance (e.g. under the Colombo Plan).
v. They claim a special relationship with Britain because of the entirely voluntary
cession of Fiji to Queen Victoria in 1874. We can say that we have and are giving
generous help to Fiji compared with what we have done elsewhere and bearing in
mind the U.K. resources available.
3 Not printed.
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3. Neither we nor the FCO know what the Chief Minister is likely to ask for
except that he wants more grant money. At the talks a fortnight ago (before the Chief
Minister arrived) Fiji Ministers asked us to increase the £677,000 in para 1(ii) above,
to a full year’s grant i.e. £1.354m. The Treasury have said that this may be conceded
if FCO and ODM Ministers thought it necessary to achieve an amicable conclusion to
the constitutional talks. If it were conceded, the transitional loan which we offered
would no longer be required.
4. FCO views
Further to his letter of the 21st April (36), Lord Shepherd has asked that our Minister
be informed that the constitutional talks which were scheduled to last only a week
are now being continued into a third week and that the situation is ‘delicate and
brittle’. The main source of trouble is failure to agree on the franchise arrangements;
there have also been other troubles e.g. over citizenship and membership of the Fiji
Upper House. The Chief Minister is under pressure from the Fijian chiefs on one side
and his Indian colleagues on the other and on certain issues on the British side. He is
complaining about all the problems which are being thrown upon him and is
constantly harking back to the extra difficulty resulting from ODM’s insistence on
hardening the terms of aid. Lord Shepherd therefore is extremely anxious that aid
arrangements should appear generous to Ratu Mara as otherwise an amicable
conclusion of the constitutional talks will be unobtainable.4
5. Suggested line to be taken by the minister
She will no doubt wish the Chief Minister to unburden himself and then reply to the
effect that the proposed transitional arrangements are indeed generous, involving as
they do a carry forward of £2.4m. of C D & W money plus £lm. for the University of
the South Pacific (admittedly a regional scheme but with Fiji the chief beneficiary)
plus a further £677,000 of grant aid. By far the greater part of these sums will remain
unspent at independence and continue to be available for an indefinite period
thereafter. Nor will Britain be unsympathetic when we get the Development Plan and
are able to make arrangements for longer term aid on loan terms which we are sure
will not place any undue burden on Fiji. Technical assistance will also be continuing
at a high level (of the order of £1m. a year), and on the assumption that Fiji wish her
to do so, she will be taking over from next April all the heavy costs which would
otherwise have fallen on Fiji (over £lm. capital plus a considerable annual sum for
expatriate pensions and compensation) in accordance with her statement of March
11. She has thrown in an extra £245,000 to cover compensation and commutation
payments incurred by the Fiji Government up to March 31 1971. (In case there is any
doubt, it might be wise for her to mention that some account will be expected to be
taken of the extra resources thus released when longer term aid arrangements come
to be made.)
4 Shepherd told Hart it would be embarrassing if aid became a sticking point, delaying Fiji’s independence
for another six months and leaving the UK with a continuing responsibility for defence and internal
security. William Rodgers, minister of state at the Treasury, told Shepherd he supported the new aid
proposals if they were needed to secure agreement, but on condition they would be transitional to cover
the year of independence and would not be repeated (OD 34/301, no 34, Shepherd to Hart, 21 Apr 1970,
and no 35, Rodgers to Shepherd, 23 Apr 1970).
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6. She might therefore say that although she is very conscious of the burdens
which the Chief Minister has to bear, she cannot accept that her present offer is in
any way ungenerous or that it will require the Fiji Government to renounce any
essential part of their development objectives.
7. Nevertheless, taking into account everything she has heard from the Chief
Minister, the close and friendly relations between the two countries and to put the
generosity of the British offer beyond question, she is prepared exceptionally to
increase the additional grant of £677,000 already offered for the transitional period to
£1,354,000.
171 OD 34/301, no 41 30 Apr 1970
[Aid to Fiji]: ODM note by R B M King1 of a meeting between 
Mrs Hart and Ratu Sir K Mara and Mr Koya
The Minister had a discussion with Ratu Mara and Sidik Koya this morning. Miss
Emery of the FCO and I were present.
Ratu Mara reiterated the desire of the Fiji Government to be assured of continuing
grant aid for their Sixth Development Plan whereas our present proposals involved
transition to loan. He said that not only would the loan terms put the contents of the
Plan in jeopardy but that it would be very difficult to explain to the Fiji people that
transition to independence meant more onerous debt obligations. Mr Koya indicated
his support of these views.
The Minister pointed out the relatively marginal burden that loan servicing
charges would entail for the Fiji Government, said that it was a common pattern that
countries going to independence switched from grant to loan basis, and added that
she did not think that the change need affect in any substantial way, if at all, the
content of the Development Plan. I added that it should not necessarily be assumed
that if Fiji were not to go into independence we could continue to provide
development assistance on grant terms; we might well come to the conclusion that
in the circumstances of Fiji, even though still dependent, loan terms would be
appropriate.
In the course of further discussion, during which the Minister stressed the relief
that our new pensions policy would give the Fiji Government, Mrs Hart said that if it
would help the situation she would be willing to agree that the second £677,000 of
the £1.3m to be available to the Fiji Government in the current year should be in
grant form instead of loan form as proposed. Ratu Mara said that this would be a
welcome relief.
Mr Koya asked whether, if the Fiji Government decided to take over the sugar
industry HMG would be prepared to make a loan to Fiji for the purpose. In reply the
Minister said we would need to look at any such proposal in some detail and it might
be appropriate for the Fijian Government to seek assistance from other quarters. If
HMG agreed to a loan for this purpose it would have to come out of the total
allocation of aid to Fiji and could not be additional.
1 Deputy secretary, Ministry of Overseas Development.
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In conclusion Ratu Mara stressed the obligations which Fiji was willing to accept
in relation to economic and technical assistance to the smaller dependencies in the
Pacific area. The Minister expressed her appreciation of this and said that we should
take these obligations fully into account in assessing our future aid to Fiji.2
2 In the final settlement Fiji received £1.354 million grant aid for hospitals, schools and communications,
and a £1.25 million grant to the University of the South Pacific. Technical assistance, including
supplementation of expatriate salaries, amounted to £800,000.
172 FCO 32/630, no 7 1 May 1970
[United Nations]: letter from J D B Shaw (New York) to J H Lambert
on how Ratu Sir K Mara and Mr Koya might address the Committee 
of 24
Thank you for your letter of 28 April about Ratu Mara’s plans for coming to New
York. We were interested to see from your telegram No. 977 to Washington that Koya
will also be coming and that both he and Ratu Mara aim to be in New York at the
same time and to act in unison in any discussions they have on U.N. matters. This,
together with the announcement in your telegram to Fiji No. 189 about agreement
on a formula for future electoral arrangements, will obviously facilitate the
presentation of the outcome of the constitutional conference in the Committee of 24
and minimize the risk of undesirable complications.
2. It may be useful to set down our preliminary thoughts on the various ways in
which Ratu Mara and Koya could jointly present their views to the Committee of 24.
I should say from the start that whatever approach is eventually adopted they must
expect to be faced with questions on the following points:—
(a) Their views on willingness to accept some form of U.N. visitation between now
and independence.
(b) Why it is proposed to move to independence without first holding a further
General Election.
(c) Whether they regard the electoral arrangements put forward as an interim
solution to be applied for the first General Election, which will not take place until
after independence, as an adequate form of democratic representation fairly
reflecting the wishes of the people of Fiji as a whole and why it is not possible to
proceed at once to a common roll for all seats on the basis of one man one vote.
Presumably both Ratu Mara and Koya are individually perfectly capable of coping
with these questions and presumably they would be able to maintain a common front
on these key issues. We would not expect either of them to be subjected to hostile or
insistent questioning, particularly in the present relaxed atmosphere in the
Committee of 24 which extends even to the Communist representatives on the
Committee. But they should be left in no doubt that all three of these questions are
liable to be put to them in sympathetic and courteous but nonetheless unavoidable
terms.
3. Subject to the understanding that they would be expected not only to make a
presentation to members of the Committee but to be willing to answer these and
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other questions, discussion with the Committee of 24 could take the following
forms:—
(a) A purely private meeting with some or all of the individual members of the
Committee or with two or three groups of members of the Committee, possibly
combined with some form of hospitality.
(b) Appearance at a closed meeting of the Sub-Committee on Fiji (there would be
no record of a closed meeting and no publicity given to what was said).
(c) Appearance at a normal open meeting of the Sub-Committee on Fiji.
(d) Appearance at a normal open meeting of the main Committee of 24.
4. From the point of view of maximum impact there is no doubt that course (d)
would have considerable attraction and I do not think there would be much difficulty
in arranging in consultation with the Chairman of the Committee, Davidson Nicol,1
for both Ratu Mara and Koya to be asked to address the Committee as distinguished
visitors without their having to go through the somewhat undignified procedure of
applying to be heard as ‘petitioners’. I believe that a somewhat similar arrangement
may have been made in 1965 or 1966 when the New Zealanders arranged for the
Premier of the Cook Islands, Mr. Albert Henry, to address the Committee of 24 and
the Fourth Committee. For obvious reasons, we do not feel that it would be
appropriate or reasonable to expect Ratu Mara and Koya to address the Committee as
part of the U.K. Delegation. Given the disappointing experience last summer when
Cato2 came to New York to speak informally to members of the Committee about St.
Vincent, we would not regard (a) above as a satisfactory method of establishing
contact with the Committee for the rather different set of circumstances which now
apply in the case of Fiji. As between (b) and (c) there are certain attractions for
aiming for a closed meeting of the Sub-Committee on Fiji, such as the avoidance of
publicity, but this needs to be set against the limited impact which unrecorded views
expressed at a closed meeting would have on the membership at large. Sooner or
later the question of Fiji is bound to come up in the main committee and from this
point of view there would be everything to be said for having the views of the Chief
Minister and Koya actually on record whether in a meeting of the Sub-Committee on
Fiji or in the main Committee itself. There is in any case a risk that once the final
conference communique is issued and the results are a matter of public knowledge,
we may be asked in any case to make a short statement in the main Committee and
this could lead to a decision to place Fiji without further ado on the main
Committee’s agenda.
5. These are preliminary thoughts only and before reaching any final conclusion
we should like to take informal soundings, once we are in a position to do so, with
the Norwegian Chairman of the Sub-Committee on Fiji and with the New Zealand
Delegation in view of their earlier experience with Albert Henry and the Cook Islands
and also rather more cautiously to try and sound out the intentions of the Indian
Mission. We cannot of course judge from here the prospects for Ratu Mara and Koya
maintaining a common front in face of questioning on such key issues as willingness
to receive a Visiting Mission but other things being equal our preference at this stage
would be to advise in favour of a formal appearance of the two leaders before an open
1 of Sierra Leone. 2 Dr A S Cato, a native of St Vincent who was prominent in Barbados public life.
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meeting of either the main Committee or the Sub-Committee on Fiji. Bearing in
mind Ratu Mara’s standing as the future Prime Minister of an independent Fiji and
the wider impact achieved by a statement in front of all members of the Committee
of 24, there is something to be said for an appearance before the main Committee.
6. In conclusion I should say that we are reasonably confident that we would find
Davidson Nicol accommodating on such matters as agreeing to hold a meeting at
comparatively short notice and on the modalities of arranging for the Chief Minister
and Koya to address the Committee without going through the tedious and
unsuitable procedure of a request for a hearing as petitioners.
7. It may be better to leave any final decision on these points until Ratu Mara and
Koya actually arrive in New York but you will perhaps find it useful to have these
ideas before you for briefing purposes.
173 FCO 32/576, no 119 4 May 1970
[Fiji constitutional conference]: minute by E J Emery on the outcome
The Secretary of State has agreed to take the chair and to address the closing
meeting of the Fiji Constitutional Conference at Marlborough House at 10.00 a.m.
on Wednesday, 6 May. I attach a draft speech.1 The Secretary of State’s speech will be
followed by speeches by the Chief Minister of Fiji, the Honourable Ratu Sir Kamisese
Mara, K.B.E., and by the Leader of the Opposition the Honourable S. M. Koya, and
then by the ceremony of signing the report of the conference. After that the
Secretary of State might say ‘I declare the Fiji Independence Conference, 1970
closed.’
2. An advance copy of the report of the conference is at A.
3. The constitution
The conference has confirmed the request made in January by representatives of the
political parties in Fiji to Lord Shepherd during his visit there that Fiji should
become a fully sovereign and indenpendent state with the Queen as Head of State
and that Fiji should proceed to independence as soon as possible after a
Constitutional Conference and without an election before independence, the
independence constitution to set an agreed date for an election after independence.
The conference has also agreed that Fiji should seek membership of the
Commonwealth.
4. The most significant development during the conference was the agreement
reached between the leaders of the two Fiji parties about the composition and
electoral arrangements for a Lower House. We thus avoided the need which seemed a
possibility before the conference that Britain would have to ‘rule’ on this matter. The
arrangements agreed between the two leaders continue the present electoral system
of combined communal and ‘cross-voting’ (the latter now to be known as the
‘national roll’) but it increases the proportion of seats elected on the national roll as
1 Not printed. Stewart was unable to attend the closing session because of a debate on Cambodia in the
House of Commons. Shepherd spoke in his place.
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opposed to the communal rolls from 9 out of 36 to 25 out of 52 and it decreases the
‘general’ (i.e. mainly European) representation in the House.
5. The Constitution provides for an Upper House the purpose of which is largely
to protect the rights of Fijians and other minority communities and there will also be
other safeguards for such communities including a Statement of Fundamental
Rights and Freedoms and an Ombudsman.
6. The Secretary of State may like to take the opportunity of congratulating the
Chief Minister and the Leader of the Opposition on their success in reaching
agreement.
7. Defence
We have undertaken no defence or internal security commitment for an independent
Fiji. This was previously understood by the two leaders and was not raised at the
conference.
8. Aid
We shall continue to give development aid to Fiji after independence. There have
been talks outside the conference between Fiji Ministers and Mrs. Hart about this.2
We believe the Fiji Ministers to be satisfied with the result.
9. House for British high commissioner in Fiji
We had understood privately that the Chief Minister might at the conference offer
the present Chief Secretary’s house in Suva to the British Government as a residence
for our future High Commissioner. He has not yet done so. If he makes this gesture
during his final speech the Secretary of State is advised to express appreciation and
to accept.
2 See 170 & 171.
174 FCO 32/615, no 23 12 May 1970
[United Nations]: inward telegram no 1087 from Lord Caradon1 (New
York) to FCO on a discussion in the Committee of 24 and a proposal
that a UN visiting Mission should visit Fiji
At today’s meeting of the Committee, Ravne (Norway) as Chairman of the Sub-
Committee on Fiji said that the Sub-Committee welcomed the agreement reached at
the Constitutional Conference in London setting 10 October as the date for
independence. It had need the presence in New York of the Chief Minister and Koya
and recommended that they be invited to address the Committee. This was approved
without objection.
2. In his statement (copy by today’s bag) Ratu Mara expressed appreciation for
the Committee’s interest and for the opportunity to inform it of arrangements for
1 Minister of state for foreign and Commonwealth affairs and UK permanent representative at the UN,
1964–1970.
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Fiji’s independence. He paid a warm tribute to Koya and outlined their common
background of western education. From being political opponents they had come in
the last few months to question some of their earlier basic assumptions and to see
that understanding and tolerance were the first priority. Neither believed the class
struggle was relevant to the task of nation building. Ratu Mara then described the
progress of inter-party talks leading to the visit of Lord Shepherd and finally to the
Constitutional Conference. He referred to the two statements about representation
(your telegrams no. 189 and 191 to Fiji), which had previously been distributed to
the Committee, and concluded by quoting the joint statement signed by all members
of the two parties at the end of the Conference.
3. In reply to an enquiry by Wyse (Sierra Leone) about the Fiji Government’s
willingness to receive a visiting Fiji Mission, Ratu Mara said that the people of Fiji,
particularly the Fijians, had in the past associated such visits with an imposed
solution of their problems. He would not rule out such a visit, but without first
consulting people in Fiji on his return he could not commit his Government. He
himself had been partly responsible for previous decisions not to accept a visit.
4. Koya said that he had reservations about a visit at the present time. There was
still a section of the community in Fiji, representing certain vested interests, which
had tried to undermine the move to independence and might still make mischief. A
visit might also be considered a reflection on the definitive agreement reached in
London. After independence they might well be glad to welcome members of the
Committee. Fiji had nothing to hide. They were proud to have reached agreement on
the issue of independence and on avoiding political competition on this question.
They had decided to have no election before independence. Their aim was to achieve
a smooth transition in the hand-over of power to the elected representatives of the
people. It had been agreed to maintain a democratic structure through the
separation of powers and to protect the interests of minority groups. Finally, they
were determined to make independence a success and to avoid the pitfalls which
independence had brought in some other countries independence would be useless if
it turned to anarchy.
5. Mselle (Danzania) while welcoming the agreement on independence, said that
he needed more time before pronouncing on the detailed arrangements.
6. Neklessa (U.S.S.R.) said that it had been important to hear the opinions of
representatives of the people. The U.K. however should be condemned for its
stubborn opposition to General Assembly decisions about Visiting Missions. This was
the main reason for the unfavourable situation in the territory. He protested about
the lack of notice given to the committee about putting Fiji on its agenda. He had
only learned of the proposed hearing a few minutes before the meeting.
7. Maiga (Mali) said that it was expected that the U.K. would oppose Visiting
Missions but it was incomprehensible that the representatives of Fiji could not give a
clear cut opinion on this matter. The recent outcome on Bahrain2 showed that when
2 In 1968, when Britain announced its decision to withdraw from the Persian Gulf by the end of 1971, the
Shah of Iran responded by insisting that before Bahrain joined any wider union of Gulf states, there must
first be a plebiscite as a means of demonstrating whether Bahrain wished to join Iran instead. The Shah
dropped his claim in May 1970 when a UN Visiting Mission confirmed overwhelming support in Bahrain
for independence.
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the U.N. was fully informed about a situation it could take appropriate decisions. Now
that the Fijian representatives had been heard in New York it was a fair quid pro quo
to ask that the Committee should be allowed to go to Fiji.
8. In reply to an enquiry by Kouame (Ivory Coast) as to whether the proceedings
were intended to lead to a definitive conclusion on Fiji, the Chairman indicated that
the item would be discussed in detail at a later stage. However, he was sure that
members of the committee would not have wished to have lost the valuable
opportunity of hearing the Fijian leaders while they were in New York.
9. Deressa (Ethiopia) spoke appreciatively of the value of direct contact with the
Fijian leaders. They had demonstrated their seriousness of purpose on the issue of
independence, and he had listened to them with pride.
10. Shaw (U.K.) paid tribute on my behalf to the Fijian leaders who had given a
striking example of unanimity and constructive agreement. Fiji had presented a
unique political problem. there would be later opportunities to reply to the
discordant comments of the U.S.S.R. he quoted from Lord Shepherd’s final
statement at the London Conference, and referred to the appropriateness of Fiji
moving to independence in this anniversary year. (Text by Bag).
11. Psoncak (Yugoslavia) also thanked the Fijian representatives, but thought
they might have misunderstood the purpose of a visiting Mission. There was no
intention of creating trouble among certain sections of the people.
12. Stanoev (Bulgaria) after quoting from a recent article in Le Monde
questioned the genuineness of racial harmony in the territory, and referred to the
virtual monopoly of an Australian company in the Sugar Industry. The Fijian reply
about a Visiting Mission had been evasive.
13. In reply Ratu Mara said that they had thought that once the Conference was
over they should lose no time in informing the Committee of its results. They could
not have done this before the Conference. They were sorry if this had caused
difficulties for certain delegations: they could have avoided coming to the U.S. and
instead gone straight home, but it was a Fijian custom to show courtesy. The Sugar
Company which had been mentioned had already given notice that it wished to
relinquish its holdings in Fiji in a year or two’s time. He was sorry if the U.K. was
being blamed for not allowing Visiting Missions. Their relationship with the U.K.
was not that of a dictatorship. The U.K. had always proceeded by consultation and
agreement. Even if the U.K. had previously agreed to a Visiting Mission this might
not have been allowed. He was prepared to consult his colleagues and might now
have a better chance of persuading those who in the past had been against a visit.
But he could not commit his Parliamentary colleagues without first consulting
them all.
14. Fiji had voluntarily ceded itself to the U.K. and had never been conquered.
The Fijians had been brought up to find solutions for themselves. Their country was
unique in having welcomed an immigrant population.
14. Sen (India) also thanked the visitors. The sole purpose of the Committee of
24 was to speed up independence. India was sensitive to what had been achieved and
would always welcome the independence of Non-Self-Governing Territories. For
various reasons the forthcoming independence of Fiji, firstly as an Asian country,
secondly as a multi-racial society, and thirdly as a society with a large community of
Asian origin, provided a special source of satisfaction to India. There was no need
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either to foreclose the Committee’s debate on Fiji or to prejudge the Chief Minister’s
decision on a Visiting Mission.3
15. Davidson Nicol concluded by claiming that the Committee should be
regarded as a peace maker. To hear leaders of both parties presenting their views to
the Committee had verged on the historic. He hoped members would understand the
great trouble taken by the Chief Minister and the leader of the Opposition in coming
to New York, and their courtesy in doing so.4
3 J D Hennings of the UK High Commission, New Delhi, informed the FCO in May 1970 that reactions in
India to Fiji’s constitutional conference had been ‘remarkably subdued’, with little press comment. There
had been no official comment by the Ministry of External Affairs, and the High Commission thought it ill-
advised to enquire. Hennings commented: ‘I think we can conclude that in the Government of India’s view
the compromises of the conference show that their interventions with us before the conference have
borne fruit, and that as the representatives of the Indian community in Fiji have been partner to what has
now been decided it must be for that community to determine how their interests can best be furthered in
the circumstances of an independent Fiji’ (FCO 32/574, no 54, Hennings to Emery, 22 May 1970).
4 Whether Britain should continue its representation on the Committee of 24 had been the subject of long-
standing debate between the UK Mission in New York and Whitehall. It came to prominence from the end
of 1967. Caradon argued consistently that the UK should not relinquish its membership and should
instead vigorously defend its record. Britain eventually withdrew from the Committee in Jan 1971,
arguing that it had become too doctrinaire and that the task of decolonisation was in any case virtually
complete. For background, see S R Ashton & Wm Roger Louis, eds, East of Suez and the Commonwealth
1964–1971 (BDEEP, 2004) part II, chapter 6.
175 FCO 32/574, no 56 27 May 1970
[New Zealand and Fiji]: letter from Sir A Galsworthy (Wellington)1 to
E J Emery on the reaction in New Zealand to the approach of
independence
In your letter to Jock Duncan2 of 11 May on the outcome of the Fiji Constitutional
Conference you said you would be interested to learn local reactions.
2. So far as the New Zealanders are concerned, the Government is clearly very
pleased indeed with the outcome of the Conference, which turned out far better than
they had dared to hope. They are particularly pleased about the new interim electoral
arrangements for the first Legislature after Independence, about the agreement to
appoint a Royal Commission thereafter to make recommendations for the most
appropriate method of election and representation for Fiji, and about the
constitutional arrangements relating to the amendment of the electoral provisions
after the Royal Commission has reported. The feeling on the part of the New Zealand
authorities is that these arrangements ought, if anything can, to take the heat out of
the electoral question for the first two or three years at any rate after Independence;
and they regard this as a considerable advantage. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in
talks with me, have paid sincere tribute to British skill in helping to bring the
Conference to so satisfactory a conclusion. On the basis of this outcome they are now
going ahead with arrangements to appoint a New Zealand Commissioner—the Prime
Minister, Mr Holyoake, is in touch with Ratu Mara on this subject.
1 Galsworthy was now UK high commissioner to New Zealand.
2 J S R Duncan, minister, UK High Commission, Canberra, 1969–1971.
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3. The New Zealand press has also generally welcomed the outcome of the
Constitutional Conference, though press comment has tended to dwell on the
underlying difficulties of the Fiji situation, and there has been no tendency to
euphoria. There has, however, been no suggestion that Britain is laying down its
responsibilities prematurely and landing New Zealand with a possibly awkward baby
on its doorstep. The general conclusion that has been drawn by the press is that it is
now up to New Zealand to provide Fiji with the help and guidance that the New
member of the Commonwealth will need; and some impatience has been expressed
in the press that New Zealand has left it so long before setting about the
establishment of a Commission in Suva.
4. The only slightly critical comment in the press as been on the theme that the
offer of future aid which we are said to have made to Mara after the Conference came
as a disappointment to him. George Laking3 asked me the other day if I could give
him some information about these aid talks (my telegram to you No. 291 of 23 May
refers).4 I should be most grateful for any information I can pass on to Laking in
confidence. The New Zealanders are now really preparing to take a close and friendly
interest in Fiji and are very conscious of their responsibilities in this respect.
5. On one thing I am quite clear. Nobody here feels that Britain has been forcing
the pace in withdrawing from our Pacific responsibilities. The general feeling is that
we had no option but to respond to the joint demands of the Alliance and Federation
parties for Independence, and that the situation in Fiji would have deteriorated
seriously had we not responded as we did. The New Zealand authorities are also
grateful to us for the care we have taken to do our best to endow Fiji with a viable
political system prior to our departure, and appreciative of the degree of success we
have been able to achieve.
6. The main grumble on the part of the New Zealand authorities, particularly the
Defence Department, is that they cannot get the Australians to take an interest in
what happens to Fiji after Independence, despite the New Zealand contention that of
things went wrong in Fiji Australian interests would be very directly affected. We can
expect the New Zealanders to push this pretty hard at the ANZAM Chiefs of Staff
meeting in July.
3 G R Laking, secretary of foreign affairs and permanent head, Prime Minister’s Dept, New Zealand,
1967–1972.
4 cf 170 & 171.
176 FCO 32/630, no 21A 2 July 1970
[United Nations]: letter from J D B Shaw to E J Emery on a proposal
that representatives of the Committee of 24 might be invited to Fiji’s
independence celebrations1
I was interested to see your letter to Mr. Lloyd in Suva with its accounts of your
contacts with New Zealand House concerning Ratu Mara’s attitude to a Visiting
Mission by the Committee of 24. It is now approaching two months since I reported
1 After the general election held on 18 June 1970, a Conservative government is now in office in the UK.
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in my letter 4/7/136 of 15 May on the visit to New York by the Chief Minister and
Mr. Koya and on their appearance before the Committee of 24 on 12 May.2 I am
glad to say that during this period there has not been a single enquiry from any
member of the Committee of 24 about Fiji or about the attitude of the Chief
Minister to a Visiting Mission following his return from New York. With each week
it seems increasingly less likely that the Committee of 24, with its heavy backlog of
work for the present year, will find time to engage in substantive discussion of Fiji,
much less to think in serious terms of mounting a Visiting Mission before
independence.
2. As indicated in my letter of 15 May, the closer we get to independence the less
convincing the argument appears for a Visiting Mission, particularly as in the case of
Fiji there is no question of independence coming immediately in the wake of ‘a final
act of self-determination’. Moreover, following the joint appearance of the Chief
Minister and Mr. Koya, it can hardly be claimed that a Mission is desirable in order to
investigate the views of a dissenting political minority. While one must always allow
for the unexpected we should expect most member of the Committee in such
circumstances to be more influenced by the euphoria of impending independence,
and by the need to think in terms of their future relations with Fiji as a fellow U.N.
Member State.
3. However this is not to say that we shall get away without formal discussion of
Fiji in the Committee of 24 between now and 10 October. We must certainly count
on receiving a letter from Ravne, Chairman of the Sub-Committee on Fiji, with the
customary annual enquiry about our readiness to accept a Visiting Mission. While
there has been no effort to reconvene the Sub-Committee on Fiji since the Chief
Minister and Mr. Koya were here in May, procedural requirements make formal
action of this kind unavoidable and a letter of enquiry can be expected sometime in
the course of the next two months.
4. Our advice, based on present indications, is that it would be sufficient to
return a temporising or tactfully negative reply to this enquiry. However, the effect of
this would in our view be much alleviated and a favourable climate created for Fiji’s
application for U.N. membership, if it were to be accompanied at the same time by an
indication that the Government of Fiji hoped to invite representatives of the
Committee of 24 to be present at the independence celebrations. I think it would
probably be sufficient if the invitations were limited to the Chairman of the
Committee of 24 (Davidson Nicol of Sierra Leone) and to the Chairman of the Sub-
Committee or Fiji (Ravne of Norway). It is quite possible that with the pressure of the
General Assembly both Nicol and Ravne might find it difficult to get away at the time
of independence. But the main point would be that a gesture had been made.
Although there would be some advantage in inviting Nicol and Ravne in their formal
capacities (this would incidentally solve the problem of responsibility for fares), even
on a private basis I am sure that the gesture towards the Committee would be well
received. In any case I would suggest that it would be unnecessary to invite more
than two, or at most three, representatives of the Committee. On the basis of recent
experience an open-ended invitation to the Committee is only likely to result in
proposals for quite excessively large representation.
2 cf 172, 174.
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5. I do not believe that there would be any risk of selected representatives of the
Committee, who visited Fiji in response to an invitation to attend the independence
celebrations, engaging in extra-mural activities such as scrutinising constitutional
and electoral arrangements. We should wish to make this clear from the start in the
course of preliminary soundings, and in any case such activities would be out of
character for both Nicol and Ravne. On the basis outlined, I am satisfied that we can
discount the speculative comment by Venkataswaran reported by the New Zealand
High Commission in Delhi.
6. There is of course no question of the Committee of 24 having any locus standi
in relation to Fiji after independence, and I take it that the penultimate sentence of
paragraph 3 of your letter was simply intended to suggest that inter-communal
relations in Fiji are likely to be somewhat less sensitive at the time of independence
than in the months immediately preceding the next general election.
177 FCO 46/537 31 July 1970
‘Fiji: defence’: minute by A B Urwick1 on why the UK is unable to
retain responsibility for external defence or internal security
Problem
The Chief Minister of Fiji, accompanied by the Leader of the Opposition, intends to
visit Britain in August for discussions with H.M.G. He has indicated that one of the
subjects he wishes to discuss is ‘defence’. He may ask whether H.M.G.’s policy of not
retaining a formal commitment for Fiji’s external defence or internal security after
independence on 10 October remains unchanged.
Recommendation
2. That this policy should be reaffirmed if it is queried by the Chief Minister of
Fiji, but that we should at the same time undertake to consider sympathetically any
request he may make for training and supplies.
Background
3. During discussions leading up to the Fiji Constitutional Conference in
April/May 1970, the Chief Minister and the Leader of the Opposition in Fiji were
aware that H.M.G. would not accept any defence or internal security commitment for
an independent Fiji.2 It was tacitly agreed that this would not be discussed during the
Conference.
4. On 30 April during an informal talk with Lord Shepherd (then Minister of
State) the Chief Minister confirmed that he fully accepted there would be no
question of a defence guarantee from the United Kingdom after independence.
5. After the Conference the Chief Minister called at the Ministry of Defence and
was seen by the Minister (Administration). The Chief Minister voiced his concern
that the existing U.K. commitment to maintain internal security in Fiji would be
withdrawn at independence and said that he would like that security ensured for 10
1 FCO Defence Dept. 2 cf 154, 158, 166.
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years. The Minister (Administration) explained the difficulties in the context of
withdrawal from Singapore.
6. H.M.G.’s decision to reverse the policy of withdrawal of all British forces from
their stations in Malaysia and Singapore by the end of 1971 may encourage Fijian
leaders to hope that H.M.G. will also be ready to reverse the previous Government’s
decision not to give any formal defence commitment to Fiji after independence.3 The
Chief Minister is coming to London in August and will be seeing Ministers in the
Foreign and Commonwealth Office and in the Ministry of Defence. It is therefore
necessary to determine precisely the line which Ministers should take in discussion
with the Chief Minister of Fiji if he raises this point.
7. The decisions taken so far on British participation in five power defence
arrangements in the Malaysia/Singapore region do not substantially affect the
arguments against retaining any formal defence commitment to Fiji after
independence. Ministers agreed before Lord Carrington’s4 departure on his Far East
tour that it would be desirable to replace our present automatic obligation to go to
Malaysia’s defence with a commitment only to consult in the event of external attack
on Malaysia and Singapore. It was also agreed that the U.K. would continue to have no
commitment to assist Malaysia and Singapore in maintaining internal security, but
that we would if required be prepared to give assurances that our definition of external
attack would cover ‘externally promoted subversion’. Ministers further agreed that the
British military presence in Malaysia/Singapore should no longer be preponderant and
that the Defence Secretary should indicate to our four Commonwealth partners in the
region that the scale of our presence was unlikely significantly to exceed a limited
number of frigates or destroyers, an infantry battalion with supporting units and some
maritime reconnaissance aircraft and helicopters.
8. Our much smaller military presence in Malaysia/Singapore would make it
necessary, if we were called upon to come to the assistance of Fiji, to send troops
from the U.K. The present Fiji Internal Security Plan envisages that, in the worst
case, at least a brigade would be needed to help preserve order in the event of
communal disturbances between the native Fijian and Indian communities, which
are roughly equal in numbers. The battalion based in Malaysia/Singapore after 1971
would probably not be available for use in Fiji, as it is likely to be integrated into a
local command structure and we do not at present envisage having transport aircraft
permanently stationed in the area. The Defence Secretary was told by the Malaysian
Government during his talks in Kuala Lumpur on 29 July that ‘any link between the
3 A new five-power agreement (involving the UK, Australia, New Zealand and the two local governments)
was concluded at London in Apr 1971. It replaced the former Anglo–Malaysian defence agreement, which
the Labour government had intended to end by withdrawing all UK forces by the end of 1971. Under the
new five-power agreement negotiated by a Conservative government, the UK maintained naval and air
units, together with a skeleton military force, as a guarantee against external aggression. The main UK
concerns were that the agreement should not extend to internal security, that Australia should play a full
part, and that there should be a commitment to consultation only in the event of an emergency. The
agreement lasted until 1976 when it lapsed and all British forces were withdrawn. For the governments of
Malaysia and Singapore, the agreement provided insurance during what for them was a period of defence
readjustment. Lee Kuan Yew in Singapore thought it would provide stability and reassure investors. These
concerns were deemed more important than an unlikely communist attack or a recurrence of Indonesian
aggression against Malaysia. S R Ashton & Wm Roger Louis eds, East of Suez and the Commonwealth
1964–1971 (BDEEP, 2004) part I, p lviii and doc 114.
4 Secretary of state for defence, 1970–1974.
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Five Power Defence Arrangements and SEATO and any wider peace-keeping or
national role, e.g. Hong Kong or Brunei, which the United Kingdom wished to play
in the area would create political difficulty for Malaysia’.
9. The serious manpower shortage in the British Army has recently led the
Defence Secretary to recommend to his colleagues that they should not fully reverse
the previous Government’s policy of reducing the order of battle of the British Army
by a further nine infantry battalions. (These nine units are however to be given the
option of remaining at company strength.) The 46th British infantry battalions to
which the British Army would be reduced in September 1972 will be insufficient to
meet the U.K.’s defence commitments during the 1970s, which the Army
Department recently estimated would require between 51–56 battalions depending
on the requirements of Northern Ireland. The Defence Secretary is likely to press in
September for the retention of the Gurkha Brigade on a five battalion basis as a
means of meeting the gap between our commitments and the minimum manpower
resources required to fulfil them. But even this would not assist us directly in
meeting any commitment to Fiji, because the use of Gurkhas would raise political
difficulties on account of the existence of a large Indian community there. In any
case four of the five Gurkhas battalions are already earmarked for the Hong Kong
garrison and the remaining battalion will probably be needed for Brunei.
10. The most serious potential threat facing Fiji is that of communal
disturbances between native Fijians and Indians. At present the internal security
situation is quiet, but after independence H.M.G. will no longer exercise ultimate
control of the internal policies of the Fiji Government. H.M.G. have not hitherto
extended internal security guarantees to dependent territories when they became
independent. We have for example taken care to avoid becoming involved in
communal disorders between Malays and Chinese in Malaysia. Moreover involvement
in the internal security problems of Fiji after independence might be embarrassing
to us in our relations with India, in view of the large Indian community there. The
Northern Ireland situation shows how many troops may be required to control an
internal security situation.
11. There is at present no external threat to Fiji and, should one ever arise, it
would be more appropriate following the reduction in our military presence in South
East Asia for Fiji to turn for assistance in the first instance to New Zealand and
Australia, her two Commonwealth neighbours. New Zealand has no formal defence
commitment to Fiji and she is not prepared to undertake any obligation to assist in
the maintenance of internal security after independence, but the defence links
between the two countries are close. Under an agreement which is due to expire on
independence (but which we expect to be renewed), New Zealand provides training
and other military assistance to the Fiji Military Force. They also provide a New
Zealand officer to command the Fiji Military Force and this arrangement is to
continue after independence.
12. Another factor to be taken into account is that the extension of an external
defence guarantee to Fiji would set an undesirable precedent for other dependent
territories, such as British Honduras, which are soon to become independent.
13. The Fiji Military Force (FMF) is made up of 152 regulars, 601 territorials and
approximately 2,000 reservists. We believe it is adequate to control any minor
internal disorders, but that it would not be able to cope with widespread communal
disturbances. The officers and men of the FMF are mostly of Fijian origin and could
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not therefore be relied upon to be entirely impartial in the event of inter-racial strife
between native Fijians and Indians.
14. The United Kingdom at present provides assistance to the FMF through
collaborative training exercises in Fiji and by extending cadet training facilities in the
U.K. It is intended that both these forms of assistance should continue after
independence. We are also looking into the possibility that a limited number of FMF
officers should receive training in an internal security role in Hong Kong after
independence and also that Internal security training teams from Hong Kong should
go to Fiji.
15. This submission has been cleared with Pacific and Indian Ocean Department,
South West Pacific Department and at official level with the Ministry of Defence.5
5 For the Aug defence talks with Mara and Koya, see FCO 32/632. The defence negotiations were protracted
and not finally settled until Jan 1971. The Fiji ministers argued they were entitled to assistance, because
Fiji had effectively skipped the usual stage of internal self-government and had moved immediately to
independence. The UK itself recognised that it would be prudent to lend support to Fiji’s military forces.
Fiji was seen as the ‘hub’ of the Pacific. If law and order broke down soon after independence it would
damage the ideal of a multi-racial society, drive tourists away, and nullify the development aid invested.
Under the Jan 1971 settlement, the UK provided £75,000 for Fiji’s military forces, and another £10,000 for
rifles if they could be obtained at low cost. In total over the first two years of independence the UK agreed
to provide £100,000 in military aid and £300,000 towards the capital cost entailed in creating a mobile
police force (FCO 24/1138 and FCO 46/537 for details).
178 FCO 32/632, no 77 12 Aug 1970
[Sugar]: FCO record of a conversation with Ratu Sir K Mara and 
Mr Koya on Britain’s negotiations to join the EEC and the
implications for Fiji’s sugar industry
After welcoming the visitors, Mr. Ford1 explained the current position in our
negotiations to join the EEC. The negotiations had formally opened with Mr.
Barber’s2 statement in Luxembourg on 30 June, a copy of which the Chief Minister
had probably seen. This statement set out our negotiating position, with reference to
Mr. Brown’s earlier statement to the WEU in 1967.3 The first bilateral Ministerial
meeting had taken place on 21 July when we had tried to get negotiations moving by
seeking Community agreement to start work at an official level on the subjects to be
covered in negotiations. We had put forward subjects for discussion, including the
problem of the CSA, and secured the Community’s agreement to a fact-finding study
being started and preparatory work undertaken to clear the way for the next
Ministerial meeting. We had put in a factual paper on the workings of the CSA which
the Community would now study. The Community Deputies would meet Sir C.
O’Neill4 in mid-September, and again a fortnight later, to discuss the agenda for the
1 J A Ford, assistant under-secretary of state, FCO.
2 Anthony Barber, chancellor of the Exchequer, 1970–1974.
3 See 159, Annex A, and 160, para 9.
4 Deputy under-secretary of state, FCO, and leader at official level of British delegation to negotiate UK
entry into the EEC, 1969–1972. See Britain’s entry into the European Community: report on the
negotiations of 1970–1972 by Sir Con O’Neill, ed, Sir David Hannay (London: 2000).
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next Ministerial meeting which we expected towards the end of October. We did not
know how negotiations would work out but hoped that putting forward factual
problems at an early stage would enable us later, when we needed to find solutions to
these problems, to be talking about the same facts with the Six. The timetable of
negotiations was still unclear but they would probably last throughout 1971. If all
went well we should be able to see a possible result by the end of July of that year and
by the end of 1971 we might be ready for the process of ratification. This process
might take nine months and so the earliest we might expect to enter the Community
would be the beginning of 1973. The Chief Minister would have seen from statements
by PMG that we considered the question of transitional periods to be one of the more
important ones. We had suggested to the Community an initiation period of one year
to enable preliminary legislation and other related matters to be carried out before
we began to feel the effects of entry.
2. On sugar the position of HMG was clear from the statement of Mr. Brown,
which Mr. Barber had later mentioned. The assurance given in 1967 by Lord Beswick
still applied,5 that we would use our best endeavours in negotiations to cover the
interests of developing CSA member countries. It was still too early to say how things
would go on sugar. We had not yet reached the point of negotiating on this particular
question. We had merely agreed to study sugar and submitted our own paper. It
would probably be a good many weeks before further progress was made.
3. Ratu Mara said that the purpose of his visit was to impress on HMG the vital
nature of sugar and the guaranteed U.K. market to Fiji. The advent of independence
increased the importance to Fiji of these factors. The country had been brought up
on a sugar-based economy and shortly the Government would inherit the
responsibility of running the country. Hitherto that responsibility had rested with
HMG, but now it would rest with them. The whole of Fiji’s future depended on sugar,
as an economic base from which they might diversify into other industries.
4. They knew that the position until 1974 was guaranteed. But what they had
heard had not assured them that the question of Fiji’s quota on sugar would be a
breaking point in the U.K. negotiations with the EEC. There was real anxiety about
how they were to sell sugar outside the present arrangements.
5. Fiji recognised that Lord Beswick’s assurance was the most they could hope
for from HMG. However it would be utterly wrong for HMG to think that Fiji could
continue to survive without sugar. Fiji was trying to diversify but still relied on
sugar. Even a lower volume of sugar sales to the U.K. at CAP prices would not be a
satisfactory solution. This would cause grave unemployment problems for Fiji. The
Chief Minister expressed his anxiety about the future and his hope that Britain’s ‘best
endeavours’ would materialise into something more concrete.
6. Mr. Koya said Fiji was alarmed at apparent French insistence that no
modifications could be made to the CAP; if the CSA were to collapse after 1974, the
ISA would probably collapse also. He thought the whole question of sugar exports
after that date should be considered in a world wide context.
7. Mr. Ford said this was one of the points which would be clearer when
negotiations had progressed somewhat. The EEC countries were not happy about the
present way in which the CAP was working. M. Mansholt6 had referred to the need to
5 See 160, para 8.
6 Dr Sicco Mansholt (Netherlands), vice-president of the European Commission from 1968.
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consider the workings of the CAP. In July in the U.K. he had referred to the need to
cut prices and hence production within the Six. However we should look at this with
a certain amount of healthy scepticism since M. Mansholt was a member of the
Commission while some of the Six had political pressures which made reducing
sugar surpluses a difficult task. It was fair to say that the Six were beginnings to see
the problems of costs and surpluses in the CAP; negotiations would provide them
with an opportunity for a critical look at the policy.
8. Mr. Ford then said that the sort of problem raised by Mr. Koya could be
discussed in the context of negotiations.
9. Ratu Mara referred to the exchange of information between Britain and the
Six. He asked whether the paper we had tabled emphasised the vital nature of the
sugar industry to Fiji. He mentioned that France boasted of the aid given to former
colonies, but it was trade that Fiji wanted. Mr. Ford confirmed we had this point very
much in mind.
10. In answer to a question from Ratu Mara, Mr. Ford confirmed, by reading out
the assurance given by Mr. Brown, that the present CSA arrangements were
guaranteed until the end of 1974. He said that it was difficult at present to see what
arrangements would finally be reached in negotiations. In answer to a question from
Mr. Koya, Mr. Ford said that the Six recognised that sugar was a special subject in
negotiations. Mr. Koya referred to Fiji’s concern that a package deal on the CAP
might be worked out, and advocated that sugar should be withdrawn from a general
discussion of the CAP. Mr. Ford said that the way in which sugar was being dealt with
in negotiations showed that it was a subject in its own right.
11. In answer to a question from Ratu Mara, Mr. Pettitt7 said that the present
International Sugar Agreement was drafted in such a way that if the EEC joined it
would be as a single member. Probably if Britain joined the EEC before the present
Agreement expired her individual membership would be at risk; but the problem was
academic as the present Agreement expired in 1973, and any successor agreement
would be drafted to meet the needs of the EEC at that time. Ratu Mara commented
that it was sad to see the prospect of the ISA collapsing after the great efforts that had
gone into its creation. Mr. Dowling8 explained Fiji’s concern that the ISA quotas
might fall through, if and when the CSA collapsed. This would lead to a complete
disintegration of the present world structure for sugar exports. Mr. Ford said we were
well aware of the importance of the U.K. Market to Fiji. We would try to get
arrangements in negotiations which would not upset world sugar arrangements and
would safeguard CSA interests. It was impossible to consider at this stage the nature
of world sugar arrangements until the completion of our negotiations, since it was
impossible to tell what we would get out of the Community to ensure that these
arrangements would not collapse.
12. Ratu Mara commented on the problem of the U.K. as a member of EEC and
no longer a member of the ISA. Where would Fiji’s market for sugar be then? Mr.
Ford said we did not see Fiji losing her market just like that. We hoped to reach
agreement with the EEC on arrangements for sugar to take account of the position
of CSA members. These arrangements would form part of a continuing process over
7 R G Pettitt, first secretary, FCO. 8 B Dowling, Colonial Sugar Refining Company.
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a period of time. The arrangements we hoped to negotiate would be for the long
term, but in the field of sugar as in other fields, whatever long term arrangements
were negotiated would almost certainly not apply on 1 January 1975. There would be
a transitional period between the CSA as it now existed and the long term
arrangements. However, it was impossible to go into detail at the present time, when
we were only at the stage of establishing facts as a basis for negotiation.
13. Mr Pettitt said we were not convinced that the international sugar market
contained the stability for the future, which it had at present. We could not look
forward with confidence to the free market for sugar being a major earner of foreign
exchange for Fiji. Ratu Mara commented that Fiji looked to it in hope. Mr. Koya
asked why we had no confidence in this. Mr. Pettitt said it depended upon the EEC
reaching satisfactory arrangements on sugar. These the Community were certainly
trying to reach. Mr. Koya commented that the future of the ISA therefore depended
upon the Community. Mr. Hadley9 commented that the future of the ISA was subject
to future policies of all the big producers. We hoped that a new ISA would be
negotiated to replace the present one when it expired in 1973. In this respect it was
helpful that our negotiations with the EEC would probably be settled before this
date, so that the re-negotiation of the ISA could be carried out in the knowledge of
what had been done in our negotiations. It would therefore perhaps be possible to re-
negotiate a meaningful ISA in 1973. Mr. Dowling commented that the ISA had not
the stability of the CSA. There was cold comfort in an international commodity
agreement to replace the CSA.
14. Mr. Ford, summing up, said we were going into negotiations to get the best
terms we could. The commitment given by Lord Beswick still stood. It was not
possible to predict what terms we would achieve, but there would be no abrupt cut-
off in the CSA at the end of 1974. It was most probable that there would be a
transitional period to long term arrangements, resulting from our best endeavours,
and we should continue to bear in mind the importance for Fiji of the CSA. Mr
Dowling said it was important that the question of the USA should not be left over to
the review of the CAP for sugar in 1974/75. Mr. Ford confirmed that this question
would be dealt with in negotiations. In answer to a question from Mr. Koya, Mr. Ford
said that no transitional period would apply until 1974. Whatever period was
negotiated would apply after that date. The length of the period would depend on
negotiations.
15. Mr. Ford then raised the question of association with the enlarged
Communities for Fiji. This had come up in the talks the Chief Minister had had with
British officials in May 1969. The discussion then had taken place within the
framework of two possibilities: that Fiji would either be independent or still
dependent by the time we entered the EEC. These possibilities had now been
clarified; Fiji would be independent before our negotiations were concluded. Mr.
Ford pointed out that if we pressed for an offer of association from the Six for Fiji,
Fiji would have to negotiate the actual terms of association herself. Last year we had
received the impression that Fiji had had doubts about the desirability of association,
in view of their close relations, involving preferences, with Australia. Fiji was
developing tourism and, we thought, would be looking towards the Far East and the
9 D A Hadley, Ministry of Agriculture and Food.
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United States for her markets rather than towards Europe. Ratu Mara commented at
this point that association had nothing to do with sugar. Mr. Ford agreed.
16. Ratu Mara then said Fiji would wish to consider association when and not
until they had settled the question of their sugar exports. There would certainly be
difficulties for them in raising a tariff wall against their immediate neighbours. Mr.
Ford said it would be useful to know if Fiji wished us to press for an offer of
association from the Six. Ratu Mara said that they would like such an offer but, in
answer to a question from Mr. Ford, Ratu Mara said they had not yet decided
whether they really wanted association.
17. In answer to a question from Mr. Ford, Ratu Mara said that Fiji considered
the CET on coconut oil a considerable barrier, which it would be difficult to
surmount. They already had a disadvantage so far as freight was involved, and a
further disadvantage of a tariff would rule out European markets for Fiji’s oil
products. He confirmed that Fiji’s interest lay in edible oils.
18. In answer to another question from Mr. Ford, Ratu Mara said that Fiji was
not eager to seek new markets in Japan, since the Japanese proved hard bargainers
when it came to primary products. Mr. Koya commented that Japan was ‘the France
of the Pacific’.
19. Mr. Ford asked whether Australia would be a useful market for oil products.
Ratu Mara said it would not. It was probably easier for Fiji to diversify her coconut
and copra industries than her sugar industry. He foresaw an expanding market in
these products. At the same time this was a long-term prospect, since coconut trees
required up to ten years to mature. Future timber and pulp industries might be
developed, but this would take 10 to 15 years.
20. Mr. Ford said he was most grateful to the Chief Minister and leader of the
Opposition for having spared time from their very full programme to come to the
FCO for this discussion. This sort of meeting was of very great value. It was all too
easy for those charged with the responsibility for negotiations on great issues to
forget the implications of their negotiations for individuals. The Chief Minister and
Mr. Koya had eloquently described what sugar meant to our Fijian friends and what
the CSA meant in human terms. This was something that was of great importance
and that we should not forget. Ratu Mara commented that he and Mr. Koya
understood the problems for the U.K. in entering the EEC. They wished us luck in
our negotiations.
179 FCO 32/612, no 16 14 Aug 1970
[EEC]: FCO record of a conversation between Mr Rippon1 and Ratu
Sir K Mara and Mr Koya on the implications for Fiji of Britain’s
negotiations to join the EEC
The Chief Minister began by saying that Fiji had for some time had anxieties about
our entry into the E.E.C., going back to Mr. George Brown’s statement.2 The
1 Geoffrey Rippon, chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, 1970–1972, head of the government delegation
negotiating Britain’s entry to the EEC.
2 See 159, Annex A, and 160, para 9.
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question was what would happen after 1974. They knew that we expected a
transitional period, but transitional to what? Mr. Rippon said that two of the main
problems for us in our negotiations were New Zealand and Sugar. The Six were
themselves well aware of these problems. Fiji was of course changing now from a
dependency to an independent state. There would then be the possibility of
association with the E.E.C. We could not give any firm assurances at this stage but
the problem of Fiji was well understood and would be taken care of in the
negotiations. It was a similar problem to that of Mauritius and the Caribbean
countries. The Chief Minister remarked that the size of Fiji’s problem should not be
such as to worry the E.E.C. Mr. Koya expressed some doubt whether association
would help Fiji. Mr. Rippon said that this was something that would have to be
considered. There could be no certainty at this stage.
2. In answer to a question Mr Rippon outlined the future programme of the
negotiations. We would start by seeking agreement with the Community on the facts
of our case. Mr. Koya asked whether we would deal with the case of each of the
countries affected by our negotiations separately or all together. Mr. Rippon said that
some would be dealt with separately and others, for instance the Caribbean
countries, probably all together. Mr. Rippon remarked that in the Community, even
with majority voting, no country could really be forced to do something which they
did not accept. The Community would be bound to have regard for our existing
arrangements including our treaty agreements. The Chief Minister said that one of
Fiji’s main worries was that we would not allow the question of sugar to be a
breaking point in our negotiations. It was important for them that we should reach
an agreement on sugar before our entry into the E.E.C. Mr. Rippon said that this was
why we were now seeking the E.E.C’s views on the sugar question and why sugar
would be a part of our negotiations. The Chief Minister said that there was a danger
of the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement collapsing without the United Kingdom’s
continued support.
3. The Chief Minister asked whether it would be possible for Mr. Rippon to visit
Fiji on his visit to the Far East. It would be very difficult for him to explain to his
people why it was not possible for Mr. Rippon to visit Fiji even for a day when he was
already going to Australia and New Zealand. Mr. Rippon said that he regretted that
owing to his time-table it was simply not possible for him to visit Fiji. There were
many other places too such as Malaysia which he would like to have visited but
simply did not have time. However, Mr. Godber3 would be going shortly after, for the
Independence Celebrations, and he could just as well as Mr. Rippon talk about Fiji’s
problem vis à vis our E.E.C. negotiations. It might be possible for him to go in the
New Year. Otherwise there were the normal contacts through the High Commission
and there was also the idea put up by the Government of Mauritius for a Conference
of the C.S.A. countries. We were not in favour of having such a conference at the
moment but it might be a good idea to have one later when we had a better idea how
negotiations were going. While it might be true to say that sugar would not be a
breaking point for us in our negotiations, neither would the Six wish it to be a
breaking point on their side. Mr. Koya said that there was considerable apprehension
in Fiji about the very far-reaching effects on the general position of the United
3 Joseph Godber, minister of state, FCO, 1970–1972.
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Kingdom if she joined the E.E.C.. They were afraid that Fiji might be the victim of a
package deal. It was for this reason that they wished to press Mr. Rippon to visit Fiji.
Mr. Rippon again regretted that he would not be able to go but explained that all his
colleagues were equally concerned with the question of our negotiations and could
speak with the same voice.
4. Mr. Rippon said that it was important for countries such as Fiji to realise the
benefit to them of having Britain as a strong trading partner and therefore of our
succeeding in our application to join the E.E.C. Apart from anything else the Six had
a better record of aiding the developing countries than the U.K., and there was no
question of our breaking the guarantees which we had given to countries such as
Fiji. The Chief Minister said it seemed to him that the message was that we were not
going to help them, even though we were really responsible for the difficult
economic position that they were now in. Mr. Rippon said that if the Chief Minister
thought that that was the message we were trying to give him he had got it entirely
wrong. We were well aware of Fiji’s problems and would do what we could to help but
we could not say now what formula would be arrived at on sugar.
Mr. Statham4 said that we were well aware of the need to make provision for sugar
in our negotiations. Mr. Rippon said that he hoped that the Chief Minister would now
have got the message from him and from the talks he had had in London with other
Minister and officials, that Fiji’s problems were not forgotten or abandoned. The
Chief Minister said that the best thing for them would be to keep very close watch on
the situation through their High Commission.5
4 N Statham, counsellor, head of European Economic Integration, Dept, FCO, 1965–1968, 1970–1971.
5 Britain, Denmark and the Irish Republic joined the original six members of the EEC in Jan 1973. In
order to ensure that the full quantities of sugar cane from Commonwealth countries could continue to be
refined and marketed in Britain, in acceding to the Common Agricultural Policy the UK secured a higher
refining margin than had been applicable to the original members. The British subsidy on sugar was
phased out in July 1973
180 FCO 32/69, no 9 26 Aug 1970
‘Project “Clear Sky” ’: minute by G T P Marshall on a US nuclear test
monitoring facility in Fiji
Over the last four years we have been negotiating with the Americans to arrive at a
formal agreement on the United States project ‘Clear Sky’ in Fiji. This is a nuclear
test monitoring station, one of a world wide network. There have been difficulties.
The first was to obtain American agreement to the disclosure of the true purpose of
the United States base (ostensibly an ionospheric research station) in Fiji to selected
unofficial ministers. After two years of protracted correspondence and meetings we
succeeded in persuading the Americans to our way of thinking in June 1968.
Thereafter a draft formal agreement between HMG and the United States
Government was prepared and has since been under consideration in Washington,
Suva and London.
2. Towards the end of 1968, following the disclosure of the true purpose of the
Station to unofficial ministers, it became clear that they were very unhappy about
certain proposals in the draft Agreement then being considered. Fiji ministers judged
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it would be difficult for them to defend publicly granting a wide variety of privileges
and concessions to the Americans in Fiji if they were unable to give a convincing
explanation of the value of the work being done. The Americans then agreed to send a
team of experts to visit the territory and explain why Fiji had been chosen for this
particular project, how important it is and to explore on the ground how best the
case might be presented for granting the concessions and privileges sought. A team
visited Fiji in this connection at the end of 1968.
3. Following the departure of the team it soon emerged that some difficulties
still remained to be ironed out. Three possible solutions were then put forward by
Fiji for consideration by ourselves and the Americans. They were:—
(a) to continue the project as hitherto without any covering agreement;
(b) to have a classified (and therefore unpublished agreement) securing the
American right for the project in Fiji but not providing for the usual privileges and
concessions, and
(c) to lease land required for the project to a body nominated by the American
Government, thus ensuring security of tenure coupled with an agreement which
omitted the provisions causing Fiji difficulty.
(c) appeared to be a starter and by mid-1969 the Americans came up with a draft
‘special lease’ and a large number of comments on the draft unclassified agreement
which had for so long been under consideration. They indicated that if a lease on the
terms they suggested could not be concluded they would wish to proceed solely on
the basis of a United States/United Kingdom classified agreement. After further
consideration in London and in Fiji we arrived at the position set out in Mr. Lloyd’s
letter of 24 December 1969 (1/1 on HPF 10/8) and that position was given an airing
in the minutes at /2–5 below.
4. The position now is that with Fiji so close to independence we are willy nilly at
a stage where all the arguments point heavily in favour of disengaging ourselves as
soon as possible and leaving it to the Americans and Fijians to hammer out details
between themselves. The best course would be to make it gently but firmly clear that
while an agreement has our blessing it is one that should properly be negotiated
between the Americans and the Fijians and formally concluded after independence.
181 FCO 32/606, no 1 8 Oct 1970
‘Fiji: final despatch before independence’: despatch from Sir R Foster
to Sir A Douglas-Home1
It is hard to believe that in two days’ time Fiji’s new flag will rise slowly to the top of
the mast in the presence of His Royal Highness The Prince of Wales and
distinguished representatives of foreign powers. For seldom can a country have
prepared for independence with such aplomb; there has been an air of quiet
satisfaction and polite interest during the last few months, but no sign of the
nationalistic braggadocio which one has grown to expect. This is not to say that the
1 S of S for foreign and Commonwealth affairs, 1970–1974.
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prospect is not widely welcomed. It most certainly is. But the diverse people of these
islands do not yet seem to think of themselves as a nation, and reserve their fervour
for the rugby and soccer fields.
2. Ten years ago Mr. Julian Amery wrote:—
‘The Fijians and Indians are more distinct as communities than Jews and
Arabs in Palestine, Greeks and Turks in Cyprus, or Europeans and Bantu in
South and Central Africa. Intermarriage, business associations, even personal
friendships are rare.’2
3. There remains some truth in his judgment. But whereas in the past relations
were dominated by a mixture of fear and suspicion, today this has been replaced by a
frank acknowledgment that potentially dangerous differences exist and a widespread
acceptance that only by playing it cool can Fiji avoid following Malaysia to the very
edge of the pit.
4. No one appreciates this better than the leaders of the two major political
parties, Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara (Alliance) and Mr. S.M. Koya (National Federation),
who themselves could hardly be more different in character or appearance. Mara is a
six foot four aristocrat, the Tui Nayau, paramount chief of Lau, the eastern group of
Fiji’s islands; a dignified and most impressive figure. Koya is a plump little lawyer,
full of intrigue and calculation, who wears a mask of amiable geniality which
occasionally slips to reveal the hatchet man beneath.
5. Mara, however, is very far from being a typical Fijian. He was the first of his
race ever to become an MA and prior to this completed five years medical training in
New Zealand. He also has a diploma in economics from the LSE. He is a man of
vision who sincerely believes that, with tolerance and understanding, each
community can retain its own identity whilst at the same time contributing to make
Fiji into a nation; and he is not afraid to pursue policies to this end, even if they
entail sacrifices not popular with his people. But he also believes (without being anti-
Indian) that Fijian paramountcy is proper and natural, if only because his race would
not tolerate any alternative so that an attempt to impose one would inevitably
provoke violence. Personally a moody, shy and solitary man who inspires awe rather
than confidence, he nevertheless has a keen sense of humour and is capable of
exercising very great charm when in a relaxed mood. But unfortunately he reverts
under pressure to a dictatorial arrogance which does not make him easy to work
with. One result of this is that his Ministers are frightened of him, so that too little
authority has been delegated and decisions are often slow in coming. Some of the
younger members of his party have fretted against the bit in the past, but since the
London Conference there have been no signs of the upsets in the party which had
previously given rise to cause for concern.
6. Nor is Koya a typical Indian. For a start he is a Muslim in a predominately
Hindu party, of which he became the leader about a year ago on the death of Mr. A.D.
Patel who had led it since its formation. He is a very different man to his predecessor:
Patel was born in India, learned his politics there and came to Fiji as a mature adult
with beliefs already hardened. He never shook off (or grew out of) many of the
attitudes of the Congress leaders of the early nineteen twenties, although most of
2 See 13.
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these have long been outmoded. He was an intellectual, sincere and dedicated, but
misguided. His opponents respected some of his qualities no matter how bitterly they
disliked his views, but they never trusted him very far. Koya on the other hand was
born in Fiji and is very much a man of this country. Unlike Patel he has a distinctly
murky past, having over a number of years been closely involved with a well known
bunch of murderers and thugs whom he defended in court whenever they slipped up
and secretly advised outside. Before he became leader of the party he had not been
noted for his moderation and had never missed an opportunity to exploit anti-
European feeling. But he has never shared Patel’s main fault as a politician—a
complete inability to compromise. A wheeler-dealer if ever there was one, he
probably has no basic principles.
7. These then are the two men who have presided over the two major parties
during the last year. They share an interest in power and a distaste for colonialism,
being sufficiently political animals to operate on the same wavelength. More indeed
than that, they have achieved a remarkable degree of mutual trust and accord which
has facilitated inter-party agreement and even led some to speculate about the
chances of a coalition Government. Although sure that Koya would dearly like to
become a Minister, I doubt whether this is a serious possibility for several years. But
before hazarding guesses as to what the future may hold, I should perhaps turn to
what has happened since my predecessor’s despatch of the 11th January 1968,3
written when the Opposition was boycotting the Legislative Council and by-elections
in the nine Indian communal constituencies seemed likely to result: for during this
period Fiji has, politically speaking, been turned upside down and will never be the
same again.
8. By-elections duly became necessary after the Opposition did not appear at two
consecutive meetings. They took place in the autumn of 1968 and were preceded by a
bitter campaign vigorously conducted by both parties. The Alliance by then had over
30,000 Indian members on their books and had convinced themselves that they stood
a real chance of winning a large measure of Indian support. They thus confidently
expected to reduce the majorities in most, if not all, constituencies and even to win
one or two seats.
9. This was not however to be. The results were little short of a landslide.4 All
nine National Federation Party candidates were successful and most received an
increased share of the poll. Despite the earlier assurances which they had received,
the Alliance only managed to attract a total of 12,000 votes: (this was nevertheless
20% of the poll and proof of not unsubstantial Indian support—far more than the
NFP would obtain from Fijians).
10. Fijians then felt that their leaders had extended the hand of friendship to the
Indians only to have it brushed aside, and that promises had not been kept. Moreover
they were angry that during the campaign abuse had been heaped upon Mara, and
indirectly on his fellow chiefs. The outcome was a highly emotional reaction. There
ensued a round of Fijian Association meetings held in all the main centres at which
were passed some extreme resolutions, often verging on the seditious. One group of
warriors marched through the streets daubed in war paint. Another processed with a
3 See 111. 4 See 123, 125.
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banner saying ‘Kill the Indians’. For a couple of months there was an ugly
atmosphere almost throughout the country. Mara and his colleagues, every bit as
disappointed and bitter as their supporters at what, with some justification, they
regarded as a cynical rejection of their very genuine and sincere overtures, at first
made no effort to restrain their people. It was only after repeated stone-throwing
incidents and assaults by Fijians on Indians that he was prevailed upon to produce a
very lukewarm statement, calling the hounds off. Although he was at once obeyed, he
had by then allowed the Fijian back-lash to progress almost to the brink: there could
easily have been widespread and potentially serious disorder.
11. As a result of all this, the politically situation changed fundamentally. On the
one hand the Alliance, hitherto disinclined to consider early constitutional changes,
started to do some hard thinking. Mara appointed a research group of well educated
young Fijians for the purpose. Both they and he himself soon concluded that the best
policy would be to go for early independence whilst the country was still under Fijian
leadership. At about this time Ratu Penaia Ganilau, then Minister for Fijian Affairs
and Local Government as a civil servant and now shortly to be appointed a Senator
and to become Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Defence, observed with un-
accustomed vehemence at a Fijian Intelligence Committee meeting that the Fijians
had now come to see clearly where they stood and had realised that they must take
the initiative if they were to remain masters in their own house.5
12. On the other hand the Opposition was thoroughly alarmed. Ordinary Indian
country folk were apprehensive about their own and their families’ safety, whilst
businessmen foresaw damage to property and looting. The party’s triumph at the
polls was therefore so short-lived that it could really be called still-born. They
immediately dropped all activities which Fijians might consider provocative. In
addition they became extremely cooperative in Legislative Council, doing all in their
power to heal the breach. And they began to say they wanted to hold private talks
with the Alliance about constitutional change, with a view to there being another
conference if these succeeded. Mara soon responded, if at first with some suspicion
and only because it suited what by then had become his book as well as theirs. After
some initial sparring and many delays, one caused by the illness and death of Patel
which in fact opened the way for progress, the two parties eventually got down to
serious discussion. Early last November they announced their wish that the next
move should be to what they then called ‘Dominion status’. A month later Mara
informed me that they had reached agreement that Fiji should proceed to this stage
without further elections and as quickly as possible.6
13. From then on events have moved at what has often seemed a bewildering
pace. In January this year Lord Shepherd visited Fiji.7 He formed the opinion that,
despite continuing differences of view over the key question of electoral
arrangements, accord might be reached before or during a Constitutional
Conference. One was duly held in London during April.8 It was a success, and very
5 See 124, 126. 6 See 150. 7 See 155, 156. 8 See 159–173.
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shortly, on the 10th October, the ninety-sixth anniversary of Cession, Fiji will
become an independent member of the Commonwealth.9
14. That so much has been achieved can be a matter of satisfaction for all
concerned. To achieve it, however, the electoral issue had to be fluffed. For ‘having
regard to the national good and for peace, order and good government of
independent Fiji’ the Conference settled on an interim composition for the new
House of Representatives. It went on to record agreement
‘that at some time after the next general election and before the second
election the Prime Minister, after consultation with the Leader of the
Opposition, should arrange that a Royal Commission should be set up to
study and make recommendations for the most appropriate method of
election and representation for Fiji and that the terms of reference should be
agreed by the Prime Minister with the Leader of the Opposition . . . .
Parliament would, after considering the Royal Commission Report, provide
through Legislation for the composition and method of election of a new
House of Representatives, and . . . such legislation so passed would be
regarded as an entrenched part of the Constitution.’
15. A calm search for a just solution to the problem of representation has in
the past proved virtually impossible: feelings ran too deep. One is therefore bound
to regret that in effect a time bomb will lie buried  in the new Constitution, and to
pray it may be defused before exploding. The two parties have however publicly
committed themselves to an act of faith which must give reasonable ground for
hope.
16. There are other grounds for this too: the new nation will start with many
advantages. The economy is healthy. As developing countries go it is not badly off.
There are few really poor people in Fiji, nor are there many millionaires. The average
per capita income is about £150.0.0. Food is plentiful and, by and large, so is water.
Much of the land could be more intensively farmed. An enlightened family planning
programme, unopposed by any religious group, has succeeded in reducing the
birthrate from 40.88 per thousand in 1961 to 28.97 per thousand in 1969. The
standard of medical services is relatively high. 95% of children of primary school age
attend school. There are admirable traditions of voluntary public service and of self-
help.
17. The Civil Service is efficient, remarkably free from corruption and generally
apolitical. The Independence Constitution contains the standard provisions to
safeguard, against patronage, and although there are already signs that Mara and
Koya may find these irksome I am hopeful that the worst abusen of a spoils system
will be avoided. Localization has proceeded at what some regard as a dangerously
rapid pace, but is not likely to result in the traumatic experiences from which many
countries have suffered. For one thing, there is a widespread recognition that an
important handful of top administrators and key professional officers will be needed
9 It was customary for the UK government to provide an independence gift to a newly independent country.
London decided to make £3,000 available. When asked what sort of gift would be appreciated, the Fiji
government replied it wanted simultaneous translation equipment for the Fiji parliament. The FCO had in
mind a more durable gift but arrangements were made to provide the translation equipment (FCO 68/374).
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for some time: it is indicative of this that Mara has told the present expatriate
Secretary to the Council of Ministers, who will be the first Secretary to the Cabinet,
that he can look forward to staying here for at least five years. For another, almost
three quarters of the overseas officers in Fiji are on contract or on secondment, so
that there is no question of their being compensated and retiring prematurely. And
finally, the country is fortunate enough to possess a substantial number of senior
local officers with good qualifications and reasonable ability.
18. Industrial relations have been remarkably stable during the last couple of
years. The Trade Union movement is led by moderate, sensible men; and employers,
by and large, have behaved in a reasonable fashion. The two Union leaders who
caused serious trouble in the past have been away in Australia for some time. Both
are ostensibly studying, one at the Australian National University for a PhD and the
other no one knows quite what, under the tutelage of Dr. Cairns, the leading figure
on the left wing of the Australian Labour Party.
19. The country’s isolated position in the middle of the enormous Pacific is in
one sense an asset: it is shielded to a very great extent from the influence of external
ideologies and events. Although a few individuals have been exposed to communist
parties and individuals overseas there is no present likelihood of the ideology itself
being introduced. There are no incipient revolutionary bodies nor are there any
primitive cults. There is no history of serious riots and civil commotion and there is
no present subversion. Even slogans like ‘Black Power’, ‘Student Power’, ‘the New
Left’, etc. are virtually unknown, although the recent foundation of the University of
the South Pacific may change this. Some of the lecturers there certainly appear
anxious to encourage dissent.
20. The Fiji Military Forces and the Police are efficient, and their morale is
high. But the loss of U.K. backup in the event of serious disorder will leave a
yawning gap. Plans have accordingly been made to create a Police Mobile Force,
especially trained in riot duties, and to enlarge the F.M.F., giving them more
modern I.S. training and equipment. Implementing these may however cost more
than the country can readily afford, and it is to be hoped that generous assistance
will be forthcoming.
21. This is not to say that there are no serious problems: indeed the most
immediate one concerns the future of the sugar industry, which still forms the
backbone of Fiji’s economy and provides a livelihood for 15,000 peasant growers.
22. Late last year Lord Denning, the Master of the Rolls, arbitrated in a dispute
between these growers and the sugar millers, South Pacific Sugar Mills Ltd., an
almost wholly-owned subsidiary of the Australian Colonial Sugar Refining Company
Ltd.10 Rightly judging that the Company had done well over a substantial period, he
decided to tip the scales in the growers’ favour. Whether he tipped them too far is a
matter of opinion. The Company obviously thought so, After a long silence it pressed
Government privately to decide at once to buy its assets on terms to be settled, saying
it would then be prepared to continue running the mills and marketing sugar for a
period, on a fee basis.
23. The pressure proved counterproductive. Even had Ministers thought that its
offer was attractive, they could not for political reasons have afforded to give the
10 See 157.
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appearance of being the Company’s puppets. On the contrary, they were determined
to show the public that it would be obliged to dance to their tune. For it has long
been regarded by local people as at best paternalistic and all too often a bully,
browbeating the Fiji Government into helping it make assured profits at the growers’
expense and not above a bit of trickery in the process. As a result both the Alliance
and the NFP had engaged counsel to support the growers against it during the
arbitration. Both had subsequently claimed credit for the favourable decision, being
thus committed to making the Company accept this.
24. Having realized it must adjust its tactics the Company then published a
critique of the award, purporting to prove that it could not operate profitably under
the proposed new contract. The following day it announced that it would
nevertheless sign this, but, more in sorrow than in anger, would give notice in
accordance with the law to withdraw from operation in Fiji after the next three
seasons.
25. It may secretly have been glad of a good excuse to disengage. Accustomed to
count on Government support, it was plainly going to face suspicion and perhaps
hostility: a position long privileged had of a sudden become uncomfortably
vulnerable. In Australia it has anyway been busily diversifying out of sugar, which is
not a good long term prospect. Moreover almost half the sugar which Fiji produces
has hitherto been sold to the United Kingdom at favourable prices under the
Commonwealth Sugar Agreement. But for this assured market the industry would
not have been viable; and the market is now at risk as a result of the U.K.’s
application to join the E.E.C.11
26. However all that may be, Government was obliged to declare its firm
intention that the mills would continue to operate after 1972 and that S.P.S.M.
might have to be purchased ‘for the people of Fiji’. Having done so, it had to face
complex questions about future ownership, management and marketing. Advice on
possible answers to some of these has already been provided by a U.K. firm of
Chartered Accountants, one of whose senior partners visited here under Technical
Assistance arrangements. And a Select Committee of Legislative Council has opened
discussions with C.S.R. It includes members of both parties, for this is rightly
regarded as a national issue. The discussions are certain to be protracted and tough,
but there seems a reasonable chance that they can be successfully concluded,
without bitterness.
27. From the country’s point of view their timing is nevertheless unfortunate.
For if its biggest overseas investor is seen to be pulling out on independence,
hazarding the future of its most important industry, the appearance must be given
that there may be good cause for anxiety about political instability, or about
nationalization. There is not yet any sign of a consequential loss of business
confidence, though the risk must be obvious.
28. Though sugar poses the most immediate problem, race relations may prove
the most perplexing. I do not imply than the atmosphere is ordinarily tense: far from
it. Despite the fundamental and abiding differences between them, the two major
communities here co-exist in a quite surprisingly relaxed manner. There are
nevertheless many sensitive subjects. Each needs to be handled with particular care,
11 But see 179, note 5.
12-Fiji-142-cpp  10/5/06  6:58 AM  Page 519
520 THE ACHIEVEMENT OF INDEPENDENCE [181]
for fear of arousing the sort of angry passions which can drive men to senseless
violence.
29. One such subject is land. Of this there is not by the standards of many
other countries a real shortage. But a lot of people here think there is, and this
colours their attitudes. Moreover most of the parts which are suited to intensive
agriculture have of course already been developed; and Indians occupy a large
proportion of them and prosper accordingly, although Fijians own 83% of the
country’s land area. So the Fijians, not by nature hard-working peasant farmers and
not in the past anxious to change their ways, now feel they have somehow been
cheated of opportunities they would like. They are in consequence increasingly
determined to recover the use of the better agricultural areas. Meanwhile the
Indians feel with some justice that in the national interest all land should be
properly used, and they look covetously at Fijian Reserves which too often appear
neglected.
30. The Agricultural Landlord and Tenant Ordinance was enacted in 1966 and
brought into force the following year in the hope of containing the situation
equitably enough to satisfy all concerned. It provided tenants with a right to renew
their leases if they could prove greater hardship than their landlords, and with an
entitlement to compensation for improvements if dispossessed. As a quid pro quo it
also made provision for landlords to revise rents upwards, to 6% of the market value
of their land. Revision took some time to arrange however, so the Fijians were slow
to appreciate the potential value of the Ordinance and it came under heavy fire after
the 1968 by-elections. Its repeal was only averted by some skilful manoeuvring by
Mara himself, which involved setting up a Committee to consider amendments to it.
During the past year or so many Fijians appear to have realised that its basic
principles are fairer than they had at first thought. With the apparent concurrence of
both sides of the House, the Committee has therefore avoided reaching any
conclusions yet. As a result the Ordinance will now be enshrined in the new
Constitution—so amendments will require the approval of two-thirds of both Houses
of Parliament.
31. Further time has been bought in this way. But a solution to the land problem
is no nearer. I doubt whether the problem will ever be solved without far more
radical changes in the system of land tenure than Fijians have hitherto been
prepared to contemplate. Any attempt to impose such changes would provoke a
thoroughly hostile reaction: unless they commanded popular confidence they would
stand no chance of success. There are however now some signs that people are at
least beginning to question the present paternalistic arrangements. These vest
control of Fijian land in the Native Land Trust Board, a body which is hopelessly
inefficient and probably corrupt. It has the power to negotiate leases without
consulting the landowners, and it deducts 25% of all rents for its services. Once a
sacred cow, it is fast becoming an Aunt Sally. An increasing number of Fijians favour
drastic reform. They feel, with justification, that they are no longer children, that
land is their only capital (of which they are chronically short) and that they ought to
be permitted greater powers of decision. Few may yet be prepared to contemplate any
substantial lifting of the restrictions on the alienation of their land; but it is
significant that a question long taboo can now be discussed.
32. Another sensitive subject is the racial composition of the Civil Service.
Fijians still outnumber Indians in it, though the better qualifications and greater
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diligence of the latter win them more of the senior positions. Hitherto, as a
generalization, the Service has in consequence been officered by expatriates, and has
had Indian n.c.os. and Fijian privates. If rapid localization were to result in Indian
officers as well as n.c.os. much bitterness might result. Except for lawyers the most
outstanding locals are by chance a mixed bunch, so the top managerial posts are
likely to be equitably distributed. Moreover it has proved possible to distinguish the
areas (like the Administration) where undue imbalance might result in a public
outcry, and to ensure that particular attention is paid to the staffing of these.
However the Judicial and Legal Departments are vulnerable areas and will continue
to be so for a few years.
33. Yet another sensitive subject is that of employment generally. When jobs are
scarce, members of each community are always liable to resent losing an opportunity
of work to someone of another race. Fijians also now realize how much they have
missed by failing to start businesses of their own. Their reaction is to blame everyone
else for their lack of the necessary capital and training, and to ignore the fact that
with greater effort and resolution they could have done much to help themselves. A
reconstituted and (hopefully) revitalized Ministry of Fijian Affairs is to be charged
with particular responsibility for securing for them a fairer slice of the economic
cake, probably by providing them with special assistance.
34. The Government recognizes that this alone will not suffice: the essential is
that Fijians’ dismal performance in school examinations should be improved, so they
become better qualified to compete on equal terms in an aggressive world. An
Education Advisory Committee reported last year, making recommendations
designed to give them preferential treatment with this object in view. Perhaps more
important still is the recognition by Fijian leaders that success must ultimately
depend on the efforts made by children of their own race. If they can get this message
across to parents, the effect may be dramatic.
35. Many of the measures I have mentioned must seem to be designed to accord
Fijians privileges which others will be denied. They are; and are probably necessary.
For racial inequalities are at the root of all the problems under discussion. The Fijian
people have a growing awareness of the present differences between their wealth and
opportunity and that of other races. They may as a result become embittered, and
embitterment may lead them to lash out wildly. This is the more likely to happen at a
time when the whole Third World is in the throes of a revolution of rising
expectations, and it may happen the more quickly if many hold high hopes of
independence, but find these are disappointed. Both political parties recognize the
danger. Both are thus committed to a policy of improving the Fijians’ position: any
argument will be about the means rather than the end.
36. Whether the policy will succeed is another matter. Doubts must assail even
the warmest admirer of the Fijian people, and they have never lacked admirers.
This may indeed have been their undoing. Big, genial men with huge smiles, ready
courtesy and natural dignity, they are physically courageous and captivate most
who meet them. But they have at the same time a deep pride in their own culture,
an appreciation of the value of leisure and a childlike trust in others, all of which
has tended to arouse protective instincts. Some have thus felt that they should be
comfortably wrapped in a cocoon: treatment they have welcomed. So they remain,
and have perhaps been encouraged to remain, accustomed to look for leadership to
others, particularly to their Chiefs (whose authority is still immense), rather than
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to exercise much individual initiative. Changes in attitude will not come easily to
them.
37. This need not be a cause for dismay: traditional societies are often stable
and cohesive. But it probably means that much will depend upon whether the
economy expands particularly fast. If it does, the Fijians may be swept along rapidly
enough to allow possible discontent even though they do not catch up much on
other races.
38. The prospects of its doing so look hopeful. Tourism is booming at a
phenomenal rate, almost doubling in size every three years. Moreover it is labour-
intensive; it attracts large-scale capital investment; and it provides many fringe
benefits. It will of course bring its own problems. Fortunately the dangers are
appreciated, in particular by Mara, and there is every sign that development will be
controlled in a sensible manner. Mineral exploration during the last year or so has
shown promising results and mining developments may well provide a substantial
increase in job opportunities and in much-needed infrastracture in the interior of
the main islands. And forestry continues to show great long-term promise; a pulp
industry now seems a likely starter.
39. A recent World Bank Mission to Fiji reached a similar conclusion about
prospects. It recorded a view that the country ‘will enter Independence on a firmer
economic base than many new countries. Balance of payment problems have been
avoided, and equilibrium should not be difficult to maintain. Minimal foreign
borrowing has kept public debt service ratios low and debt service on private account
is not significant. Debt service ratios in 1975 are estimated at 3% of commodity
exports and 1.3% of non-factory export receipts for goods and services, the difference
indicating the importance of tourism. Fiji can be considered creditworthy for Bank
lending on its own account, following Independence.’
40. Moreover the strategy contained in Development Plan VI (to cover 1971–75)
appears sound. For the economy as a whole the projected growth in domestic
produce is 6.9% a year. This compares with 5% annually over the last five years,
during which there was a much higher rate in 1968–70 than in 1966–67. Tourism is
expected to be the leading sector with an annual growth rate of 25%, and emphasis is
also to be placed on export growth and import substitution. Investment is projected
to grow at more than 10% per annum, exceeding 32% of Gross National Product in
1975.
41. Emphasis is also rightly to be placed on rural development—on bringing the
income of the population in the country areas, where incidentally most Fijians live,
closer to that of town dwellers, and on providing those areas with better services so
that they will be an attractive place to live. It is hoped thus to stop the drift to the
towns and the consequent growth of a large urban unemployed class, many of them
Fijians in a strange environment, cut off from their village roots: the increase in
crime by young Fijians is already causing concern.
42. The plan is ambitious. The growth rate may prove a little beyond the
country’s capacity when viewed in the perspective of past performance. Furthermore
the present high rate of private investment will be difficult to maintain. The
construction sector in particular appears to have been reaching capacity in the last
two years, so that further expansion will be difficult in the short run.
43. Whether the plan can be implemented in full will partly depend on what
outside assistance is available. So I end with a brief look at an independent Fiji’s
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likely international interests, hopes and attitudes. As an isolated archipelago, she will
not be troubled by defence problems. Her immediate concern will be with
neighbouring South Pacific islands. Mara would undoubtedly like to be regarded as
their leader, but is very conscious that others are jealous of Fiji and that he must be
careful. He will probably continue to work for regional co-operation wherever
possible, offering help where he can (for instance in training), hoping to increase
trade and perhaps trying to coordinate some economic activities. I am sure he has no
present ideas of any political confederation, however loose; nor should I regard one
as a starter in the foreseeable future.
44. He will enjoy playing a part on a wider stage too, when Fiji joins the
United Nations and the Commonwealth. But I expect it to be a cautious part. He
has already shown that he would prefer to avoid taking sides—between Israel and
the Arab States, between the two Chinas, and so on. Caution comes naturally to
him: it is symptomatic that rather than inherit all Treaties unexamined on
independence (‘signing a blank cheque’, he said) he has arranged for advice from
an Australian Professor of International Law, so that an effective exercise can be
done. Moreover he is unlikely to wish to be permanently aligned with any group,
and Fiji is more likely than most new Commonwealth nations to be open to
argument about, and prepared to take a line helpful to the U.K. on, colonial issues
at New York.
45. Partly as the result of encouragement from India, he has become involved
with bodies like ECAFE and the Asian Bank, and has shown interest in the Colombo
Plan. Links with India seem certain to be developed, even though there is not yet to
be a Fiji High Commissioner in New Delhi. London and Canberra alone have been
chosen, probably because most is expected of the U.K. and of Australia by way of trade
and aid. For the U.K. there is a great store of goodwill. This will not prevent Mara
from the occasional display of bad temper when denied his way, but it should
generally ensure a lasting and valued relationship.
46. Relations with Australia may be more difficult.12 Many here consider that the
Australian Government has a large debt to repay, because Fiji has been exploited by
big business from there; and that official Australian attitudes are too often
overbearing when they are not indifferent. These attitudes are in fact gradually
changing, as is the Fiji view of Australia. But it is to be hoped that change will
become rapid and radical enough to ensure much greater mutual understanding: Fiji
certainly needs Australian interest and support.
47. From New Zealand she can look forward to getting both, although she will
have no High Commission in Wellington. For there has long been close sympathy
between the two countries, and this should continue to survive the occasional
difference of view.
48. All in all, therefore the outlook is bright. There are certainly problems, but
everyone is united in a genuine desire to solve them. There is not yet any real feeling
of nationhood, but there is a solid core of goodwill and genuine tolerance which is a
sounder basis than many emerging countries have had at the start of the journey.
Above all Fiji is a country of commonsense, and that is no small asset. Those of us
12 cf 117, 120.
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here who have seen other countries at the same stage are at one in believing that
things should go well.
49. It is perhaps not without significance that, with the willing agreement of
all concerned, the Union Flag will be lowered for the last time not as part of the
Independence Parade on the 10th but, with the dignity which befits the departure
of an old and respected friend, at a special Retreat ceremony on the evening before.
In addition the new flag to be raised on the 10th incorporates the Union Flag.
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